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Abstract 
The overarching aim of this research was to understand factors implicated in 
the maintenance of rumination and worry, conceptualised as a transdiagnostic process 
of repetitive negative thought (RNT), through the use of cross-sectional, prospective, 
and experimental research designs. Rumination and worry have been repeatedly 
implicated in the development and maintenance of various forms of psychopathology, 
in particular, depression and anxiety disorders. Given the negative outcomes for mood 
and psychopathology, there is a need for a better understanding of vulnerability 
factors that maintain this unconstructive thinking. 
Based on a review of the literature, an integrative theoretical model was 
developed and tested using structural equation modelling. Using cross-sectional data, 
the model was tested in a large sample of adults (n = 506). Of the broad range of 
proximal and distal vulnerability factors examined, only neuroticism and beliefs about 
the function of repetitive thought remained significantly associated with RNT once 
current symptoms were statistically controlled. Emotional abuse and abstract 
processing were indirectly associated with RNT. 
Following on from this, a prospective study examined which of these 
vulnerability factors prospectively predicted change in RNT over six to eight weeks. 
Only neuroticism and the specific belief that repetitive thought aids instrumental 
understanding predicted change in RNT, after controlling for depression and anxiety 
symptoms. 
Next, two experimental studies were conducted to explore the causal 
relationship between RNT and the belief that RNT aids insight and understanding, by 
experimentally manipulating this appraisal and measuring the impact on state RNT. 
Whilst methodological issues with the first experimental study precluded clear 
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conclusions being drawn about the nature of the relationship, the second experimental 
study demonstrated that participants manipulated to believe that RNT is helpful for 
increasing insight and understanding had greater levels of state RNT after exposure to 
a stressor, relative to participants manipulated to believe that RNT is unhelpful. 
 Finally, in order to see whether rumination has any consequences that may 
potentially reinforce its further use, an experimental study was conducted to 
manipulate processing mode (abstract rumination versus concrete thinking) and 
examine the effect on a range of outcomes relating to insightfulness and avoidance. 
Whilst rumination did not lead to increased insight, it did afford more justification for 
avoidance, relative to concrete thinking.  The clinical and theoretical implications of 
these findings are discussed with respect to existing theories of repetitive negative 
thought. 
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Notes on Thesis Structure 
This thesis has a paper-based structure, and it reports five studies, four of 
which have been submitted as papers for publication (see Table i). Articles are 
reported exactly as they appear in publication or as submitted, with the only 
amendments concerning formatting and figure/table numbering. Since these papers 
have been written as stand-alone manuscripts, some information is repeated across 
chapters. As these papers have been submitted as co-authored manuscripts, the 
candidate’s contribution to each paper is outlined in Appendix 1.  
At the beginning of each chapter reporting a paper is a preface that outlines 
how that paper contributes to the overall thesis, and how it follows on from previous 
work. Moreover, following each paper-based chapter are appendices that report 
additional information and/or analyses not contained in the paper submitted for 
publication. 
 
Table i. Publication status of papers presented in this thesis 
Chapter Status 
2 Published in Journal of Experimental Psychopathology 
3 Under review 
5 Under review  
6 Under review  
 
The overarching aim of this thesis is to increase understanding of the factors 
that maintain the tendency towards rumination and worry in adults. The reason why 
an increased understanding of the maintenance of rumination and worry is important 
is because of the deleterious outcomes of these forms of thinking: rumination and 
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worry are both associated with the onset and maintenance of a variety of mental 
health problems, in particular, depression and anxiety. Thus, an understanding of 
factors that maintain these unconstructive thinking processes can inform treatment 
and prevention interventions.  
The thesis begins with a literature review (Chapter 1). Rumination and worry 
are defined, and evidence for their negative effects is presented. Theoretical accounts 
of rumination and worry are reviewed, alongside supporting evidence for these 
accounts. Then, the argument for considering rumination and worry together as a 
common transdiagnostic process of repetitive negative thought (RNT) is presented, in 
which it is noted that (i) rumination and worry are highly correlated and it is difficult 
to make meaningful distinctions between the two processes; (ii) rumination and worry 
have similarly negative consequences in terms of mood and psychopathology; and 
(iii) there are considerable overlaps between the theoretical accounts of rumination 
and worry. After a review of the vulnerability factors for RNT suggested by the 
theoretical models, an integrative theoretical model is proposed, in which proximal 
vulnerability factors (metacognitive beliefs; neuroticism; intolerance of uncertainty; 
abstract processing; deficiencies in cognitive inhibition; effortful control) are 
hypothesised to mediate the relationship between distal vulnerability factors (parental 
overcontrol; childhood abuse) and RNT. Some proximal factors (deficiencies in 
cognitive inhibition; effortful control) are also hypothesised to moderate the 
relationship between distal factors and RNT.  
Study 1, reported in Chapter 2, aims to test this integrative theoretical model, 
and in doing so, tests the hypotheses that proximal factors will have a direct effect on 
RNT, and that distal factors will only have an effect on RNT through their 
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relationship with proximal factors. The model is tested using structural equation 
modelling in a large and geographically diverse sample of adults (n = 506).  
Study 2, reported in Chapter 3, follows on from the cross-sectional study 
reported in Chapter 2, and it aims to explore the prospective relationships between the 
putative vulnerability factors and RNT, by examining which factors maintain RNT 
over time. The hypotheses to be tested are that proximal factors (e.g., metacognitive 
beliefs) will predict change in RNT after controlling for symptoms of depression, 
anxiety and stress, but distal factors (e.g., childhood maltreatment) will not have an 
effect on maintenance of RNT. 
Study 3 and Study 4, reported in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 respectively, are 
experimental studies in which a vulnerability factor found to be significant in 
predicting change in RNT – the belief that repetitive thinking aids understanding and 
insight – is experimentally manipulated, such that the subsequent effects on RNT can 
be examined.   
Study 5, reported in Chapter 6, focuses on rumination, with the aim of 
assessing whether an experimental analogue to depressive rumination (abstract 
rumination) has beneficial outcomes that may reinforce its further use, relative to a 
non-ruminative form of thinking (concrete thinking). Based on existing theoretical 
accounts, specific outcomes relating to insight and avoidance are assessed. 
The thesis ends with a general discussion (Chapter 7), in which the 
implications for theoretical models of RNT are discussed, followed by a discussion of 
the strengths and limitations of the research reported in the thesis, and suggestions for 
future research studies.  
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CHAPTER 1: Introduction 
1.1. Overview of Literature Review Structure and Introduction to Key Concepts 
This literature review chapter is organised into five sections. After briefly 
outlining some key concepts, in Section 1.2, rumination will be defined and evidence 
for its negative effects will be presented, followed by a discussion of theoretical 
models of rumination and relevant evidence. In Section 1.3, worry will be defined 
alongside evidence of its negative effects, followed by a discussion of the theoretical 
models of worry and evidence for those models. In Section 1.4, there will be 
discussion of how rumination and worry can be conceptualised as the transdiagnostic 
process of repetitive negative thought. There will be an evaluation of the commonality 
between rumination and worry, in terms of overlaps between the characteristics and 
qualities of ruminative and worrisome thoughts, their negative effects on mood and 
psychopathology, and the theoretical models outlined in earlier sections. There will 
also be discussion of the utility of the transdiagnostic approach. The chapter will 
conclude with a review of vulnerability factors for repetitive negative thought, and 
presentation of a hypothesised integrative theoretical model.  
Repetitive thought (RT) is defined as “thinking attentively, repetitively or 
frequently about one’s self and one’s world” (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & 
Shortridge, 2003, p. 909). There are many forms of RT, not limited to but including 
rumination, worry, mind wandering, problem solving, counterfactual thinking, and 
reflection, with RT referring to processes that can be constructive or unconstructive 
(Watkins, 2008).  
Some forms of RT can be adaptive and beneficial, and lead to a range of 
constructive outcomes. For example, the process of reflection can be pleasurable and 
intellectually stimulating, and the process of mental simulation or problem solving 
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can assist with the generation of useful and creative solutions to unresolved questions 
(e.g., Harrington & Lofredo, 2010; Hixon & Swann, 1993; May & Etkina, 2002). 
Watkins (2008) reviewed evidence from cross-sectional, longitudinal and 
experimental studies demonstrating a variety of constructive outcomes, including how 
RT can contribute to successful processing of traumatic events, adaptive planning and 
preparation, and can contribute to the uptake of health-promoting behaviours.  
However, this thesis will focus on repetitive negative thought (RNT), which 
refers to negative forms of RT that are often experienced to be unconstructive 
(Watkins, 2008). Specifically, RNT has four defining characteristics: that it is (i) 
repetitive; (ii) passive and/or relatively uncontrollable; (iii) characterised by an 
abstract style of processing; and (iv) focused on negative content (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008). Whilst there are differences between particular forms of RNT, these four 
properties are common to all forms of RNT.  
Two forms of RNT that have been widely studied and are associated with the 
development and maintenance of psychopathology are rumination and worry. In the 
following sections, these two forms of thought will be defined, along with evidence 
for their negative effects. Theories of rumination and worry will be presented, 
followed by a more detailed evaluation of their commonalities and how they can be 
conceptualised as a transdiagnostic process of RNT.  
1.2. Rumination 
1.2.1. Defining Rumination 
The term rumination has been defined as “a class of conscious thoughts that 
revolve around a common instrumental theme and that recur in the absence of 
immediate environmental demands requiring the thoughts” (Martin & Tesser, 1996, p. 
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7). This conceptualisation of rumination does not presuppose whether the content or 
outcomes of rumination are positive or negative, and instead characterises rumination 
as a process that is driven by personal goals and concerns. This broad definition is 
applicable to cases of pathological or depressive rumination, as well as forms of 
rumination that many healthy individuals engage in from time to time.  
A form of pathological rumination, associated with depression, was identified 
by Nolen-Hoeksema (1991), who provided the following definition of depressive 
rumination with a negative valence (p. 569): “Ruminative responses involve 
repetitively focusing on the fact that one is depressed; on one’s symptoms of 
depression; and on the causes, meanings, and consequences of depressive symptoms.” 
Martin and Tesser’s (1996) definition refers to rumination that can be positive 
or negative, and focused in the past, present, or future. Within this conceptualisation, 
rumination can be constructive or unconstructive, depending on whether the thoughts 
help or hinder an individual’s progress towards an unattained goal (Watkins, 2008). In 
the course of this thesis, when the term rumination is used, it will refer to negatively 
valenced, unconstructive rumination, as per the Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) definition, 
unless otherwise specified. However, since the studies reported in this thesis were 
conducted with nonclinical populations, the term rumination will refer to rumination 
about negative moods and negative feelings, rather than symptoms of depression. 
Some examples of depressive ruminative thoughts include, “Why do I react so 
negatively?” and, “I just can’t cope with anything” (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2004).  
The Response Styles Questionnaire (RSQ), developed by Nolen-Hoeksema 
and Morrow (1991), is the most widely used measure of trait rumination. The RSQ 
contains a subscale, the Ruminative Responses Scale (RRS), designed to assess an 
individual’s tendency to respond with rumination when in a depressed mood. The 
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RSQ-RRS contains 22 items which describe responses to depressed mood that focus 
on the self (e.g., “I think back to other times I have been depressed”), symptoms (e.g., 
“I think about how hard it is to concentrate”), and causes or consequences of the 
depressed mood (e.g., “I go away by myself and think about why I feel this way”). 
Respondents rate how typical each response is for them on a scale of 1 (almost never) 
to 4 (almost always).1 
1.2.2. Evidence for the Negative Effects of Rumination 
Rumination is a common thought process that most people engage in from 
time to time (Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). However, persistent and 
unconstructive forms of rumination have been associated with the onset and 
maintenance of symptoms of psychopathology. This section reviews the cross-
sectional, prospective, and experimental evidence that demonstrates rumination’s 
deleterious consequences for mood and mental health.  
There is an extensive body of evidence that links rumination with depression 
(Watkins, 2008). A major depressive episode is defined as a period of at least 2 weeks 
during which there is depressed mood or a lack of interest or enjoyment in activities 
previously found to be pleasurable (anhedonia), as well as at least five of the 
following symptoms: changes in weight or appetite; psychomotor agitation or 
retardation; fatigue or loss of energy; insomnia or hypersomnia; feelings of 
worthlessness or inappropriate guilt; difficulty thinking, concentrating or making 
                                                
1 Distinctions have been made between the “brooding” and “reflection” subtypes of 
rumination that can be assessed with subscales of the RSQ-RRS (Treynor, Gonzalez, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2003). However, since this thesis aims to take a broader approach by focusing on repetitive 
negative thinking as a transdiagnostic process, there will not be further examination of these specific 
subtypes of rumination.  
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decisions; and recurrent thoughts of death or suicidal ideation, plans or attempts 
(American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000). These symptoms need to 
cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning almost every day.  
Cross-sectional studies of depressed and nondepressed individuals indicate a 
relationship between rumination and depression. Riso et al. (2003) found that 
depressed and previously depressed individuals showed significantly greater levels of 
rumination than people who had never been depressed. Richmond, Spring, 
Sommerfield, and McChargue (2001) found that adults who ruminated reported 
greater levels of depressive and dysphoric symptoms. Kuyken, Watkins, Holden, and 
Cook (2006) found a similar pattern of results in adolescents, with 14-18 year old 
adolescents who ruminated reporting greater levels of depressive symptoms. Further 
evidence for the association between rumination and depression comes from studies 
examining gender differences. There is a gender difference observed in rumination, 
with females reporting greater levels of rumination than males (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Girgus, 1994). There is also a gender difference in depression: From middle 
adolescence and throughout adulthood, women are twice as likely to have depression 
as men (Rudolph, 2009). There is evidence that gender differences in depression may 
be accounted for by gender differences in rumination: Once the effects of rumination 
have been statistically accounted for, there is no difference in the rate of depression 
between men and women (Grant et al., 2004), suggesting that rumination may 
mediate the relationship between gender and depressive disorders.  
Prospective longitudinal studies also demonstrate the temporal antecedence of 
rumination in the development of depression. Depressive rumination predicts the 
onset of depression (Just & Alloy, 1997), as well as depressive symptoms in both 
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depressed individuals (Kuehner & Weber, 1999) and nondepressed children (Abela, 
Brozina, & Haigh, 2002) and adults (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Just and 
Alloy (1997) examined levels of depression and rumination in a prospective study of 
189 undergraduates, and found that greater levels of rumination predicted depressive 
episodes 18 months later. In a large-scale longitudinal study spanning one year in a 
community sample of 1132 adults, Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) found that rumination 
predicted the onset of major depressive episodes in people who had never been 
previously depressed, and it also predicted the severity of the episodes when people 
with chronic depression and people in remission from depression were compared. 
Rumination also predicted change in symptoms of depression and anxiety after one 
year. In a study of shorter duration, Nolen-Hoeksema, Morrow, and Fredrickson 
(1993) had participants keep a diary of their mood and their responses to their moods 
for 30 days. Most participants demonstrated a consistent style of responding to their 
moods, and those that engaged in ruminative responding experienced prolonged 
periods of depressed mood, after controlling for initial mood severity. Nolen-
Hoeksema, Parker, and Larson (1994) conducted a prospective longitudinal study 
over a period of six months with bereaved adults, and found that adults who had 
higher levels of rumination at one month experienced higher levels of depressive 
symptoms at six months, after controlling for initial depression levels, social support, 
concurrent stressors, gender, and level of pessimism.  
Experimental studies provide evidence for the causal role of rumination in 
depression. Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) experimentally manipulated 
rumination to examine the effects on depressed mood. A depressed mood was induced 
in all participants (reading an upsetting story about bereavement, accompanied by sad 
music), and then, participants were given a task that varied according to their 
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experimental condition (passive/active and ruminative/distracting). In the passive 
conditions, participants were given written sentences and were told to “think about 
and concentrate on the meaning” of the sentence. In the passive-ruminative condition, 
the sentences related to internal emotional states (e.g., “I often wonder why I feel the 
way I do”). In the passive-distracting condition, the sentences related to external 
events (e.g., “Canada’s biggest industry is lumber”). In the active conditions, 
participants had to sort and rank giant cards by arranging them over a large table and 
walking back and forth. In the active-ruminative condition, sentences referred to 
personal feelings and emotions (cards contained positive, negative and neutral 
emotional words), and had to be sorted according to the participants’ current feelings. 
In the active-distracting condition, sentences referred to external stimuli (cards 
contained country names and had to be sorted according to how industrialised the 
countries were). Participants completed questionnaires about their mood at the 
beginning of the study, after the mood induction, and after the tasks. The authors 
found that participants in the distracting-active condition reported the greatest 
reduction in sadness, followed by the distracting-passive condition, followed by the 
ruminative-active condition, and finally, the ruminative-passive condition. These 
findings suggest that whilst activity level has an effect on sadness reduction, degree of 
rumination has a greater influence on the duration of depressed mood.  
In a subsequent adaptation of the rumination/distraction manipulation task, 
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) manipulated rumination to examine the 
effects on negative thinking and problem solving. In this version of the task, 
participants were asked to focus their attention on and think about a series of 45 items. 
In the rumination condition, items referred to emotion-focused, symptom-focused, 
and self-focused topics, although participants were not specifically instructed to think 
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in a negative way (e.g., “think about your current level of energy”, “think about your 
character and who you strive to be”). In the distraction condition, items referred to 
external topics not related to emotions, symptoms, or the self (e.g., “think about a boat 
slowly crossing the Atlantic”, “think about a double-decker bus driving down the 
street”). In this study, relative to distraction, dysphoric participants receiving the 
rumination manipulation endorsed more negative and biased interpretations of 
situations, were more pessimistic about the future, and generated less effective 
solutions to interpersonal problems.  
Ciesla and Roberts (2007) conducted a further study examining the effect of 
an experimental manipulation of rumination on mood. Depressed mood was induced 
in participants by means of a sad film clip, and then participants engaged in a 
ruminative or distracting task. They used the same sentence reading task as in the 
Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) study described above, with distracting 
sentences referring to external events and ruminative sentences referring to internal 
states. Consistent with previous findings, participants in the rumination condition 
reported greater levels of depressed mood after the rumination manipulation relative 
to those in the distraction condition.  
Further experimental studies demonstrate that rumination has additional 
negative consequences beyond its influence on mood. Relative to distraction, 
rumination manipulations resulted in a broad variety of negative effects, including 
less effective interpersonal problem solving (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; 
Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999; Watkins & Baracaia, 2002), increased 
recall of negative memories (Lyubomirsky, Caldwell, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; 
Moulds, Kandris, & Williams, 2007), and maladaptive recall of over-general 
memories (Crane, Barnhofer, Visser, Nightingale, & Williams, 2007; Raes, Watkins, 
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Williams, & Hermans, 2008; Sutherland & Bryant, 2007; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001; 
Watkins, Teasdale, & Williams, 2008). 
Rumination has also been associated with anxiety in cross-sectional, 
longitudinal, and experimental studies. In a cross-sectional study, Harrington and 
Blankenship (2002) found moderate correlations between self-reported rumination 
and depression (r = .33) as well as between self-reported rumination and anxiety (r 
= .32), indicating that in this sample, there was little difference between the strength 
of relationships between rumination and depression, and rumination and anxiety. 
Kocovski, Endler, Rector, and Flett (2005) found that participants high on social 
anxiety were more likely to ruminate and less likely to distract after exposure to 
vignettes about making mistakes in public than participants low on social anxiety. 
Perini, Abbott, and Rapee (2006) demonstrated that socially phobic participants 
engaged in more negative rumination in the week after an impromptu speech 
performance task than nonanxious participants.  
Longitudinal studies demonstrate that rumination temporally precedes changes 
in anxiety symptoms. In a short-term prospective study with adolescents, Schwartz 
and Koenig (1996) found that rumination predicted anxiety symptoms six weeks later. 
In further longitudinal studies with adults, Hong (2007) found that rumination 
predicted subsequent anxiety symptoms after one month, and Calmes and Roberts 
(2007) demonstrated that rumination predicted change in anxiety symptoms after 6-8 
weeks.  
A number of longitudinal studies have also studied the relationship between 
rumination and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow 
(1991) found that rumination predicted the level of PTSD symptoms in adults seven 
weeks after a natural disaster (the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989). Ehlers, Mayou, 
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and Bryant (2003) studied rumination and the development of chronic PTSD over a 
period of six months in children (5–16 years old) following experience of road traffic 
accidents. Rumination predicted onset and symptom severity of PTSD. The finding 
that rumination predicts PTSD has been demonstrated multiple times in adult samples 
(e.g., Ehlers, Mayou, & Bryant, 1998; Kleim, Ehlers, & Glucksman, 2007; Michael, 
Ehlers, Halligan, & Clark, 2005; Murray, Ehlers, & Mayou, 2002). However, it is 
important to note that the studies by Ehlers and colleagues used a different measure of 
rumination rather than the widely-used RSQ-RRS measure (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Morrow, 1991). Instead, rumination was measured on brief self-report scales created 
for these studies, where participants rated whether they dwelled on memories of the 
accident using a scale from 0 (no) to 3 (yes, often).  
In an experimental manipulation of anxiety and rumination, Blagden and 
Craske (1996) examined the effects of active or passive rumination or distraction on 
anxious mood, replicating the method used by Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990). 
Anxious mood was induced by participants listing three anxiety-provoking past or 
future events, and then concentrating on the one which provoked most anxiety whilst 
listening to a piece of music based on themes of apprehension, fear, and anxiety. The 
active/passive and rumination/distraction conditions were as previously described in 
the Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990) study. Whilst rumination did not amplify 
the induced anxious mood, it prolonged the symptoms of anxiety at a stable level. 
Participants in the distraction conditions experienced a reduction in anxiety that was 
not experienced by participants in rumination conditions, suggesting a relationship 
between the maintenance of anxiety and rumination.  
In addition to rumination’s negative effects for anxiety and depression, there is 
evidence that rumination predicts a range of other psychological disorders. In a 
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prospective study of 496 female adolescents, Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, and 
Bohon (2007) found that in addition to predicting depressive symptoms, rumination 
also predicted the onset of binge eating and substance abuse, as well as increases in 
bulimia symptoms and substance abuse. In a meta-analysis of 114 studies, Aldao, 
Nolen-Hoeksema, and Schweizer (2010) found that rumination was associated with 
depression, anxiety, eating disorders, and substance abuse. As such, there is evidence 
that rumination has a range of negative effects in addition to its effect on depression 
and anxiety symptoms.  
1.2.3. Theoretical Models of Rumination 
In this section, there will be a discussion of theories of rumination, and 
evaluation of the supporting evidence for these models. This section will review the 
response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1993), control theory (Martin & Tesser, 1996), processing mode theory (Watkins, 
2008), the cognitive inhibition model (Linville, 1996), the operant conditioning 
functional account of depression and rumination (Ferster, 1973), the metacognitive 
model of rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), developmental accounts of 
rumination (Conway, Mendelson, Giannopolous, Csank, & Holm, 2004; Rose, 2002); 
and the personality account of rumination (neuroticism; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 
1998). 
1.2.3.1. Response styles theory. 
Response styles theory, the most prominent theory of depressive rumination 
(RST; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991, 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1993), proposes 
that individual responses to symptoms of depression influence the duration of those 
symptoms, and that ruminative responses lead to a longer duration of depressive 
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symptoms. According to RST, learning, conditioning, and socialisation processes 
during childhood are implicated in the development of rumination. Nolen-Hoeksema 
proposed that rumination is a consistent, enduring and habitual cognitive style, and 
that it prolongs depressive episodes by influencing information processing and 
problem solving. She argued that “rumination does not lead to active problem solving 
to change circumstance surrounding these symptoms. Instead, people who are 
ruminating remain fixated on the problems and on their feelings about them without 
taking action” (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008, p. 400).  
Four specific mechanisms are hypothesised to explain how rumination 
prolongs depressive episodes. First, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1993) proposed that 
rumination exacerbates negative thinking. According to RST, depressed mood 
negatively influences information processing. As such, a depressed person may be 
more prone to evaluating themselves and situations negatively. This negative 
information processing then leads to exacerbation of depressive symptoms, creating a 
vicious circle: depressed mood leads to negative information processing, and negative 
information processing leads to depressed affect (e.g., Teasdale, 1999). Nolen-
Hoeksema proposed that rumination makes people prone to fall into this vicious circle, 
by making negative thoughts and information more accessible. Essentially, 
rumination prolongs negative thinking by increasing the accessibility and processing 
of depressogenic information, such as negative interpretations, memories, and 
expectations. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995, p. 177) explain that “it is the 
depressed mood that activates negative thoughts, but self-focused rumination brings 
these thoughts to the attention of the person and allows these thoughts to affect the 
person’s judgements and interpretations of his or her current situation”. This 
maintains the depressed mood, and the person becomes stuck in a vicious cycle. 
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Consistent with this hypothesis, a number of studies demonstrate that a 
ruminative response style can exacerbate negative thinking. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-
Hoeksema (1995) found that relative to dysphoric participants receiving a distraction 
induction, dysphoric participants who ruminated demonstrated more negative and 
biased interpretations of hypothetical situations. After rumination, dysphoric 
participants were also more pessimistic about the occurrence of positive future events. 
Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) found that dysphoric participants receiving a rumination 
manipulation were more likely to express self-blame, self-criticism, and less self-
confidence than dysphoric participants undergoing the distraction manipulation. 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Burling, and Tibbs (1992) demonstrated that following a 
manipulation of self-focus, participants focusing internally (in a manner characteristic 
of rumination) were less likely to endorse internal attributions for success than 
participants who focused externally. Further experimental studies previously outlined 
in Section 1.2.2 demonstrate the way that rumination influences negative attentional 
and memory biases. As such, there is extensive evidence consistent with the RST 
prediction that rumination exacerbates negative thinking.  
The second mechanism by which rumination is hypothesised to prolong 
depression is by reduction of instrumental behaviour. RST proposes that engaging in 
rumination causes individuals to cease their engagement in activities that would 
provide them with a sense of control and positive reinforcement, which then 
contributes to prolonging the depressive episode. Distracting responses can alleviate 
depressed mood because these activities may be inherently pleasurable, and can 
suspend rumination until the negative mood has passed (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1993; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990). In support of the hypothesis that 
rumination reduces instrumental behaviour, after a rumination manipulation, relative 
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to participants who received a distraction manipulation, dysphoric participants 
reported being less willing to engage in pleasant, distracting activities, even though 
they believed that such activities would be enjoyable and potentially lift their mood 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993).  Moreover, examining rumination and 
help-seeking in a study of breast cancer survivors, women who ruminated reported 
taking on average one month longer to speak to their doctor about their symptoms, 
relative to women lower on trait rumination (Lyubomirsky, Kasri, Chang, & Chung, 
2006).  
The third mechanism by which rumination can prolong depression is through 
the impairment of problem solving, partly through increasing the accessibility of 
negative cognitions. In support of this, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1995) 
studied adults’ performance on an interpersonal problem-solving task (adapted from 
Platt & Spivack’s (1975) Means-Ends Problem-Solving Procedure), and their 
interpretations of situations, after completing a rumination or distraction manipulation, 
adapted from Morrow and Nolen-Hoeksema (1990). Dysphoric participants in the 
rumination condition showed less effective problem solving than dysphoric 
participants in the distraction condition; there was no difference for participants who 
were not dysphoric. Follow-up studies have replicated this finding, for example, 
Lyubomirsky et al. (1999) also used the rumination versus distraction induction and 
demonstrated that rumination led to dysphoric participants rating their problems as 
more serious and less likely to be solvable, and they were less likely to report that 
they would implement solutions to their problems. 
The fourth mechanism by which rumination prolongs depression is through 
the erosion of social support. RST proposes that ruminators behave in a way that 
negatively impacts social relationships. There is correlational evidence consistent 
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with this hypothesis, with rumination being associated with a number of negative 
personal characteristics, including neediness and dependency (Spasojević & Alloy, 
2001) and sociotropy (Gorski & Young, 2002). In a study where participants had to 
evaluate fictitious scenarios about depressed protagonists using ruminative or 
distracting response styles, ruminative protagonists were perceived more negatively 
by participants than protagonists who engaged in distraction (Schwartz & Thomas, 
1995).  
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed a number of mechanisms by which a 
ruminative response style can develop. She hypothesised that a tendency towards 
rumination may develop in children as a result of (i) parental modelling of a 
ruminative style and/or (ii) because a child is not taught adaptive and active coping 
strategies for dealing with negative affect or depressed mood. Certain types of 
parenting are hypothesised to prevent children from successfully acquiring active and 
constructive ways of dealing with negative moods and situations. Nolen-Hoeksema 
(1998) suggested that children who experience little control over their environment 
are at risk of developing a tendency towards depressive rumination. This experience 
of limited control could occur because parents are overcontrolling and intrusive, 
giving the child limited opportunity to develop active coping strategies, and/or 
because the child is brought up under conditions of psychological deprivation and 
neglect, such that the child’s responses repeatedly fail to receive sufficient 
reinforcement, engendering a passive response style (cf. Ferster, 1973).   
Consistent with this hypothesis, there is indirect evidence from a study that did 
not directly measure rumination, but that demonstrated that parenting style influenced 
whether 5- to 7-year-old children adopted a passive or active coping style during a 
problem-solving task (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wolfson, Mumme, & Guskin, 1995). 
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Specifically, mothers who were overcontrolling had children who became more 
helpless, passive, and poorer at active problem solving during the task. More direct 
evidence comes from a study in which adults were asked to retrospectively report on 
how they were parented and their current levels of rumination (Spasojević & Alloy, 
2002). Overcontrolling parenting was associated with rumination, after controlling for 
symptoms of depression. This relationship was specific to overcontrolling parenting, 
since parental rejection (also measured) was not significantly associated with 
rumination. However, this study is limited by its retrospective approach. 
Nolen-Hoeksema also hypothesised that rumination may have two potential 
functional properties that could potentially reinforce the process of ruminative 
thinking. First, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) hypothesised that people 
may engage in rumination as a means of gaining an improved sense of understanding 
and insightfulness, and to attempt to gain an understanding of the reasons for why 
things happen. Specifically, they hypothesised that “the perception that one possesses 
insight (and not actual insight per se) may lead some dysphorics to continue 
ruminating” (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, p. 347). Consistent with this, 
in a cross-sectional study, people reported that rumination helps them to gain insight 
into the meanings of their feelings and problems, and discern the reason for why 
things happen to them (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). In the only experimental study to 
experimentally manipulate rumination and examine the effect on subsequent sense of 
insight and understanding, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) found that 
relative to a distraction induction, dysphoric and nondysphoric participants 
undergoing a rumination induction rated themselves as more insightful. However, this 
study was limited in that it did not examine the effect of rumination on a real-world 
problem. Furthermore, perceived insightfulness was only assessed post-manipulation, 
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so it was not possible to examine the change in perceived insightfulness resulting 
from rumination. Critically, this study only compared rumination to distraction, such 
that thinking about the self, feelings and problems (i.e., rumination) was compared 
with not thinking about feelings and problems. As such, it cannot be concluded that 
any observed differential effects are specific to rumination rather than the general 
benefit of thinking about and focusing on the problem, versus not thinking about the 
problem. As such, further experimental studies addressing these limitations are 
required. 
Second, in addition to this insight hypothesis, in a more recent paper updating 
response styles theory, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) hypothesised that rumination 
may have avoidant functions that negatively reinforce the ruminative thinking. 
Specifically, they hypothesised that “rumination serves to build a case that the 
individual is facing a hopelessly uncontrollable situation and so he or she is not able 
to take action to overcome the situation … rumination provides depressed individuals 
with the evidentiary base to justify withdrawal and inactivity … The case that is built 
through rumination provides a rationale for avoiding taking action or responsibility 
for situations and for withdrawing instead. In turn, the withdrawal and inactivity that 
is justified by rumination is reinforced because it reduces exposure to an aversive 
environment” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008, p. 407). As such, whilst avoidance in 
itself is not conceptualised as a vulnerability factor for rumination, it can be 
characterised as a consequence of rumination that may negatively reinforce the 
ruminative process, thus motivating people to continue ruminating once they have 
started. Consistent with this, there is cross-sectional evidence demonstrating that that 
trait rumination is significantly correlated with self-reported avoidance (Cribb, 
Moulds, & Carter, 2006; Giorgio et al., 2010; Moulds, Kandris, Starr, & Wong, 2007) 
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and behavioural avoidance (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006). However, thus far, no 
experimental studies have manipulated rumination and demonstrated that it leads to 
increased self-reported or behavioural avoidance.  
In summary, RST predicts that ruminative responding prolongs depressed 
moods by enhancing negative thinking, reducing instrumental behaviour, interfering 
with problem solving, and eroding social support. Such response styles are 
hypothesised to develop as a result of parental modelling and/or early environments in 
which children are not taught adaptive ways of responding to mood, potentially 
because of the child experiencing limited control. Ruminative responses may be 
maintained and reinforced by a sense of increased insightfulness and justification for 
avoidance that may arise from engagement in rumination. 
1.2.3.2. Control theory models of rumination. 
Martin and Tesser (1996) and Watkins (2008) proposed control theory models 
of rumination, based on Carver and Scheier’s (1990) control-process view of emotion 
regulation. First, Carver and Scheier’s (1990) model will be described, followed by 
discussion of the theories by Martin and Tesser (1996) and Watkins (2008). 
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1.2.3.2.1. Control-process model of emotion regulation. 
 
Figure 1.1. Schematic depiction of a feedback loop (Carver & Scheier, 1990). 
Carver and Scheier’s model (Figure 1.1) proposes that individuals self-
regulate their behaviours based on feedback in order to reduce discrepancies between 
their goal behaviour (the reference value) and their perception of the environment (the 
input function). Self-regulation occurs to reduce discrepancies between how an 
individual wants things to be, and how they perceive things to be. As the individual’s 
behaviour (the output function) can have an impact on and change the environment, it 
can therefore alter the input function, reducing the perceived discrepancy between 
that and the reference value. In self-regulation models, feedback refers to a process 
where individuals compare their perception of the environment with their reference 
values, with the intention of reducing discrepancies between actual state and desired 
goals. 
Carver and Scheier suggest that goals are organised in a hierarchical way, 
depending on the level of abstraction (Figure 1.2). At the highest level of abstraction 
    40 
are system concepts, which typically refer to global values such as the sense of the 
idealised self (the most frequently used value for this level), or the ideal relationship 
or society. The next lower level in the hierarchy is comprised of abstract principles 
(e.g., “be kind”) that are suggested by the system concept. These principles are 
implied by the idealised self, and whilst they are not specifications of actions, they 
refer to qualities that can manifest themselves in many acts. Carver and Scheier (1990, 
p. 20) note that “people do not just go out and ‘do’ honesty… rather, people manifest 
any one (or more) of these qualities while doing more concrete activities”. Beneath 
these principles are more concrete programmes (e.g., “help elderly neighbours with 
their shopping”), which are made up of concrete sequences of behaviours (see Carver 
& Scheier, 1990, p. 19-20). Although these programmes are still relatively abstract, 
they are more easily recognised as forms of behaviour. Movement sequences, which 
comprise individual programmes, represent concrete forms of behaviour, with the 
main difference between programmes and sequences being that programmes involve 
choice points (where decisions need to be made), whereas sequences are just series of 
actions that are performed all at once. 
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Figure 1.2. Hierarchy of feedback loops, showing the various levels of control, from 
most abstract to most concrete (Carver & Scheier, 1990). 
 
Carver and Scheier (1990) proposed that affect originates from a meta-
monitoring system, which checks the rate at which the discrepancies are being 
reduced and goal progress is being made. The outcome of this checking and 
comparison process is affect, which is negative if the goal progress is at a rate slower 
than the standard expected, and positive if the goal progress is at a rate faster than 
expected. The level of abstraction at which the goal discrepancy is perceived 
influences the intensity of affect. Discrepancies that are noted at higher levels of 
abstraction produce more intense affect and emotional impact, and discrepancies at 
lower, more concrete levels, produce less intense affective changes.  
1.2.3.2.2. Control theory of rumination. 
Martin and Tesser’s (1996) control theory of rumination proposes that 
personal goal discrepancies drive rumination. Personal goals can be consciously 
accessible and completion can be easily defined (e.g., “sweep the kitchen floor”), or 
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they can be non-conscious and have less clear end states (e.g., “encode these 
behaviours in terms of a trait” when meeting a person and forming an impression) 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996). Rumination is instigated by problematic progress towards a 
goal (e.g., slow speed of progress towards goal attainment). These discrepancies in 
goal progress can occur for a number of reasons: A person’s own motivations, 
interests or abilities may not match their environment, or their environment may be 
too challenging or not challenging enough. Thus, rumination occurs as a result of goal 
nonattainment. The focus of rumination is on these unresolved goals, and this is an 
instrumental process, because making the goal discrepancy more accessible to 
consciousness has the potential function of facilitating progress, and therefore 
increasing the likelihood of achieving goal resolution. In this model, rumination 
continues until the goal is resolved or abandoned.  
In Martin and Tesser’s model, goal hierarchy is associated with the 
maintenance of rumination. As in Carver and Scheier’s (1990) control theory model, 
goals at the highest level of abstraction relate to an individual’s sense of self and their 
fundamental values, beliefs and desires, and thus such goals are more long-term and 
have greater permanence (e.g., “take care of my family”). At the lowest level of the 
hierarchy are concrete goals that are relevant in the “here and now” and refer to 
specific tasks or behaviours, and thus are more short-term (e.g., “arrange a meeting 
with my supervisor”). These lower-level goals instantiate the means to deliver the 
higher-level goals down to the level of concrete behaviours to be performed. The 
lowest-level goals take the form of motor actions (e.g., “dial my supervisor’s office 
number into the telephone”). Martin and Tesser (1996) proposed that problematic 
goal progress relating to higher-level goals, integral to wellbeing, are more likely to 
instigate persistent rumination, because such goals are more challenging to achieve, 
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and also harder to abandon, because of their significance to a person’s sense of self. 
However, lower-level goals can produce rumination under certain circumstances. First, 
low-level goals may trigger rumination if they are closely linked to important high-
level goals: Problematic goal progress at this low level may threaten goal attainment 
of certain higher-level goals. Second, successive nonattainment of lower-order goals 
may trigger rumination if it jeopardises the achievement of a higher-order goal (e.g., 
lots of minor goals fail to be achieved, and results in the person perceiving attainment 
of a higher-level goal, such as control of their own life, to be at risk).  
Whilst Martin and Tesser acknowledge that rumination can be a normal and 
adaptive form of thought, they also explain how rumination can become maladaptive 
and pathological, and how individuals can find themselves “stuck” in rumination, 
unable to stop. According to the model, rumination is typically stopped in three ways, 
either through attainment or abandonment of the goal whose problematic progress 
triggered rumination, or through distraction (shifting thoughts to something other than 
the topic of rumination). Distraction only allows for temporary cessation of 
rumination, and thus, goal attainment or goal abandonment are the only permanent 
ways to stop rumination.  
However, goal attainment, and thus the termination of rumination, can be 
challenging when the goal is highly abstract. Martin and Tesser proposed that 
attainment of highly abstract goals can be problematic for two key reasons. First, the 
goal may be too difficult to reach: For example, attainment may take a long time, or 
attainment of that goal may threaten the attainment of another goal, or the goal may 
be so loosely defined that attainment is improbable. Second, it may be difficult to 
identify what needs to be done to attain the higher-level goal if it is too loosely 
specified and abstract (e.g., “be happy”). If these lower-level goals cannot be 
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specified, then goal progress cannot be made, and an individual may become stuck in 
ruminative thought.  
Goal abandonment can also be challenging when the goal is too abstract. More 
abstract goals tend to be more closely tied into an individual’s sense of self, and their 
overarching and enduring principles, beliefs, and desires. As a result of this degree of 
abstraction, they are difficult to abandon, thus setting up the conditions for persistent 
rumination. As higher-level abstract goals can be problematic and more challenging 
to attain or abandon for the reasons discussed above, the level of abstraction of the 
unattained goal becomes a risk factor for pathological rumination.  
Martin and Tesser’s (1996) control theory of rumination explains why people 
start ruminating, and why rumination is sometimes maintained, resulting in 
individuals becoming stuck in rumination. Consistent with this account, there is 
considerable evidence that demonstrates how problems with goal progress can 
instigate rumination. Millar, Tesser, and Millar (1988) studied 76 undergraduates in 
their first few weeks of university, and asked them to provide information about 
activities that they had taken part in at home, and the extent to which they were able 
to carry on these activities at university. Participants ruminated more about activities 
that they had previously enjoyed at home but could no longer participate in at 
university, relative to activities that they could continue. In a diary study of 
ruminative thoughts and goal progress (Lavallee & Campbell, 1995), participants 
described the most negative event of each day and rated it according to how much it 
bothered them. In subsequent analysis of the diaries, events that were most closely 
related to the participants’ own personal goals elicited the greatest amount of 
rumination about the event, suggesting that nonattainment of personal core goals and 
problematic goal progress may instigate rumination. Finally, in an experience 
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sampling study, Moberly and Watkins (2010) demonstrated that low levels of 
personal goal success were associated with increased levels of ruminative self-focus 
and negative affect.  
Examining the prediction about goal hierarchy, McIntosh, Harlow, and Martin 
(1995) studied the way in which some people link lower order goals (e.g., being one’s 
ideal weight) with higher order goals (e.g., being happy). They found that participants 
who were more prone to link lower-order goals with higher-order goals experienced 
greater levels of rumination and depressive symptoms than participants who did not 
make such links. This supports the prediction that abstract goals afford persistent 
rumination because such goals are difficult to achieve or abandon. Participants who 
consistently linked low-level goals to high-level goals therefore experienced greater 
discrepancy between their current state and their desired state (e.g., “be happy”), 
because the high-level goal is abstract and ill-defined, but at the same time, tied in to 
their sense of self, and thus is harder to abandon, leading to persistent rumination.  
1.2.3.2.3. Processing mode theory. 
Watkins (2008) proposed an extension to and elaboration of Martin and 
Tesser’s (1996) theory, to explain how RT can have constructive or unconstructive 
outcomes. Martin and Tesser’s control theory account demonstrated that abstract 
rumination leads to persistent rumination, but their account did not address the 
consequences of rumination. Processing mode theory (Watkins, 2008) hypothesises 
that the consequences of rumination are determined by an interaction between 
structural aspects of rumination (i.e., valence, whether positive or negative) and the 
process aspects of rumination (i.e., level of construal, whether information is 
processed in at an abstract high level or a concrete low level).  
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Watkins (2008) proposed that the valence of cognition (e.g., the ruminative 
thoughts, the individual’s mood) determines whether rumination is helpful or 
unhelpful. RT with negative valence is likely to lead to more negative thoughts and 
feelings. As RT is hypothesised to amplify and exacerbate the existing valence of 
thoughts, if the content is negatively valenced, RT will increase the level of negativity. 
Negative cognitions are proposed to lead to negative consequences, negative mood, 
and thus, negative outcomes for rumination. In addition to this, Watkins (2008) 
proposed that when an individual has negative beliefs and expectations, goal 
persistence will be less, and an individual will judge goal progress less favourably, 
perceiving greater goal discrepancy. This will lead to a disengagement from goal 
pursuit, and thus, an unresolved goal, resulting in rumination with unconstructive 
consequences (e.g., Lavallee & Campbell, 1995; Millar et al., 1988; Moberly & 
Watkins, 2010). 
Watkins (2008) also proposed that level of construal influences the outcome of 
rumination. High-level abstract construals are characterised by being general, 
superordinate and decontextualised, whereas low-level concrete construals are 
characterised by being specific, subordinate and contextualised. Concrete 
representations focus on the “how”, means, processes, feasibility, and planning of 
outcomes. Abstract representations focus on the “why”, ends, purposes, desirability 
and importance of outcomes. Consistent with Martin and Tesser’s (1996) control 
theory account, the level of construal relates to the level of identification of goals and 
behaviours in the goal hierarchy, that is, whether they constitute high-level or low-
level goals. All actions, events, and goals can be construed at varying levels of 
abstraction (Watkins, 2008, p. 187): for example, a behaviour could be described as 
“laziness” (an abstract, global trait that would be identified higher in the goal 
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hierarchy) or “tiredness” (a concrete, specific state that would be identified lower in 
the hierarchy). Watkins (2008) proposed that there are advantages and disadvantages 
to these different levels of construal. 
In some contexts, abstract processing can have more constructive outcomes 
than concrete construal. First, Watkins (2008) proposed that higher-level construal 
allows for increased stability and consistency of behaviour across different situations, 
with less interference from situational demands, resulting in less distractibility and 
impulsiveness. Abstract construals are more stable, because they are more distanced 
from the context and situational issues, and are more focused on higher-level, long-
term goals and purposes. Second, higher-level construals allow for more flexibility in 
responding to problematic goal progress with lower-level goals, as alternative sub-
goals can be generated. Therefore, for familiar, straightforward, and positive 
situations, representing goals at a higher level of construal would result in more 
constructive consequences.  
However, in some contexts, abstract processing can be less constructive than 
concrete processing. First, Watkins (2008) proposed that construal level is 
hypothesised to influence problem solving. Identifying a goal at a more concrete level 
of construal can result in better problem solving, because lower-level processing 
provides more specific and detailed information about the actions required and the 
alternatives available when encountering a challenging or novel situation, thus leading 
to more successful problem solving. Consistent with this, Watkins and Moulds 
(2005b) manipulated processing mode and found that compared with abstract 
processing, concrete processing improved social problem solving. In addition, 
Watkins and Baracaia (2002) found that process-focused questions about problems 
(i.e., concrete processing) improved social problem solving in currently depressed 
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patients relative to state-oriented questions (i.e., abstract processing, analogous to 
depressive rumination).  
Second, level of construal is hypothesised to influence self-regulation. A 
lower level of construal can be beneficial when abstract self-focus could have 
unconstructive outcomes for self-regulation. For example, if someone was feeling 
highly anxious before taking a test, it may be more beneficial for them to process at a 
lower level of construal and focus on more concrete behaviours, such as locating the 
examination hall, rather than processing at an abstract level, such as considering the 
importance of passing the test. Leary, Adams, and Tate (2006) proposed that concrete 
processing can assist with self-regulation by reducing anxiety, focusing on immediate 
situational demands, and by requiring fewer cognitive resources and less mental effort. 
In a meta-analytic review, Gollwitzer and Sheeran (2006) found that having 
implementation intentions (i.e., specific plans about when, where, and how to respond 
to achieve goal attainment) significantly increased the likelihood of goal attainment 
and reduced the likelihood of individuals persevering with unhelpful courses of action 
and being “derailed” from successful progress as a result of conflicting situational 
interference. 
Third, construal level influences the degree of generalisation. Abstract 
construal allows for generalisation across various situations, and can be advantageous 
when it affords helpful cross-situational inferences. In negative situations, concrete 
processing can be more adaptive as it can prevent negative overgeneralisations being 
made, when situation-specific appraisals would be more appropriate (Hamilton, 
Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Cather, 1993). For example, following exam failure, a 
concrete level of construal may be more adaptive (e.g., “I should have revised at the 
weekend instead of seeing my friends”) than an abstract level of construal (e.g., “I 
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can’t do anything right”). Carver (1998) conducted a short-term prospective 
longitudinal study, where participants self-reported tendency to generalise in response 
to negative situations was assessed (e.g., “a single failure can change me from feeling 
OK to seeing only the bad in myself”). At the 6-week follow-up, generalisation 
predicted subsequent depressive symptoms, even when baseline levels of depression 
were controlled for. An interaction between generalisation and experience of adverse 
events was found, indicating that adverse events also contributed to depressive 
symptoms, but only in participants who reported greater tendencies to generalise. This 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that abstract, high-level construal in 
response to negative situations can cause negative outcomes. Carver (1998, p. 617) 
proposed that “generalisers are people who are trying to control their lives at too high 
a level of abstraction…the person trying to control behaviour from too high a level 
will experience a setback at a lower level not as a task failure, but as a failure of the 
self. Given this difference in the meaning of failure, generalisers are more vulnerable 
to experiencing depressive symptoms than other people”.  
This processing mode account is consistently supported by studies indicating 
that low-level, concrete thinking is more adaptive than high-level abstract rumination, 
with abstract rumination leading to a variety of unconstructive outcomes. First, 
Watkins and Teasdale (2001) examined the effects of high levels of abstraction in a 
study of overgeneral memory in depressed participants, by experimentally 
manipulating thinking styles. Overgeneral memory refers to the tendency to recall 
past events in a broad and categorical manner (i.e., recalling summaries of repeated 
past experiences rather than recalling specific events), and it has been implicated in 
the maintenance of depression (Williams et al., 2007).  The experimenters used a 
modified version of Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow’s (1993) rumination versus 
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distraction induction procedure, using a 2 x 2 design to manipulate analytical thinking 
(high or low) and self-focus (high or low). The specificity of participants’ memories 
was examined pre- and post-manipulation, using the autobiographical memory test 
(AMT; Williams & Broadbent, 1986). Overgeneral memory reduced following the 
low-analysis manipulations, and increased following the high-analysis manipulations. 
Consistent with processing mode theory, abstract processing led to unconstructive 
outcomes for overgeneral memory.  
Second, examining the effects of abstract processing on emotional recovery 
after a failure, Watkins (2004a) gave participants a negative mood induction that took 
the form of a challenging cognitive task that they would fail at, and informed them 
that this task acted as a brief measure of IQ and was correlated with academic and 
career outcomes. Following the task, participants had to write three brief expressive 
essays at intervals over the next 24 hours. Participants were allocated to either the 
conceptual-evaluative condition (i.e., abstract processing), where they were asked to 
write about the causes, reasons and meanings for their task performance and feelings 
(focusing on the “why”, e.g., “write about why you feel the way you do after the 
test”), or the experiential condition (i.e., concrete processing), where they were asked 
to write about their direct experiences of their task performance and feelings 
(focusing on the “how”, e.g., “write about how you approached the problems and your 
thinking process as you tried to find the answers”). An interaction between processing 
mode and trait rumination was found: Participants in the abstract processing condition 
who also had high levels of trait rumination reported significantly higher levels of 
depressed mood and intrusions than those in the concrete processing condition. 
Moreover, 12 hours after the failure experience, participants in the abstract processing 
    51 
condition, who reported greater tendency to ruminate, experienced greater levels of 
negative mood.  
Third, examining the effect of processing mode on emotional vulnerability to 
negative events, Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2008) allocated participants to one 
of two processing mode training conditions: abstract processing, analogous to 
depressive rumination (participants considered causes, meanings and implications of a 
variety of scenarios), or concrete processing, inconsistent with depressive rumination 
(participants considered concrete, sensory details of scenarios). After subsequent 
exposure to a stressful failure task, participants in the abstract processing condition 
had a greater negative emotional response than participants in the concrete processing 
condition.  
Fourth, examining the effect of processing mode on mood and physiological 
arousal following trauma, Ehring, Szeimies, and Schaffrick (2009) exposed 
participants to video clips of distressing scenes following motor vehicle accidents, 
and then were assigned to one of three conditions: abstract thinking, concrete thinking, 
or distraction. In the abstract thinking condition, participants read and dwelled on 
abstract, ruminative sentences related to the topic of the video (e.g., “why do so many 
accidents have to happen?”). In the concrete thinking condition, participants focused 
on concrete sentences relating to the topic (e.g., “what are the different reasons for 
accidents happening?”). In the distraction condition, participants read and mentally 
answered questions unrelated to the video topic (e.g., “please try and recall as many 
rivers flowing through Germany as you can think of”). Participants in the abstract 
thinking condition experienced longer maintenance of negative mood and 
physiological arousal after the distressing video than participants in the concrete 
thinking and distraction conditions, consistent with processing mode theory.   
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Finally, Watkins and Moulds (2007) examined reduced concreteness in 
rumination, using a modified version of the Problem Elaboration Questionnaire 
(Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). They found that currently depressed participants 
generated more abstract descriptions of their problems and the possible consequences 
of the problems than participants who had previously been depressed, and never-
depressed control participants. There were no significant differences between the 
concreteness of descriptions and consequences given by the never-depressed and 
previously depressed groups. Whilst the data are correlational, these studies are 
consistent with processing mode theory and demonstrate an association between 
abstract processing and symptoms of psychopathology. 
Whilst the studies outlined above did not manipulate processing style to 
examine subsequent engagement in RNT, they demonstrated that manipulating 
abstract processing lead to less constructive outcomes, relative to concrete processing, 
consistent with processing mode accounts of RNT.   
1.2.3.3. Cognitive inhibition models of rumination. 
A number of researchers have proposed that cognitive inhibitory and control 
processes are implicated in the tendency towards persistent, unconstructive 
rumination (Hertel, 1997; Joormann, 2004, 2005; Linville, 1996). Inhibition has been 
clearly defined by MacLeod (2007, p. 5) as “the stopping or overriding of a mental 
process, in whole or in part, with or without intention”.  
Linville (1996) proposed that attention inhibition may underlie ruminative 
thought. She proposed that attentional inhibition is “essential for maintaining a 
coherent stream of thought” (p. 123) and that it involves excitation of relevant 
information, and inhibition of non-relevant information. Linville proposed that 
rumination and attentional inhibition are both goal-directed processes, with inhibition 
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aiding goal progress by focusing attention on goal-relevant information. She proposed 
two mechanisms by which inhibitory processes can foster rumination.  
First, rumination can occur when inhibitory processes are functioning 
normally. Ruminative thoughts may enter consciousness because they are strongly 
related to high-level goals that are currently active; even though the ruminative 
thoughts may be goal relevant, they are not relevant to the goal at hand. Linville also 
suggested that inhibitory processes are imperfect and off-task thoughts may “leak” 
into working memory, when they are usually stopped by inhibitory mechanisms.  
Second, rumination can occur when inhibitory mechanisms have been 
weakened. Linville argued that there are considerable individual differences in 
inhibitory ability, and there are also certain populations who show deficiencies in 
attentional inhibition (e.g., people with depression (Linville, 1994), obsessive-
compulsive disorder (Enright & Beech, 1993), and older adults with cognitive 
memory deficits (Kane, Hasher, Stoltzfus, Zacks, & Connelly, 1994)). Weakened 
inhibitory mechanisms can allow for ruminative thoughts to enter working memory 
and disrupt goal-related thought processes. This can also result in ruminative thoughts 
that were once relevant staying in working memory, despite no longer being relevant 
to the current goal. Deficiencies in inhibition could also allow for lower level and less 
important goals to intrude into working memory, disrupting the goal hierarchy.  
Joormann (2004, 2005, 2010) proposed a similar theory in which inhibitory 
deficits prevent the expulsion of negative material from working memory, leading to 
uncontrollable and persistent rumination. Working memory has limited capacity and 
as a result of this, effective inhibitory processing is necessary to limit the information 
that enters working memory, and to update and remove information from working 
memory when it is no longer pertinent (Hasher, Zacks, & May, 1999). 
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Joormann (2010) hypothesised that deficiencies in controlling inhibition 
processes in working memory contribute towards rumination via several pathways. 
Specifically, she hypothesised that the inability to expel irrelevant mood-congruent 
items from working memory leads to persistent rumination. Deficiencies in cognitive 
inhibition are also hypothesised to hinder the use of more adaptive strategies by 
interfering with the processing of new information and effective reappraisal. Lastly, 
inhibitory deficiencies make it challenging to retrieve mood-incongruent material 
(e.g., recalling happy memories to alleviate sad moods). As such, cognitive inhibition 
deficits contribute to unconstructive emotion regulation strategies, in particular, 
persistent rumination. 
More recently, Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, and De Raedt (2011) 
developed an approach to depressive rumination stemming from a cognitive science 
perspective, termed the impaired disengagement hypothesis. In this model, internal or 
external stressors that conflict with an individual’s goals drive negative critical 
thinking, which creates a negative mood state. Koster et al. (2011) hypothesised that 
this critical thinking ceases when a solution is found to the problem, or an individual 
engages in deliberate or automatic emotion regulation. However, in most individuals, 
this critical thinking signals cognitive conflict because the negative thoughts and 
moods contrast with existing positive self views. This conflict then leads to 
disengagement from the negative thoughts, which affords reappraisal of the situation, 
or distraction from the negative thoughts and mood. However, under certain 
conditions, disengagement from the negative thinking does not occur. Koster et al. 
(2011) hypothesised that impaired conflict signalling (e.g., because negative thinking 
may cause less conflict in an individual with negative self-schemas) or impaired 
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attentional control (e.g., as a result of depression) prevent disengagement of attention, 
which results in persistent cycles of unconstructive rumination.  
A number of correlational studies have demonstrated an association between 
cognitive inhibition and rumination (e.g., Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Joormann, 2006; 
Joormann & Gotlib, 2010; Whitmer & Banich, 2007; Whitmer & Banich, 2010). In a 
quasi-experiment, Davis and Nolen-Hoeksema (2000) examined the performance of 
ruminators and nonruminators on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & 
Berg, 1948). Ruminators made significantly more errors of perseveration than 
nonruminators, indicating that they had a more inflexible cognitive style, even when 
levels of general intelligence and depression were controlled for. However, as this 
study only illustrates a correlation, it does not give evidence for cognitive inflexibility 
playing an aetiological role in the development and maintenance of rumination. 
There are also a small number of longitudinal studies that demonstrate that 
inhibitory deficits temporally precede changes in rumination (Demeyer, De Lissnyder, 
Koster, & De Raedt, 2012; De Lissnyder, Koster, Goubert, Onreadt, Vanderhasselt, & 
De Raedt, 2012; Zetsche & Joormann, 2011). However, there are no experimental 
studies that have directly tested the hypothesis that inhibitory deficits causally 
contribute to rumination. 
As such, further studies are required to examine the relationship between 
cognitive inhibition and rumination. Specifically, the direction of causality in the 
relationship between rumination and inhibition has yet to be established: People who 
ruminate may find that rumination utilises cognitive resources and thus impairs their 
inhibitory abilities because they are working at a high level of cognitive load, or 
people may start to ruminate and persevere with rumination because they are unable 
to inhibit or control their cognitions. Whilst there is currently no experimental 
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evidence manipulating inhibitory processes and examining the effects on rumination, 
experimental studies manipulating rumination have demonstrated effects on inhibitory 
processes, in contrast to what is predicted by the theoretical models outlined 
previously. For example, experimental manipulations demonstrate that rumination 
causally influences random number generation, such that rumination makes it less 
easy for individuals to inhibit the natural tendency to count in sequences (Watkins & 
Brown, 2002), and leads to interference errors on Stroop tasks (Philippot & Brutoux, 
2008). 
Whilst these studies demonstrate a relationship between rumination and 
deficiencies in inhibitory control, they do not provide evidence for the aetiology of 
rumination; that is, it is unclear whether in depressed individuals, a tendency towards 
an inflexible cognitive style precedes or follows engagement in rumination.  
Therefore, further experimental studies are required that manipulate cognitive control, 
to measure its effects on levels of repetitive thought.  
A specific self-regulatory concept relevant to the literature on cognitive 
inhibition is the construct of effortful control, which has been studied with respect to 
rumination. Effortful control refers to the capacity to self-regulate and control 
emotional and behavioural responses, such as the ability to inhibit and activate 
behaviours when necessary, as well as the ability to focus and shift attention 
(Rothbart, 1989).  
Studies have demonstrated a cross-sectional association between rumination 
and effortful control (Hilt, Armstrong, & Essex, 2012; Verstraeten, Bijttebier, Vasey, 
& Raes, 2011; Verstraeten, Vasey, Raes, & Bijttebier, 2009), however in a study 
using alternative self-report measures, a correlation between rumination and effortful 
control was not found (Mezulis, Simonson, McCauley, & Vander Stoep, 2011). There 
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is also prospective evidence demonstrating that effortful control prospectively 
predicts rumination (Hilt et al., 2012).  
Rather than being characterised as a risk factor for RNT, some researchers 
have hypothesised that effortful control may moderate the relationship between 
negative affectivity and depression. Consistent with this, Verstraeten et al. (2009) 
found that rumination mediated the relationship between negative affectivity and 
depression, and this relationship was moderated by effortful control. Individuals who 
reported lower levels of effortful control (i.e., a weaker capacity to self-regulate 
behavioural and emotional responses, such as inhibiting or interrupting thoughts, and 
switching the focus of attention) may persevere with rumination, finding it hard to 
disengage, and thus making them more vulnerable to depression. In a further study 
exploring the different components of effortful control, Verstraeten et al. (2011) 
found that depression symptoms were associated with activation control and 
inhibitory control, whereas anxiety symptoms were associated with attentional control. 
However, when analysing their prospective data, Verstraeten et al. (2009) found that 
effortful control did not contribute towards change in depression symptoms. This null 
finding with prospective data has been replicated by Mezulis et al. (2011).  
Alternatively, some researchers have hypothesised that deficiencies in 
effortful control may be a consequence, rather than a cause, of rumination. For 
example, in a longitudinal study with adolescents, Connolly et al. (2014) found that 
rumination prospectively predicted decreases in attentional switching 15 months later. 
As such, future studies should explore the relationship between rumination and 
components of effortful control, with prospective studies exploring the longitudinal 
relationships between effortful control and rumination, and experimental studies 
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manipulating components of effortful control and measuring the effect on subsequent 
rumination.   
1.2.3.4. Functional and operant conditioning accounts of rumination and 
depression. 
A number of accounts propose that individuals may develop a tendency 
towards rumination because it serves a function for them (i.e., a functional approach 
to rumination). In particular, Martell, Addis, and Jacobson (2001) proposed that 
“although the rumination may be experienced as aversive to the individual, it is 
possible that it is maintained by the avoidance of even more aversive conditions” (p. 
121). Rumination can thus be conceptualised as a mechanism that helps depressed 
individuals to avoid engaging with their aversive environment and depressive 
symptoms by preoccupying their attention (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), and by 
passively avoiding the negative outcomes that active responses may trigger (Ferster, 
1973).  
The role of avoidance and escape in the development of depression was 
developed by Ferster’s (1973, 1974) functional analysis of behaviour. Ferster’s model 
is based on the principles of operant conditioning, and through observations of the 
behaviour of people with depression. Operant conditioning (Skinner, 1953) refers to 
the modification of voluntary behaviours emitted by the organism, and in contrast to 
classical conditioning (Pavlov, 1927), emphasises the active role of the organism 
“operating” on his or her own environment. Two types of learning occur in operant 
conditioning. Contingency-governed behaviour refers to behaviour that has been 
directly influenced by contingencies of reinforcement. Rule-governed behaviour 
refers to behaviour that is not sensitive to contingencies of reinforcement, because 
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that behaviour is controlled by verbal (or imagined) descriptions of contingencies, 
such as instructions, advice, and laws, rather than direct experiences.  
Referring to contingency-governed behaviours, the consequence of the 
response influences the occurrence of that behaviour in the future. Reinforcers 
increase the likelihood of responses occurring in the future. Positive reinforcement 
refers to responses that are followed by the presentation of a stimulus that increases 
the chance of that behaviour occurring (usually, the reinforcer is a pleasant stimulus). 
Negative reinforcement (or escape) refers to the removal of a stimulus that increases 
the chance of the behaviour occurring (usually, something aversive is removed). 
Punishers decrease the likelihood of responses occurring in the future. Positive 
punishment refers to the presentation of a stimulus that decreases the likelihood of the 
behaviour occurring again (usually, the punisher is an aversive stimulus). Negative 
punishment (or penalty) refers to the removal of a stimulus that decreases the chance 
of a behaviour occurring (usually, something pleasant is removed).  
Ferster’s (1973) model applies the principles of operant conditioning to the 
development and maintenance of depression. In this analysis, Ferster identified two 
key observations of the functional behaviour of the depressed person that are 
explained in operant conditioning terms. First, Ferster (1973) proposed that 
depression is typified by “a reduced frequency of adjustive behaviours” (p. 857), as 
the frequency of positively reinforced behaviours (e.g., hobbies and socialising) 
significantly declines. Ferster argued that passive responding emerges under 
conditions of deprivation and neglect: When behaviours do not result in positive 
reinforcement, the contingency learnt is that there is no value in being active. 
Moreover, when active responses repeatedly fail to receive sufficient reinforcement, 
this engenders passive responses, such as rumination. Thus, this operant conditioning 
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analysis predicts that an environment characterised by neglect, limited positive 
reinforcement, and/or the experience of limited control, would engender the 
development of a passive response style. This analysis leads to the prediction that a 
period of uncontrollable stress and non-contingency would lead to increased levels of 
rumination. 
Second, Ferster proposed that “the repertoire of a depressed person is a 
passive one” (Ferster, 1973, p. 859), as people with depression respond passively to 
aversive events. Ferster hypothesised that passive responses may serve the function of 
avoiding aversive consequences in certain situations, such as in social interactions 
with others, and thus are negatively reinforced. For example, complying with the 
demand of another person by responding passively avoids aversive consequences that 
could potentially arise if the depressed person refused to comply. In this case, the 
depressed person’s passive response is negatively reinforced, as it allows the person 
to avoid an aversive response. Ferster also identified a second component of passivity 
in the depressed person’s failure to adequately deal with aversive social events, 
proposing that depressed individuals passively assume responsibility for negative 
situations because they do not actively seek out information that confirms or 
contradicts this assumption of responsibility. Thus, rumination, as a form of passive 
response, can become reinforced and increase in frequency because its passive nature 
affords avoidance of aversive situations that may potentially arise from more active 
ways of responding to low moods (e.g., active responding may exacerbate difficulties, 
lead to interpersonal conflict, etc.). Specifically, rumination may develop as a form of 
contingency-governed behaviour that is negatively reinforced.  
Whilst Ferster’s (1973) account concerns depression rather than rumination 
specifically, rumination can serve an avoidant function in a number of different ways. 
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For example, people may believe that thinking in the head is safer than taking the risk 
of failure or humiliation in the real world, or that thinking about something means the 
person can avoid actually having to do it. People may believe that thinking about 
something can help to second-guess or anticipate another’s response, thus avoiding 
further trouble. Rumination may act as a form of problem solving, which can be 
reinforced if the problem solving is effective and avoids negative outcomes. 
Rumination may also change an emotional state in a way that is negatively reinforced, 
by avoiding the aversive experience of a particular emotion (e.g., switching anger for 
sadness).  
Moreover, Ferster (1973) hypothesised that that the reinforcement of certain 
behaviours in response to aversive circumstances can account for the extension of 
those behaviours to less appropriate situations, as a result of the behaviour having 
been effective in the past. Applying Ferster’s model to rumination, rumination may be 
partially reinforced as an avoidance mechanism in some situations, but if an 
individual is poor at discriminating when rumination would be a helpful strategy, they 
may use it when it is less appropriate and less helpful. For example, considering the 
constructive forms of RNT outlined in Section 1.1, rumination may be experienced to 
be helpful in some scenarios (e.g., aiding successful processing of a traumatic event), 
but may become unconstructive when it becomes persistent or if an individual 
becomes “stuck” in cycles of rumination (e.g., repeatedly dwelling on the same 
aspects of a previous trauma). 
Furthermore, partial reinforcement is more resistant to extinction than 
continuous reinforcement (Jenkins & Stanley, 1950), and therefore, people may find it 
difficult to abandon rumination as a strategy, even when it ceases to be helpful. The 
partial reinforcement effect creates a sense of persistence in individuals, argued to be 
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the root of superstitious behaviour by Skinner (1948), because the individual expects 
their responses to be reinforced, and when they are not reinforced, the individual may 
persist with the behaviour with the belief that continuing the behaviour will mean the 
reinforcement will eventually happen. Therefore, if rumination is partially reinforced 
as an avoidance strategy, people may find it difficult to abandon, and persist with 
rumination even when it becomes unhelpful, ineffective, or even detrimental to the 
individual.  
To explore in more detail how these passive and avoidant responses are 
initially developed, Gilbert (1984, p. 55) suggested that “those most prone to 
depression are individuals who have developed a limited response repertoire and have 
failed to learn to generate alternative, adaptive, reinforcable behaviours when 
adjustments in responding are required”. Ferster (1973) proposed that stimulus 
discrimination learning is responsible for the development of an adaptive response 
repertoire, and that problems with this can block the development of appropriate 
alternative ways of responding. Stimulus discrimination learning refers to the process 
by which individuals learn to respond with a particular behaviour in the presence of 
some stimuli, but not other stimuli, through the differential reinforcement (and 
punishment or ignoring) of their responses. Gilbert (1984) proposed that successful 
learning depends on predictable and accurate reinforcement of behaviours, and for 
children to be able to learn the outcomes of their own behaviours, parents and 
caregivers need to be sensitive and respond accurately and appropriately to the child’s 
behaviour. If parental responses are arbitrary, unpredictable, or inaccurate, effective 
learning does not take place, and the child fails to develop subtle discrimination 
learning for social situations, and exploratory responses are inhibited. Essentially, “if 
the child does not know whether he will be shouted at, smacked, ignored, or smiled at 
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for exploring, then exploring becomes an extremely hazardous venture” (Gilbert, 
1984, p. 55). As a result of this poor stimulus discrimination learning, Ferster 
suggested that the child develops a highly limited response repertoire, because the 
parent does not help the child learn, through contingencies of reinforcement, the 
different strategies for responding to aversive situations. Therefore, without this broad 
response repertoire, the child responds passively, using strategies such as rumination, 
to aversive events.  
Developing this argument, there are constructive forms of RT (see Section 
1.1), and RT can be constructive in certain situations. However, impaired stimulus 
discrimination may result in individuals persisting with rumination when it ceases to 
be constructive. For example, individuals may find it difficult to differentiate between 
rumination and problem solving, and because problem solving is sometimes 
reinforced, so too are other less helpful forms of repetitive thought.  
Compared with other theoretical models, there is relatively little research that 
has examined this avoidance account of rumination. There is some cross-sectional 
evidence demonstrating that trait rumination correlates with self-reported avoidance 
(Cribb et al., 2006; Giorgio et al., 2010; Moulds et al., 2007) and behavioural 
avoidance (Lyubomirsky et al., 2006). However, this research is limited by its 
correlational approach. Thus far, there have been no experimental studies that have 
demonstrated that rumination affords increased avoidance (i.e., by manipulating 
rumination and demonstrating that it leads to avoidant outcomes). Moreover, there 
have been no studies to specifically test the reinforcement hypothesis (i.e., that 
justification for avoidance elicited by rumination leads to more rumination). As such, 
further experimental studies are required to test this functional account of rumination. 
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1.2.3.5. Metacognitive model of rumination. 
Metacognition refers to “knowledge and cognition about cognitive phenomena” 
(Flavell, 1979, p. 906). Specifically, metacognitive beliefs concern “the costs and 
benefits of particular types of thinking … these beliefs have motivational 
consequences by encouraging the individual to engage in certain types of thinking or 
expend effort in controlling thoughts” (Wells, 1995, p. 303).  
The metacognitive model of rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) 
proposes that beliefs about rumination are involved in its activation and maintenance 
as a coping strategy, as the ruminative process occurs within a feedback loop which 
allows for rumination to be sustained, despite its negative consequences. Initially, 
positive beliefs about rumination motivate individuals to engage in rumination when 
faced with difficulties (e.g., “Ruminating about the past helps me to prevent future 
mistakes and failures”). Once engaged in sustained rumination, negative beliefs about 
rumination become activated, such as beliefs about its uncontrollability, harmfulness, 
and detrimental social consequences, and this contributes to the development of 
depressive symptoms (e.g., “I can’t stop myself from ruminating”, “Nobody wants to 
be with people who ruminate all the time”). The depressive symptoms lead to the 
experience of reduced metacognitive confidence (e.g., “My memory can mislead me 
at times”), which contributes to sustaining the negative beliefs about rumination, as 
well as maintaining the positive beliefs relating to the need to ruminate to help cope 
with difficulties. Thus, individuals become stuck in a vicious cycle of persistent 
rumination.  
A number of studies are consistent with the hypothesis that metacognitive 
beliefs about rumination are associated with persistent engagement in rumination. 
Correlational studies demonstrate relationships between having metacognitive beliefs 
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about the function of rumination, and engaging in greater levels of rumination (e.g., 
de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2001, Watkins & Moulds, 2005a). Moreover, in studies 
specifically examining the metacognitive model of rumination (Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2003), structural equation modelling has been used to demonstrate that the 
model provides a good statistical fit to the data (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Roelofs, 
Papageorgiou, Gerber, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2007; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, 
Arntz, & van Os, 2010).  
In a quasi-experiment, Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams, and Kandris (2010) 
exposed individuals with high versus low levels of positive beliefs about rumination 
to an insolvable anagram task, and assessed subsequent self-reported rumination. 
Regardless of whether participants received positive, negative, or neutral feedback 
about anagram performance, participants with higher endorsement of positive beliefs 
about rumination reported more state rumination than participants with lower levels of 
positive beliefs.  
A small number of prospective longitudinal studies also provide support for 
the metacognitive model of rumination. In a study examining the metacognitive 
model of rumination and depression in a nonclinical sample, Papageorgiou and Wells 
(2009) found that negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination predicted 
subsequent symptoms of depression 12 weeks later, after controlling for baseline 
levels of rumination and depression. However, this study did not examine whether 
these beliefs predicted change in rumination itself. Specifically examining whether 
beliefs predicted future rumination, Weber and Exner (2013) found that in a 
nondepressed student sample, positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination 
predicted changes in rumination two months later. However, there have been no 
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experimental studies that test the metacognitive model of rumination by manipulating 
beliefs about rumination and measuring the effect on subsequent engagement in 
rumination.  
However, one methodological concern arising from the literature in this area is 
that it is possible that there may be contamination between measures of rumination, 
and measures of beliefs about rumination, as there may be some overlap in the way 
these variables are measured. For example, a widely used measure of beliefs about 
rumination, the Positive Beliefs About Rumination Scale (PBRS; Papageorgiou & 
Wells, 2001a), contains items such as “In order to understand my feelings of 
depression I need to ruminate about my problems”, and “I need to ruminate about my 
problems to find the causes of my depression”. This could potentially overlap with 
items on the RSQ-RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), such as “Analyse your 
personality to try and understand why you are depressed” and “Try to understand 
yourself by focusing on your depressed mood”. As such, it is important to give careful 
consideration to the way these variables are assessed.  
 Taken together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that positive 
beliefs about rumination (e.g., believing that rumination helps with problem solving) 
may contribute to a tendency to engage in rumination when faced with difficulties, 
but as the evidence is correlational and prospective, as yet, it is not possible to 
conclude whether beliefs about rumination cause a tendency towards rumination.  
1.2.3.6. Developmental accounts of rumination. 
Theoretical links have been made between a number of experiences early in 
life and the development of rumination. Specifically, rumination has been associated 
with parental modelling (specifically, co-rumination between parents and children), 
and traumatic life events, particularly abuse and maltreatment in childhood. 
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Co-rumination between parents and children may play a role in a parent 
socialising a child into the use of rumination, as a result of the parent modelling the 
ruminative process. Co-rumination, a form of rumination that can occur in dialogue 
between individuals and is usually unconstructive, specifically refers to “extensively 
discussing and revisiting problems, speculating about problems, and focusing on 
negative feelings” (Rose, 2002, p. 1830). In a study specifically examining mother-
adolescent co-rumination, Waller and Rose (2010) found that mothers were 
significantly more likely to co-ruminate with daughters rather than sons (a possible 
explanation for greater levels of rumination found in female adolescents, cf. Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991). They also found that level of mother-adolescent co-rumination was 
significantly and positively associated with adolescent symptoms of depression and 
anxiety. The finding that co-rumination predicts depression symptoms has been 
repeated in several studies (Hankin, Stone, & Wright, 2010; Stone, Hankin, Gibb, & 
Abela, 2011; Stone, Uhrlass, & Gibb, 2010; Waller & Rose, 2013). However, these 
studies do not demonstrate that co-rumination between parents and children causes 
the development and/or maintenance of intrapersonal rumination in children. As such, 
these studies do not establish whether or not parental modelling of ruminative 
thinking via the interpersonal process of co-rumination is a vulnerability factor for 
intrapersonal rumination.  
In the only study to directly examine the relationship between mother and 
child rumination (Gibb, Grassia, Stone, & Uhrlass, 2012) demonstrated that whilst the 
children of mothers with a history of depression had significantly greater levels of 
brooding rumination, with the magnitude of the relationship being influenced by the 
degree of the child’s exposure to the maternal depression (i.e., duration and 
recurrence of depression), no significant relationship was found between mother and 
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child brooding rumination. However, as the children included in this study were 
between 8 – 12 years old (mean age 9.97 years), it is possible that the capacity to 
engage in ruminative thinking was yet to develop in some of the younger children in 
this sample. Whilst the evidence concerning the age at which rumination develops is 
inconsistent, Hampel and Petermann (2005) found that early adolescents (10 - 12 
years) and middle adolescents (12 – 13 years) reported significantly more rumination 
than children in late childhood (8 – 10 years). As such, further longitudinal and 
experimental studies are required to examine the direct relationship between parental 
modelling of a ruminative thinking style and rumination in children and adolescents.  
In addition, it has also been hypothesised that traumatic events, in particular, 
abuse and maltreatment in childhood, are associated with the development of 
rumination. Spasojević and Alloy (2002) hypothesised that depressive rumination 
might develop as a result of maltreatment and abuse in childhood, because these sorts 
of experiences may lead children to feel as though they have little control over their 
lives and personal environments. In addition, Conway et al. (2004) proposed a variety 
of different pathways by which maltreatment can confer vulnerability to rumination. 
First, they suggest that abuse may make individuals become less trusting and more 
withdrawn, and thus when faced with a low mood, they may choose to ruminate 
rather than seek social support. Second, they proposed that abuse may make 
individuals feel powerless, and thus abused individuals may choose not to engage in 
externally-oriented forms of problem solving. Third, they highlight that some people 
who have been abused have a tendency to blame negative outcomes on personal 
characteristics which they judge to be stable and internal, resulting in increased 
rumination when faced with negative situations. Finally, they suggest that low self-
esteem, which often results from the experience of abuse, may mean that abused 
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individuals have a tendency to overgeneralise the consequences when faced with 
negative outcomes, also fostering increased rumination.  
Consistent with this hypothesis, Conway et al. (2004) found that retrospective 
self-reports of sexual abuse in childhood and adulthood were associated with 
increased levels of self-reported rumination on sadness. Examining emotional abuse, 
Raes and Hermans (2008) found that rumination was correlated with retrospective 
reports of childhood emotional abuse, and that rumination mediated the relationship 
between childhood emotional abuse and depression in adulthood. In a study of 
currently depressed adults, Barnhofer, Kuehn, de Jong-Meyer, and Williams (2007) 
found that in female participants, experience of physical or sexual assault lead to 
more positive beliefs about the benefits of rumination: Depressed participants without 
a history of abuse reported fewer positive beliefs. This finding suggests that for 
people who have experienced this type of trauma, rumination may be perceived to 
have functional properties for coping with the emotional consequences of abuse. 
Spasojević and Alloy (2002) found that in adult participants, retrospective report of 
the experience of sexual and emotional abuse in childhood was associated with 
increased levels of rumination. 
In addition, several studies have demonstrated an association between other 
traumatic life events and rumination. For example, rumination has been associated 
with bereavement (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Davis, 1999; Nolen-Hoeksema, McBride, 
& Larson, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994), the experience of natural disasters 
(e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), chronic illness (e.g., Soo, Burney, & 
Basten, 2009), and road traffic accidents (e.g., Ehlers et al., 1998, 2003; Ehring, Frank, 
& Ehlers, 2008). 
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1.2.3.7. Personality accounts of rumination. 
Neuroticism has been proposed as a personality trait that may confer increased 
vulnerability to rumination. Neuroticism refers to an individual’s relatively stable 
tendency to experience negative emotional states, such as feelings of anxiety, sadness, 
and anger (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991). Neuroticism involves difficulties with 
emotion regulation, and an individual high on neuroticism is “overly emotional, 
reacting too strongly to all sorts of stimuli, and finds it difficult to get back on an even 
keel after each emotionally arousing experience” (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991, p. 4).  
In terms of the origins of neuroticism, genetic and environmental contributions 
to the development of trait neuroticism are roughly equal (Laceulle, Ormel, Aggen, 
Neale, & Kendler, 2013). Neuroticism predicts a range of negative outcomes and 
psychopathologies; in particular, it predicts the development of depression and 
anxiety, as well as poor prognosis for the course of these disorders (Clark, Watson, & 
Mineka, 1994).  
In considering how neuroticism may influence rumination, it is important to 
consider the cognitive substrates underpinning neuroticism. In a recent review of the 
neuroticism literature, Augustine, Larsen, and Lee (2013) identified four different 
levels of processing which are influenced by neuroticism, noting that neuroticism 
influences (i) stimulus reactivity; (ii) cognitive style; (iii) how information is encoded 
and recalled; and (iv) judgments and decision-making. The evidence for each of these 
cognitive components associated with neuroticism will be briefly reviewed, with 
respect to how they may relate to rumination.  
First, Augustine et al. (2013) reviewed evidence that neuroticism influences 
stimulus reactivity, noting that individuals high in neuroticism have stronger negative 
affective reactions to stimuli, with evidence for this coming from inside and outside 
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of the laboratory. In the lab, individuals high on neuroticism show greater negative 
emotional reactions to mood inductions (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991), false performance 
feedback (Larsen & Kelelaar, 1989), and affective images and videos (e.g., Augustine 
& Larsen, 2011; Hemenover, 2003). Outside of the lab, individuals high on 
neuroticism report more minor symptoms of illnesses (Larsen & Kasimatis, 1991), 
more undesirable daily events (David, Green, Martin, & Suis, 1997), day-to-day 
problems (Suls & Martin, 2005), and more negative appraisals of daily stressors 
(Gunthert, Cohen, & Armeli, 1999).  
Second, neuroticism influences cognitive style such that it is associated with 
attentional focus towards negative stimuli, inconsistent and erratic responses to 
stimuli, and inefficient allocation of effort to task demands (Augustine et al., 2013). 
There is evidence that individuals high on neuroticism are more likely to attend to 
negative stimuli and have a negative self-focus (e.g., Field, Joudy, & Hart, 2010). 
Moreover, there is evidence that neuroticism is associated with erratic responses to 
stimuli, termed the mental noise hypothesis (Robinson & Tamir, 2005): Individuals 
high on neuroticism show considerable variation in reaction time across trials, 
whereas individuals low on neuroticism show more even distribution of reaction time, 
with reaction time peaking on the point on the point of decision in these tasks. This 
“noise” observed in the responses of neurotic individuals is thought to reflect 
interference from other sources, such as deficiencies in executive functioning.  
Third, neuroticism is hypothesised to influence encoding and recall of 
information, with Augustine et al. (2013, p. 321) hypothesising that “the highly 
neurotic individual should possess a broad and densely interconnected associative 
network for negative information. With more negative experiences and a bias toward 
interpreting events as negative, those higher in neuroticism possess memory systems 
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that are relatively awash with negative affective information”. Whilst there is less 
direct evidence in support of this hypothesis, there is evidence that neuroticism is 
associated with negative affective priming (Robinson, Ode, Moeller, & Goetz, 2007). 
Finally, neuroticism is hypothesised to influence judgments and decision-
making (Augustine et al., 2013). Consistent with this, there is evidence that 
individuals high on neuroticism are quicker to make evaluations of word categories 
when experiencing negative mood (e.g., sadness), relative to individuals lower on 
neuroticism (Tamir & Robinson, 2004). There is also evidence that individuals high 
on neuroticism are more prone to relying on the recognition heuristic (Hilbig, 2008), 
which refers to the notion of making decisions based on recognition or familiarity 
only, rather than making use of further knowledge (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). 
Considering accounts of how rumination may be associated with neuroticism, 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1994) hypothesised that the personality trait of neuroticism 
may manifest itself in the cognitive domain as an increased tendency to engage in 
repetitive thought in response to depressed moods. Rumination is hypothesised to be a 
specific mechanism by which the global trait of neuroticism is related to depression, 
and Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1994) proposed that rumination might mediate the 
relationship between the personality trait of neuroticism and symptoms of depression. 
Elaborating on this, Roberts et al. (1998) hypothesised that individuals high on 
neuroticism tend to focus their attention on negative moods and experiences by 
engaging in rumination, which then amplify these moods and experiences, resulting in 
the prolonging of the negative mood. This is consistent with the cognitive 
mechanisms underpinning neuroticism reviewed previously (Augustine et al., 2013), 
specifically, that neuroticism influences negative stimulus reactivity and is associated 
with processing biases towards negative stimuli. 
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A number of cross-sectional studies find evidence consistent with the 
hypothesis that rumination and neuroticism are associated. In studies using 
nonclinical adult samples, rumination fully mediated the relationship between 
neuroticism and symptoms of depression (Kuyken et al., 2006; Muris, Roelofs, Rassin, 
Franken, & Mayer, 2005). Rumination partially mediated the relationship between 
neuroticism and depression in nonclinical adolescents (Muris, Fokke, & Kwik, 2009) 
and in currently depressed adults (Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & Van Os, 2008).  
In a further nonclinical sample, Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, and Arntz (2008) 
found that rumination on sadness partially mediated the relationship between 
neuroticism and symptoms of depression. Moreover, Nolan, Roberts, and Gotlib 
(1998) found that rumination was correlated with neuroticism, and it mediated the 
prospective relationship between neuroticism and depression (rumination and 
neuroticism were measured at one time point which precluded examination of their 
prospective relationship). Roberts et al. (1998) found that rumination fully mediated 
the relationship between neuroticism and number of lifetime episodes of dysphoria. 
Finally, Verstraeten et al. (2009) conducted a moderated mediation analysis with 
cross-sectional data and found that the relationship between negative affectivity 
(neuroticism) and depression symptoms was mediated by rumination, but with the 
relationship between neuroticism and rumination moderated by effortful control (only 
at low levels of effortful control was the relationship between neuroticism and 
rumination significant).   
There is also prospective evidence consistent with the hypothesis that 
neuroticism is a vulnerability factor for rumination. Barnhofer and Chittka (2010) 
found that neuroticism prospectively predicted rumination, measured six years later, 
and that rumination significantly mediated the relationship between neuroticism and 
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current depression. When analysing prospective data, Verstraeten et al. (2009) did not 
find that rumination mediated the prospective relationship between negative 
affectivity (neuroticism) and depression, but when conducting a moderated mediation 
analysis with the rumination–depression relationship being mediated by effortful 
control, moderated mediation was found, such that rumination only prospectively 
predicted depression at low levels of effortful control. 
In addition, a number of cross-sectional studies not specifically examining the 
meditational relationship between neuroticism, rumination, and depression have 
demonstrated significant associations between rumination and neuroticism, in 
currently depressed samples (Bagby & Parker, 2001; Lam, Smith, Checkley, Rijsdijk, 
& Sham, 2003) and nonclinical samples (Hankin, Lakdawalla, Carter, Abela, & 
Adams, 2007; Wupperman & Neumann, 2006). 
In summary, these findings provide support for the relationship between 
neuroticism and rumination, however due to the cross-sectional and longitudinal 
approaches adopted, they do not provide casual evidence for the hypothesis that 
neuroticism contributes to a tendency towards rumination.  
1.3. Worry 
1.3.1. Defining Worry 
Worry refers to “a chain of thoughts and images, negatively affect-laden and 
relatively uncontrollable; it represents an attempt to engage in mental problem-
solving on an issue whose outcome is uncertain but contains the possibility of one or 
more negative outcomes” (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983, p. 10). 
Worry is characterised by a focus on anticipated future threat or uncertainty (Watkins, 
2008); examples of worrisome thoughts include, “What if I mess up at my interview 
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tomorrow?” or, “How am I going to pay for that expensive repair bill?” There is 
considerable overlap between worrisome thoughts and ruminative thoughts. For 
example, Watkins (2008) observed that both worry and rumination involve repetitive 
thought focused on more general meanings and implications, rather than on more 
specific and concrete details. This commonality between the characteristics of 
rumination and worry will be fully addressed in Section 1.4.1. 
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990) is the most widely used measure of trait worry. The PSWQ 
examines the general tendency towards engagement in worry, as well as how 
excessive and generalised the worry is (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). It contains 16 
items that take the form of statements (e.g., “Once I start worrying, I can’t stop”, “I 
find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts”), and respondents are instructed to rate 
how characteristic each item is of themselves, on a scale from 1 (not at all typical) to 
5 (very typical). 
1.3.2. Evidence for the Negative Effects of Worry 
Worry is highly prevalent, being described as a “pervasive human 
activity…nearly everyone is periodically aware of its occurrence, and for some it is a 
constant but unwanted and severe companion” (Borkovec, 1994, p. 5). Like 
rumination, worry is also associated with a number of negative psychological 
processes. Chronic worry is the central feature of generalised anxiety disorder (GAD; 
American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000), as well as contributing to the 
maintenance of other anxiety disorders (Watkins, 2008). A better understanding of the 
development and maintenance of worry can assist in understanding anxiety disorders 
and developing effective treatment and prevention interventions (Borkovec, 1994). 
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Anxiety disorders refer to a range of conditions, including panic disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), social phobia, posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), and GAD. In the context of the literature on pathological RNT, rumination 
and worry have most frequently been studied with respect to GAD, social anxiety, and 
PTSD (Watkins, 2008).  
GAD is characterised by excessive anxiety and worry for at least six months. 
The anxiety and worry relate to a number of different activities and events, is hard for 
the individual to control, and is accompanied by a number of symptoms, including 
restlessness, difficulties concentrating, being easily fatigued, irritability, muscle 
tension, and disturbed sleep (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000).  
PTSD involves the development of symptoms following exposure to a highly 
traumatic stressor and subsequently reacting with feelings of fear, horror or 
helplessness. In PTSD, the individual persistently re-experiences the traumatic event, 
avoids stimuli associated with the trauma, and experiences persistent increased 
arousal (American Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000). 
Cross-sectional studies demonstrate a relationship between worry and anxiety. 
In undergraduate samples, worry is strongly correlated with trait anxiety (Borkovec et 
al., 1983) and symptoms of GAD (Meyer et al., 1990; Segerstrom et al., 2000). In a 
study of Cambodian refugees who had experienced highly traumatic events, worry 
was associated with symptoms of PTSD (Hinton, Nickerson, & Bryant, 2011). Similar 
findings have been reported in cross-sectional studies with children and adolescents. 
Weems, Silverman, and La Greca (2000) studied children aged 6–16 years old who 
had been referred to a clinic with anxiety or phobia problems. On a variety of self-
report measures of worry and anxiety, anxiety was significantly correlated with a 
variety of aspects of worry (e.g., number, intensity, and frequency of worries).  
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Longitudinal studies demonstrate that worry is a temporal antecedent of 
changes in anxiety symptoms. In studies with adults, worry predicted change in 
anxiety symptoms (after one month, Hong, 2007; after 6-8 weeks, Calmes & Roberts, 
2007). Worry during a stressful period (undergraduate university examinations) also 
predicted anxiety symptoms one week after termination of the stressor (Segerstrom et 
al., 2000). Worry also predicted symptoms of PTSD after 6 months (Holeva, Tarrier, 
& Wells, 2001). In a study of undergraduates, worry predicted symptoms of stress 
three months later (Roussis & Wells, 2008). 
 Experimental studies manipulating worry demonstrate its causal influence on 
symptoms of anxiety.  Borkovec and Hu (1990) experimentally manipulated worry 
prior to mental imagery of a feared activity (public speaking), and found that 
participants in the worrisome thinking group had greater self-reported fear in response 
to the mental imagery relative to participants in the relaxed and neutral thinking 
groups. In a similar study, participants experimentally manipulated to worry showed 
greater fear and vividness responses to phobic images relative to participants who 
engaged in relaxed thinking (Borkovec, Lyonfields, Wiser, & Deihl, 1993). 
McLaughlin, Borkovec, and Sibrava (2007) experimentally manipulated worry and 
found that it led to increased negative affect, and increased symptoms of depression 
and anxiety.  
Studies examining worry, alongside or independently of rumination, provide 
evidence for its association with depression. In a correlational study, Segerstrom et al. 
(2000) found that worry was associated with symptoms of depression. Moreover, in a 
study involving factor analysis of measures of rumination, worry, depression, and 
anxiety, Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, and Heimberg (2002) found two distinct 
factors that accounted for the majority of the variance on the measures of worry and 
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rumination, which they termed worry engagement and dwelling on the negative, 
respectively. Both of these factors were correlated with each other, as well as being 
correlated with measures of depression, indicating a relationship between worry and 
depressive symptoms. Starcevic (1995) examined worry in individuals with diagnoses 
of depression or GAD, and found that mean PSWQ scores of depression and GAD 
participants fell within less than one point of each other, indicating an almost identical 
mean score for each group. As such, these results support existing findings 
demonstrating the association between worry and anxiety, but they also suggest worry 
may be significantly related to depression.  
Worry has additional negative consequences beyond its association with 
depression and anxiety. In correlational studies, worry has been associated with 
sleeping difficulties and insomnia (Harvey, 2000), elevated levels of the stress 
hormone cortisol (Schlotz, Hellhammer, Schultz, & Stone, 2004), and self-reported 
fatigue (Andrea et al., 2004). In prospective studies, worry predicts impaired wound 
repair and recovery post-surgery (Broadbent, Petrie, Alley, & Booth, 2003), decreased 
functional status (e.g., mobility, grip strength) in arthritis patients (Evers, Kraaimaat, 
Geenen, & Bijlsma, 1998), delayed healing in psoriasis patients (Fortune et al., 2003), 
and lower numbers of cells that respond to infection (Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, 
& Fahey, 1998).  
1.3.3. Theoretical Models of Worry 
In this section, there will be a discussion of theoretical models of worry, and 
evaluation of the supporting evidence for these models. This section will review the 
avoidance and reduced concreteness theories of worry (Borkovec, 1994; Stöber, 
1998), the intolerance of uncertainty model of worry (Krohne, 1989; Freeston, 
Rhéaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994), the metacognitive model of worry 
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(Wells, 1995), developmental accounts of anxiety (e.g., Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; 
Rapee, 1997), and temperamental models of anxiety (behavioural inhibition; 
Biederman et al., 1993). 
1.3.3.1. Avoidance and reduced concreteness theories of worry. 
Like rumination, worry is hypothesised to have avoidant functions. Borkovec 
(1994) characterised worry as an internal verbal-linguistic function that allows 
cognitive avoidance of threatening information. This theory is based on a series of 
findings from individuals with GAD: When asked about the benefits that they derive 
from worrying, the reasons most frequently offered refer to an avoidance of threat 
(Borkovec, 1994). Like Ferster’s (1973) functional operant conditioning account (see 
Section 1.2.3.4), Borkovec proposed that worry is reinforced and strengthened in a 
similar avoidance paradigm. He proposed five ways that worry could be reinforced, 
either immediately, or through a delayed schedule of reinforcement (Borkovec, 1994, 
p. 16): 
1. Worry as “superstitious avoidance of catastrophe”: the belief that worrying 
about an event means that it is less likely to occur. This belief receives delayed 
negative reinforcement as a result of the nonoccurrence of the feared catastrophe.   
2. Worry as “actual avoidance of catastrophe”: the belief that worry can serve 
as a method of problem solving that can assist with preventing an event. Again, this 
receives delayed negative reinforcement when the event does not occur.  
3. Worry as “avoidance of deeper emotional topics”: worrying about certain 
topics as a means of distracting attention and thought away from other emotional 
topics that the individual does not want to think about. This receives immediate 
negative reinforcement when this emotional avoidance strategy is effective.  
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4. Worry as “coping preparation”: the belief that worrying about a future event 
will assist in dealing with that event if it occurs. This belief is reinforced when 
emotional reactions to events are perceived as having been moderated by the 
preceding worry and expectation of a negative emotional reaction.  
5. Worry as a “motivating device”: worrying about tasks acts as an unpleasant 
stimulus, to encourage the individual to complete the tasks at hand. The worry acts as 
an aversive stimulus, and when tasks are accomplished, the belief is reinforced.  
Borkovec (1994) further hypothesised that worrying is negatively reinforced 
by suppression of the autonomic features of the anxious experience, which in turn, 
leads to inhibition of emotional processing. The immediate function of worry 
(suppression of autonomic activity) is the feature that gives rise to the maintenance of 
anxiety, through perpetuating threatening meanings (by preventing emotional 
processing).  
This theory is based on evidence that demonstrates that verbal-linguistic 
thought has little effect on cardiovascular activity, when compared to imagery of the 
same material (Vrana, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1986). Borkovec (1994) proposed that 
abstract conceptual thought (e.g., worry) has few connections to physiological 
channels and occurs in relative isolation from physiological and behavioural channels, 
and that this has adaptive value in evolutionary terms:  “Because thought is not 
immediately expressed in efferent channels, humans are able to delay overt 
responding, search memory for usable information, manipulate symbols, deploy 
logical analysis and problem-solving tactics, and freely experiment with possibilities 
in the absence of any environmental consequences during such processing” (p. 18). 
However, Borkovec proposed that this system also allows individuals to engage in 
maladaptive forms of thought, such as pathological worry.  
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In terms of the mechanisms responsible for this suppression effect, one theory 
is that it relates to the way in which worrisome thought can be characterised by 
reduced concreteness (Borkovec, Ray, & Stöber, 1998). The reduced concreteness 
theory of worry (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) elaborates on the avoidance theory of 
worry (Borkovec, 1994), proposing that worrying about problems in an abstract way 
reduces the likelihood of finding concrete solutions to these problems, thus allowing 
the problem to remain unresolved, and the worrying to continue. Moreover, the act of 
worrying in an abstract manner is reinforced. As outlined previously, verbal thought 
generates fewer physiological symptoms of anxiety (e.g., increased heart rate) than 
mental images. Whilst mental images can be primed by verbal thoughts, generating 
mental images from abstract (rather than concrete) mental verbalisations is more time 
consuming, and it produces images that are less vivid (Paivio & Marschark, 1991). As 
such, if worrisome thought is verbally abstract, mental images may still be produced, 
but they will be less vivid and intrusive, affording commensurate reduction in 
physiological symptoms of anxiety. Therefore, worry will be negatively reinforced as 
a result of the commensurate reduction in the somatic anxiety response resulting from 
focusing on verbal thoughts of an abstract nature (Borkovec et al., 1998). It is 
noteworthy that both the reduced concreteness theory of worry (Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002) and the processing mode theory of RT (Watkins, 2008) implicate level of 
abstraction in influencing engagement in RNT.  
There is empirical evidence for a relationship between reduced concreteness 
and worry. Stöber, Tepperwien, and Staak (2000, Study 2) had undergraduate student 
participants elaborate on personal problems using catastrophising interviews (where 
participants were asked “what worries you most about X?”, with step X being 
substituted with what the participant gave in the previous answer, until the participant 
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could not generate any further new answers; cf. Vasey & Borkovec, 1992). Worry 
was associated with reduced concreteness of problem elaborations, such that more 
worrisome problems were elaborated on in a more abstract way than less worrisome 
problems. The same pattern of findings was observed in a study of participants with 
GAD (Stöber et al., 2000, Study 1), where participants used problem elaboration 
charts that required them to write about three potential antecedents of problems, and 
three potential consequences: more worrisome problems were associated with less 
concrete elaborations.  
Further evidence comes from a study comparing GAD participants with 
nonclinical control participants (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). Participants completed a 
problem elaboration questionnaire, where they wrote descriptions of two current 
problems, followed by three potential consequences of each problem. Participants 
with GAD, the hallmark of which is excessive and generalised worry, generated 
answers that were rated as significantly less concrete than the nonclinical participants, 
providing further support for the reduced concreteness theory of worry. 
There is also an extensive literature indicating that worry reduces 
physiological responding relative to other forms of thought, which is consistent with 
Borkovec’s (1994) hypothesis that worrying inhibits emotional responding, and 
Stöber & Borkovec’s (2002) hypothesis that abstract worrying affords a reduction in 
aversive symptoms of anxious arousal. For example, there is evidence that worry 
suppresses somatic anxiety by suppressing the cardiovascular response to threatening 
images. Borkovec and Hu (1990) conducted an experiment examining the 
physiological effects of worry, in which speech-anxious participants had to use 
mental imagery to visualise giving a speech to a large group of people. Prior to the 
imagery, participants had to engage in worrisome thinking, relaxed thinking, or 
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neutral thinking. Participants in the worrisome thinking group showed little or no 
cardiovascular response to the phobic imagery, which contrasted with those in the 
relaxed and neutral thinking groups, who showed significant heart rate reactions to the 
phobic imagery. This study provides evidence that worrying suppresses the aversive 
physiological features of anxiety, which may result in worry being negatively 
reinforced as an avoidance response to aversive situations. In a similar study, 
participants experimentally manipulated to worry with a focus on verbal thoughts 
showed significantly less heart rate response to phobic images, relative to participants 
who engaged in relaxed thinking (Borkovec et al., 1993). 
1.3.3.2. Intolerance of uncertainty model of worry. 
Intolerance of uncertainty is defined as “the tendency to react negatively on an 
emotional, cognitive, and behavioural level to uncertain situations and events ... 
individuals who are intolerant of uncertainty find ambiguity stressful and upsetting, 
believe uncertainty is negative and should be avoided, and have difficulty functioning 
in uncertain situations” (Buhr & Dugas, 2006, p. 223). Krohne (1993) proposed that 
individuals with GAD are intolerant of the autonomic arousal associated with anxiety, 
as well as intolerant of uncertainty.  
It has been hypothesised that intolerance of uncertainty leads to worry for two 
key reasons (Freeston et al., 1994). First, an individual who is intolerant of 
uncertainty may engage in worry if they believe that worrying helps them to increase 
their sense of control and reduce uncertainty.  Second, intolerance of uncertainty may 
lead to increased anxious physiological arousal in uncertain situations (Krohne, 1989). 
Therefore, if an individual is intolerant of this sort of anxious arousal, worrying may 
help to reduce these aversive physical symptoms, as it involves thoughts of a verbal-
linguistic nature, which is associated with less physiological arousal than imagery of 
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the same material. Krohne (1989) proposed that people who are intolerant of 
uncertainty typically utilise “vigilant” coping strategies (e.g., “anticipation of negative 
events”, “planning for the future”), the functions of which appear to have 
considerable overlap with commonly reported functional and metacognitive beliefs 
accounts of RNT (e.g., Borkovec, 1994; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). 
A number of studies demonstrate a cross-sectional relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty and worry. In undergraduate samples, intolerance of 
uncertainty, measured by the self-report Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; 
English version, Buhr & Dugas, 2002; French version, Freeston et al., 1994) was 
correlated with trait worry (Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas, Freeston, & Ladouceur, 
1997). The same pattern of findings emerges in adolescent samples (Laugesen, Dugas, 
& Bukowski, 2003). In developing the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale, in addition to 
demonstrating the correlational relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and 
trait worry, Freeston et al. (1994) demonstrated that participants with GAD scored 
significantly higher on the IUS than nonclinical participants. Moreover, in a study 
using both dysphoric and nondysphoric participants, worry was associated with 
intolerance of uncertainty across dysphoria status (de Jong-Meyer et al., 2009). 
Finally, whilst fewer studies have examined rumination and intolerance of uncertainty, 
there is evidence for a cross-sectional association between the two constructs from 
studies examining both worry and rumination alongside intolerance of uncertainty. 
Rumination has been associated with intolerance of uncertainty in both dysphoric and 
nondyphoric participants (de Jong-Meyer et al., 2009). Additionally, in a study of 
participants with depression and/or GAD, rumination fully mediated the relationship 
between intolerance of uncertainty and depression, and worry partially mediated the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and anxiety (Liao & Wei, 2011).  
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The only English-language experimental study to attempt to manipulate 
intolerance of uncertainty used a gambling task, and following the experimental 
manipulation, participants manipulated to have greater intolerance of uncertainty 
showed greater levels of worry, relative to those manipulated to have less intolerance 
of uncertainty (Ladouceur, Gosselin, & Dugas, 2000). However, there are a number of 
methodological limitations to this study, the first of which is that arguably, the 
researchers actually manipulated uncertainty itself, rather than intolerance of 
uncertainty. The manipulation involved relaying information to participants that led 
them to believe their chances of winning on a gambling task were high (allegedly 
decreasing intolerance of uncertainty) or low (allegedly increasing intolerance of 
uncertainty). However, it could be argued that this manipulation actually influenced 
sense of uncertainty, with participants being manipulated to feel more or less certain 
about winning, without any actual manipulation of how tolerable that sense of 
certainty was for them. Moreover, the conclusions are limited in that this study did 
not measure levels of generalised worry, only worry relating to one specific topic 
(worry about a fictitious charity not receiving money if participants lost at a gambling 
task). In addition, no baseline measures of worry were taken prior to the manipulation 
of intolerance of uncertainty, and therefore the study does not demonstrate that the 
manipulation caused greater worry, only that those participants in the high intolerance 
of uncertainty group displayed more worry than those in the low intolerance of 
uncertainty group. 
Whilst there is some evidence for the association between intolerance of 
uncertainty and worry (and to a much lesser extent, rumination), the extant evidence 
is generally limited by its correlational approach, precluding examination of whether 
intolerance of uncertainty causally influences worry. As such, further experimental 
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studies are required to test the causal relationship between intolerance of uncertainty 
and worry.  
1.3.3.3. Metacognitive model of worry. 
The metacognitive model of worry (Wells, 1995) proposes that worry is 
initiated by metacognitive beliefs about the effects of worry, and it becomes harmful 
when individuals begin to worry about worrying (i.e., meta-worry or “Type 2” worry). 
Wells (1995) proposed that individuals are initially motivated to engage in worry in 
response to real or imagined threats. This tendency is hypothesised to arise for a 
variety of reasons (e.g., parental modelling of the benefits of worry; worry protecting 
against unexpected negative events; worry being associated with the non-occurrence 
of feared events).  
Wells (1995) hypothesised that harmful meta-worry can develop for four 
reasons. First, repeated engagement in worry may lead to automatisation of the worry 
process in response to a variety of cues. As a result of how easily it is elicited, 
individuals may then perceive the worry as uncontrollable, and these negative beliefs 
about worry can contribute to engagement in meta-worry. Second, individuals may 
not attempt to stop worrying as a result of having positive beliefs about its utility, or 
perceiving it to be uncontrollable, leading to unrestrained engagement in worry. Third, 
individuals may develop meta-worry as a result of experiencing life events that 
demonstrate the harmful effects of excessive worrying (e.g., observing a parent who 
modelled worrying developing mental health problems). Finally, engagement in 
worry may block emotional processing of difficulties, and as such, this may lead to 
meta-worry about diminished mental control. Wells (1995, p. 306) suggested that 
individuals with GAD are in a state of “meta-cognitive dissonance in which positive 
beliefs about worrying and negative beliefs co-exist. Beliefs about the advantages of 
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worrying or the costs of not worrying are likely to contribute to worry periods of 
longer duration. For example, the belief that one must ruminate on a problem until an 
answer is found or until things feel as if they will be alright will motivate the use of 
worry as a strategy and increase the duration of worry episodes”.  
A number of studies are consistent with the hypothesis that metacognitive 
beliefs about worry are associated with engagement in worry. Correlational studies 
demonstrate an association between having metacognitive beliefs about the utility of 
worry, and engaging in greater levels of worry (Bacow, Pincus, Ehrenreich, & Brody, 
2009; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Davis & Valentiner, 2000; de Jong-Meyer et 
al., 2009; Irak & Tosun, 2008; Nuevo, Montorio, & Borkovec, 2004; Wells, 2005; 
Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998; Yilmaz, Gençöz, & 
Wells, 2008).  
Two prospective longitudinal studies also provide support for metacognitive 
models of worry. In a prospective study examining worry and maladaptive coping 
with a four-month follow-up, baseline levels of positive and negative metacognitive 
beliefs predicted subsequent level of worry, after controlling for initial levels of worry 
(Sica, Steketee, Ghisi, Chiri, & Franceschini, 2007). In addition, 
avoidant/maladaptive coping was predicted by positive metacognitive beliefs about 
worry, after controlling for baseline levels of avoidant/maladaptive coping. In a 
prospective study examining the prospective relationships between stressful events, 
positive beliefs about worry and engagement in worry, Iijima and Tanno (2013) found 
that positive beliefs about worry significantly moderated the relationship between 
stressful events and worry, with stressful events leading to greater levels of worry in 
individuals with high positive beliefs about worry.   
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Only one study has experimentally manipulated beliefs about worry to 
examine the effects on engagement in worry. Prados (2011) manipulated beliefs about 
the utility of worry, and found no differences in worrisome thoughts between groups 
manipulated to perceive worry as constructive versus unconstructive. However, there 
were a number of methodological issues with this study. First, it is possible that the 
overt manipulation of beliefs about worry may have resulted in demand effects, since 
the manipulation was quite explicit (e.g., “According to prestigious scientists, worry 
has positive consequences…”; Prados, 2011, p. 218). Second, there were potential 
methodological issues with the prompts used to afford engagement in worry. In the 
first experiment, participants received a “worrisome message” about the 
disappearance of an indigenous Amazonian culture. Due to this message not being 
personally relevant to participants, it may have been insufficiently powerful to prompt 
engagement in worry. In the second experiment, participants were instructed to 
engage in worry about an important exam. This may have had the opposite impact, 
since instructing participants to engage in worry may have resulted in high levels of 
worry in all participants, potentially reducing the capacity to observe a difference 
between experimental groups. As such, it is not possible to conclude from the limited 
experimental evidence whether manipulating beliefs about worry influences 
engagement in worry. 
1.3.3.4. Developmental accounts of worry. 
A number of theoretical models suggest that certain experiences within 
childhood and adolescent development contribute to the development of worry and 
anxiety. Whilst some of these models have tended to focus on anxiety generally, 
rather than worry, since worry is a central feature of anxiety, it is still helpful to 
review these developmental theoretical models. These models specifically focus on 
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the influence of three factors: parental modelling, overcontrolling parenting, and 
traumatic life events, including abuse and maltreatment.  
In the general sense, parental modelling refers to the way in which children 
acquire behaviours through observation of their parents’ actions. Parental modelling 
of anxious behaviour refers to parents “describing problems to children as irresolvable 
or dangerous, encouraging (rewarding) children to view problems in a catastrophic 
manner, and extinguishing or punishing children’s expressions of coping thoughts and 
problem solving strategies” (Wood, McLeod, Sigman, Hwang, & Chu, 2003). Wood 
et al. (2003, p. 135) explain that “children of parents who frequently model anxious 
behaviour may come to believe that there is no way of coping effectively with 
problems and are not likely to develop strategies that can reduce anxiety”. In an early 
theoretical account of how parents can model anxious behaviours, Rachman (1977) 
proposed that anxiety can be transmitted via operant conditioning processes. He 
hypothesised that anxiety can be transmitted indirectly, through observational 
learning (i.e., parental modelling), or by the direct transmission of information from 
parent to child (i.e., verbal instructions). For example, if a child witnesses a parent’s 
anxious reaction to a feared stimulus or situation (e.g., running late for an 
appointment), the child may go on to imitate or model these reactions in the presence 
of that stimulus in the future. Ollendick, Vasey, and King (2001) proposed that 
observational learning can also occur as a result of children’s observations of the way 
in which parental behaviours are reinforced: They hypothesise that if a child 
witnesses that parental avoidant responses to aversive or feared stimuli result in a 
reduction in parental anxiety, they may develop rule-governed behaviours which 
result in them responding with avoidance to anxiety-provoking situations. In terms of 
the verbal transmission of information resulting in the operant conditioning of anxiety, 
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Ollendick et al. (2001) proposed that many anxious behaviours are both positively and 
negatively reinforced, for example, “the child who worries excessively about how he 
or she will do on a test is offered encouragement and consolation from teachers and 
peers alike”, and “the ‘anxious’ child…is frequently allowed to escape or avoid the 
unpleasant aspects of the situation and, in turn, may be negatively reinforced” (p. 240). 
 There is evidence consistent with the hypothesis that parental modelling may 
lead to worry. First, there is indirect evidence that demonstrates an association 
between parental modelling and anxiety, rather than worry specifically. In an 
observational study where children had to interpret ambiguous scenarios, anxious 
children were more likely to switch from a nonthreatening to a threatening 
interpretation after discussion with their parents, with nonanxious children showing 
the opposite pattern of responding (Barrett, Rapee, Dadds, & Ryan, 1996; Dadds, 
Barrett, Rapee, & Ryan, 1996). Moreover, there is observational evidence that 
anxious mothers catastrophise more in the presence of their children than nonanxious 
mothers (Moore, Whaley, & Sigman, 2004; Whaley, Pinto, & Sigman, 1999). In a 
further correlational study, maternal expression of fear mediated the relationship 
between mother and child fearfulness (Muris, Steerneman, Merckelbach, & Meesters, 
1996). However, it is important to note that these studies did not directly measure 
worry.  
 Second, there is some direct correlational evidence demonstrating an 
association between anxious rearing behaviours and worry in children. Muris, 
Meesters, Merckelbach, and Hülsenbeck (2000) conducted a correlational study in 
which children were asked to report on their perceptions of the rearing behaviours of 
their parents, along with their own levels of worry. Anxious rearing behaviours (e.g., 
“your parents are scared when you do something on your own”) were positively 
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associated with children’s level of worry. This study is limited by its correlational 
approach, as well as its operationalisation of parental anxious rearing (entirely 
measured through child self-report), however the evidence is consistent with the 
hypothesis that parental modelling may influence child worry. However, longitudinal 
studies and experimental studies manipulating parental modelling behaviours are 
required in order to establish the direction of causality between child worry and 
parental modelling.  
Overcontrolling parenting has been highlighted as a vulnerability factor for the 
development of anxiety. Parental overcontrol is characterised as “a pattern of 
behaviour involving excessive regulation of children’s activities and/or routines, high 
levels of parental vigilance and intrusion, and the discouragement of independent 
problem-solving ... [it] is assumed to limit the development of children’s autonomy, 
lead to perceptions of the environment as uncontrollable and a limited sense of 
personal competence of mastery” (Bögels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006, p. 841). 
Several theoretical accounts emphasise the role of parental overcontrol in the 
development of anxiety. Rapee (1997, p. 62) hypothesised that “excessive protection 
from a parent may help to provide information to the child that the world is a 
dangerous place and may also reduce the child’s opportunities for learning otherwise”. 
Similarly, Thompson (2001, p. 173) proposed that “by responding overprotectively 
and overcontrollingly … caregivers provide little or no opportunity for [children] to 
master the anxiety … In doing so, parents may be inadvertently reinforcing and also 
modelling anxious behaviour and poor self-regulatory strategies”.  In addition to this, 
Chorpita and Barlow (1998) proposed that overcontrolling parenting may be 
problematic because of its negative effects on perceived control. Chorpita and Barlow 
(1998, p. 5) defined control as “the ability to personally influence events and 
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outcomes in one’s environment, principally those related to positive or negative 
reinforcement … control, as such, can implicitly allow prediction of when something 
will happen, such as the termination of an aversive event”. They hypothesised that 
children who experience a low sense of control, either through the experience of 
overcontrolling, overprotective and intrusive parenting styles, or through being raised 
in an uncontrollable, unpredictable home environment, are more likely to be at risk 
for interpreting subsequent events as out of their control, increasing vulnerability to 
anxiety.  
Whilst not examining worry directly, several comprehensive reviews have 
examined the relationship between parental overcontrol and anxiety in children 
(Bögels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006; Rapee, 1997; Wood et al., 2003), which is 
relevant given the close relationship between worry and anxiety. Moreover, in a meta-
analysis examining the effects of parenting styles on the development of anxiety 
(Gerlsma, Emmelkamp, & Arrindell, 1990), the development of anxiety disorders in 
childhood was associated with parenting styles high in psychological control. In 
addition, evidence from several studies demonstrates that relative to mothers of 
nonanxious children, mothers of anxious children display more intrusive, unsolicited 
and negative involvement when their children complete challenging tasks (Hudson & 
Rapee, 2001, 2002), grant less autonomy (Moore et al., 2004; Whaley et al., 1999), 
and are more controlling, and more likely to display aversive affect and behaviours 
(Dumas, LaFreniere, & Serketich, 1995). However, it is important to note that these 
studies did not measure the effect of parental overcontrol on worry directly. 
In a study directly examining worry and parental overprotection, Manfredi et 
al. (2011) employed a retrospective correlational design and found that participant-
reported parental overprotection was associated with current levels of worry, after 
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controlling for symptoms of anxiety and depression. However, this retrospective 
design is limited in that retrospective reports can be influenced by current mood, 
beliefs, and adult interpretations of events, and the correlational approach precludes 
conclusions as to whether parenting style is a vulnerability factor that temporally 
antecedes and causally influences worry. As such, further longitudinal and 
experimental studies are required to examine the relationship between parental 
overcontrol and worry.  
Traumatic events, including childhood abuse and maltreatment, have also been 
implicated in the development of worry and anxiety. The avoidance theory of worry 
(Borkovec, 1994), outlined in Section 1.3.3.1, hypothesises that worry functions as a 
form of cognitive avoidance, which is reinforced and strengthened under particular 
conditions. Worry is hypothesised to have a number of functions that may be 
particularly relevant for individuals who have experienced traumatic life events and 
childhood abuse. For instance, Borkovec (1994) proposed that worry can serve as a 
form of problem solving that may help prevent a negative event from occurring, and 
this is negatively reinforced if the feared event does not occur. Worry is also thought 
to help people “prepare for the worst” by assisting individuals with coping and 
dealing with emotional reactions if the feared event does occur.  
Consistent with this, several studies have demonstrated a correlational 
association between GAD (the hallmark of which is pathological worry) and 
traumatic life events. Torgersen (1986) found that individuals with GAD were 
significantly more likely to have had one or both parents die before they were 16 
years old. Blazer, Hughes, and George (1987) found that individuals who reported 
experiencing at least one negative, unexpected, and important life event were three 
times more likely to develop GAD than people who had not had such an experience. 
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Roemer, Molina, Litz, and Borkovec (1996/1997) examined nonclinical participants 
who met the criteria for GAD, as well as clinical participants who had received an 
official diagnosis of GAD. They found that both groups of GAD participants had 
retrospectively reported that they experienced significantly more potentially traumatic 
events than nonanxious participants. However, all of this evidence is correlational, 
and thus it is not possible to draw conclusions about the causal relationship between 
traumatic life events and worry. Moreover, the specificity of the association between 
traumatic life events and worry is unclear, since abuse and trauma predict a range of 
psychopathologies. As such, it is difficult to ascertain the specific relationship 
between these two factors. 
To conclude, these developmental accounts implicate parental modelling, 
parental overcontrol, and the experience of traumatic life events, including abuse and 
maltreatment, in the development of worry. However, the evidence is limited in that 
much of it is retrospective and correlational, and/or examines anxiety, rather than 
worry directly. 
1.3.3.5. Temperamental account of worry. 
Behavioural inhibition refers to the tendency to be shy, inhibited, and fearful 
in response to unfamiliar events or people and stressful situations, and it has been 
associated with the development of anxiety disorders (Kagan, Snidman, Arcus, & 
Reznick, 1994; Rapee, 2001). Fisak and Grills-Taquechel (2007) proposed three 
pathways by which behavioural inhibition may put children at risk for the 
development of anxiety. First, children may inherit a behaviourally inhibited 
temperament from parents, who may additionally model anxious and fearful 
behaviour, so the child may be vulnerable to anxiety as a result of both parental 
modelling and temperamental factors. Second, behaviourally inhibited children may 
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elicit more anxious behaviours from their parents, which may increase symptoms of 
anxiety in children and/or parents. Finally, certain learning mechanisms (e.g., parental 
modelling) may have a greater impact on children who are behaviourally inhibited 
relative to children who are less inhibited, such that children with an inhibited 
temperament may be more vulnerable to developing anxiety via parental modelling 
and socialisation processes. However, it is important to note that these theoretical 
accounts of behavioural inhibition refer to anxiety more generally, rather than worry. 
Whilst these accounts may be relevant in understanding vulnerability to worry due to 
worry being a central feature of GAD, it is nonetheless important to note that these 
accounts do not specifically refer to worry.  
Examining the evidence for this account, a number of studies have examined 
behavioural inhibition and its relationship with anxiety disorders more generally (e.g., 
Biederman et al., 1993; Muris, van Brakel, Arntz, & Schouten, 2011; Rosenbaum et 
al., 1993), but fewer studies have specifically examined the link between behavioural 
inhibition and worry. Correlational studies specifically examining worry (Muris, 
Merckelbach, Wessel, & Ven, 1999) and rumination (Leen-Feldner, Zvolensky, 
Feldner, & Lejuez, 2004) in nonclinical samples alongside behavioural inhibition 
have found significant associations between these factors. However, in a study 
specifically examining GAD, the authors found that behavioural inhibition made no 
contribution to the development of GAD symptoms over and above measures of 
childhood cognitive performance (Martin et al., 2007). However, behavioural 
inhibition appears to be strongly related to neuroticism (e.g., Jorm et al., 1999), which 
has been consistently linked with the development of rumination as outlined 
previously. 
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As such, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the relationship between 
behavioural inhibition and worry due to a lack of longitudinal and experimental 
evidence demonstrating that behavioural inhibition temporally precedes and causally 
contributes to worry. Further studies of a prospective and experimental nature are 
required to shed more light on the nature of the relationship between these factors. 
1.4. Repetitive Negative Thought: The Transdiagnostic Approach 
Where possible, this thesis will aim to consider rumination and worry together, 
as a transdiagnostic process of RNT (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). The term transdiagnostic refers to a process that 
is present across multiple psychiatric diagnoses and that causally contributes to those 
disorders (Harvey et al., 2004). Recent reviews have marshalled evidence that RNT is 
found in nearly all Axis I psychiatric disorders and that it prospectively predicts 
symptoms in longitudinal studies (Aldao et al., 2010; Ehring & Watkins, 2008; 
Harvey et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; Watkins, 2008). There are 
considerable benefits to be gained from a better understanding of RNT’s aetiology as 
a means to develop more parsimonious theoretical accounts and to improve treatment 
and prevention interventions.  
In the following section, the justification for considering rumination and worry 
together as a common process of RNT will be presented. There will also be discussion 
of the transdiagnostic approach, and a summary of the vulnerability factors for RNT 
that emerge from the rumination and worry theoretical accounts discussed in the 
previous sections.  
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1.4.1. Justification for Studying Repetitive Negative Thought 
There are three primary justifications for studying rumination and worry 
together, as the process of RNT. First, rumination and worry are highly correlated and 
it can be difficult to make meaningful distinctions between the qualities and 
characteristics of the two processes. Second, rumination and worry have similarly 
negative consequences in terms of mood and psychopathology. Finally, there is 
considerable overlap between theoretical accounts of rumination and worry. Evidence 
for these justifications will now be presented in more detail. 
1.4.1.1. Commonality between characteristics of rumination and worry. 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) identified four common processes that characterise 
RNT, specifically, that it is (i) repetitive; (ii) passive and/or relatively uncontrollable; 
(iii) characterised by an abstract style of processing; and (iv) focused on negative 
content (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). They proposed that whilst forms of RNT, such as 
rumination and worry, are characterised by these fundamental processes, different 
forms of RNT may differ in content, noting that “the definitions [of different forms of 
RNT] differ considerably regarding the exact content the thinking is supposed to be 
focused on (e.g., symptoms of depression; future negative events; past traumas, or 
recent social situations)” (Ehring & Watkins, 2008, p. 193).  
A number of studies have attempted to distinguish between rumination and 
worry by examining the content of each type of thought. When comparing rumination, 
worry, depression, and anxiety, thoughts about past losses correlated more strongly 
with levels of rumination and depressive symptoms, whereas thoughts about future 
threats and questioning thoughts about uncertainties correlated more strongly with 
levels of worry and anxiety symptoms (Beck, Brown, Eidelson, Steer, & Riskind, 
1987).   
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However, this distinction is not clear-cut or categorical. There is evidence that 
it is difficult to make meaningful distinctions between the qualities of ruminative 
thought and worrisome thought. Segerstrom et al. (2000, p. 672) suggested that “the 
concepts of depressive rumination and anxious worry appear to share some common 
elements, most notably the idea of repetitive thought focused on negative events. The 
extent to which the two constructs have unique or specific features remains to be 
established”. Evidence from studies comparing these two constructs reveals strong 
correlations and little disparity between rumination and worry on the standard 
measures (e.g., Fresco et al., 2002; Hong, 2007; Muris et al., 2005; Watkins, 2004b; 
Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005). For instance, Segerstrom et al. (2000) found 
strong correlations (r = .52 - .55) between measures of worry and rumination in 
clinical and nonclinical samples.  
Specifically, although the content of worrisome thoughts often relates to future 
events, people can worry about the past: for example, worrying that a recently 
submitted academic essay may contain errors (Molina, Borkovec, Peasley, & Person, 
1998), and people can ruminate about the future, for example, ruminating about their 
flaws and whether this would influence their chances of finding a suitable romantic 
partner (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Additionally, when comparing rumination and 
worry on a range of variables concerning general properties of the thought, few 
differences are found: Watkins et al. (2005) compared thoughts on a range of 53 
dimensions and only found significant differences between worry and rumination on 7 
dimensions. Specifically, the main meaningful differences concerned temporal 
orientation (worry was more about the future), feelings of insecurity (worry was 
associated with greater feelings of insecurity), and basis in reality (rumination was 
associated with more real problems and concerns). In a prospective longitudinal study, 
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Hong (2007) found that scores on measures of worry and rumination were highly 
correlated. Thus, the commonality between the qualities and characteristics of 
ruminative and worrisome thoughts provides some justification for studying the two 
processes together as a common process of RNT. 
1.4.1.2. Commonality between consequences of rumination and worry. 
Harvey et al. (2004) and Ehring and Watkins (2008) proposed that RNT is a 
transdiagnostic process because it is present across a wide range of psychological 
disorders, and causally contributes to those disorders. There is a high degree of 
comorbidity between the disorders that rumination and worry predict, and there is also 
overlap between the disorders predicted by rumination and worry (see Sections 1.2.2 
and 1.3.2 for detailed reviews of the consequences of rumination and worry).  
In summary, depression is prospectively predicted by both rumination (e.g., 
Just & Alloy, 1997; Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994) and worry 
(Calmes & Roberts, 2007; Hong, 2007). Experimental studies demonstrate that 
manipulating rumination (e.g., Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1990) and worry (McLaughlin et al., 2007) lead to greater depressive symptoms. 
Anxiety is also prospectively predicted by both rumination (Calmes & Roberts, 2007; 
Hong, 2007; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996) and worry (Calmes & Roberts, 2007; Hong, 
2007). Experimental evidence further indicates that manipulating rumination 
(Blagden & Craske, 1996) and worry (e.g., Borkovec & Hu, 1990; McLaughlin et al., 
2007) both cause greater symptoms of anxiety. In addition, rumination and worry 
both prospectively predict symptoms of PTSD (e.g., Ehlers et al., 2003; Holeva et al., 
2001; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Finally, there is a high degree of 
comorbidity between depression and anxiety disorders (Brady & Kendall, 1992). It 
has been argued that comorbidity between anxiety and depression is the rule, rather 
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than the exception (Aina & Susman, 2006), as more than 50% of depressed or anxious 
individuals experience a comorbid depressive or anxiety disorder (Hirschfeld, 2001). 
This is consistent with the characterisation of worry and rumination as a common 
process of RNT that underlies both disorders.  
As such, since rumination and worry have similar consequences in terms of 
mood and psychopathology, with both predicting depression and anxiety, these 
overlapping outcomes provide further justification for considering rumination and 
worry together as a single common process of RNT. 
1.4.1.3. Commonality between theoretical accounts of rumination and 
worry. 
In reviewing the theoretical accounts of rumination and worry, it becomes 
apparent that there is considerable overlap between the hypothesised models for 
worry and rumination. Abstract processing is implicated by control theory and 
processing mode accounts of rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Watkins, 2008), as 
well as by the reduced concreteness theory of worry (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002). 
Metacognitive beliefs are emphasised in theoretical accounts of rumination 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001) and worry (Wells, 1995). 
The highly related personality and temperamental constructs of neuroticism and 
behavioural inhibition are hypothesised to be vulnerability factors for rumination (e.g., 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994; Roberts et al., 1998) and anxiety (e.g., Kagan et al., 
1994). Functional properties of RNT, specifically its avoidant function, are 
emphasised in theoretical models of rumination (Ferster, 1973; Martell et al., 2001) 
and worry (Borkovec, 1994). Certain parenting styles, particularly overcontrolling 
and intrusive parenting, as well as parental modelling, are implicated in theoretical 
accounts of rumination (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998, Rose, 2002; Spasojević & 
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Alloy, 2002) and worry (e.g., Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Rachman, 1977). Finally, 
negative early life experiences, particularly abuse, maltreatment, and the experience 
of traumatic events, are implicated in developmental accounts of rumination (e.g., 
Conway et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) and worry/anxiety (Borkovec, 1994). 
The similarities across the theoretical models for rumination and worry 
provides further reasons for considering that it may be parsimonious to consider a 
common process of RNT incorporating both worry and rumination. It is clear that 
there is substantial overlap between the underlying processes implicated in many of 
the theoretical accounts. 
1.4.2. The Transdiagnostic Approach  
The transdiagnostic approach refers to an “across disorder” perspective, rather 
than a “disorder-focus” perspective, with transdiagnostic processes referring to 
processes that are present across multiple disorders and that play a causal role in the 
onset or maintenance of those disorders (Harvey et al., 2004). Rather than focusing on 
specific disorders and examining the aetiology and maintenance of those specific 
disorders, the transdiagnostic approach involves examining parallel processes (e.g. 
social, emotional and psychological processes; aetiological and maintaining 
processes) that occur across a range of disorders (Harvey et al., 2004). There is 
plausible evidence that supports the transdiagnostic approach, with Harvey et al. 
(2004) highlighting some specific strands of evidence in support of this approach. 
First, they note that there is a high degree of comorbidity across disorders, and they 
highlight evidence that a treatment focused on one disorder can alleviate symptoms of 
other disorders that are not the target of the original intervention. Second, they note 
that attention, memory, reasoning, thought, and behavioural processes are consistently 
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implicated in disorder-focused models of psychopathology and that these processes 
are common to multiple disorders.  
Harvey et al. (2004) proposed three distinct advantages to the transdiagnostic 
approach. First, psychological disorders are often highly comorbid and individuals 
rarely present with a “pure” case of one single disorder. As such, the transdiagnostic 
approach is helpful in affording a better understanding of comorbidity. Second, the 
transdiagnostic approach allows for the constructive transfer of theoretical and 
treatment advances across disorders. Third, the transdiagnostic approach can 
contribute to an understanding of how treatments influence a range of across-disorder 
symptoms, and maximise positive treatment effects. As disorder-focused randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) tend to assess the presence and severity of single disorders 
pre- and post-treatment, it is not usually known how the treatment may influence 
symptoms of other unmeasured comorbid disorders. As such, by taking a 
transdiagnostic approach through tailoring treatments to comorbid conditions and 
measuring a range of across-disorder symptoms pre- and post-treatment, positive 
treatment effects can be maximised, and it can also result in a better understanding of 
how particular treatments impact a range of symptoms.  
Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) further argued that “there is growing 
agreement that the heterogeneous disorders in our current diagnostic system are each 
made up of dysfunctional versions of processes that vary along continua in the general 
population” (p. 590), and as such, by focusing on basic dysfunctional processes that 
can be present across the whole spectrum, including in healthy individuals, it allows a 
more parsimonious fundamental understanding of these processes. They further 
argued that the parsimonious nature of the transdiagnostic approach affords more 
efficient assessment and training, since it would be more efficient to focus on 
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transdiagnostic factors than the large number of discrete categories of disorders 
identified in the DSM. The recent Research Domain Criteria project (RDoC) from the 
National Institute of Mental Health aims to take a transdiagnostic approach by 
defining basic dimensions of functioning (e.g. working memory, stress regulation) 
across multiple methods of analysis (e.g., genes, behaviour, neuroscience, etc.) that 
cut across traditional categories of disorders. As such, by focusing on fundamental 
transdiagnostic mechanisms rather than arbitrarily defined symptom presentations, 
this leads towards a more integrative understanding of psychopathology.    
To recap on the transdiagnostic conceptualisation of rumination and worry as 
a common process of RNT, RNT is proposed to have four defining characteristics: it 
is (i) repetitive; (ii) passive and/or relatively uncontrollable; (iii) abstract in 
processing style; and (iv) focused on negative content (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). 
Ehring and Watkins (2008) distinguish between content and process aspects of RNT, 
noting that whilst rumination and worry have some difference in content (e.g., 
rumination may focus more in depressive symptoms, past events, and failures, 
whereas worry may focus more on future uncertainty and anxious feelings), they both 
reflect a tendency towards unhelpful, abstract, and repetitive focus on negative 
content, despite these differences in content. They proposed that “there are no clear 
criteria to judge whether the small number of differences found … should be 
interpreted as evidence for different processes or not. However, it can be argued that 
in such a situation, preference should be given to the more parsimonious hypothesis, 
namely that worry and rumination share the same process and only differ in content” 
(Ehring & Watkins, 2008, p. 195). As outlined previously (see Section 1.4.1.2), 
rumination and worry predict an overlapping range of disorders (Aldao et al., 2010; 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007); Ehring and Watkins (2008) identified 13 distinct 
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disorders in which elevated RNT is observed, noting that RNT is present in almost all 
Axis 1 disorders. As such, this provides further support for RNT being considered as 
a transdiagnostic process.  
1.4.3. Vulnerability Factors for Repetitive Negative Thought 
Given the deleterious and wide-ranging outcomes of RNT, it is of 
considerable clinical utility to have a better understanding of its aetiology and 
maintenance. An awareness of factors that are implicated in vulnerability to RNT can 
inform treatment and prevention interventions. In reviewing the theoretical accounts 
of rumination (see Section 1.2) and worry (see Section 1.3), a range of vulnerability 
factors have been identified, along with discussion of the extant evidence for these 
factors. In the following section, there will be a brief recap of the vulnerability factors 
that have emerged from the models, and a summary of any gaps in the research 
evidence for these factors.  
1.4.3.1. Parental modelling and socialisation of repetitive negative 
thought. 
Parental modelling, the process of transmitting the tendency towards RNT by 
maternal or paternal modelling of an unconstructive ruminative or worrisome style, is 
implicated as a vulnerability factor for RNT as a result of several different theoretical 
accounts, including response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; see Section 
1.2.3.1), co-rumination accounts of rumination (Rose, 2002; see Section 1.2.3.6), and 
developmental accounts of anxiety (Rachman, 1977; Wood et al., 2003; see Section 
1.3.3.4). There is a lack of research directly examining the effects of parental 
modelling on the development of RNT, for example, by observing parental modelling 
of RNT and measuring child RNT, by examining whether parental modelling of RNT 
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prospectively predicts child RNT, or through experimentally manipulating parental 
modelling processes and measuring the effects on subsequent child engagement in 
RNT.  
The extant correlational evidence is scarce and the results are inconsistent: 
child-reported parental anxious rearing was associated with child worry (Muris et al., 
2000), but in a study examining rumination, mother and child brooding rumination 
were not correlated (Gibb et al., 2012). There is some indirect evidence from studies 
in which RNT is not directly measured. For example, in studies of co-rumination, 
maternal co-rumination predicts child depression (e.g., Waller & Rose, 2010), and in 
studies of anxiety, anxious children were more likely to switch to a threatening 
interpretation of an ambigious situation after discussion with parents (Barrett et al., 
1996, Dadds et al., 1996). As such, further correlational, prospective and experimental 
studies are required to directly examine the hypothesis that parental modelling of 
RNT affords vulnerability to RNT in children.  
1.4.3.2. Parental overcontrol. 
Parental overcontrol, a parenting style characterised as excessively controlling, 
intrusive, and vigilant, is implicated as a vulnerability factor for RNT in a number of 
theoretical accounts, including response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1998; see 
Section 1.2.3.1), and developmental accounts of anxiety (Bögels & Brechman-
Toussaint, 2006; Rapee, 1997; see Section 1.3.3.4). 
There is a lack of direct evidence examining the effect of parental overcontrol 
on RNT. The extant research evidence is limited by its retrospective and correlational 
approach (Manfredi et al., 2011; Spasojević & Alloy, 2002). There is some indirect 
evidence demonstrating an association between parental overcontrol and anxiety (e.g., 
Gerlsma et al., 1990; Hudson & Rapee, 2001, 2002), and evidence from an 
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observational study with children demonstrating that overcontrolling parenting was 
associated with passive responding (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1995), but these studies 
do not directly measure RNT. As such, further correlational, prospective and 
experimental studies examining the relationship between parental overcontrol and 
RNT are required. In addition, studies using observational methods in addition to 
child- or parent-reported overcontrol would be useful in elucidating the nature of the 
relationship between the factors. Studies with children and adolescents would be 
helpful in avoiding problems of retrospective reporting of parenting styles (e.g., 
inaccurate or biased recall).    
1.4.3.3. Abuse, maltreatment and traumatic life events. 
The early experience of traumatic life events, including abuse and 
maltreatment, is implicated in the development of RNT in a number of theoretical 
models, including the avoidance model of depression (Ferster, 1973; see Section 
1.2.3.4), developmental accounts of rumination (Conway et al., 2004; Spasojević & 
Alloy, 2002; see Section 1.2.3.6), and the avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, 
1994; see Section 1.3.3.1). 
There is a body of evidence demonstrating an association between various 
types of abuse or maltreatment and RNT (e.g., Raes & Hermans, 2008; Spasojević & 
Alloy, 2002), and further studies demonstrating an association between various 
traumatic life events and RNT (e.g., Ehlers et al., 1998; Roemer et al., 1996/1997, 
Torgersen, 1986). Whilst it would not be possible to provide experimental evidence 
due to the nature of these vulnerability factors, prospective studies in children and 
adolescents examining the effects of the experience of abuse, maltreatment and 
traumatic life events on RNT would be helpful in establishing the relationship 
between these factors.  
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1.4.3.4. Abstract thinking styles. 
A number of theoretical models propose that under certain conditions, 
adopting an abstract mode of thinking and processing of information can lead to 
unhelpful and persistent RNT. Abstract processing is implicated as vulnerability 
factor for unconstructive RNT by a number of models, including the control theory of 
rumination (Martin & Tesser, 1996; see Section 1.2.3.2.2), processing mode theory 
(Watkins, 2008; see Section 1.2.3.2.3), and the reduced concreteness theory of worry 
(Stöber & Borkovec, 2002; see Section 1.3.3.1). 
Correlational evidence indicates that individuals more prone to link low-level 
goals to high-level, abstract goals were more prone to rumination (McIntosh et al., 
1995). Experimental studies manipulating processing mode have demonstrated that 
abstract processing has a range of negative outcomes, for example, overgeneral 
autobiographical memories and prolonged negative emotional responses (e.g., 
Watkins, 2004; Watkins et al., 2008, Watkins & Teasdale, 2001). However, these 
experimental studies have not examined the effect of a processing mode manipulation 
on the frequency and duration of RNT itself. As such, there is a lack of evidence 
demonstrating the relationship between abstract processing and RNT. To rectify this, 
further correlational studies are required to see whether abstract processing style and 
persistent RNT are significantly associated, but critically, prospective studies and 
experimental studies are required to test whether abstract processing temporally 
precedes and causes vulnerability RNT. Martin and Tesser (1996) and Watkins (2008) 
make different predictions for the relationship between abstract processing and RNT. 
The prediction from Martin and Tesser’s account is that abstract processing would 
lead to more potential triggers for rumination (i.e., as a result of unresolved goals), 
and this would lead to an increased frequency of rumination (i.e., more trait 
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rumination). The prediction from Watkins’ account is that abstract processing leads to 
ineffective episodes of rumination with unconstructive consequences, which is likely 
to cause these episodes to become prolonged (i.e., more extended state rumination).  
1.4.3.5. Metacognitive beliefs about repetitive negative thought. 
Metacognitive beliefs about RNT refer to beliefs and appraisals about the 
costs and benefits of RNT (e.g., believing that RNT increases sense of understanding 
and insight). Theoretical accounts implicating metacognitive beliefs in the 
development and maintenance of RNT include the metacognitive model of rumination 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; see Section 1.2.3.5) and the metacognitive model of 
worry (Wells, 1995; see Section 1.3.3.3).   
There is a substantial body of correlational evidence that demonstrates 
significant cross-sectional associations between metacognitive beliefs and RNT (e.g., 
Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997, Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001), and there are also a small number of prospective studies (Iijima & Tanno, 
2013; Sica et al., 2007, Weber & Exner, 2013). However, there have been no 
experimental studies that have experimentally manipulated metacognitive beliefs and 
examined subsequent engagement in rumination. There has been only one 
experimental study that has examined the effect of manipulating beliefs on worry 
(Prados, 2011), and this study had some methodological limitations (see Section 
1.3.3.3). As such, prospective studies examining how metacognitive beliefs influence 
change in RNT over time, and experimental studies manipulating metacognitive 
beliefs, are critically required to establish the relationship between this vulnerability 
factor and RNT.  
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1.4.3.6. Deficiencies in cognitive inhibition and cognitive control. 
Deficiencies in cognitive control and inhibition, and impairments in 
disengaging from negative material, have been implicated as a risk factor for 
persistent rumination in a number of theoretical models (Hertel, 1997; Joormann, 
2004, 2005; Linville, 1996; Koster et al., 2011; see Section 1.2.3.3). 
There is some correlational evidence demonstrating an association between 
deficiencies in cognitive inhibition and rumination (e.g., Hertel & Gestle, 2003; 
Joormann, 2006), and evidence from several prospective studies demonstrating that 
deficiencies in cognitive inhibition temporally precede changes in rumination (e.g., 
Demeyer et al., 2012). However, there have been no experimental studies that have 
experimentally manipulated cognitive inhibitory mechanisms and measured the effect 
on subsequent RNT, although there have been experimental studies demonstrating 
that manipulating rumination leads to inhibitory deficits (e.g., Watkins & Brown, 
2002). As such, further prospective and experimental studies are required to elucidate 
the nature and direction of the relationship between cognitive inhibition deficiencies 
and RNT.  
1.4.3.7. Intolerance of uncertainty. 
Intolerance of uncertainty, the tendency to respond to uncertain and 
ambiguous situations in a negative way on emotional, cognitive and behavioural 
levels, has been implicated as a vulnerability factor for worry (Freeston et al., 1994; 
see Section 1.3.3.2).  
Regarding the extant research evidence, there have been several correlational 
studies demonstrating an association between intolerance of uncertainty and worry 
(e.g., Buhr & Dugas, 2006; Dugas et al., 1997), and a smaller number of studies 
demonstrating a correlation between intolerance of uncertainty and rumination (e.g., 
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de Jong-Meyer et al., 2009). However, there have been no prospective studies that 
examine how intolerance of uncertainty influences RNT over time. Moreover, there 
has only been one study that has attempted to experimentally manipulate intolerance 
of uncertainty and measure the effect on subsequent engagement in worry (Ladouceur 
et al., 2000). However, it can be argued that this study has some methodological 
limitations that preclude drawing conclusions about the causal relationship between 
intolerance of uncertainty and RNT (see Section 1.3.3.2). As such, longitudinal 
studies and further experimental studies are required in order to reveal more about the 
relationship between intolerance of uncertainty and RNT. 
1.4.3.8. Neuroticism and behavioural inhibition. 
The constructs of neuroticism and behavioural inhibition have been implicated 
as vulnerability factors in personality and temperamental models of rumination 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994) and worry (Kagan et al., 1994, Rapee, 2001).  
There is a considerable body of correlational evidence linking neuroticism, 
and to a lesser extent, behavioural inhibition, with RNT (e.g., Kuyken et al., 2006; 
Roelofs et al., 2008; Muris et al., 1999), although it is worth noting that neuroticism 
has generally been studied with respect to rumination, and behavioural inhibition with 
respect to anxiety and worry. There is also prospective evidence demonstrating that 
neuroticism prospectively predicts rumination (e.g., Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010), but 
there is no prospective evidence demonstrating the longitudinal association between 
behavioural inhibition and RNT. In addition, there is a lack of experimental evidence 
that demonstrates the causal relationship between neuroticism/behavioural inhibition 
and RNT. As such, further longitudinal studies and experimental studies are required 
to establish the relationship between these factors and RNT.  
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1.4.3.9. Functional properties of repetitive negative thought: Insight and 
avoidance. 
A key question in understanding the mechanisms underlying RNT is: “What 
makes it so difficult to break free of rumination once it has begun?” (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008, p. 418). As such, whilst not characterised as vulnerability 
factors in the same way as the other factors reviewed in this section (i.e., factors that 
temporally precede and causally contribute to RNT), there are two additional factors 
suggested by theoretical models, classified as consequences of RNT, that may 
reinforce and maintain the process of RNT once it has begun. 
 First, engagement in RNT may increase sense of insight and understanding, 
with this increased sense of insightfulness being a potential consequence of RNT that 
may reinforce its further use (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2001). Second, engagement in RNT may afford avoidance of feared 
situations, which may negatively reinforce further engagement in RNT. This avoidant 
property of RNT has been suggested as a possible maintaining consequence of RNT 
in several theoretical models including recent updates to response styles theory 
(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), and functional behavioural models of rumination and 
depression (Ferster, 1973; Martell et al., 2001).  
There is limited cross-sectional (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001) and experimental 
evidence (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993) demonstrating an association 
between rumination and an increased sense of insightfulness. The evidence from the 
only experimental study to test that rumination leads to increased insightfulness 
(Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993) is limited by (i) not examining 
insightfulness with reference to a real-world problem; (ii) only examining 
insightfulness post-rumination manipulation, rather than pre- and post-manipulation; 
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and (iii) comparing rumination with distraction (i.e., thinking versus not thinking), 
rather than with an appropriate thinking control. Regarding the potential avoidance 
functions of RNT, there is cross-sectional evidence demonstrating an association 
between rumination and avoidance (Cribb, et al., 2006; Giorgio et al., 2010; 
Lyubomirsky et al., 2006; Moulds et al., 2007). However, there is a lack of 
experimental evidence demonstrating that rumination leads to increased avoidance.  
1.4.4. Development of Repetitive Negative Thought 
One consideration in examining the aetiology of RNT is to consider it within a 
developmental context; that is, to examine at what ages RNT becomes manifest. 
Reviewing the literature on depressive rumination, a number of prospective 
longitudinal studies suggest that children develop the capacity for depressive 
rumination during late childhood and early adolescence, at approximately 10 – 12 
years old (Abela, Aydin, & Auerbach, 2007; Abela et al., 2002; Broderick & 
Korteland, 2004; Driscoll, Lopez, & Kistner, 2009; Hilt, McLaughlin, & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 2010; Jose & Brown, 2008; Roelofs et al., 2009). During this period of 
early adolescence, the gender difference in rumination seems to emerge, with girls 
reporting greater levels of rumination than boys (Abela, Parkinson, Stolow, & Starrs, 
2009; Hankin, 2008; Roelofs et al., 2009; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; Verstraeten et 
al., 2009), although research findings are inconsistent and not all prospective 
longitudinal studies have found a gender difference at this stage (Abela et al., 2007; 
Abela et al., 2002; Broderick & Korteland, 2004). Critically, this period of late 
childhood and early adolescence is also when rumination begins to predict subsequent 
depressive symptoms (Abela et al., 2002; Abela et al., 2007; Broderick & Korteland, 
2004; Hankin, 2008; Hilt et al., 2010; Roelofs et al., 2009; Verstraeten et al., 2009), as 
well as other psychological disorders including substance abuse and eating disorders 
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(Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2007). Thus, there is considerable value in understanding the 
aetiology of pathological RNT, such that children at risk of becoming pathological 
ruminators and worriers can be identified, and also so that RNT can be targeted as a 
primary prevention strategy to avoid the development of potential future 
psychopathology.  
Reviewing the developmental literature on worry suggests that worry emerges 
earlier in development than rumination, and it is thought that this is because relatively 
young children are able to engage in less abstract forms of worry without being 
constrained by their cognitive developmental stage (Vasey & Daleiden, 1994). Vasey 
and Daleidin (1994, p. 193) proposed that worry in children becomes more abstract 
and widely focused from approximately 8 years old, and that the “increased ability to 
conceptualise elaborate sequences of negative consequences is likely to increase the 
potential severity and generality of worry”.  
Consistent with this, worry about physical threats declines as the child grows 
older: Vasey, Crnic, and Carter (1994) found that 8- to 9-year-olds and 11- to 12-
year-olds worried significantly less than 5- to 6-year-olds about physical threats to 
well-being, such as injury, sickness and kidnapping. Furthermore, worry about more 
abstract and psychological threats increases as the child develops: Vasey et al. (1994) 
found that 11- to 12-year-olds worried significantly more about threats relating to 
social evaluation and psychological well-being (e.g., being disliked, feeling 
incompetent) than 5- to 6-year-olds and 8- to 9-year-olds. In addition, Muris, 
Merckelbach, Gadet, and Moulaert (2000) found that 10- to 12-year-olds worried 
significantly more about social threats and test performance than younger children 4- 
to 6-year-olds and 7- to 9-year-olds.  
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Further evidence for the early aetiology of worry comes from clinical studies 
of individuals with GAD. People with GAD frequently report that they have been 
anxious for as long as they can recall (Rapee, 1985), and Rapee (2001, p. 482) 
proposed that “this would seem to suggest, that GAD, or at least many of its features, 
are an extension of basic features of the individual’s personality”. Whilst there have 
been a number of prospective longitudinal and experimental studies conducted with 
adult participants examining the casual relationship between worry and clinical 
symptoms of anxiety (Calmes & Roberts, 2007; Hong, 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2007; 
Segerstrom et al., 2000), there have been no prospective longitudinal studies 
conducted with children and adolescents examining the developmental trajectory of 
worry and its relationship with anxiety symptoms. However, a number of 
correlational studies that have been conducted with younger participants indicate that 
there is a positive association between worry and anxiety symptoms in children and 
adolescents (e.g., Chorpita, Tracey, Brown, Collica, & Barlow, 1997; Layne, Bernat, 
Victor, & Bernstein, 2009; Muris, Meesters, & Gobel, 2001; Rood, Roelofs, Bögels, 
& Alloy, 2010; Weems et al., 2000). Therefore, understanding the aetiology of RNT 
is important as it would enable the identification of individuals at risk for 
psychopathology, and it would inform the development of effective early prevention 
interventions for anxiety and depression.  
1.5. General Considerations in the Literature on Vulnerability to Repetitive 
Negative Thought 
In this section, there will be a review of some general theoretical and 
methodological issues that are relevant to the study of vulnerability to RNT. First, it is 
important to consider the differences between state and trait RNT. Much of the 
theoretical and empirical literature has focused on trait RNT. Factors that cause a bout 
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or episode of rumination or worry (i.e., state RNT) may differ from factors that cause 
a pervasive tendency towards rumination or worry (i.e., trait RNT).  For example, 
high levels of perceived stress may trigger a bout of worry, but on-going perceived 
stress alone may not be sufficient to make an individual develop a tendency to worry. 
As a further example, the experience of parental overcontrol in childhood may not 
predict bouts of rumination in adulthood, but it may be a factor in the development of 
a tendency towards trait rumination.  
Second, it is also important to consider differences between factors that cause 
the onset of trait RNT in childhood and adolescence, and factors that maintain RNT in 
adulthood. Whilst Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1993) defined rumination as a consistent, 
enduring and habitual cognitive style, it is currently unknown whether the factors that 
are associated with the development of a ruminative response style in childhood are 
the same factors that maintain rumination in adulthood. For example, the experience 
of childhood abuse or maltreatment may contribute to the onset of rumination in 
childhood and adolescence, but these particular experiences may not be what maintain 
the trait towards rumination in later adulthood.  
Third, in considering what factors are associated with vulnerability to RNT, it 
is important to consider how the factors may be related to each other, as well as the 
underlying mechanisms by which they confer vulnerability to RNT. Factors may 
interact with each other and act as mediators or moderators of the relationship with 
RNT. A mediator variable refers to “a variable that occurs in the causal pathway from 
an independent to a dependent variable. It causes variation in the dependent variable, 
and in itself is caused to vary by the independent variable” (Last, 1995, p. 87). 
Considering its temporal location, a mediator variable “occurs after that which it 
mediates and before the outcome” (Kraemer, Stice, Kazdin, Offord, & Kupfer, 2001, 
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p. 849), although Kraemer et al. (2001) note that mediation is often assessed in cross-
sectional studies where temporal precedence cannot be determined. A moderator 
variable is an effect modifier, such that a moderator variable is one that “affects the 
direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable 
and a dependent or criterion variable” (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174).  
To illustrate this distinction with the vulnerability factors reviewed previously, 
maltreatment in childhood (an independent variable) may cause vulnerability to RNT 
(the dependent variable). It is possible that childhood maltreatment could also lead to 
deficiencies in cognitive inhibition (a mediator variable), as inhibitory mechanisms 
are hypothesised to be weakened by stress and depression (Linville, 1996). In turn, 
deficiencies in cognitive inhibition may cause individuals to become stuck in cycles 
of unconstructive RNT. An alternative possibility is that the relationship between 
childhood maltreatment and RNT may be moderated by poor effortful control (a 
moderator variable), such that childhood maltreatment may only lead to RNT in 
individuals with poor effortful control.  
Furthermore, when considering the possible vulnerability factors for 
developing a tendency towards RNT, it is important to consider how each factor 
contributes to the risk, and whether they contribute in a way that is additive or 
multiplicative. For example, when considering early experiences (e.g., parental 
modelling and overcontrol, abuse and maltreatment), it could be that the risk for 
pathological repetitive increases in a linear way for each additional vulnerability 
factor, or it could be that for each additional vulnerability factor, the risk increases 
exponentially.  
Although some specific methodological concerns have already been addressed 
alongside discussion of the research evidence, a number of methodological issues are 
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common to the studies examining the development and maintenance of RNT. First, 
most studies have tended to examine rumination and worry separately, despite their 
considerable commonality, common effects, and overlap (see Section 1.4.1). Second, 
the majority of studies have tended to examine vulnerability factors in isolation, rather 
than considering them together. As such, it is not known how these factors interact, 
whether factors moderate or mediate each other, and which factors remain associated 
with RNT whilst other factors are statistically controlled.  
Third, much of the evidence associating these factors is correlational, although 
there is some evidence from prospective longitudinal studies for some factors. There 
has been very little experimental research in which vulnerability factors are 
manipulated and the effect on subsequent RNT is examined. This is problematic as 
experimental studies are the only way to infer the causal relationships between 
putative vulnerability factors and RNT. For some factors, experimental manipulation 
would be impossible (e.g., abuse, maltreatment, traumatic events), but for other 
factors, it would be possible to devise experimental paradigms that manipulate the 
vulnerability factor and measure the effects on RNT. Finally, studies have tended to 
rely heavily on self-report questionnaire measures, both of RNT and also of 
vulnerability factors. Whilst it is difficult to envisage appropriate alternative methods 
for measuring certain factors other than self-report (e.g., beliefs about the function of 
RT), for some factors, it would be helpful to consider alternative ways of 
measurement where possible.  
1.6. An Integrative Theoretical Model of Vulnerability to Repetitive Negative 
Thought 
As outlined previously, it is important to consider how the vulnerability 
factors reviewed may relate to one another, and develop hypotheses about the nature 
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of the relationships between the vulnerability factors. In considering the relationship 
between the various vulnerability factors and RNT, it is helpful to consider the 
conceptual framework proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011). They 
recently distinguished between distal and proximal vulnerability factors for 
transdiagnostic processes, using the specific example of RNT, arguing that 
vulnerability factors vary in their causal distance to rumination and worry. Distal 
factors refer to “environmental and congenital biological variables relatively distal to 
observable symptoms of disorders”, whereas proximal factors refer to “within-person 
variables that are more proximal to symptoms of disorders” (p. 593). Nolen-
Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) proposed that distal factors generally tend to be distant 
in time from symptoms of psychopathology, although this is not always the case, and 
they tend to be difficult to control or modify. In contrast, proximal factors follow 
distal risk factors in time, but precede symptoms of psychopathology, and tend to be 
easier to control or modify. Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) argued that distal 
factors do not directly cause symptoms such as RNT, but that they influence 
symptoms via mediating proximal factors, which have a direct effect on RNT. 
Distal vulnerability factors can further be characterised as “experiences or 
characteristics that are usually independent of any actions of the individual – basically, 
they ‘happen’ to the individual – and they set the stage for proximal risk factors (or 
mediators) that more directly lead to psychopathology” (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 
2011, p. 593). Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins proposed two categories of distal 
vulnerability factors: (i) environmental context factors (e.g., parental psychopathology, 
childhood maltreatment), and (ii) congenital biological abnormalities (e.g., genetic 
abnormalities). There are three categories of proximal vulnerability factors: (i) 
biological factors that lead directly to maladaptive emotional, cognitive, or 
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behavioural tendencies (e.g., hyperactivity in the amygdala associated with increased 
emotional reactivity); (ii) cognitive deficits and biases in information processing (e.g., 
attentional biases), and (iii) individual difference factors reflecting tendency towards 
certain response styles (e.g., attributional style, personality factors). It is important to 
note that distal and proximal factors do not refer to hard and fast categories into which 
each vulnerability factor can be easily categorised; instead, there may be a continuum 
between proximal and distal factors, with some factors sharing both proximal and 
distal qualities.  
Building upon this conceptualisation, it is possible to develop an integrative 
model of vulnerability to RNT in which the relationship between distal vulnerability 
factors (e.g., parental modelling, parental overcontrol, abuse) and RNT is mediated by 
proximal factors (e.g., abstract processing style, metacognitive beliefs about the 
function of RT). Within this conceptualisation, neuroticism can be characterised as an 
intermediate factor with both proximal and distal qualities. Like other proximal 
variables, it is a within-person characteristic that influences how someone may 
respond in the here-and-now due to its influence on cognitive processing (e.g., 
stimulus reactivity, attentional biases; cf. Augustine et al., 2013), and it is thus likely 
to have a direct effect on RNT, but like other distal variables, it has genetic and 
environmental origins (e.g., Loehlin, 1992). As such, neuroticism may have a direct 
effect on RNT, as well as an indirect effect via mediating proximal factors.  
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Figure 1.1. Hypothesised integrative theoretical model illustrating the potential 
relationships between proximal and distal factors and RNT. 
 
In addition to the broad conceptualisation of factors as either proximal or 
distal, it is also beneficial to give theoretical consideration to the specific relationships 
that may exist between the putative vulnerability factors, in particular, the way in 
which distal factors may potentially cause the development of proximal factors, 
developing the hypothesised meditational relationship outlined above.  Figure 1.1 
displays an illustration of the potential relationships that may exist between putative 
vulnerability factors and RNT (note that dashed, dotted, and dashed-dotted lines 
illustrate the potential moderation/mediation alternatives for the role of effortful 
control and cognitive inhibition). This relationships depicted in this model will now 
be outlined in more detail. 
In terms of how the tendency towards abstract processing may develop with 
respect to distal vulnerability factors, abstract thinking may be a form of rule-
governed behaviour which develops as a result of operant conditioning processes: 
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Individuals may believe that there is value to being abstract, and thus develop an 
abstract processing style. Alternatively, abstract thinking may develop as a direct 
result of operant conditioning via procedural learning, and it does not necessarily need 
to be a consciously learned rule. In addition to this, abstraction may develop as a 
result of poor stimulus discrimination learning, in that individuals may not be able to 
switch strategies according to whether abstract or concrete processing is more 
appropriate. For example, early experiences of parental overcontrol or inconsistency 
may impair stimulus discrimination learning such that children may begin to respond 
in an unconstructively abstract manner to negative events, when more concrete 
processing would be more adaptive. As such, the early experience of limited control 
may result in a tendency towards more generalised abstract processing, despite its 
potentially unconstructive consequences. Thus, abstract thinking may develop as a 
consequence of environments characterised by non-contingency, such as the 
experience of parental overcontrol, abuse, neglect, or ongoing stress. Abstraction may 
act as a mediator between these factors and rumination, developing via learning and 
operant conditioning processes. 
Considering the relationship between deficiencies in cognitive inhibition and 
the other vulnerability factors, it has been previously hypothesised that inhibitory 
deficits can arise as a result of ongoing stress and depression (Linville, 1996). As such, 
highly stressful early life experiences, such as abuse, traumatic events, or being 
parented in a psychologically overcontrolling manner, could potentially contribute 
towards increased susceptibility to deficiencies in cognitive inhibitory mechanisms. 
Alternatively, cognitive inhibition may act as a moderator of the relationship between 
negative early life experiences and repetitive thought: an individual who has had 
certain life experiences conferring vulnerability to RNT may be more prone to RNT if 
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they have deficient inhibitory mechanisms, and less prone to RNT if their inhibitory 
mechanisms are functioning normally (cf. the finding from Hilt et al., 2012, 
demonstrating that effortful control interacted with overcontrolling parenting to 
predict rumination). On the other hand, if an individual does not have any pre-existing 
tendency towards repetitive thought, their tendency to ruminate and worry in response 
to difficulties may not be influenced or exacerbated by their inhibitory abilities, and it 
may cease to be a relevant factor. An alternative hypothesis is that there may be a 
main effect of cognitive inhibition, in that poor cognitive inhibition may be associated 
with a greater tendency towards repetitive thought, regardless of any early life 
experiences. Moreover, combining the two explanations, there may be both a main 
effect and a moderating effect of cognitive inhibition on repetitive thought.  
Metacognitive beliefs about RNT may also develop as a result of certain early 
experiences. Wells (1995) hypothesised that a range of developmental experiences 
may result in the development of metacognitive beliefs, proposing that parental 
modelling of RNT may result in children developing beliefs about the utility of RNT, 
and/or the experience of uncontrollable and negative environments may lead to beliefs 
about RNT buffering against the impact of unexpected negative events. Applying the 
operant conditioning model (Ferster, 1973) to the development of metacognitive 
beliefs, positive beliefs about the functions of RT can be conceptualised as a form of 
rule-governed behaviour that may lead to an increase in repetitive thought. 
Individuals may also form rule-governed behaviours about the value of being abstract 
(e.g., that being abstract helps them to understand things better), and this may have 
been reinforced in the past. The avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, 1994) is 
concordant with this view, proposing that worry is reinforced because it appears to 
have positive consequences (i.e., it allows for cognitive avoidance of threatening 
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information). Based on these theories, it can be hypothesised that individuals who 
develop rule-governed contingencies concerning the positive functions of RNT would 
be more likely to engage in RNT, and develop a tendency to ruminate and worry in 
response to negative situations. Such beliefs may mediate the relationship between 
particular life experiences and rumination: Positive beliefs about repetitive thought 
may lead to greater levels of RNT, and certain early learning experiences and operant 
conditioning processes may lead to the development of these metacognitive beliefs 
through the mechanisms outlined above. 
Similarly, such stressful and negative early experiences may also lead to a 
person developing an intolerance of uncertainty. Repeated experience of 
uncontrollable and unpleasant events in early life, such as ongoing abuse or 
maltreatment, may contribute towards an individual developing the tendency to find 
uncertain situations stressful and upsetting. Individuals may learn to feel threatened 
by uncertain situations as a result of ongoing negative experiences characterised by 
little certainty and control. In contrast, someone who has not had negative experiences 
in which their sense of personal control is violated may not find the idea of 
uncertainty so stressful. As such, intolerance of uncertainty may mediate the 
relationship between early experiences and RNT.  
Finally, considering neuroticism as a variable with proximal and distal 
qualities, it is important to consider how it may be related to the other vulnerability 
factors reviewed. Like other proximal factors, the development of neuroticism may 
arise from particular early life experiences. As genetic heritability only accounts for 
half of the variance in the trait of neuroticism (Goldberg, 2000), social and 
environmental factors, such as aversive early life experiences, may be implicated in 
its development. Specifically, it has been hypothesised that abuse and maltreatment 
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experiences may contribute to the development of neuroticism (e.g., Goldberg, 2000; 
Lahey, 2009; Roy, 2002). Like the other proximal variables, neuroticism may act as a 
mediator of the relationship between abuse and RNT, such that individuals who have 
experienced maltreatment in childhood may develop the trait of neuroticism, and as a 
result of this tendency to experience negative mood states, may be more prone to 
developing a tendency towards pathological RNT. In addition, neuroticism has also 
been associated with reduced effortful control. Several studies have demonstrated an 
association between neuroticism or negative emotionality and low levels of effortful 
control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008; Muris, de Jong, & Engelen, 2004), and it has been 
hypothesised that effortful control moderates the relationship between neuroticism 
and anxiety (Lonigan & Phillips, 2001).  
1.7. Research Objectives 
Taking into account the theoretical and methodological considerations 
outlined above, three primary research objectives have been generated. The first 
objective is to explore the relationships between the hypothesised vulnerability factors 
and RNT, by developing and testing a theoretical model of RNT in a large nonclinical 
sample of adults. Whilst a cross-sectional study is not sufficient to establish causality, 
this study will address some of the shortcomings outlined previously by examining 
rumination and worry together, alongside a variety of vulnerability factors, such that 
the relationship between vulnerability factors can be examined in light of the 
integrative model outlined in Section 1.6. This study will help to illustrate which 
factors may be particularly important in maintaining RNT in adulthood.  
The second objective is to build upon this cross-sectional research by 
exploring the longitudinal relationships between the hypothesised vulnerability 
factors and RNT, by examining which vulnerability factors predict change and 
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maintenance in RNT over time. Again, this study will not establish causality as it does 
not involve the experimental manipulation of variables, but it will provide a necessary 
step in establishing the causal relationships by exploring which factors are temporal 
antecedents of changes in RNT. Referring back to the theoretical conceptualisation of 
proximal and distal vulnerability factors proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins 
(2011), this study will test the hypothesis that current, within-person proximal factors 
may be more important in maintaining RNT than historic distal factors.  
The third objective is to examine the causal relationship between vulnerability 
factors and RNT by conducting experimental studies in which variables implicated in 
the maintenance of RNT are manipulated, and the effect on subsequent RNT is 
examined. This will fill a critical gap in the literature by (i) providing experimental 
evidence that can establish causal relationships between RNT and factors implicated 
in its maintenance; and (ii) by examining the effects on state rumination, rather than 
trait rumination, as state rumination is an important and understudied process. 
There are two important points to be noted with respect to the approach taken 
for the research in this thesis. First, the research studies in this thesis will make use of 
analogue rather than clinical samples, and there are several justifications for this 
approach. First, worry and rumination are on a continuum that spans both normal and 
pathological forms of RNT, and as such, the difference between normal and 
pathological RNT is dimensional, rather than categorical (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Watkins, 2011). Second, as yet, there is no theoretical argument for different 
processes causing vulnerability to RNT in analogue versus clinical populations. If 
there is no reason to think that qualitatively different processes drive RNT in healthy 
samples, it makes sense to initially use analogue samples to test the hypotheses, due 
to the practical advantages of this approach (e.g., relative ease of participant 
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recruitment leading to good statistical power when testing complex integrative 
models). Finally, as transdiagnostic processes such as RNT reflect universal human 
mechanisms that cut across disorder and normal behaviour (Ehring & Watkins, 2008), 
it seems logical to initially use an unselected sample to test the hypotheses. 
Second, the thesis will focus on exploring what factors are involved in the 
maintenance, rather than aetiology, of RNT. Examining aetiology would necessarily 
involve extended longitudinal prospective studies with children and adolescents, 
which given the time constraints of the PhD project are less manageable. As such, the 
focus of the thesis will involve examining factors with respect to their involvement in 
the maintenance of RNT in adulthood.  
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CHAPTER 2: Study 1 - An Integrated Examination of Risk Factors for 
Repetitive Negative Thought 
2.1. Preface 
This chapter describes a cross-sectional study designed to examine the 
relationships between rumination and worry, conceptualised as a transdiagnostic 
process of RNT, and a wide range of vulnerability factors. Based on a review of the 
literature examining vulnerability factors for RNT, an integrative model of the 
relationships between these factors and RNT was developed and tested using 
structural equation modelling (see Chapter 1, Section 1.6 for detailed discussion of 
the model). This study is reported in the following article: 
Kingston, R. E. F., Watkins, E. R., & O’Mahen, H. A. (2013). An integrated 
examination of risk factors for repetitive negative thought. Journal of Experimental 
Psychopathology, 4, 161-181.  
Considering the research objectives of the PhD, this study aimed to contribute 
to the literature by examining rumination and worry together, alongside a range of 
vulnerability factors. The study also attempted to replicate the finding reported by 
Spasojević and Alloy (2002) in which retrospective reports of overcontrolling 
parenting were associated with rumination after controlling for current symptoms of 
depression (see Appendix A, Section 2.7 for a more detailed discussion). 
It is important to note that one additional measure was used in this study but 
not reported in the published article. In Appendix C (Section 2.9), there will be a 
more detailed discussion and analysis of the excluded measure, the Effortful Control 
Scale (Lonigan & Phillips, 2001).   
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Kingston, R. E. F., Watkins, E. R., & O’Mahen, H. A. (2013). An integrated 
examination of risk factors for repetitive negative thought. Journal of Experimental 
Psychopathology, 4, 161-181. 
2.2. Abstract 
The two most common forms of repetitive negative thought (RNT) are rumination 
and worry, which are both repeatedly implicated in the onset and maintenance of 
depression and anxiety disorders. It is therefore of theoretical and clinical value to 
understand why people engage in worry and rumination, despite their negative 
consequences. A variety of vulnerability factors have been implicated, including 
distal factors relating to personality, abuse, and overcontrolling parenting; and 
proximal cognitive factors, including abstract processing and perceptions of the 
function of repetitive thought (RT). The current study provided a cross-sectional 
examination of these vulnerability factors alongside rumination and worry in a large 
sample of adults, with reference to a new integrative model of RNT.  Structural 
equation modelling analyses indicated that a model in which neuroticism and 
emotional abuse were related to RNT via their association with perceptions about the 
function of RT provided a good fit to the data.  
2.3. Introduction 
Repetitive thought (RT), defined as “thinking attentively, repetitively or 
frequently about one’s self and one’s world” (Segerstrom, Stanton, Alden, & 
Shortridge, 2003, p. 909), can have both constructive and unconstructive 
consequences (Watkins, 2008). The two main forms of unconstructive RT are 
depressive rumination and worry. Depressive rumination refers to the process of 
repetitively focusing on one’s own feelings of depression and distress, and the causes, 
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meanings and consequences of these feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Worry refers 
to a series of relatively uncontrollable negative thoughts and images, focused on 
future uncertainties, potential risks, and negative outcomes (Borkovec, Robinson, 
Pruzinsky, & DePree, 1983). Both prospective longitudinal studies and experimental 
studies have implicated depressive rumination in the onset and maintenance of 
anxiety and depression (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; 
Watkins, 2008). Similarly, excessive worry is a key feature of generalised anxiety 
disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and is implicated in the 
development and maintenance of anxiety disorders (Borkovec, 1994).  
Both worry and rumination have been proposed to reflect a common process 
of repetitive negative thought (RNT; Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Segerstrom, Tsao, 
Alden, & Craske, 2000; Watkins, 2008) since they both involve (i) repetitive thought 
focused on negative content; (ii) abstract processing of information, focused on 
decontextualised representations of the meanings and implications of events (Ehring 
& Watkins, 2008); and (iii) are experienced as passive and relatively uncontrollable. 
Moreover, there is considerable evidence indicating commonality between worry and 
rumination, consistent with an underlying common process. Standardised worry and 
rumination questionnaires are typically highly correlated (Penn State Worry 
Questionnaire, PSWQ; Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & Borkovec, 1990; Response Styles 
Questionnaire, RSQ; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). Structural equation 
modelling finds that these measures load on a common factor with both forms of RNT 
related to anxiety and depression (Fresco, Frankel, Mennin, Turk, & Heimberg, 2002; 
McEvoy, Mahoney & Moulds, 2010; Segerstrom et al., 2000). When individuals rated 
personal examples of worry and rumination on multiple cognitive dimensions, few 
differences were found (Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005) other than temporal 
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orientation, with worry and rumination predominantly focused on the future versus 
the past, respectively. Experimental manipulations find that both worry and 
rumination increase self-reported anxiety and depression, relative to control 
conditions (e.g., Blagden & Craske, 1996; McLaughlin, Borkovec, & Sibrava, 2007). 
Thus, convergent evidence indicates considerable similarities between the processes 
and consequences of worry and rumination. 
RNT is characterised as a transdiagnostic process, that is, a process present 
across multiple psychiatric diagnoses that causally contributes to those disorders 
(Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004). Recent reviews have marshalled 
evidence that RNT is found in nearly all Axis I psychiatric disorders and that it 
prospectively predicts symptoms in longitudinal studies (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & 
Schweizer, 2010; Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Watkins, 2011; Watkins, 2008). There are considerable benefits to be gained from a 
better understanding of RNT’s aetiology as a means to develop more parsimonious 
theoretical accounts and to improve treatment and prevention interventions. 
Specifically, understanding which factors contribute to individual differences in RNT 
would allow clinicians to determine who may be at risk and assess these vulnerability 
factors at an earlier stage, and to target specific mechanisms underpinning the 
development of RNT. Given that RNT is associated with multiple psychological 
disorders, an integrated model enabling clinicians to better identify when and for 
whom intervention may be necessary, and highlighting tractable mechanisms for 
change, can potentially enhance treatments, enable earlier help for vulnerable 
individuals, and prevent future disorder.  
However, knowledge of the factors underpinning individual differences in 
RNT is less developed than knowledge of its negative consequences. Theories to 
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explain RNT include response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1987, 1991, 2004), 
control theory (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Watkins, 2008), avoidance and reduced 
concreteness theories (Borkovec, 1994; Stöber, 1998), and metacognitive models 
(Wells, 1995; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). Across these theories, a number of 
common factors emerge as potential contributors to individual differences in RNT.  
First, parental overcontrol, where children’s activities are excessively 
regulated by parents that are highly vigilant and intrusive (Bögels & Brechman-
Toussaint, 2006), is hypothesised to be a risk factor for RNT (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1991; Rapee, 1997). Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) suggested that if parents are 
overcontrolling and intrusive, the child may have limited opportunities to develop 
active coping strategies, thereby engendering a passive response style, leading to 
rumination. Rapee (1997) suggested that such overcontrol may lead children to 
believe that their environment is threatening and dangerous, whilst preventing them 
from challenging this belief, thereby engendering worry. Consistent with this 
hypothesis, adult retrospective self-report of overcontrolling parenting is associated 
with trait rumination (Spasojević & Alloy, 2002) and trait worry (Zlomke & Young, 
2009). Moreover, in a prospective longitudinal study, observed maternal overcontrol 
at age 4 predicted depressive rumination at age 16 (A. Mills, unpublished data, 2003).  
Second, early experiences of abuse and maltreatment are hypothesised to be 
associated with RNT via two pathways: (i) engendering an experience of limited 
control over the environment leading to withdrawal, reduced problem-solving, and 
increased internal focus (Conway, Mendelson, Giannopolous, Csank, & Holm, 2004); 
(ii) through RNT acting as a coping strategy by preparing for the worst, anticipating, 
and mitigating the impact of negative events (Borkovec, 1994). Consistent with this 
hypothesis, there is a robust association between childhood maltreatment and 
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depressive rumination (Barnhofer, Kuehn, de Jong-Meyer, & Williams, 2007; 
Conway et al., 2004; Raes & Hermans, 2008; Spasojević & Alloy, 2002) and 
generalised anxiety disorder, characterised by chronic worry (Brown & Harris, 1993; 
Brown, Harris, & Eales, 1993; Roemer, Molina, Litz, & Borkovec, 1997). 
Third, personality factors such as neuroticism are associated with RNT. 
Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, and Larson (1994) hypothesised that neuroticism may 
manifest itself cognitively as an increased tendency to engage in RNT in response to 
depressed moods. Neuroticism and RNT are associated in correlational and 
prospective studies, with the relationship between neuroticism and psychopathology 
often mediated by rumination (e.g., Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010; Kuyken, Watkins, 
Holden, & Cook, 2006; Muris, Fokke, & Kwik, 2009; Roberts, Gilboa, & Gotlib, 
1998; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & Van Os, 2008) and worry (Muris, Roelofs, 
Rassin, Franken, & Mayer, 2005; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2008).  
Fourth, intrapersonal cognitive factors are proposed to influence individual 
differences in RNT. Watkins (2008) reviewed evidence that an abstract processing 
style, characterised by general decontextualised representations focused on meanings, 
causes, and implications (e.g., “why” an event happened) leads to persistent and 
unconstructive RNT, relative to a more concrete style, characterised by detailed and 
specific contextualised representations focused on the means and sequence by which 
an event or action occurs. Similarly, the reduced concreteness theory (Borkovec, Ray, 
& Stöber, 1998; Stöber, 1998; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) proposes that worry is 
predominantly experienced in a more abstract-verbal form rather than in a concrete-
visual imagery form. As abstract thoughts are hypothesised to evoke mental images 
with less ease, speed, and vividness than concrete thoughts (Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002), this reduction in vivid, aversive imagery is hypothesised to reduce the somatic 
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symptoms of anxiety, further reinforcing the abstract worrisome thoughts. Consistent 
with these hypotheses, experimental studies manipulating processing style have found 
that an abstract style results in increased RNT (Watkins, 2004; Moberly & Watkins, 
2006), impaired problem-solving (Watkins & Baracaia, 2002; Watkins & Moulds, 
2005b) and increased emotional reactivity to a subsequent failure (Watkins, Moberly, 
& Moulds, 2008), relative to a concrete style. 
Fifth, the perception that RT is functional is associated with individual 
differences in RNT. The avoidance theory suggests that worry is maintained because 
it is perceived to have reinforcing functions (Borkovec, 1994), such as avoiding future 
problems (see similar accounts of rumination: Martell, Dimidjian, & Herman-Dunn, 
2010; Watkins & Moulds, 2007). Metacognitive models propose that positive beliefs 
about its utility lead individuals to engage in RNT (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; 
Wells, 1995). Consistent with these hypotheses, there is a significant positive 
correlation between endorsement of instrumental functions of RT and rumination 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001, Watkins & Moulds, 2005a) 
and worry (Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; 
Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998). There is also experimental evidence that endorsing 
instrumental functions for RT may be causally associated with increased RNT 
(Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams, & Kandris, 2010). 
Thus, there is evidence suggesting that multiple variables may contribute to 
vulnerability for both worry and rumination, supporting a common process of RNT. 
However, to date, research into the aetiology of RNT is limited because it has tended 
to (a) retrospectively examine each potential explanatory factor in isolation, rather 
than studying multiple factors simultaneously; (b) use relatively small samples; (c) 
examine worry and rumination separately. Therefore, it is not known how these 
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factors interact, whether they moderate or mediate each other, or which factor(s) 
would remain significantly associated with RNT once others are statistically 
controlled. Critically, there is no integrative theoretical model that attempts to explain 
how these distinct factors interact. These risk factors are unlikely to be independent of 
each other, and thus it is necessary to consider them together to determine potential 
relationships between them. If risk factors are studied independently, it is not possible 
to tell if the effect of any given variable on RNT is directly due to the variable studied, 
or indirectly via its relationship to other (potentially unobserved) risk factors. This 
study aims to rectify these limitations by examining all of these factors concurrently 
with measures of worry and rumination in a large sample, with reference to a new 
integrative model of RNT. 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) recently distinguished between distal 
and proximal vulnerability factors for RNT, arguing that vulnerability factors vary in 
their causal distance to rumination and worry. Distal factors refer to “environmental 
and congenital biological variables relatively distal to observable symptoms of 
disorders”, whereas proximal factors refer to “within-person variables that are more 
proximal to symptoms of disorders” (p. 593). Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) 
proposed that distal factors do not directly cause symptoms such as RNT, but that 
they influence symptoms via mediating proximal factors, which have a direct effect 
on RNT. Building on this analysis, we propose an integrative model in which the 
relationship between distal vulnerability factors (parenting style, abuse) and RNT is 
partially mediated by proximal cognitive factors (abstract processing style, perceived 
RT function), which will directly be associated with RNT. We propose that 
neuroticism is an intermediate factor with both proximal and distal qualities: Like 
other proximal variables, it is a within-person characteristic that we hypothesise will 
    135 
have a direct effect on RNT, but like other distal variables, it has genetic and 
environmental origins (e.g., Loehlin, 1992). We hypothesise that neuroticism will 
indirectly influence RNT via proximal cognitive factors.  
This integrative model for individual differences in RNT, including the 
hypotheses outlined above, results in the following specific predictions (see Figure 
2.1): (1) Measures of rumination and worry will form a valid latent variable consistent 
with our hypothesis of an underlying RNT construct; (2) Distal vulnerability factors 
of (a) perceptions of overcontrolling parenting and (b) childhood abuse/maltreatment 
will be associated with increased RNT; (3) These relationships will be at least 
partially mediated by proximal cognitive vulnerability factors of (a) abstract 
processing and (b) perceived function of RT, which will be associated with increased 
RNT; (4) Neuroticism will have both an indirect effect (via the proximal cognitive 
mediator of perceived RT function) and a direct effect on RNT; (5) Given the 
extensive evidence that RNT is associated with increased anxiety and depression 
(Watkins, 2008), current distress will be associated with increased RNT, since 
individuals experiencing distress may be more likely to use passive coping strategies 
like RNT. Nonetheless, we hypothesise that other factors will still show a relationship 
with RNT over and above the effects of current distress. 
The current study provides a preliminary test of the model outlined in Figure 
2.1. Although the theoretical model predicts causal directions, it will not be possible 
to establish the direction of causality between the variables in the current study, which 
tests cross-sectional associations as a necessary first step in discovering the nature of 
the relationships between these factors. Structural equation modelling (SEM) is an 
effective way of examining the relationships between multiple variables in a single 
analysis. As SEM requires large sample sizes, the current study investigated these 
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factors in a large adult sample. The study will test whether this model provides the 
best fit to the data, or whether theoretically plausible variants of the model are 
superior.  
2.4. Method 
2.4.1. Participants 
One hundred and fifty-four university departments across the UK were 
contacted and requested to circulate an e-mail message to current undergraduate 
students within their departments. The e-mails contained a web-link to an online 
questionnaire, where potential participants saw a webpage inviting them to take part 
in a study about worry and rumination. A total of 1,238 people initially visited the 
online questionnaire webpage, and of these, 506 participants completed the full set of 
questionnaires (85% female, 15% male; age range 18 – 57, M = 22.15 years, SD = 
5.79; 83.79% identified themselves as British, 10.28% as non-British European, 
3.16% as Asian, 2.37% as North American, and 0.40% as Australian). Although 
participants were not selected on the basis of symptoms, 147 participants (29.05%) 
scored 20 or more (indicating moderate or severe depression) on the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
2.4.2. Measures 
2.4.2.1. Repetitive thought. 
Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS, 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RSQ-RRS is the standard measure of 
depressive rumination, and assesses ruminative responses to depressed mood which 
are focused on the self, symptoms, and possible causes and consequences of their 
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mood. We used a 25-item version, which amalgamates the two existing 22-item 
versions of the scale: The measure includes all items from the original 22-item 
version, plus three additional items from the other 22-item version used by Treynor et 
al. (2003), designed to tap into the reflection versus brooding components of 
rumination. Scores range from 25 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater trait 
rumination. The measure has acceptable convergent validity and high internal 
consistency (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure designed to examine the trait of 
worry. It evaluates the tendency of an individual to engage in excessive, 
uncontrollable and generalised worry, and the measure has sound psychometric 
properties (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). Scores range from 16 to 80, with higher 
scores indicating greater trait worry. The questionnaire possesses high internal 
consistency and construct validity (Molina & Borkovec, 1994).  
2.4.2.2. Symptoms and current stress. 
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II, Beck, et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 
21-item questionnaire designed to measure the intensity of somatic and affective 
symptoms of depression. Scores range from 0 to 63, with higher scores indicating 
more intense symptoms of depression. The measure has been widely used and has 
been found to be a reliable instrument with high internal consistency (α = .91; Dozois, 
Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998).  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State subscale (STAI, Spielberger, 1989). The 
state subscale of the STAI is a 20-item measure designed to measure respondents’ 
current experience of state anxiety. Respondents are required to rate various 
statements (e.g., “I feel calm”, “I feel nervous”) on a 4-point scale ranging from “not 
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at all” to “very much”, to indicate how they have been feeling for the past two weeks. 
Scores range from 20 to 80, with higher scores indicating greater state anxiety. The 
measure has high internal consistency (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; 10-item version, Cohen & Williamson, 1988). 
The PSS is a 10-item questionnaire measuring the degree to which respondents 
appraise their current life situation as stressful. Items measure current levels of 
perceived stress, as well as how uncontrollable, unpredictable and overloaded 
respondents perceive their lives to be. Scores range from 0 to 40, with higher scores 
indicating greater levels of perceived stress. The scale has adequate internal 
consistency and construct validity (Cohen & Williamson, 1988). 
2.4.2.3. Early experiences. 
Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour Inventory (30-item version, CRPBI-
30, Schludermann & Schludermann, 1988). The CRPBI-30 is a shortened form of the 
108-item CRPBI (Schludermann & Schludermann, 1970), which is in itself derived 
from the original 260-item CRPBI (Schaefer, 1965) designed to measure parenting 
behaviours of the respondents’ mothers and fathers. Three dimensions of parenting 
behaviours are examined and rated on a 3-point scale: acceptance versus rejection, 
firm versus lax behavioural control, and psychological autonomy versus 
psychological control. Scores range from 0 to 10 on each dimension, with higher 
scores representing greater acceptance, greater firm behavioural control, and greater 
psychological control on the respective dimensions. In the current sample there was 
good to excellent internal consistency (Mother: Acceptance α = .93, Firm Behavioural 
Control α = 86, Psychological Control α = 86; Father: Acceptance α = .94, Firm 
Behavioural Control α = .86, Psychological Control α = .87).  
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Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ, Gibb et al., 2001). The LEQ is an 82-item 
measure which assesses previous experiences of neglect and abuse in childhood. 
Various maltreatment experiences are listed, and participants are instructed to respond 
with “yes”, “no”, or “not sure”, to indicate whether they have experienced each event. 
For the purposes of this study, several minor modifications were made: Only the 
abuse, rather than neglect subscales were administered, since there was no hypothesis 
relating to neglect; no additional detail was requested about abuse experiences (e.g., 
frequency, age at occurrence); and the initial instructions were modified to ask about 
events that occurred before 16, rather than 15, years of age. Scores range from 0 to 28 
on the emotional abuse subscale, 0 to 10 on the physical abuse subscale, and 0 to 26 
on the sexual abuse subscale, with higher scores indicating more experiences of abuse. 
The LEQ demonstrates good internal consistency (α = .89, Gibb et al., 2001). 
2.4.2.4. Cognitive factors. 
Beliefs about the Function of RT - Why Ruminate scale. The Why Ruminate 
scale (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001) is a 46-item questionnaire measuring perceived 
benefits and functions of rumination. Face valid items were written based on clinical 
experiences with depressed patients (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001), and items were 
adapted from questionnaires measuring metacognitive beliefs about worry (Freeston, 
Rheaume, Letarte, Dugas, & Ladouceur, 1994; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 1997). 
The measure consists of four subscales: (1) the use of rumination for instrumental 
understanding (e.g., “I ruminate to try and find the answer to my problems”; score 
range 14 to 70), (2) rumination for self and social control (e.g., “I ruminate to have 
better control over my life”; score range 11 to 55), (3) rumination for motivation, 
learning and problem-solving (e.g., “I ruminate to try and maintain my standards”; 
score range 7 to 35), and (4) rumination for reducing past distress (e.g., “I ruminate to 
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remove the pain of upsetting memories and images”; score range 6 to 30). Participants 
are instructed to indicate the extent to which they believe each statement is true for 
them on a scale from 1 (“not true at all”) to 5 (“completely true”). For the current 
sample, internal consistency for the subscales was good to excellent (instrumental 
understanding α = .93; self and social control α = .90, motivation, learning and 
problem-solving α = .84, reducing past distress α = .83). 
Abstract thinking styles - Problem Elaboration Questionnaire (PEQ, Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002). The PEQ instructs participants to identify two significant problems 
that they are currently experiencing, and then asks them to provide an open-ended 
description of each problem, followed by an account of three possible consequences 
of each problem. The wording of the instructions was modified so as to make the task 
relevant to RNT (Watkins & Moulds, 2007), such that the instructions read: “Please 
note down two major problems or issues that you are currently ruminating about (that 
is repeatedly dwelling on and frequently thinking about). These problems or issues 
should be ones that you are greatly concerned about and spend a lot of time thinking 
about”. The written problem descriptions and consequences were then rated by the 
experimenter for level of concreteness on a 5-point Likert scale: 1 (abstract), 2 
(somewhat abstract), 3 (neither-nor), 4 (somewhat concrete), 5 (concrete), giving each 
participant two scores (one for the problem description, and one for the consequence 
description). After responses were coded, mean scores were calculated for problem 
descriptions, and consequence descriptions. Inter-rater reliability was good (mean 
Cohen’s kappa = .76). 
Neuroticism - Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Short Form 
(Neuroticism subscale; EPQ-R; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barratt, 1985). This 
questionnaire contains a 12-item subscale which measures the personality trait of 
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neuroticism. Participants indicate their response to each item (e.g., “does your mood 
often go up and down?”) by endorsing “yes” or “no”. Internal consistency for this 
measure is good (α = .80 – 84; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barratt, 1985). 
2.4.3. Procedure 
On visiting the study’s website, participants were presented with information 
about the purpose of the research and the nature of the questions that they would be 
asked. Participants were informed that some questionnaires explored personal topics 
relating to low moods and negative events in childhood concerning parenting, abuse, 
and maltreatment. After giving informed consent, participants then went on to 
complete the online questionnaires. Prior to commencing recruitment for this study, 
ethical approval was sought and granted by the departmental research ethics 
committee.    
2.4.4. Data Analytic Strategy 
Structural equation modelling (SEM) analyses were conducted in order to test 
the hypothesised theoretical model. SEM enables the researcher to explore the 
relationships between observed (measured) and unobserved (latent) variables, and 
therefore test multiple hypotheses about these relationships simultaneously. Whilst 
SEM requires the researcher to generate a priori models to be tested, it can be used in 
both a confirmatory and an exploratory sense, such that models which make 
theoretical sense and provide a good statistical fit to the data can be generated (Kline, 
1998). SEM analyses were conducted using the AMOS statistical software (Arbuckle, 
2009). 
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Figure 2.1. First hypothesised model of the relationship between RNT and potential 
vulnerability factors. 
Note. RNT: Repetitive Negative Thought; CD: Current Distress; Abs: Abstraction; Abuse: Childhood 
Abuse or Maltreatment; POv: Perceived Parental Overcontrol; PFuncRT: Perceived Function of 
Repetitive Thought; RSQ: Response Styles Questionnaire; PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire; 
BDI: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state subscale); PSS: 
Perceived Stress Scale; MatOv: CRPBI Maternal Overcontrol subscale; PatOv: CRPBI Paternal 
Overcontrol subscale; EmotAbuse: LEQ Emotional Abuse subscale; PhysAbus: LEQ Physical Abuse 
subscale; SexAbus: LEQ Sexual Abuse subscale; N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Revised - 
Short Form Neuroticism subscale; PEQProb: PEQ Problem Description score; PEQCons: PEQ 
Consequence Description score; IU: Why Ruminate RT for  Instrumental Understanding subscale; 
SSC: Why Ruminate RT for Self and Social Control subscale; MLP: Why Ruminate RT for Motivation, 
Learning and Problem Solving subscale; RPD: Why Ruminate RT for Reducing Past Distress subscale. 
 
 
As described in the Introduction, a model was devised to illustrate the 
hypothesised relationships between the different vulnerability factors and RNT 
(Figure 2.1). The original model included six latent variables, two of which were 
removed after preliminary measurement model analyses. The Repetitive Negative 
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Thought latent variable was created with the RSQ and PSWQ as measured indicators. 
The Parental Overcontrol latent variable was created with the two subscales from the 
CRPBI-30 that measured child self-reported maternal and paternal psychological 
overcontrol. The Abuse latent variable was composed of the three LEQ subscales, 
measuring emotional, physical, and sexual abuse in childhood. The Abstraction latent 
variable was composed of the two scores from the PEQ, measuring the extent to 
which current problems and their potential consequences are described in an abstract 
(versus concrete) way. The Perceived Function of RT latent variable was comprised 
of four subscales from the Why Ruminate scale, which represent endorsement of 
functional reasons for engaging in RT. Finally, the Current Distress latent variable 
was composed of the BDI-II, state subscale of the STAI, and PSS, and thus reflects 
current level of psychological distress. 
Disturbance terms were added to each of the latent variables in the model, in 
order to represent the variance in the latent variables that was unmeasured and not 
accounted for by the indicators specified in the model. In order to evaluate how well 
the hypothesised model fitted the data, a number of different statistical tests were used. 
The maximum likelihood chi-square statistic (χ2) should be nonsignificant if the 
model provides a good fit. However, χ2 is very sensitive to sample size, as larger 
samples may provide significant χ2 values even if the difference between the data and 
the model is slight, which may incorrectly imply that the model is a poor fit 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2004). Therefore, a series of additional fit indices were 
inspected in order to evaluate model fit: the normed fit index (NFI), the comparative 
fit index (CFI), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). In order 
to judge the fit of the model, the following criteria were used: for the NFI and CFI, 
values of .90 - .95 indicated acceptable fit, values of greater than .95 indicated good 
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fit, and values of less than .90 were unacceptable (Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Hu & 
Bentler, 1999); for the RMSEA, values of .00 - .05 indicated close fit, values of .05 -
 .08 indicated fair fit, values of .08 - .10 indicated mediocre fit, and values of greater 
than .10 indicated poor fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993; MacCallum, Browne, & 
Sugawara, 1996). The Akaike information criterion (AIC) was used to compare 
alternative models, with smaller AIC values indicating better fit. 
2.5. Results 
2.5.1. Preliminary Analyses 
Correlations, means, standard deviations and reliabilities for the measured 
variables are displayed in Table 2.1. Despite being robust to violations of normality, 
the maximum likelihood method of estimation in SEM assumes normally distributed 
data (McDonald & Ho, 2002), and therefore, univariate analyses of normality were 
conducted. The analyses revealed that a number of variables had significant skew and 
kurtosis. Therefore, all variables were subjected to square root transformations, which 
improved the normality of the distributions, and all but two of the transformed 
variables were retained for subsequent analyses. Despite the transformations, the 
physical abuse and sexual abuse subscales from the LEQ had distributions which 
were still substantially non-normal: There were a very limited range of scores on 
these subscales, since few participants reported having experienced sexual or physical 
abuse or maltreatment (see Table 2.1). As a result of this insufficient reporting range, 
these two variables were excluded from the subsequent SEM analysis, with only the 
emotional abuse variable being retained. Thus, it was not possible to fully examine 
Hypothesis 2 (b), or to provide any comment as to the nature of the relationship 
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between physical and sexual abuse and the other variables included in the model, 
given the low levels of participant report. 
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Table 2.1. Correlations, means, standard deviations and reliabilities for the observed variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 
1. RSQ 1                 
2. PSWQ  .65*** 1                
3. BDI .70*** .58*** 1               
4. STAI .64*** .68*** .79*** 1              
5. PSS .67*** .71*** .77*** .83*** 1             
6. EPQ-R-SF-N .66*** .77*** .60*** .67*** .66*** 1            
7. Emotional abuse .32*** .27*** .44*** .37*** .37*** .28*** 1           
8. Physical abuse .15*** .08 .24*** .24*** .24*** .07 .62*** 1          
9. Sexual abuse .12*** .06 .17*** .12* .11* .09 .36*** .32*** 1         
10. Maternal overcontrol .26*** .17*** .31*** .23*** .26*** .20*** .47*** .26*** -.17*** 1        
11. Paternal overcontrol .21*** .19*** .25*** .18*** .25*** .16*** .47*** .24*** .08 .37*** 1       
12. RT for IU .45*** .36*** .25*** .29*** .33*** .28*** .21*** .14*** -.03 .15*** .08 1      
13. RT for SSC .48*** .40*** .35*** .37*** .40*** .40*** .25*** .15*** .03 .21*** .17*** .71*** 1     
14. RT for MLP .19*** .08 -.02 .01 .06 .03 .10* .08 -.04 .12*** .03 .66*** .53*** 1    
15. RT for RPD .30*** .24*** .15*** .20*** .27*** .22*** .15*** .14*** -.01 .13*** .07 .70*** .60*** .48*** 1   
16. PEQ-problem -.29*** -.20*** -.27*** -.21*** -.22*** -.24*** -.09 -.04 -.04 -.09 -.04 -.21*** -.21*** -.10* -.09* 1  
17. PEQ-consequence -.27*** -.23*** -.22*** -.23*** -.25*** -.27*** -.12* -.06 -.08 -.06 -.07 -.18*** -.22 -.10* -.04 .78*** 1 
Mean 54.60 53.31 15.81 48.83 20.33 6.81 6.42 1.10 .91 15.64 14.81 45.28 30.47 22.28 15.32 2.72 2.32 
SD 15.39 14.64 12.39 14.02 7.76 3.37 5.31 1.62 2.24 4.82 4.69 11.70 9.25 5.38 5.14 .94 .82 
α .93 .94 .94 .95 .87 .83 .88 .73 .86 .86 .87 .92 .90 .84 .83 .65 .67 
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory; STAI: State-Trait 
Anxiety Inventory (state subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form (neuroticism subscale); RT for IU: RT 
for Instrumental Understanding (Why Ruminate subscale); RT for SSC: RT for Self Control and Social Control (Why Ruminate subscale); RT for MLP: RT for Motivation, 
Learning and Problem Solving (Why Ruminate subscale); RT for RPD: RT for Reducing Past Distress (Why Ruminate subscale); PEQ-problem: Problem Elaboration 
Questionnaire mean problem abstraction rating; PEQ-consequence: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean consequence abstraction rating. 
* p < .05, *** p < .001. 
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2.5.2. Measurement Model Analyses 
Preliminary measurement analyses were conducted in order to see whether the 
measured variables loaded well onto their respective latent variables. Figure 2 
displays the loadings of the measured variables onto their respective latent variables, 
demonstrating that the latent variables fit the data well (sr range = .66 - .98). 
Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported, since having a latent variable representing 
RNT with two measured variables of rumination (RSQ) and worry (PSWQ) provided 
a good fit to the data, and is consistent with the theoretical conceptualisation of RNT. 
However, measurement model analyses revealed that one latent variable did not fit the 
data well: For the Parental Overcontrol latent variable, although both of the measured 
variables representing paternal and maternal overcontrol were significantly associated 
with the latent variable, the loadings were not as high as the measured variable 
loadings found in the other analyses (sr = .57 and .60, respectively). As such, the 
initial model was modified such that the latent variable representing Parental 
Overcontrol was removed, and instead, the paternal overcontrol and maternal 
overcontrol variables were represented in the model as distinct observed variables. 
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Figure 2.2. First hypothesised model of the relationship between RNT and potential 
vulnerability factors, with the Parental Overcontrol latent variable and 
Sexual/Physical Abuse measured variables removed after preliminary measurement 
model analyses. 
Note. RNT: Repetitive Negative Thought; CD: Current Distress; Abs: Abstraction; PFuncRT: 
Perceived Function of Repetitive Thought; RSQ: Response Styles Questionnaire; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; MatOv: CRPBI Maternal Overcontrol subscale; PatOv: CRPBI 
Paternal Overcontrol subscale; EmotAbuse: LEQ Emotional Abuse subscale; N: Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire – Revised - Short Form Neuroticism subscale; PEQProb: PEQ Problem Description 
score; PEQCons: PEQ Consequence Description score; IU: Why Ruminate RT for  Instrumental 
Understanding subscale; SSC: Why Ruminate RT for Self and Social Control subscale; MLP: Why 
Ruminate RT for Motivation, Learning and Problem Solving subscale; RPD: Why Ruminate RT for 
Reducing Past Distress subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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2.5.3. Structural Model Analyses 
Figure 2.2 displays the factor loadings of each latent variable onto its 
measured variables, as well as the regression weights for the paths between each of 
the variables. Analysis of the hypothesised model indicates that it did not provide an 
acceptable fit to the data (χ2 (79, n = 506) = 578.77, p < .001, NFI = .872, CFI = .887, 
RMSEA = .112, AIC = 690.772).  
In particular, contrary to initial hypotheses, Paternal and Maternal Overcontrol 
did not have a significant indirect effect on RNT (Hypothesis 2(a)). They were not 
significantly associated with Abstraction and Perceived Function of RT, which were 
originally hypothesised to be mediators of the relationship between perceived parental 
overcontrol and RNT.2 Moreover, when examining the direct relationships between 
the proximal cognitive factors and RNT, Abstraction was not a significant predictor of 
RNT, contrary to prediction (Hypothesis 3(a)).  
Although a number of specific hypotheses were supported or partially 
supported (Hypothesis 2(b); Hypothesis 3(b); Hypotheses 4 (a) and (b); Hypothesis 5), 
because the overall model did not provide an acceptable fit to the data, and several of 
the original hypotheses were not supported, attempts were made to improve the model 
in light of this, and a second model was tested with the following modifications. First, 
                                                
2 A further SEM model was tested which was identical to the first model (Figure 2.2), except 
as well as testing the indirect, mediated relationships, it also tested the direct relationships between the 
early experience variables and RNT. As such, the model had three additional pathways which lead 
directly from the Maternal Overcontrol, Paternal Overcontrol and Emotional Abuse variables to the 
RNT latent variable. However, despite there being significant correlations between these variables and 
RNT (Table 2.1), none of the direct pathways between these factors and RNT were significant when 
other strong predictors of RNT were included in the model. 
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the Maternal and Paternal Overcontrol measured variables were removed from the 
model, since the hypothesis that they would be related to RNT via association with 
the intrapersonal cognitive variables was not supported. Second, as the analysis 
revealed that the Abstraction latent variable was not a significant predictor of RNT, 
the pathway between the two variables was removed. In light of this prediction not 
being supported by the data, an alternative hypothesis was considered: that abstract 
processing may have an indirect relationship with RNT via emotional reactivity. 
There is experimental evidence which demonstrates how abstract, evaluative thinking 
leads to greater emotional responses to negative events (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; 
Watkins, 2004; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008), and evidence from an 
experience sampling study which shows an association between abstract thinking and 
concurrent negative affect (Takano & Tanno, 2010). As such, abstract thinking may 
be one of the mechanisms underpinning emotional reactivity, a key part of the 
neuroticism construct. Therefore, to test this alternative hypothesis and to see whether 
neuroticism mediates the relationship between abstraction and RNT, a pathway was 
added to the model from Abstraction to Neuroticism. 
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Figure 2.3. Second hypothesised model of the relationship between RNT and 
potential vulnerability factors.  
Note. RNT: Repetitive Negative Thought; CD: Current Distress; Abs: Abstraction; PFuncRT: 
Perceived Function of Repetitive Thought; RSQ: Response Styles Questionnaire; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; EmotAbuse: LEQ Emotional Abuse subscale; N: Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire – Revised - Short Form Neuroticism subscale; PEQProb: PEQ Problem 
Description score; PEQCons: PEQ Consequence Description score; IU: Why Ruminate RT for  
Instrumental Understanding subscale; SSC: Why Ruminate RT for Self and Social Control subscale; 
MLP: Why Ruminate RT for Motivation, Learning and Problem Solving subscale; RPD: Why 
Ruminate RT for Reducing Past Distress subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
The second model is displayed in Figure 2.3. Analysis of this revised model 
indicates that it provided an acceptable fit to the data (χ2 (58, n = 506) = 279.63, p 
< .001, NFI = .934, CFI = .947, RMSEA = .087, AIC = 371.63). This second model 
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provided a significantly better fit to the data than the first model (χ2diff (21, n = 506) = 
299.15, p < .001; Δ AIC = -.299.15). 
The hypotheses that were supported or partially supported in the first model 
were also supported in the second model. Specifically, although it was not possible to 
fully test the hypothesis relating to childhood maltreatment as a result of insufficient 
reporting of physical and sexual abuse (Hypothesis 2(b)), Emotional Abuse had a 
significant indirect effect on RNT (standardised indirect effect = .14, p <. 001) 
through its relationship with Perceived Function of RT. In order to test the 
significance of this meditational pathway, a Sobel test was performed (Sobel, 1982). 
This test was significant (z = 2.78, p < .01), supporting the hypothesis that the 
proximal factor of perceived function of RT mediates the relationship between the 
distal factor of emotional abuse and RNT. Moreover, Perceived Function of RT 
significantly predicted RNT (sr = .21, p < .001; Hypothesis 3(b)). In addition, the 
hypothesis that Neuroticism would act as an indirect (distal) and direct (proximal) 
predictor were supported (Hypotheses 4(a), (b)). Neuroticism was a direct predictor of 
RNT (sr = .43, p < .001), as well an indirect predictor through its effects on Perceived 
Function of RNT and Current Distress (standardised indirect effect = .44, p < .001). 
Two further Sobel tests were conducted to test the significance of these meditational 
pathways (Sobel, 1982). Both Perceived Function of RT (z = 4.30, p < .001) and 
Current Distress significantly mediated the relationship between Neuroticism (z = 
10.32, p < .001) and RNT. Finally, as predicted, Current Distress was a significant 
predictor of RNT (sr = .56, p < .001; Hypothesis 5). All of the above hypotheses were 
supported in both the first and second models.  
With regards to the additional pathway which was added in to the second 
model, Abstraction had a significant indirect effect on RNT (standardised indirect 
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effect = -.233, p < .001) through its effects on Neuroticism. A Sobel test indicated that 
this meditational pathway was significant (z = -5.19, p < .001), suggesting that 
neuroticism mediates the relationship between abstract processing and RNT.  
A third and final version of the theoretical model was tested, which made a 
single modification to the second model. Since the original model revealed that 
Emotional Abuse was a significant predictor of Abstraction, and the second model 
revealed that Abstraction was a significant predictor of Neuroticism, we wanted to 
test whether Emotional Abuse had a direct effect on Neuroticism. Therefore, we 
added a single path to the model, leading from Emotional Abuse to Neuroticism (see 
Figure 2.4). Theoretical justification for the addition of this pathway comes from the 
extant literature which suggests that a number of social and environmental factors, 
including aversive early experiences, have been implicated in the development of 
neuroticism, since genetic heritability tends to account for less than half of the 
variance in this trait (Goldberg, 2000). As such, it has been hypothesised that events 
like abuse and maltreatment early in development may contribute to the development 
of neuroticism (e.g., Goldberg, 2000; Lahey, 2009; Roy, 2002). Like the other 
proximal variables included in the theoretical model, neuroticism may act as a 
mediator of the relationship between emotional abuse and RNT, such that individuals 
who have experienced emotional maltreatment in childhood may develop the trait of 
neuroticism, and as a result of this tendency to experience negative mood states, may 
be more prone to developing a tendency towards pathological RNT. 
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Figure 2.4. Third hypothesised model of the relationship between RNT and potential 
vulnerability factors.  
Note. RNT: Repetitive Negative Thought; CD: Current Distress; Abs: Abstraction; PFuncRT: 
Perceived Function of Repetitive Thought; RSQ: Response Styles Questionnaire; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; EmotAbuse: LEQ Emotional Abuse subscale; N: Eysenck 
Personality Questionnaire – Revised - Short Form Neuroticism subscale; PEQProb: PEQ Problem 
Description score; PEQCons: PEQ Consequence Description score; IU: Why Ruminate RT for  
Instrumental Understanding subscale; SSC: Why Ruminate RT for Self and Social Control subscale; 
MLP: Why Ruminate RT for Motivation, Learning and Problem Solving subscale; RPD: Why 
Ruminate RT for Reducing Past Distress subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
 
Analysis of this third model indicates that it provided a good statistical fit to 
the data χ2 (57, n = 506) = 251.81, p < .001, NFI = .941, CFI = .953, RMSEA = .082, 
AIC = 345.81). This third model provided a significantly better fit to the data than the 
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second model (χ2diff (1, n = 506) = 27.82, p < .001; Δ AIC = -.25.14). With regards to 
the modification that was made, the pathway between Emotional Abuse and 
Neuroticism was statistically significant, such that Emotional Abuse was a significant 
predictor of Neuroticism (sr = .24, p < .001). All of the hypotheses supported in the 
first and second models remained supported in the third model.  
2.6. Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to provide a cross-sectional examination 
of factors implicated in the aetiology of rumination and worry, by testing a new 
integrative model of RNT. Using SEM to examine the concurrent relationships 
between the variables, the final model demonstrates that several proximal and distal 
factors are associated with RNT.  
The study examined a series of specific hypotheses. First, the hypothesis that 
rumination and worry would form a latent variable representing RNT was supported, 
providing further evidence for the commonality between these forms of RNT. Second, 
the hypothesis that distal vulnerability factors would be associated with RNT via their 
relationships with proximal cognitive factors was partially supported. Whilst 
insufficient reporting on our measure of childhood maltreatment precluded further 
examination of physical and sexual abuse in the SEM model, emotional abuse was 
found to be a significant distal predictor of RNT via its association with perceptions 
of the function of RT, neuroticism, abstraction, and current distress. However, 
perceived overcontrolling parenting was not found to be a significant distal predictor 
of RNT either directly, or through the proposed mediators, and therefore was omitted 
from the final model. Third, the hypothesis that proximal cognitive factors would be 
directly associated with RNT was partially supported. Whilst perceived function of 
RT had a significant direct association with RNT, abstract processing did not. 
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However, in the second model, the addition of a significant pathway leading from 
abstraction to neuroticism suggests that the relationship between abstraction and RNT 
may be mediated by neuroticism. Fourth, the hypothesis that neuroticism would act as 
an intermediate factor with both proximal and distal qualities was supported, as it had 
both a direct effect on RNT, as well as an indirect effect on RNT where the 
relationship was mediated by perceptions of the function of RT and current distress. 
Finally, the hypothesis that current distress would be associated with increased RNT 
was supported, as was the hypothesis that other factors would still have a relationship 
with RNT over and above the effects of current distress. Therefore, the data provide 
broad support for the hypothesised integrative model, with the exception of the 
specific relationships predicted for abstraction and overcontrolling parenting. 
More specifically, the results support the hypothesis that there are distal and 
proximal risk factors associated with RNT, with the former’s relationship with RNT 
mediated by the latter, consistent with Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins’ (2011) 
theoretical account. Therefore, this study demonstrates that there are several factors 
which are associated with individual differences in RNT, and that these vulnerability 
factors are diverse, relating to an individual’s early experiences in life, their 
personality, and current intrapersonal and cognitive characteristics. 
One specific aim was to examine a previous finding that found that 
retrospective reports of perceived overcontrolling parenting and abuse were 
associated with increased RNT (Spasojević & Alloy, 2002). The current study did not 
replicate these previous findings: Retrospective reports of overcontrolling parenting 
did not have a significant direct or indirect association with RNT when examined 
alongside other proximal predictors. However, in our preliminary correlational 
analysis, we did find small but statistically significant positive correlations between 
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the paternal overcontrol variables and measures of RNT (Table 2.1). As such, it is 
reasonable to suggest that because our SEM analyses involved the inclusion of other 
measures of proximal risk factors, it may be that distal early experience factors no 
longer have a significant relationship with RNT when examined alongside more 
powerful proximal cognitive and intrapersonal predictors. Additionally, a different 
pattern of findings may have resulted from different recruitment strategies: We 
recruited all participants interested in completing a study on worry and rumination, 
whereas Spasojević and Alloy (2002) utilised a sample selected on the basis of high 
and low scores on measures of attributional style and dysfunctional attitudes. 
However, it is worth noting that both the current study and the study by Spasojević 
and Alloy (2002) only examined adult retrospective reports of perceived 
overcontrolling parenting, and so to establish the relationship between parenting style 
and RNT, studies utilising alternative measures should be conducted (e.g., 
observation of parent-child interactions; child and parent self-report). 
This study also examined the prediction that, consistent with previous research, 
abstraction would be associated with increased RNT; however, this prediction was not 
supported. One explanation for this may be due to differences in the way that RNT is 
characterised and measured across studies: There is a difference between a “bout” of 
rumination or worry captured by state measures, and an ongoing tendency to engage 
in rumination or worry, captured by trait measures. All previous studies examining 
the effects of abstract processing have shown an effect on state rather than trait 
rumination in experimental studies (i.e., bouts of rumination and their consequences). 
It is therefore possible that the tendency towards abstraction may impact more on 
state bouts of RNT, rather than an individual’s trait tendency to engage in RNT, as 
measured in the current study. A further explanation for these different findings 
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concerns the measurement of abstract processing: The current measure (PEQ) 
assesses an individual’s abstract or concrete response to two specific problems they 
have identified. However, this may not generalise to reflect the individual’s 
processing style in response to situations other than those described. As such, 
abstraction assessed using this measure may be less likely to be associated with trait 
measures of RNT, which assess the tendency to engage in RNT across all situations, 
and not just the situations identified in the PEQ.  
The role of perceived function of RT in predicting RNT is noteworthy: 
Alongside neuroticism and current distress, perceived function of RT was a strong 
direct predictor of RNT, with greater perceptions that RT is functional associated with 
increased RNT. It also mediated the relationship between neuroticism and RNT, and 
emotional abuse and RNT. Since perceived function of RT remained a significant 
predictor of RNT when controlling for well-established predictors of RNT (current 
distress, neuroticism), future studies should attempt to examine the causal direction of 
the relationship between RNT and perceived function of RT in experimental and 
longitudinal studies. 
There were a number of strengths to the current study, including examining 
both rumination and worry together under the conceptualisation of RNT; examining a 
large number of potential vulnerability factors concurrently in a single integrative 
model, in contrast to studies examining factors in relative isolation; and using a large 
sample size, allowing SEM to be used effectively. However, there were several 
limitations including the fact that it was a cross-sectional, correlational study, 
precluding us from establishing the causal relationships between variables; the limited 
statistical power of the data collected on physical and sexual abuse in childhood and 
an insufficient range on these variables for statistical analysis; and a reliance on 
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retrospective self-report measures, in which participants may have been unwilling to 
disclose highly personal information (e.g., experiences of abuse), and which have 
been critiqued as potentially suffering from mood-dependent biases and poor 
agreement with parent reports (Bögels & Brechman-Toussaint, 2006). Relationships 
between variables may exist in the opposite direction to what is depicted in the 
structural model (or the relationships may be bidirectional), and/or the associations 
between variables may be caused by a mutual association with an unmeasured 
additional variable. For example, the model depicts symptoms of depression leading 
to RNT, when a bidirectional relationship between RNT and symptoms of depression 
may exist (e.g., Moberly & Watkins, 2008). In order to establish the causal 
relationships, a prospective longitudinal study could be used to assess which variables 
predict subsequent RNT, and experimental studies could be used to examine whether 
manipulation of putative vulnerability factors, such as beliefs about the function of 
RT, influences RNT. Nonetheless, although the current study is not sufficient to 
establish causality, it provides a necessary first step in identifying the cross-sectional 
relationships that exist between factors that influence individual differences in RNT.   
Furthermore, future studies exploring this area may benefit from targeting 
populations in which greater reports of abuse may be more likely, and from including 
relevant observational and independently assessed measures. Whilst there is typically 
good agreement between self-report and clinician-assessed measures (e.g., the BDI-II 
is highly correlated with clinician-assessed symptoms; Sprinkle et al., 2002), 
conclusions could be drawn more confidently if self-report measures were further 
corroborated by independent evaluations. Future studies examining RNT would 
benefit from the inclusion of independent assessments of internalising symptoms. 
There is also the possibility that the title used to advertise the research study 
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(“Understanding worry and rumination”) led to a self-selected sample of individuals 
particularly prone to RNT, consistent with the elevated rates of depression. Although 
increasing the potential relevance of the findings for clinical populations, this 
possibility raises questions about the generalisability of the findings. Although the 
study did not select on the basis of (or assess) clinical diagnosis, the BDI-II scores 
suggest that a significant proportion of the sample were experiencing at least 
moderate levels of depression. Nonetheless, future research should test this model in 
clinical populations to examine whether the model fits the data equally well, including 
patients diagnosed with major depression and individuals diagnosed with autism 
spectrum disorders, both of whom display elevated repetitive thought.   
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that the vulnerability factors examined 
in the current study may only represent some of the variables involved in individual 
differences in RNT. Although we sought to examine the majority of the factors which 
have been repeatedly associated with RNT in the theoretical and research literature, as 
a result of practical constraints, such as reducing participant burden, it was not 
possible for every relevant factor to be examined. For instance, deficiencies in 
executive functioning abilities (e.g., attention inhibition, effortful control) are 
hypothesised to lead to RNT, since difficulties in switching attention, inhibiting, and 
disengaging from negative thoughts may lead to persistent RNT (e.g., Joormann, 
2006; Linville, 1996). However, this factor was not measured, as it was judged 
difficult to assess it reliably via the online self-report method adopted for this study. 
As such, it would be useful to develop and test this model with reference to other 
potential vulnerability factors not examined in the current study, such as executive 
functioning, effortful control and the related temperamental construct of 
conscientiousness (e.g., Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002). 
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If the patterns arising from the current correlational study can be extended into 
longitudinal studies, which show that the aforementioned factors prospectively predict 
increases in RNT, then there may be clinical implications arising from the research. 
For example, individuals who hold strong beliefs about the functional properties of 
RNT may benefit from psychoeducation interventions that aim to inform individuals 
about the ways in which rumination and worry can be unhelpful. Additionally, 
prevention strategies designed to decrease the likelihood of individuals developing a 
tendency towards RNT could be aimed at young people known to be from 
environments that may be conducive to the development of RNT. Finally, because 
RNT is a transdiagnostic process and the current study has examined both rumination 
and worry, these preliminary findings, relating to the identification of possible 
proximal and distal vulnerability factors, are relevant to mental health problems 
where both rumination and/or worry are key features (e.g., depression, generalised 
anxiety disorder). 
In conclusion, the findings from the current study provide support for an 
integrative aetiological model of RNT, in which a variety of proximal and distal 
vulnerability factors, namely childhood emotional abuse, abstraction, perceived 
function of RT, neuroticism, and current distress, interact and are associated, directly 
and/or indirectly, with increased levels of worry and rumination.   
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2.7. Appendix A: Further Analysis of Overcontrolling Parenting Findings 
One of the specific aims of Study 1 was to attempt to replicate the finding that 
retrospective reports of parenting are associated with increased RNT (Spasojević & 
Alloy, 2002). However, in the SEM analysis, overcontrolling parenting was neither 
directly associated with RNT, nor indirectly associated with RNT (via relationships 
with perceived function of RT, abstract thinking styles, or current distress). In the 
Discussion (Section 2.6) several possible explanations for this finding were noted, in 
particular, the different sampling techniques (this study used an unselected 
undergraduate sample; Spasojević & Alloy used a selected sample based on 
attributional style and high/low levels of dysfunctional attitudes), and the other factors 
concurrently examined alongside overcontrolling parenting (this study examined the 
effects of overcontrolling parenting on RNT alongside other powerful predictors; 
Spasojević & Alloy examined the effect of overcontrolling parenting on RNT both as 
a sole predictor, and after controlling for depression symptoms).  
However, when examining basic correlations between maternal overcontrol 
and paternal overcontrol and rumination, significant positive correlations were found 
(Table 2.1). As such, to explore whether the finding observed in the SEM analysis 
may have been due to the presence of other more powerful predictors, regression 
analyses were repeated exactly as performed by Spasojević and Alloy (2002). The 
same measures of rumination (RSQ-RRS; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991) and 
overcontrolling parenting (CRPBI-30; Schludermann & Schludermann, 1988) were 
used, with the only difference being that when controlling for depression, this study 
used the BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) to measure depression symptoms, whereas 
Spasojević and Alloy used the original BDI (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).   
    163 
Spasojević and Alloy initially demonstrated that mothers’ and fathers’ 
overcontrolling parenting was significantly associated with their child’s trait 
rumination. When attempting the same regression analyses on this data by entering 
RSQ-RRS as the dependent variable and parental overcontrol (CRPBI30; mother or 
father overcontrol) as the predictor variable, the finding was replicated for both 
maternal overcontrol (t(494) = 6.03, p < .001, β = .26) and paternal overcontrol 
(t(480) = 4.70, p < .001, β = .21). 
However, Spasojević and Alloy then went on to demonstrate that the 
relationship between parental overcontrol and rumination remained significant after 
controlling for depression symptoms. When attempting the same hierarchal regression 
analysis by entering RSQ-RRS as the dependent variable, BDI-II score as a predictor 
in Step 1, and parental overcontrol (CRPBI30; mother or father overcontrol) as a 
predictor in Step 2, it was not possible to replicate this finding: after controlling for 
BDI-II score, maternal overcontrol (t(464) = 1.71, p = .089, β = .06) and paternal 
overcontrol (t(452) = .82, p = .411, β = .03) were not significantly associated with 
rumination.  
As such, this demonstrates that the failure to replicate the finding that 
overcontrolling parenting predicts rumination after controlling for depression was not 
simply due to the presence of other more powerful proximal predictors in the SEM 
model, since when examining maternal or paternal overcontrol variables individually, 
after controlling for current depression symptoms, the relationship between paternal 
overcontrol and rumination did not remain significant.   
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2.8. Appendix B: Further Analysis of Abstract Processing Findings 
A further aim of the study was to examine the control theory and processing 
mode predictions that more abstract processing of information would be associated 
with RNT (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Watkins, 2008). Characterising abstract 
processing as a proximal, within-person current factor (Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 
2011), according to Martin and Tesser’s (1996) model, it was predicted to have a 
direct effect on trait RNT.  
There are several possible explanations offered as to why abstract processing 
was not directly associated with RNT in this study. First, as outlined in the Discussion 
(Section 2.6), abstract processing may have more of an influence on state rumination 
(i.e., individual “bouts” of rumination), rather than trait RNT (i.e., the relatively stable 
tendency to engage in RNT), which was being measured in the study. This is 
consistent with Watkins’ (2008) processing mode account, which predicts that 
abstract processing influences state rumination, as abstract processing is hypothesised 
to lead to ineffective episodes of rumination with unconstructive consequences, which 
is likely to cause these episodes to become prolonged.  
 Second, the failure to find a direct association between abstract processing 
and RNT could be due to the way in which abstract processing was operationalised. 
By using the Problem Elaboration Questionnaire (PEQ; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), 
the study may have inadvertently been capturing participants’ tendencies to be 
abstract only in response to the specific events identified in the PEQ, rather than 
assessing their more generalised tendency to construe information in an abstract 
manner. As such, the level of abstraction demonstrated in the PEQ may not generalise 
across all situations and as such may be an inadequate measure of the more global 
tendency towards abstract processing.  
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Finally, it is also possible that abstract processing may have a direct effect on 
trait RNT, but when the relationship was considered alongside other powerful 
predictors in a SEM analysis, the relationship no longer remained significant. This is a 
possibility since examining basic correlations indicates that abstract processing was 
significantly associated with rumination and worry (Table 2.1).  
To explore this possibility, further regression analyses were conducted to see 
whether when considered on its own, abstract processing (PEQ) would be 
significantly associated with rumination (RSQ-RRS) and worry (PSWQ), and whether 
the associations would remain significant after controlling for depression (BDI-II) and 
anxiety (STAI-state) symptoms. In a regression analysis with either rumination (RSQ-
RRS) and worry (PSWQ) as the dependent variable and abstract processing (mean 
PEQ score) as the predictor, abstract processing was a significant predictor of 
rumination (t(493) = -7.06, p < .001, β = -.30) and worry (t(493) = -5.22, p < .001, β = 
-.23).  
In order to see whether the relationships remained significant after controlling 
for depression and anxiety symptoms, further hierarchical regression analyses were 
conducted with either rumination (RSQ-RRS) or worry (PSWQ) as the dependent 
variable, and then depression (BDI-II) and anxiety (STAI-state) as predictors in Step 
1, and abstract processing (mean PEQ score) as the predictor in Step 2. Abstract 
processing remained a significant predictor of rumination (t(444) = -3.62, p < .001, β 
= -.12), however, the result did not remain statistically significant for worry (t(444) = 
-1.88, p = .060, β = -.07). 
As such, it appears that whilst abstract processing may be significantly 
associated with trait RNT, and remain associated with rumination after controlling for 
current symptoms of depression and anxiety, when considering it alongside other 
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more powerful proximal predictors, it may cease to be a significant predictor. This 
suggests that the variance in RNT is accounted for by other factors.   
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2.9. Appendix C: Excluded Measures and Unmeasured Constructs: Effortful 
Control and Intolerance of Uncertainty 
The following section comprises discussion of two constructs that were 
identified as potential vulnerability factors for RNT in Chapter 1 that were either 
measured but not reported in the published paper, or not measured at all in the study. 
One measure that was administered but not reported in the published article 
was the 24-item Effortful Control Scale (EC scale; Lonigan & Phillips, 2001). The 
measure assesses the construct of effortful control, which is a self-regulatory ability 
that concerns individual differences in the ability to exert control over emotional and 
behavioural responses. In particular, effortful control refers to the ability to inhibit 
and activate responses when necessary, and to voluntarily shift attention as required 
(Rothbart, 1989). Previous studies examining effortful control have demonstrated 
cross-sectional associations with rumination (Hilt et al., 2012; Verstraeten et al., 2009, 
2011). However, rather than being characterised as a vulnerability factor that 
independently contributes towards vulnerability to RNT, effortful control has been 
hypothesised to moderate the relationship between rumination and depression 
(Verstraeten et al., 2009). It has also been hypothesised to interact with early negative 
life events, such as overcontrolling parenting, to contribute to RNT (Hilt et al., 2012). 
The EC scale was included as it is self-report measure that could be 
administered online which would tap into some concepts identified in the cognitive 
control theories of RNT (cf. Hertel, 2007; Linville, 1996). The EC scale has two 
subscales: Impulsivity, and Persistence / Low Distractibility. Prior to performing the 
main SEM analysis, preliminary correlations were examined between the two 
subscales of the EC scale and the RSQ-RRS and PSWQ. The Impulsivity subscale 
had no significant relationship with either the RSQ-RRS (r = -.047, p = .294) or the 
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PSWQ (r = .051, p = .257), whereas the Persistence / Low Distractability subscale 
was moderately correlated with the RSQ-RRS (r = -.480, p < .001) and PSWQ (r = -
.364, p < .001).  
Next, further analyses were conducted to examine whether effortful control 
(the persistence/low distractibility subscale) would act as a moderator of the 
relationship between early experiences (abuse and overcontrolling parenting) and 
RNT. The findings were inconsistent: considering the relationship with rumination, 
effortful control did moderate the relationship between rumination and emotional 
abuse (t(445) = -2.31, p = 021., β = -.10) and physical abuse (t(492) = -3.04, p = .003, 
β = -.12), but it did not moderate the relationship between rumination and maternal 
overcontrol (t(497) = -1.07, p = .287, β = -.04), paternal overcontrol (t(483) = -1.15, p 
= .251, β = -.05), or sexual abuse (t(446) = -1.27, p = .204, β = -.06). 
Considering the relationship with worry, effortful control did moderate the 
relationship between worry and emotional abuse (t(445) = -2.41, p = .016, β = -.11), 
but it did not moderate the relationship between maternal overcontrol (t(497) = -1.22, 
p = .220, β = -.05), paternal overcontrol (t(483) = -1.36, p = .175, β = -.06), physical 
abuse (t(492) = -1.70, p = .090, β = -.07), or sexual abuse (t(446) = -.27, p = .785, β = 
-.01). However, it is important to note that it would be unlikely to observe a 
significant finding for physical and sexual abuse due to low levels of participant 
report.  
Given the slightly irregular pattern of findings, it was difficult to include the 
low persistence/distractibility subscale of the EC scale in the SEM model whilst also 
achieving good fit indices. Moreover, the measure was only tapping in to a small 
component of the more global construct of cognitive inhibition and control that has 
been implicated in vulnerability to RNT. On reflection, it is possible that self-report 
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measures of these sorts of executive function constructs are not the optimum way of 
assessing these tendencies. Given the online methodology adopted for this study it 
was not possible to use anything other than self-report questionnaires, but it would 
nonetheless be useful to attempt to explore the relationship between effortful control 
and other components of the broader cognitive inhibition/control construct using 
laboratory-based measures in future studies.  
The construct of intolerance of uncertainty was identified as a potential 
vulnerability factor from the literature review, but was not measured in the current 
study. Due to practical constraints – specifically, the time taken to complete the 
battery of measures – it was not practical to include measures of every construct. 
Since intolerance of uncertainty has been most widely studied with respect to 
symptoms of anxiety, rather than RNT specifically (see Chapter 1, Section 1.3.3.2), it 
was less of a priority to include a measure of this construct when compared with other 
vulnerability factors more directly associated with RNT. As such, it would be 
interesting and useful to conduct a modified version of this study using a measure 
such as the Intolerance of Uncertainty Scale (IUS; Buhr & Dugas, 2002).   
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2.10. Appendix D: Normality Statistics Pre- and Post-Data Transformations 
Study 1 reported the use of square root transformed data due to the data, as 
expressed in its original form, not being normally distributed. Due to the nature of the 
variables being measured (e.g., depression score), one would not expect to observe a 
normal distribution. Whilst the square root transformations do not completely rectify 
the skewness and kurtosis within the data (i.e., Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests still give significant values post-transformation), transformation does 
substantially improve the normality of the distributions. To demonstrate this, Table 
2.2 displays skew and kurtosis statistics for all variables pre- and post-transformation. 
Note that a skew or kurtosis value of 0 indicates that the data perfectly matches the 
normal distribution, and a value “between plus or minus one is considered excellent 
for most psychometric purposes, but a value between plus or minus two is in many 
cases also acceptable” (George & Mallery, 2003, p. 99).  
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Table 2.2. Study 1 data skew and kurtosis statistics pre- and post-square root 
transformation 
Measure  
Pre- 
Transformation 
Post-
Transformation 
Skew Kurtosis Skew Kurtosis 
RSQ-RRS .19  -.74  -.07  -.78  
PSWQ -.24 -.70  .35 -.50  
BDI-II 1.02  .38  .30  -.56  
STAI .03  -.79  -.25  -.67  
PSS -.05  -.50  .44  -.07  
EPQR-SF-N -.26  -.85  .15  -.90  
LEQ Emotional Abuse 1.00  .87  .24  -.61 
LEQ Physical Abuse 2.12  5.53  1.33  1.41  
LEQ Sexual Abuse 4.14 21.47 2.70  8.34 
CRPBI-30 Father Psych. Overcontrol 1.05  .28  .83  -.26  
CRPBI-30 Father Psych. Overcontrol .90  .01  .68  -.45  
PEQ Problem Mean .07  -.37  -.24  -.36  
PEQ Consequence Mean .40  .07  .08  -.29  
WR: Instrumental Understanding -.34  -.18  .39  .28  
WR: Self and Social Control -.12  -.66  .32  -.24  
WR: Motivation, Learning, Goal-Setting -.41  -.16  .11  -.05  
WR: Reduce Past Distress .23  -.45  -.13  -.56 
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(state subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised 
Short Form (neuroticism subscale); LEQ: Life Events Questionnaire; CRPBI-30: Children’s Report of 
Parental Behaviour Inventory (30-item version); PEQ: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean 
abstraction rating; WR: Why Ruminate scale.   
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2.11. Appendix E: Discussion of Online Data Collection Approach  
As this study adopted an online method of data collection, it is important to 
consider the strengths and weaknesses of such an approach, and whether different 
findings would have occurred has the study been conducted in person. One limitation 
of the online approach is that it is not possible to control the environment in which the 
questionnaires are being completed. For example, participants may be doing other 
activities at the same time whilst completing the measures (e.g., concurrently 
browsing the internet and filling out the online questionnaires), or participants may be 
in the company of other people who may be able to observe their responses, rather 
than on their own. A further limitation with online research is that the researcher is 
not physically present to provide immediate answers to questions. This could be 
particularly problematic in the event of participants perceiving information to be 
ambiguous (e.g., confusion over the wording of instructions, or questionnaire items).  
However, due to the aims of the study necessitating the measurement of a 
large number of variables, a large sample was required. It would not have been within 
the practical scope of the PhD project to test such a large sample (over 500 
participants) in the laboratory with a questionnaire battery taking a minimum of 45 
minutes to complete. Whilst it is important to acknowledge the limitations of online 
research, in an evaluation of six online studies, Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, and John 
(2004) concluded that internet findings generalise across presentation formats and are 
consistent with findings from traditional methods. As such, there is no serious reason 
to believe that responses to measures would have been significantly different if 
completed in the laboratory under supervision. Moreover, great care and attention was 
given to the wording of all instructional materials, to minimise the chances of 
participants finding materials confusing or ambiguous. The online questionnaires 
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were pilot tested in the laboratory using several pilot participants who were blind to 
the aims of the study and unfamiliar with the research area. This ensured that the 
materials were clearly and unambiguously presented, and modifications were made to 
any instructional materials judged to be ambiguous by the pilot participants. 
 
  
    174 
CHAPTER 3: Study 2 - A Prospective Examination of Risk Factors for 
Repetitive Negative Thought 
3.1. Preface 
Having examined the cross-sectional relationships between RNT and putative 
vulnerability factors (Chapter 2, Study 1), this chapter reports a longitudinal study 
designed to examine the prospective relationships between rumination and worry, 
conceptualised as the transdiagnostic process of RNT, and a wide range of 
vulnerability factors. This study is a longitudinal extension of the cross-sectional 
study described in the previous chapter, with Time 2 data being collected 6-8 weeks 
after the Time 1 data. A paper reporting this study is currently under review: 
Kingston, R. E. F., Watkins, E. R., & O’Mahen, H. A. (under review). A 
prospective examination of risk factors for repetitive negative thought.  
Referring to the research objectives of the PhD, this study aimed to contribute 
to the literature by examining rumination and worry together, alongside a range of 
vulnerability factors, to see which factors prospectively predicted change in RNT 
after controlling for symptoms of depression and anxiety, and perceived stress.  
The prospective design builds upon the study reported in the previous chapter 
by testing which of the factors measured in Study 1 temporally precede changes in 
RNT. As such, this study provides a necessary but not sufficient step in establishing 
the causal relationships between vulnerability factors and RNT by demonstrating 
temporal precedence. Whilst the prospective design alone cannot establish causality, 
by demonstrating which factors may prospectively predict change in RNT, it affords 
identification of vulnerability factors that it may be useful to examine more closely 
using subsequent experimental studies where vulnerability factors are manipulated 
and the effect on subsequent RNT is examined. 
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As with Study 1, reported in the previous chapter, the prospective study 
reported in this chapter considered rumination and worry together, as the 
transdiagnostic process of RNT. As outlined in Chapter 1 (Section 1.4.1), studying 
rumination and worry together as the common process of RNT is justified by (i) their 
high degree of correlation and difficulties making meaningful distinctions between 
the qualities of the two processes; (ii) their similarities in terms of negative 
consequences for mood and psychopathology; and (iii) the considerable overlap 
between theoretical accounts of rumination and worry (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; Watkins, 2008). Moreover, the cross-sectional 
analyses reported in Chapter 2 found that worry and rumination formed a single latent 
variable, further validating the use of a combined measure. As such, this study aims to 
contribute to the transdiagnostic literature by examining which factors prospectively 
predict change in RNT. 
This study also aimed to test some specific hypotheses relating to the 
classification of vulnerability factors as either proximal or distal (Nolen-Hoeksema & 
Watkins, 2011). In Chapter 1 (Section 1.6), the conceptual framework proposed by 
Nolen-Hoeksema and Watkins (2011) was outlined, in which vulnerability factors for 
RNT can be classified according to their causal distance to rumination and worry. 
Specifically, distal factors refer to “environmental and congenital biological variables 
relatively distal to observable symptoms of disorders”, whereas proximal factors refer 
to “within-person variables that are more proximal to symptoms of disorders” (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011, p. 593). Distal factors are not hypothesised to have a 
direct influence on symptoms such as RNT, but they are hypothesised to influence 
symptoms such as RNT via mediating proximal factors, which are hypothesised to 
have a direct effect.  
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Within this conceptualisation, the current study classified the vulnerability 
studies that were measured as either proximal or distal factors: overcontrolling 
parenting and childhood abuse were classified as distal factors, whereas abstract 
processing and beliefs about the function of RT were characterised as proximal 
factors. The personality trait of neuroticism is more of an intermediate factor that is 
less easy to classify as either proximal or distal since it has qualities that span both 
dimensions. Proximal and distal factors do not necessarily refer to definitive 
categories into which each vulnerability factor must neatly fit; instead, there may be a 
continuum between proximal and distal factors such that certain factors – such as 
neuroticism – share both proximal and distal qualities. Specifically, neuroticism’s 
distal qualities stem from its aetiology: in part, it is a heritable trait with genetic 
origins, but its development is also influenced by early environmental experiences 
(Goldberg, 2000; Laceulle et al., 2013). On the other hand, neuroticism’s proximal 
qualities stem from its tendency to influence experiences in the present: unlike other 
distal factors, it is a within-person temperamental factor that has a direct influence on 
how individuals respond in the here-and-now. Neuroticism is associated with a range 
of cognitive, emotional and behavioural responses, including influencing emotional 
reactivity to stimuli, encoding and recall of information, and judgments and decision-
making (Augustine et al., 2013). For instance, neuroticism is associated with biased 
recall of negative trait words (Martin et al., 1983; Young & Martin, 1981), more 
negative perceptions of exchanges with others (McNulty, 2008), and increased 
interpersonal self-focus (Fetterman & Robinson, 2012).  
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A Prospective Examination of Risk Factors for Repetitive Negative Thought 
Rosemary E. F. Kingston, Edward R. Watkins, and Heather A O’Mahen 
Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, 
University of Exeter, UK, EX4 4QG 
3.2. Abstract 
The current study examines which proximal and distal factors are 
prospectively associated with changes in repetitive negative thought (RNT) in a large, 
non-clinical adult sample. Proximal factors (beliefs about the function of repetitive 
thought, neuroticism) were hypothesised to predict change in RNT, whereas distal 
factors (parental overcontrol, childhood maltreatment) were not. At Time 1, measures 
of RNT (rumination, worry), symptoms (depression, anxiety, stress), parental 
overcontrol, childhood maltreatment, neuroticism, abstraction, and beliefs about the 
function of repetitive thought were administered. Six to eight weeks later, at Time 2, 
RNT was measured again. The hypotheses were broadly supported: only neuroticism 
and the belief that repetitive thought aids instrumental understanding prospectively 
predicted change in RNT after controlling for symptoms.  
3.3. Introduction 
Repetitive thought (RT) refers to the process of “thinking attentively, 
repetitively or frequently about one’s self and one’s world” (Segerstrom, Stanton, 
Alden, & Shortridge, 2003, p. 909). Whilst most psychologically healthy individuals 
engage in RT from time to time, and RT can be constructive, RT also prospectively 
predicts mental health problems such as depression and anxiety (Watkins, 2008). 
Rumination and worry are two of the most widely studied forms of such 
unconstructive RT. 
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Whilst rumination and worry are often examined separately, they can be 
conceptualised within the broader process of repetitive negative thought (RNT; 
Segerstrom, Tsao, Alden, & Craske, 2000). Both are (i) repetitive; (ii) focused on 
negative content; (iii) experienced as passive and relatively uncontrollable; (iv) 
abstract in processing style, with a focus on generalised meanings and implications of 
events (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). Previous empirical research emphasises the 
commonality between worry and rumination (e.g., Watkins, Moulds, & Mackintosh, 
2005; Watkins, 2008). Moreover, RNT has been proposed as a transdiagnostic 
process that is common to and causally contributes to a large number of mental health 
problems (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004).  
To date, research has predominantly focused on the negative consequences of 
RNT, rather than its causes. Given its negative outcomes, there is much to be gained 
from a more parsimonious and integrated theoretical understanding of the factors 
associated with individual differences in RNT to inform assessment, treatment, and 
prevention.  
Overcontrolling parenting (Spasojević & Alloy, 2002), childhood 
maltreatment or abuse (Conway, Mendelson, Giannopolous, Csank, & Holm, 2004; 
Raes & Hermans, 2008), neuroticism (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, Parker, & Larson, 
1994), beliefs about the function of RT (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins 
& Baracaia, 2001), and having an abstract processing style (e.g., Stöber & Borkovec, 
2002; Watkins, 2008) are all factors theoretically predicted to influence RNT and 
found to be associated with individual differences in RNT. These factors can be 
categorised according to their hypothesised causal distance from RNT (Nolen-
Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011): proximal factors refer to current within-person 
variables that may be closely associated with RNT (e.g., cognitive factors increasing 
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likelihood of RNT), whereas distal factors refer to environmental or congenital 
variables which may not be directly associated with RNT (e.g., overcontrolling 
parenting, childhood maltreatment), but rather influence RNT via mediating proximal 
factors. Some factors are harder to classify: Neuroticism can be characterised as 
having both proximal and distal qualities, because it is proposed to have genetic and 
environmental origins (Goldberg, 2000), but it is also a temperamental characteristic 
involving direct influence on cognitive processing (e.g., Martin, Ward, & Clark, 
1983).  
A recent cross-sectional study that examined all of the above factors using 
structural equation modelling found that the proximal factors of perceived function of 
RT and neuroticism were directly associated with RNT, over and above the effects of 
current distress (Kingston, Watkins, & O’Mahen, 2013a). Whilst emotional abuse and 
abstract processing style had significant indirect effects on RNT, the relationships 
between these variables and RNT were fully mediated by the perceived function of 
RT and neuroticism.  
However, much of the extant literature examining such risk factors is 
correlational, these factors tend to be studied in isolation, and there is a lack of 
prospective and causal evidence. The current study sought to advance our knowledge 
of the role of these factors on the maintenance of RNT by using a longitudinal 
prospective design including multiple factors: If a factor is hypothesised to cause 
RNT, then a necessary (although not sufficient to establish causality) prediction 
arising from that hypothesis is that the identified factor will prospectively predict 
RNT at a later time point, after controlling for initial RNT.  
The theoretical categorisation of vulnerability factors according to their 
proximal or distal qualities generates testable predictions about the ways in which 
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these variables may or may not prospectively influence the maintenance of RNT. First, 
we hypothesised that distal factors (overcontrolling parenting, childhood 
maltreatment) would not predict short-term maintenance or increase in RNT over 6-8 
weeks after controlling for symptoms (depression, anxiety, stress), even though these 
factors may be significantly associated with baseline levels of RNT. Distal factors 
were hypothesised to have limited influence over short-term maintenance of RNT 
because (i) they were temporally distant from these potential changes, unlike 
proximal factors; (ii) their effects tend to be indirect and dependent on proximal 
factors to exert their effects; (iii) over the short-term period examined in the current 
study distal factors were presumably unchanged over time, and unlikely to influence 
short-term changes in RNT. Second, we hypothesised that proximal factors (beliefs 
about the function of RT, abstract processing, neuroticism) would predict short-term 
change in RNT, after controlling for both symptoms and distal factors, because they 
are current rather than historic factors, and because of their potential to influence how 
an individual responds to situations and feelings in the moment.  
We utilised a longitudinal prospective design to test which factors predicted 
changes in RNT over 6-8 weeks, after controlling for baseline levels of RNT, 
depression, anxiety, and stress. 
3.4. Method 
3.4.1. Participants 
Participants were recruited via e-mails sent to undergraduate students at UK 
university departments, inviting them to complete a series of online questionnaires for 
a study examining worry and rumination. For full details of Time 1 recruitment 
methods, see Kingston et al. (2013a). At Time 1, 506 participants completed the 
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online questionnaires (85% female, 15% male; age range 18-57, M = 22.15 years, SD 
= 5.79; 83.79% identified themselves as British, 10.28% as non-British European, 
3.16% as Asian, 2.37% as North American, 0.40% as Australian). Although not 
selected on the basis of symptoms, 147 participants (29.05%) scored 20 or more 
(indicating moderate or severe depression symptoms) on the Beck Depression 
Inventory-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). 
Six weeks later, at Time 2, all 506 participants were e-mailed with the follow-
up questionnaires, and 401 participants completed them (85.5% female, 14.5% male; 
age range 18–57, M = 22.35, SD = 5.88). The data analysed comes from these 401 
participants with Time 1 and Time 2 data. 
3.4.2. Measures 
3.4.2.1. Repetitive negative thought. 
Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS, 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RSQ-RRS is a 22-item questionnaire that 
assesses ruminative responses focused on the self, symptoms, and possible causes and 
consequences of low mood. Total scores range from 22-88, with higher scores 
indicating greater trait rumination. It has acceptable convergent validity and high 
internal consistency (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure of trait worry, assessing the 
tendency to engage in excessive, uncontrollable and generalised worry. Scores range 
from 16-80, with higher scores indicating greater trait worry. It has good internal 
consistency and construct validity (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). 
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3.4.2.2. Symptoms and current stress. 
Beck Depression Inventory – II (BDI-II, Beck, et al., 1996). The BDI-II is a 
widely used 21-item questionnaire designed to measure the intensity of somatic and 
affective symptoms of depression, with good psychometric properties (α = .91; 
Dozois, Dobson, & Ahnberg, 1998). Scores range from 0-63, with higher scores 
indicating greater depression.  
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State subscale (STAI, Spielberger, 1989). The 
“state” subscale of the STAI is a 20-item measure of state anxiety, with high internal 
consistency (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). Respondents rate statements (e.g., “I feel 
nervous”) on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”, to indicate 
their feelings over the past two weeks, giving scores from 20-80 (higher scores 
indicating greater state anxiety).  
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS; 10-item version, Cohen & Williamson, 1988). 
The PSS is a 10-item questionnaire measuring the degree to which respondents 
appraise their current situation as stressful, uncontrollable, and unpredictable, with 
adequate internal consistency and construct validity. Scores range from 0-40, with 
higher scores indicating greater levels of perceived stress.  
3.4.2.3. Early experiences. 
Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour Inventory (30-item version, CRPBI-
30, Schludermann & Schludermann, 1988). The CRPBI-30 is designed to measure 
parenting behaviours of the respondents’ mothers and fathers. Three dimensions of 
parenting behaviours were examined and rated, with good internal consistency in our 
sample: acceptance versus rejection (Mother α = .93; Father α = .94); firm versus lax 
behavioural control (Mother α = 86, Father α = .86); psychological autonomy versus 
psychological control (Mother α = 86, Father α = .87). Scores range from 10-30 on 
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each dimension, with higher scores representing greater acceptance, greater firm 
behavioural control, and greater psychological control, respectively.  
Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ, Gibb et al., 2001). The LEQ is an 82-item 
measure which assesses previous experiences of emotional abuse (range 0-28), 
physical abuse (range 0-10), sexual abuse (range 0-26) in childhood by asking 
participants to respond with “yes”, “no”, or “not sure”, to indicate whether they 
experienced particular maltreatment events. We only administered the abuse 
subscales and participants were asked about events occurring before 16 years old. The 
LEQ demonstrates good internal consistency (α = .89, Gibb et al., 2001). 
3.4.2.4. Cognitive and personality factors. 
Beliefs about the Function of RT - Why Ruminate scale. The Why Ruminate 
scale (WR, Watkins & Baracaia, 2001) is a 46-item questionnaire measuring 
perceived benefits and functions of rumination, with participants indicating their 
agreement with each item on a scale from 1 (“not true at all”) to 5 (“completely 
true”) . There are four subscales: (1) instrumental understanding (e.g., “I ruminate 
because I need to know the reasons for why things happen”; range 14-70; internal 
consistency α = .93), (2) self and social control (e.g., “I ruminate to have better 
control over my life”; range 11-55; α = .90), (3) motivation, learning, and goal-setting 
(e.g., “I ruminate to try and maintain my standards”; range 7-35; α = .84), and (4) 
reducing past distress (e.g., “I ruminate to remove the pain of upsetting memories and 
images”; range 6-30; α = .83). 
Abstract thinking styles - Problem Elaboration Questionnaire (PEQ, Stöber & 
Borkovec, 2002). This adapted PEQ instructs participants to identify two significant 
current problems about which they are currently repeatedly thinking (see Watkins & 
Moulds, 2007, for detailed instructions), and then provide a description and three 
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possible consequences of each problem. Responses were blindly rated on a 5-point 
scale: 1 (abstract, defined as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, 
aggregated”), 2 (somewhat abstract), 3 (neither-nor), 4 (somewhat concrete), 5 
(concrete, defined as “distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular”), 
giving each participant two mean scores (problem description rating; consequence 
description rating). Inter-rater reliability was good (mean Cohen’s kappa = .76). 
Neuroticism - Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire – Short Form 
(Neuroticism subscale; EPQR-SF-N; Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barratt, 1985). The 
EPQR-SF-N measures the personality trait of neuroticism, with high internal 
consistency (α = .80 – 84). Participants indicate their response to each of 12 items 
(e.g., “does your mood often go up and down?”) by endorsing “yes” or “no”. 
3.4.3. Procedure 
On visiting the study website, participants were given information about the 
study, completed informed consent, and completed all of the questionnaires online 
(Time 1). At Time 2, 6-8 weeks later, participants were individually e-mailed and 
asked to complete the RSQ and PSWQ online. For participants who did not respond 
to the initial follow-up communication, up to two reminder e-mails were sent at 
weekly intervals to encourage follow-up response (at seven and eight weeks post-
baseline). The mean interval between completion of baseline measures and follow-up 
measures was 47.53 days (SD = 7.42).  
3.5. Results 
3.5.1. Preliminary Analyses 
All variables were examined for skew and kurtosis. Since some variables were 
not normally distributed, all variables were subjected to square root transformations, 
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which improved the normality of the distributions for all variables. Physical and 
sexual abuse variables were excluded from subsequent analyses as a result of 
insufficient reporting range. In addition, all independent variables were screened for 
multicollinearity by examining VIF and tolerance statistics. Since no tolerance values 
were less than .1 and no VIF values were greater than 10 (Myers, 1990), problematic 
multicollinearity was not detected. Descriptive statistics (means and standard 
deviations) are displayed in Table 3.1. 
  
    186 
Table 3.1. Means (and standard deviations) for Time 1 and Time 2 variables 
Variables Time 1 Time 2 
RSQ-RRS 54.60 (15.39) 50.62 (14.38) 
PSWQ 53.31 (14.64) 51.67 (15.01) 
BDI-II 15.81 (12.39)  
STAI 48.83 (14.02)  
PSS 20.33 (7.76)  
LEQ Emotional Abuse 6.42 (5.31)  
CRPBI-30 Maternal Overcontrol 15.64 (4.82)  
CRPBI-30 Paternal Overcontrol 14.81 (4.69)  
EPQR-SF-N 6.81 (3.37)  
PEQ 5.04 (1.67)  
WR: Instrumental Understanding 45.28 (11.70)  
WR: Self and Social Control 30.47 (9.25)  
WR: Motivation, Learning and Goal-Setting 22.28 (5.38)  
WR: Reduce Past Distress 15.32 (5.14)  
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(state subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; LEQ Emotional Abuse: Life Events Questionnaire 
(emotional abuse subscale); CRPBI-30: Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour Inventory (30-item 
version); EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form (neuroticism subscale); 
PEQ: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean abstraction rating; WR: Why Ruminate scale.  
 
 
After this data screening, a composite variable was created to represent RNT, 
based on the theoretical model of a common process. Furthermore, PSWQ and RSQ 
were significantly correlated (r = .66, p < .001). The square root transformed RSQ 
and PSWQ scores were converted into z-scores to standardise the scorings. The 
standardised variables were then added together, creating a total composite score for 
RNT.
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Table 3.2. Regression analysis examining the effects of Time 1 variables on Time 2 RNT  
Time 1 Variables 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
RNT .82 .03 .84*** .75 .04 .77*** .75 .04 .77*** .65 .05 .67*** .60 .05 .61*** 
BDI-II    .06 .06 .05 .05 .06 .04 .03 .06 .03 .04 .06 .03 
STAI    -.01 .01 -.01 -.02 .09 -.01 -.07 .09 -.04 -.08 .09 -.05 
PSS    .13 .10 .06 .14 .10 .07 .15 .10 .07 .15 .10 .07 
LEQ Emotional Abuse       .08 .06 .04 .09 .06 .04 .06 .06 .03 
CRPBI-30 Maternal Overcontrol       .09 .10 .03 .10 .10 .03 .10 .10 .03 
CRPBI-30 Paternal Overcontrol       -.18 .10 -.06 -.16 .10 -.05 -.16 .10 -.05 
EPQR-SF-N          .43 .12 .16*** .46 .12 .17*** 
PEQ             -.12 .11 -.03 
WR: Instrumental Understanding             .19 .07 .13** 
WR: Self and Social Control             .08 .08 .04 
WR: Motivation, Learning and 
Goal-Setting 
            -.11 .09 -.05 
WR: Reduce Past Distress             -.17 .10 -.06 
R2   .71 .71 .72 .73 .74 
Adjusted R2 .71 .71 .71 .72 .73 
R2 Change .71 .00 .00 .01 .01 
F for change in R2 973.26*** 1.94 1.59 14.02*** 2.71* 
 
Note. RNT: Repetitive negative thought composite variable; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state subscale); PSS: Perceived 
Stress Scale; LEQ Emotional Abuse: Life Events Questionnaire (emotional abuse subscale); CRPBI-30: Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour Inventory (30-item version); 
EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form (neuroticism subscale); PEQ: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean abstraction rating; WR: Why 
Ruminate scale.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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3.5.2. Regression Analysis 
In order to examine which factors prospectively predicted changes in RNT 
from Time 1 to Time 2, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted, 
with variables simultaneously entered into each step of the hierarchy. Time 2 RNT 
was entered as the dependent variable. Time 1 RNT was entered in Step 1 and 
symptom measures (BDI-II, PSWQ, PSS) were entered in Step 2, thus examining 
whether subsequently entered independent variables predicted variance in Time 2 
RNT once Time 1 RNT and symptoms were controlled. Early experience factors were 
entered in Step 3, neuroticism was entered in Step 4, and cognitive factors were 
entered in Step 5, since distal variables reflecting experiences early in life have 
temporal priority over current proximal factors. The results of this analysis are 
reported in Table 3.2.  
The results are consistent with the hypothesis that neuroticism would 
prospectively predict changes in RNT (i.e., RNT at Time 2 regressed on RNT at Time 
1) after controlling for symptoms: greater neuroticism at Time 1 predicted increases 
in RNT at Time 2.  
The hypothesis that beliefs about the function of RT would prospectively 
predict changes in RNT was partially supported: The belief that RT facilitates 
instrumental understanding predicted changes in RNT after controlling for symptoms, 
whereas the other types of belief about the function of RT did not predict changes in 
RNT. Inconsistent with our hypothesis, abstract processing did not predict changes in 
RNT. 
Notably and unsurprisingly the strongest predictor of Time 2 RNT was Time 1 
RNT. Symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress did not predict changes in RNT 
once Time 1 RNT was statistically controlled. As hypothesised, overcontrolling 
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parenting and childhood maltreatment did not predict change in RNT when 
controlling for symptoms. 
3.6. Discussion 
The current study aimed to identify factors that may be involved in the 
medium-term maintenance of RNT by examining which early experience, cognitive, 
and personality factors influenced change in RNT over 6-8 weeks, once symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and stress were statistically controlled. Our hypotheses were 
broadly supported: the only variables that prospectively predicted changes in RNT 
after controlling for baseline RNT and symptoms were neuroticism and the belief that 
RT facilitates instrumental understanding.  
Whilst distal factors may be important in establishing the tendency towards 
RNT, we hypothesised that proximal factors would be more important in predicting 
the maintenance of RNT over a medium-time period (changes in RNT over 6–8 
weeks). These prospective findings are consistent with this hypothesis that proximal 
factors causally contribute to RNT. 
 One variable that predicted RNT above and beyond all other factors is the 
perception that RT aids instrumental understanding: Participants who strongly 
endorsed this function for RT reported greater subsequent engagement in RNT. This 
finding is consistent with suggestions that RNT may be driven by its perceived 
functional effects and/or by positive metacognitive beliefs (e.g., Borkovec, 1994; 
Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins et al., 2007). However, only the perceived 
function of instrumental understanding was predictive of changes in RNT. 
Interestingly, other reported functions for RT including increasing self and social 
control, enhancing motivation and learning, and reducing past distress, were not 
predictive of subsequent changes in RNT. If replicated, this finding would indicate a 
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more specific relationship between the perceived function of rumination and 
increased RNT than prior meta-cognitive accounts (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), 
advancing our understanding of its maintenance. The unique role of perceived 
instrumental understanding is consistent with prior associations between rumination 
and increased understanding (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2001). Because the need to understand meanings and make sense of 
thoughts, feelings, and events is an important and common need (e.g., Heine, Proulx, 
& Vohs, 2006), it may be that if RT is perceived to facilitate such understanding, 
motivation to engage in RT will be strong. We speculate that people perceive that 
gaining understanding and insight is something which can only be achieved through 
conceptual analysis and prolonged thinking about an issue (i.e., RT), whereas other 
potential functions of RT can be achieved through alternative activities (e.g., 
distraction to reduce distress).  
Neuroticism also prospectively predicted changes in RNT, after controlling for 
symptoms. We hypothesised that neuroticism has both proximal and distal qualities, 
and that the proximal qualities of neuroticism enable it to have an influence on the 
medium-term maintenance of RNT. One proximal quality of neuroticism is the way it 
involves selective information processing such as increasing accessibility of negative 
self-referent material in memory (Martin et al., 1983). Neuroticism may influence 
engagement in RNT over time by predisposing individuals to attend selectively to 
negative material, and to recall more self-related negative information (e.g., past 
mistakes and shortcomings), which in turn, increases the likelihood of individuals 
dwelling on negative material about themselves. 
Contrary to our hypothesis, abstract processing did not predict change in RNT. 
One explanation for this finding may be that abstraction influences the duration of 
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state RNT (i.e., “episodes” of RNT, e.g., Watkins, 2008), rather than trait RNT, as 
examined in this study.  
Level of distress (anxiety, depression, stress) was not predictive of Time 2 
RNT after accounting for Time 1 RNT. Although RNT has been characterised as both 
a cause and consequence of low mood, this suggests that symptoms may not directly 
influence the medium-term maintenance of RNT. If replicated in a clinical sample, 
this would suggest that interventions designed to only tackle mood, stress, or anxiety 
without focus on RNT itself may not be successful at reducing RNT. 
These findings have potential clinical implications. First, we found factors that 
are temporal antecedents of change in RNT. This is of potential clinical value since 
clinicians can assess factors such as neuroticism and perceived function for RT in 
instrumental understanding to identify individuals at increased risk for RNT. 
Clinicians can then target these factors, for example by challenging perceived 
functions, as a putative means to reduce or prevent RNT. One successful intervention 
for rumination – rumination-focused CBT – includes a focus on analysing and then 
replacing the potential functions of rumination for patients (Watkins et al., 2007; 
Watkins, Mullan, et al., 2011). 
The current study has several strengths. First, it examined rumination and 
worry together, thus contributing to a more parsimonious theoretical account of the 
transdiagnostic process of RNT. Second, the sample size was relatively large (n=401). 
Third, the study examined a broad and integrated range of factors, rather than 
examining specific factors in isolation. Thus, we could evaluate which of these factors 
are particularly important in predicting RNT when considered alongside other factors. 
Fourth, the prospective longitudinal methodology enables examination of the ways in 
which variables influence changes in RNT over time. This is a necessary (but not 
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sufficient) step in establishing the causal relationships between the variables, and 
builds upon previous cross-sectional research (Kingston et al., 2013a), which 
demonstrated a concurrent association between these variables. Finally, whilst the 
study did not utilise a clinical sample, nearly 30% of the sample scored over 20 on the 
BDI-II, indicating that they were experiencing at least moderate levels of depression 
symptoms. Findings may be tentatively generalised to clinical populations, although 
replication in a clinical sample is required.  
There were limitations to the study. First, the study relied on retrospective 
self-report measures, which are highly subjective, and measures of past life events 
may be subject to inaccurate or biased recall. Future studies would benefit from using 
additional measures (e.g., using parental-report measures of overcontrol in addition to 
child-report measures). Second, due to low levels of participant report, it was not 
possible to examine the prospective relationships between sexual and physical abuse 
in childhood and RNT. It may be helpful to target populations in which experience of 
abuse is more prevalent.  
It would be beneficial to have further prospective studies using longer and 
multiple follow-up periods, to see if the effects observed in this initial study remain 
beyond 8 weeks. Critically, experimental studies are needed to establish the causal 
relationships between these factors and RNT. Studies that bidirectionally manipulate 
factors (e.g., enhancing or diminishing the perception that RT aids instrumental 
understanding) whilst measuring subsequent RNT would establish the causal 
relationship between the variables.  
Engagement in pathological RNT has serious implications for mental health, 
and thus an understanding of the vulnerability factors that influence ongoing 
engagement in RNT is important in informing treatment and prevention. Building 
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upon previous correlational research, the current study demonstrates that two factors 
are significant predictors of medium-term changes in RNT: neuroticism and the 
specific perception that RT aids instrumental understanding.  
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3.7. Appendix A: Regression Analysis Using Separate Rumination and Worry 
Variables 
The main regression analysis examining the prospective relationships between 
putative vulnerability factors and RNT used a composite variable representing RNT, 
made up of the RSQ-RRS and the PSWQ. In order to test whether the same predictors 
would be found for rumination and worry when considered separately, the regression 
analyses were repeated to examine the RSQ-RRS and PSWQ variables individually. 
The results from the regressions examining rumination and worry are displayed in 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4, respectively.  
Generally, the same pattern of results is observed: the early experience factors 
(emotional abuse and overcontrolling parenting) do not predict change in rumination 
or worry. Similarly, abstract processing does not predict change in either rumination 
or worry. 
However, there are some differences observed between the analyses. First, in 
the main analysis with the RNT composite variable (Table 3.2), neuroticism 
prospectively predicted change in RNT. Whilst worry continues to be predicted by 
neuroticism (Table 3.4), when examining rumination alone, neuroticism did not 
significantly predict change in rumination after accounting for the effect of symptoms 
and early life experiences (Table 3.3). However, on closer examination of the results 
it is important to note that the relationship between neuroticism and change in 
rumination is at the trend level, and the 95% confidence intervals pass through zero (p 
= .063, 95% CI for B [-.01, .29]). As such, it is not possible to confidently conclude 
that neuroticism is not prospectively associated with rumination.  
Second, there were some differences observed between the predictive 
relationships between beliefs about the function of RT and rumination/worry. In the 
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original analysis using the composite score, the belief that RT aided instrumental 
understanding was a significant predictor of RNT (Table 3.2). This result is replicated 
when analysing the rumination variable by itself (Table 3.3). However, when 
examining the worry variable by itself, the belief that RT aids instrumental 
understanding did not prospectively predict worry, and instead, the belief that RT 
reduces past distress was negatively associated with change in worry. In other words, 
people who are less likely to endorse the belief that RT reduces past distress are more 
likely to experience increased worry. However, it is worth noting that whilst 
significant, the magnitude of the relationship was relatively small (β = -.08, p = .028, 
95% CI for B [-.35, -.02]). Nonetheless, it is interesting to note there may be 
differences between the type of metacognitive beliefs that predict rumination and 
RNT more generally, and the type of metacognitive beliefs that specifically influence 
engagement in worry.  
Considering the theoretical interpretation of this finding for worry, it seems 
consistent with the metacognitive model of worry (Wells, 1995), in which meta-worry 
(i.e., worry about worry) is hypothesised to lead to unconstructive engagement in 
worry. Essentially, having the negative metacognitive belief that worrying will not 
help to relieve unpleasant feelings of distress about the past can be conceptualised as 
form of meta-worry. This meta-worry predicts future worry, consistent with this 
theoretical account.  
Finally, there was a small difference observed in symptoms that predicted 
RNT. In the composite RNT analysis (Table 3.2), and in the analysis examining 
worry (Table 3.4), neither depression, nor anxiety, nor current stress predicted change 
in RNT or worry. However, in the rumination analysis (Table 3.3), depressive 
symptoms prospectively predicted change in rumination.    
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Table 3.3. Regression analysis examining the effects of Time 1 variables on Time 2 rumination  
Time 1 Variables 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
B SE B β B SE B Β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
RSQ-RRS .69 .03 .71*** .57 .05 .59*** .56 .05 .58*** .53 .05 .55*** .47 .05 .49*** 
BDI-II    .11 .04 .16** .10 .04 .14* .09 .04 .13* .10 .04 .15 
STAI    -.05 .06 -.04 -.05 .06 -.05 -.07 .07 -.07 -.08 .06 -.08 
PSS    .09 .07 .07 .09 .07 .08 .08 .07 .07 .06 .07 .05 
LEQ Emotional Abuse       .07 .05 .06 .07 .05 .07 .05 .05 .05 
CRPBI-30 Maternal Overcontrol       .10 .07 .08 .10 .07 .06 .11 .07 .06 
CRPBI-30 Paternal Overcontrol       -.12 .07 -.06 -.11 .07 -.06 -.10 .07 -.06 
EPQR-SF-N          .14 .08 .09 .15 .07 .09 
PEQ             -.13 .08 -.06 
WR: Instrumental Understanding             .14 .05 .16** 
WR: Self and Social Control             .01 .06 .01 
WR: Motivation, Learning and 
Goal-Setting 
            -.06 .06 -.04 
WR: Reduce Past Distress             -.04 .08 -.02 
R2   .51 .53 .54 .54 .56 
Adjusted R2 .51 .53 .53 .53 .55 
R2 Change .51 .02 .01 .00 .02 
F for change in R2 416.12*** 5.55** 2.13 3.47 3.14** 
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state subscale); 
PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; LEQ Emotional Abuse: Life Events Questionnaire (emotional abuse subscale); CRPBI-30: Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour Inventory 
(30-item version); EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form (neuroticism subscale); PEQ: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean abstraction 
rating; WR: Why Ruminate scale.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.  
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Table 3.4. Regression analysis examining the effects of Time 1 variables on Time 2 worry 
Time 1 Variables 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
B SE B β B SE B Β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
PSWQ .89 .03 .86*** .84 .04 .82*** .84 .04 .82 .74 .04 .72*** .72 .04 .71*** 
BDI-II    -.04 .05 -.04 -.04 .05 -.04 -.07 .05 -.07 -.08 .05 -.08 
STAI    .09 .07 .06 .08 .07 .05 .02 .07 .02 .01 .07 .01 
PSS    .07 .08 .04 .08 .08 .04 .09 .08 .05 .11 .08 .06 
LEQ Emotional Abuse       .02 .05 .01 .03 .05 .02 .01 .05 .01 
CRPBI-30 Maternal Overcontrol       .03 .08 .01 .01 .08 .01 .02 .08 .01 
CRPBI-30 Paternal Overcontrol       -.10 .08 -.04 -.07 .08 -.03 -.09 .08 -.03 
EPQR-SF-N          .42 .09 .18*** .42 .10 .18*** 
PEQ             -.01 .09 -.00 
WR: Instrumental Understanding             .07 .06 .06 
WR: Self and Social Control             .10 .06 .06 
WR: Motivation, Learning and 
Goal-Setting 
            -.06 .07 -.03 
WR: Reduce Past Distress             -.18 .08 -.08* 
R2   .74 .75 .75 .76 .76 
Adjusted R2 .74 .74 .74 .74 .76 
R2 Change .74 .00 .00 .01 .01 
F for change in R2 1151.254*** 1.26 .56 20.07*** 1.43 
 
Note. PSWQ: Penn State Worry Questionnaire; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; 
LEQ Emotional Abuse: Life Events Questionnaire (emotional abuse subscale); CRPBI-30: Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour Inventory (30-item version); EPQR-SF-
N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised Short Form (neuroticism subscale); PEQ: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean abstraction rating; WR: Why Ruminate 
scale.  
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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3.8. Appendix B: Discussion of Data Analytic Strategy and Additional Structural 
Equation Modelling Analysis 
In the previous study, SEM was used to test the cross-sectional relationships 
between vulnerability factors and RNT. For this prospective study, multiple 
regression was selected as the method of data analysis for several reasons. Using 
multiple regression allowed for identification of factors that prospectively predicted 
RNT after baseline levels of RNT and symptoms were statistically controlled. 
Moreover, by adopting a hierarchical approach to the regression analysis, it was 
possible to see whether the effects of proximal factors remained once the effects of 
temporally preceding distal factors were accounted for.  
Had vulnerability factors been measured at multiple time points, then a 
theoretical model could have been constructed and tested with SEM to examine 
whether distal factors prospectively influence RNT through their effect on mediating 
proximal factors (i.e., demonstrating that a distal vulnerability factor measured at an 
earlier time point prospectively predicts change in a vulnerability factor measured at a 
later time point). As outlined by Kraemer et al. (2001), it is necessary to measure 
vulnerability factors at multiple time points to examine whether any vulnerability 
factors act as mediators, since the mediator needs to temporally precede the outcome 
variable (i.e., RNT), but temporally succeed the variable that it mediates. 
However, the benefit of the SEM analysis used in Study 1 was that it afforded 
construction of a latent variable representing RNT, with measured indicators of 
rumination (RSQ-RRS) and worry (PSWQ), and as such, it was not necessary to rely 
on a composite variable representing RNT. To see whether the composite variable 
calculated to represent RNT in the prospective study would have the same pattern of 
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predictors as a latent variable representing RNT, an additional SEM analysis was 
performed.  
In the SEM analysis, a latent variable representing Time 1 RNT (with 
measured indicators of Time 1 RSQ-RRS and Time 1 PSWQ) was created, with a 
pathway leading to a latent variable representing Time 2 RNT (with measured 
indicators of Time 2 RSQ-RRS and Time 2 PSWQ). The addition of this pathway had 
the effect of statistically controlling for Time 1 RNT, such that the relationships 
between Time 2 RNT and the other variables in the model could be examined after 
the effects of Time 1 RNT had been accounted for. It was not possible to test for 
mediation (i.e., whether proximal factors mediated the relationship between distal 
factors and RNT) because all measures of vulnerability factors were taken at a single 
time point. 
Figure 3.1 displays the factor loadings of each latent variable onto its 
measured variables, as well as the regression weights for the paths between each of 
the variables. Analysis of the hypothesised model indicates that it did not provide an 
acceptable fit to the data (χ2 (104, n = 401) = 3030.246, p < .001, NFI = .244, CFI 
= .247, RMSEA = .265, AIC = 3126.246).  
It is unsurprising that the model did not provide a good fit to the data because 
it was not predicted that distal factors would predict Time 2 RNT after controlling for 
Time 1 RNT. As such, these distal variables diminished the goodness of fit for the 
overall model. On examining the predictors of Time 2 RNT and comparing it with the 
pattern of predictors found in the hierarchical regression analysis (Table 3.2), a 
broadly similar pattern was found. The strongest predictors were neuroticism and the 
belief that RT aids instrumental understanding. 
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Figure 3.1. Relationship between Time 2 RNT and vulnerability factors measured at 
Time 1 after controlling for Time 1 RNT. 
Note. RNT: Repetitive Negative Thought; RSQ: Response Styles Questionnaire; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; EmotAbuse: Life Events Questionnaire emotional abuse 
subscale; CRBPI-30 Maternal Psychological Control subscale; PatOv: CRBPI-30 Maternal 
Psychological Control subscale; EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised (Short form 
neuroticism subscale); PEQ: Problem Elaboration Questionnaire mean abstraction score; Belief IU: 
Why Ruminate RT for Instrumental Understanding subscale; Belief SSC: Why Ruminate RT for Self 
and Social Control subscale; Belief MLP: Why Ruminate RT for Motivation, Learning and Problem 
Solving subscale; Belief RPD: Why Ruminate RT for Reducing Past Distress subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
However, there were some differences: First, perceived stress at Time 1 
significantly predicted Time 2 RNT, which it did not do in the hierarchical regression 
model. In addition, the Why Ruminate subscale representing the belief that RT 
reduces past distress was a negative predictor of Time 2 RNT. Whilst this was not a 
significant predictor in the regression analysis using the composite variable, this 
finding is consistent with the additional regression analysis in which worry (PSWQ) 
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was examined separately (see Appendix A, Table 3.4). Finally, the Why Ruminate 
subscale representing the belief that RT aids self and social control was a positive 
predictor of RNT. Whilst it had a relatively weak relationship with Time 2 RNT 
compared to the other significant predictors, this finding indicates that other positive 
metacognitive beliefs may influence engagement in RNT, even if the belief that RT 
aids instrumental understanding is a more powerful predictor. 
In order to examine whether the fit of the model would be improved by 
removing some of the vulnerability factors with poor loadings onto Time 2 RNT, a 
second model was tested. Figure 3.2 displays the factor loadings of each latent 
variable onto its measured variables, as well as the regression weights for the paths 
between each of the variables. Analysis of the hypothesised model indicates that it did 
not provide an acceptable fit to the data (χ2 (54, n = 401) = 2690.214, p < .001, NFI 
= .266, CFI = .267, RMSEA = .349, AIC = 2762.214), although the fit was improved 
from the previous model as a result of removing some of the vulnerability factor 
variables with non-significant pathways to Time 2 RNT (i.e., abstract processing, 
maternal overcontrol, paternal overcontrol, and emotional abuse). However, it was 
necessary to retain some variables that did not have a significant relationship with 
Time 2 RNT – the symptom measures of depression, anxiety, and stress – such that it 
was possible to examine the relationship between the other vulnerability factors and 
Time 2 RNT after symptoms were statistically controlled. As such, the retention of 
these pathways will have diminished the overall fit of the model.  
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Figure 3.2. Relationship between Time 2 RNT, Time 1 neuroticism, and Time 1 
beliefs about the function of RT, after controlling for Time 1 RNT. 
Note. RNT: Repetitive Negative Thought; RSQ: Response Styles Questionnaire; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale; EPQR-SF-N: Eysenck Personality Questionnaire Revised 
(Short form neuroticism subscale); Belief IU: Why Ruminate RT for Instrumental Understanding 
subscale; Belief SSC: Why Ruminate RT for Self and Social Control subscale; Belief MLP: Why 
Ruminate RT for Motivation, Learning and Problem Solving subscale; Belief RPD: Why Ruminate RT 
for Reducing Past Distress subscale. 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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3.9. Appendix C: Pattern of Change in RNT Over Time 
On examining the change in mean score for rumination and worry from Time 
1 to Time 2, it is noteworthy that on average, rumination and worry were actually 
decreasing over time in this sample (Table 3.1). On examining the scores at Time 2, 
scores for rumination and worry were lower, but not significantly lower, than at Time 
1 (i.e., the scores at Time 2 are less than one standard deviation lower than they were 
at Time 1). As such, some participants’ scores may be going down, other participants’ 
scores may be going up, and this mean score just represents the average trend. It is 
possible that neuroticism and the belief that RT aids instrumental understanding are 
predicting increase in scores, but that this is not visible from the data.  
To explore this further, a series of figures were created with the standardised 
residuals for Time 1 RNT regressed onto Time 2 RNT on the y axis. Figure 3.3 
illustrates the association between the Time 1 belief that RT aids instrumental 
understanding (Why Ruminate subscale) and Time 1 RNT regressed onto Time 2 
RNT. Figure 3.4 illustrates the association between Time 1 neuroticism score (EPQR-
SF-N) and Time 1 RNT regressed onto Time 2 RNT. Figure 3.5 illustrates the slopes 
of the two previous graphs on a single figure, demonstrating the association between 
standardised scores for neuroticism and belief that RT aids instrumental 
understanding at Time 1, and Time 1 RNT regressed onto Time 2 RNT. As the slope 
of these graphs are positive, this indicates that both neuroticism and the belief that RT 
aids instrumental understanding are predicting increases in RNT over time, even if the 
overall mean RNT scores within the sample decrease. 
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Figure 3.3. Association between the Time 1 belief that RT aids instrumental 
understanding and Time 1 RNT regressed onto Time 2 RNT. 
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Figure 3.4. Association between Time 1 neuroticism and Time 1 RNT regressed onto 
Time 2 RNT. 
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Figure 3.5. Associations between the Time 1 belief that RT aids instrumental 
understanding, Time 1 neuroticism, and Time 1 RNT regressed onto Time 2 RNT. 
!
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3.10. Appendix D: Comparison Between Completers and Non-Completers of the 
Longitudinal Study 
Of the 506 participants that fully completed the cross-sectional study reported 
in Chapter 1, 401 of these participants also responded to the follow-up questionnaires 
for the longitudinal study reported in this chapter, such that 79% of the sample was 
retained. As such, it was important to examine whether there were any differences 
between the 401 participants who completed assessments at both time points, and the 
105 participants who only completed the initial assessments and did not respond to 
the follow-up questionnaires.  
The analyses reported in Table 3.5 indicate that there was no significant 
difference on measures taken at Time 1 for people who completed both parts of the 
experiment, and for people who only completed measures at the first time point.  
 
Table 3.5. Means (and standard deviations) comparing longitudinal study completers 
and non-completers. 
Measure Completers Non-Completers Difference 
RSQ-RRS 56.27 (16.30) 56.11 (16.24) t(504) = -1.14, p = .256 
PSWQ 54.97 (14.51) 54.78 (14.47) t(504) = -1.16, p = .249 
BDI-II 17.52 (13.30) 17.46 (13.20) t(473) = -1.50, p = .134 
STAI-State 49.19 (15.10) 49.28 (14.92) t(484) = -.362, p = .717 
PSS 21.27 (8.10) 21.20 (8.05) t(504) = -1.29, p = .196 
Age (years) 21.41 (5.46) 21.37 (5.41) t(504) = 1.55, p = .122 
Gender 85.5% female 83.8% female χ2 (1, n =506) = .20, p = .658 
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; BDI-II: Beck Depression Inventory-II; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(state subscale); PSS: Perceived Stress Scale.  
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CHAPTER 4: Study 3 - Experimentally Manipulating Beliefs about RNT and 
Examining the Effects on State RNT 
4.1. Introduction 
As reported in Study 1 (Chapter 2), beliefs about RNT were directly 
associated with trait RNT after controlling for other well-established predictors 
(neuroticism, and symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress). Furthermore, in Study 
2 (Chapter 3), specific beliefs about RNT prospectively predicted RNT 6-8 weeks 
later. Whilst this cross-sectional and prospective evidence does not establish causality, 
these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that people may persist in RNT 
because, despite its disadvantageous consequences, they appraise RNT to have useful 
functions and outcomes, which reinforces their continued use of RNT (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). 
This perception-of-benefit account hypothesises that the appraisal that RNT 
has advantages and benefits (whether accurate or not) causes RNT (Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2001). A specific operationalisation of this hypothesis is in terms of 
metacognitive beliefs, which refer to “beliefs and appraisals about one’s thinking and 
the ability to monitor and regulate cognition” (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001b, p. 160). 
For example, positive metacognitive beliefs about RNT reflect beliefs about the 
advantages of RNT as a coping strategy. 
Despite considerable interest in and investigation of the perception-of-benefit 
and positive metacognitive belief approach to RNT, the key hypothesis that 
appraising RNT as beneficial causally maintains or increases RNT has not been 
directly tested. Cross-sectional studies conducted in depressed and nondepressed 
samples have found associations between self-reported positive beliefs about RNT 
and trait RNT (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a, 2003; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, 
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& van Os, 2010; Roelofs, Papageorgiou, Gerber, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2007, 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Similarly, in a quasi-
experiment, Moulds, Yap, Kerr, Williams, and Kandris (2010) exposed individuals 
with high versus low levels of positive beliefs about rumination to an unsolvable 
anagram task, and assessed subsequent self-reported rumination. Regardless of 
whether participants received positive, negative, or neutral feedback about anagram 
performance, participants with higher endorsement of positive beliefs about 
rumination reported more state rumination than participants with lower levels of 
positive beliefs. However, all of these studies are correlational, leaving the causal 
direction of this relationship unresolved.  
In an experimental study, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) 
examined the effects of rumination versus distraction manipulations on perceived 
level of insight in dysphoric and nondysphoric students. All participants reported 
greater levels of insight following the rumination induction relative to the distraction 
induction, with the authors noting that rumination made participants “sadder but wiser” 
(p. 346). This study suggests that repeated thinking about the self and feelings 
increases perceived insight relative to not thinking about the self (i.e., distraction), but 
it did not test whether perception-of-benefit influences rumination.   
Two prospective longitudinal studies have examined whether perceived 
benefits of rumination predict future rumination. Weber and Exner (2013) found that 
in a nondepressed student sample, positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination 
predicted changes in rumination two months later. Moreover, in Study 2 (Chapter 3), 
a study was reported that used a similar design whilst incorporating a range of 
putative vulnerability factors for RNT (e.g., parenting style, stress, neuroticism), and 
found that only neuroticism and the belief that repetitive thinking increases insight 
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and understanding predicted increases in RNT over six to eight weeks. Notably, 
within a range of metacognitive beliefs (e.g., perceiving RNT to aid self-control and 
social control), only this specific metacognitive belief predicted increases in RNT in 
the main hierarchical regression analysis.  
Although these prospective studies suggest that it is unlikely that the observed 
relationship is due to RNT causing positive appraisals because the assessment of 
positive metacognitive beliefs temporally precedes increases in RNT, they cannot rule 
out the role of possible third factors. The definitive way to infer causality is by bi-
directionally manipulating the independent variable of interest (i.e., perception-of-
benefit) and investigating its influence on the dependent variable (i.e., state RNT). 
However, there have been no experimental studies that directly test the perception-of-
benefit and positive metacognitive belief hypotheses in rumination, and only one 
study that has tested these hypotheses with worry (Prados, 2011).  
The current study aimed to address this critical gap in the literature by testing 
this hypothesis: Participants were manipulated to view RNT as helpful versus 
unhelpful to test how this would influence RNT following exposure to a situation that 
may afford RNT. In the prospective study described in Chapter 3, only specific types 
of belief about RNT predicted change in RNT. Specifically, believing that RNT 
improves sense of understanding and insight was the strongest predictor of change in 
RNT. However, other types of belief (e.g., believing that RNT aids self and social 
control) did not predict change in RNT. As such, in the current study, only the 
appraisal that RNT increases sense of understanding and insight was manipulated.  
Unlike Study 1 and Study 2, this study specifically examined state RNT rather 
than trait RNT. The experiment was designed to examine the short-term impact of a 
manipulation of beliefs in a single experimental session. As such, within-experiment 
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change in beliefs is hypothesised to impact on state RNT, rather than trait RNT. This 
is also of theoretical interest, since much of the RNT literature has focused on trait 
RNT, often measured by self-report questionnaires, rather than state RNT. Moreover, 
the extant literature has tended to focus on the outcomes and consequences of RNT, 
and there has been less examination of what influences the maintenance of RNT itself. 
One advantage of the experimental design utilised in this study is that it affords 
examination of factors that may influence state RNT, which is an understudied and 
important process that is strongly associated with the trait tendency towards RNT. For 
example, in studies that have examined both trait rumination and state rumination, the 
two processes are highly correlated (e.g., Key, Campbell, Bacon, & Gerin, 2008; 
Puterman, Delongis, & Pomaki, 2010). It can be argued that trait RNT represents the 
tendency to engage in repeated bouts of state RNT, and as such, understanding factors 
that contribute towards bouts of state RNT is informative in increasing understanding 
about factors that may be involved in the development of the trait tendency towards 
RNT.  
The basic structure of this experiment can be conceptualised as having three 
sequential steps or phases: phase A, phase B, phase C (an “ABC” design). In phase A, 
the variable hypothesised to influence RNT is manipulated (in this case, the variable 
is the belief that RNT increases insight and understanding). In phase B, participants 
complete a task that affords the opportunity for RNT in some, but not all people (i.e., 
avoiding floor or ceiling effects). In phase C, RNT is then assessed. This ABC 
paradigm is valuable as it allows for precise experimental manipulation of putative 
vulnerability factors to see how they may causally influence engagement in RNT. It 
also differs from existing experimental approaches to studying RNT, which tend to 
focus on directly manipulating rumination to examine its consequences (cf. 
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rumination versus distraction manipulations, Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995). 
In phase B, the aim is to have RNT occur naturally, without deliberate instruction, 
such that it is activated in response to events, consistent with how it would occur in 
daily life. As such, this is a more ecologically valid approach relative to instructed 
periods of RNT. Moreover, this approach is necessary when the aim is to examine 
what influences the extent of RNT itself. To examine this, it is not feasible to instruct 
people to ruminate as has been done in previous studies (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1995; Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990), as it is not possible to use 
instructed RNT to examine what causes naturally occurring RNT. As such, this sort of 
ABC design affords a way of experimentally examining individual factors that might 
influence spontaneously occurring RNT. The development of the individual tasks 
comprising the ABC paradigm for this experiment will now be discussed.  
For the purposes of the experiment, it was necessary to develop a task that 
would put participants in a situation conducive to RNT, without prompting all 
participants to engage in RNT (i.e., phase B in the ABC paradigm), since the aim of 
the study was to measure differences in RNT across experimental conditions. As such, 
it was not possible to ask participants to voluntarily engage in RNT, as is common to 
many rumination or worry studies (e.g., Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; 
McLaughlin et al., 2007), because the purpose of the study was to try and observe 
variations in state RNT in response to different manipulations of beliefs. Asking 
participants to engage in RNT in this way would be likely to result in a ceiling effect 
whereby all participants engage in RNT regardless of experimental condition.  
Conversely, it was necessary to use a task that would result in some RNT to avoid a 
floor effect where no participants engage in RNT, eliminating the possibility to 
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observe a difference between experimental conditions as a result of the belief 
manipulation.  
There are several different options for tasks that could be used to potentially 
afford engagement in RNT, including (i) presentation of concerning or worrisome 
messages; (ii) failure feedback tasks; and (iii) priming unresolved goals. These 
various methods will now be discussed in further detail and evaluated.  
Considering the first option, in the only the only study to attempt to 
experimentally manipulate positive, negative or neutral beliefs about the utility of 
worry, Prados (2011) reported two experiments where different worry-provoking 
scenarios were used. In the first experiment, after manipulating appraisals of worry, 
participants were exposed to a “worrisome message” about the disappearance of an 
indigenous Amazonian culture. Subsequently, no differences were found in worry 
between the positive, negative and neutral consequences of worry group. One 
limitation of this “worrisome message” approach is that the messages, whilst 
worrisome, are not personally relevant to participants because they are not 
personalised to each individual. This may have resulted in floor effects such that it 
may have been insufficiently powerful to prompt engagement in worry for any 
participants, regardless of experimental condition. In Prados’ (2011) second 
experiment, the task was altered with the stated aim of making it more personally 
relevant to participants: Unemployed participants were instructed to worry for five 
minutes about failing an important exam that would have ramifications for their future 
employment. In this experiment, no differences were found between the positive and 
neutral consequences of worry group (a negative consequences group was not used). 
However, this sort of task where participants are instructed to engage in RNT would 
not be suitable for the current study for the reasons outlined above (i.e., it is not 
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possible to examine naturally-occurring RNT by instructing participants to engage in 
RNT, as this is not ecologically valid, and would be likely to result in ceiling effects 
such that differences are not observed in level of RNT across conditions).   
Considering the second option, some studies have used failure feedback tasks 
as a means of examining responses to negative events and eliciting RNT. For example, 
Watkins et al. (2008) used a task that involved giving participants a list of anagrams 
that they were instructed to unscramble into real words within a timed period of three 
minutes. Unbeknownst to the participants, half of these anagrams were not solvable, 
and most participants only correctly solved one or two anagrams. Prior to beginning 
the task, participants were given unrealistically high expectations of performance as 
the experimenter explained that they were expected to solve five or six anagrams. 
Failure feedback was delivered after the task to the effect that performance was well 
below average. This anagram failure task has successfully been used to elicit 
engagement in rumination in previous studies (Moulds et al., 2010). Moreover, whilst 
failure feedback tasks have been used much more broadly in studies not directly 
assessing RNT, these sorts of task generally appear to be successful at inducing 
negative mood states, which could prime people towards RNT (e.g., mental arithmetic 
exercise failure, Dedovic et al., 2005; interpersonal sensitivity task failure, Shrauger 
& Rosenberg, 1970). 
Considering the third option, based on goal discrepancy models of rumination 
(Martin & Tesser, 1996), tasks that prime discrepancies in personal goals may 
generate RNT, without causing ceiling effects that might occur if participants were 
explicitly instructed to engage in RNT. Within Martin and Tesser’s (1996) theoretical 
account, problematic progress towards personal goals is hypothesised to drive 
rumination. Rumination is characterised as an instrumental process, with rumination 
    215 
being focused on the unresolved goals. Higher level, abstract goals that are tied in to a 
person’s sense of self are hypothesised to lead to persistent rumination because such 
goals are more difficult to achieve, and harder to abandon. Consistent with this, there 
is experimental evidence demonstrating that focusing on unresolved personal goals 
results in increased state rumination (Roberts, Watkins, & Wills, 2013). Moreover, 
several studies have used similar self-discrepancy tasks as a means of inducing state 
rumination, even though state rumination was not always directly assessed (e.g., 
Schoofs, Hermans, Griffith, & Raes, 2013; Smets, Griffith, Wessel, Walschaerts, & 
Raes, 2013). For instance, Schoofs et al. (2013) and Smets et al. (2013) used a task in 
which participants had to rate a series of 50 positive characteristics (e.g., serene, 
active, funny) according to the extent to which they wanted to possess the 
characteristic (i.e., ideal self) as well as the extent to which they currently possessed 
the characteristic (i.e., actual self), as a means of inducing self-discrepancy. 
As such, for the current study, a questionnaire exploring self-discrepancy (i.e., 
the differences between the “ideal self” and the “actual self”) was selected, as an 
implicit means of exposing participants to a situation that might prompt RNT, without 
explicitly instructing participants to dwell on the task. Moreover, this task would be 
personally relevant, and so potentially more likely to afford RNT than less 
personalised tasks (e.g., the “worrisome message” task used by Prados, 2011). In this 
task, participants generated brief lists of personal qualities or traits that they wanted to 
have, or felt they ought to have (e.g., forgiving, generous), as well as some 
undesirable traits that they did not want to have (e.g., jealous, impatient). They were 
then asked to focus in on desirable traits that they felt they lacked, as well as 
undesirable traits that they possessed, and briefly write about the ways in which they 
wanted to be different in light of these traits (e.g., a participant might write that they 
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were prone to jealousy, but wanted to be less jealous as a means of improving their 
own wellbeing, reducing relationship conflict, etc.).  
Corresponding to phase A of the ABC paradigm, it was necessary to develop a 
task to manipulate people’s appraisals about the usefulness of RNT in increasing 
understanding and insight. In Prados’ (2011) study experimentally manipulating 
beliefs about the utility of worry, participants listened to recorded persuasive 
messages about the positive, negative, or neutral consequences of worry (e.g., 
“According to prestigious scientists, worry has positive consequences. For example, 
worry seems to be useful in order to be more prepared for negative events”, p. 218). 
Despite a manipulation check revealing more positive appraisals of worry in the 
positive consequences of worry group, no differences were found in worrisome 
thoughts between the positive, negative, and neutral groups. However, there are 
several potentially complementary possibilities for why this pattern of findings may 
occur.  
First, it is possible that the effect observed in the manipulation check was not a 
genuine effect of the manipulation, but rather a response to demand effects. Since 
Prados utilised a relatively overt manipulation of the utility of worry, in which 
participants were explicitly told from an authoritative viewpoint that worry had either 
positive or negative consequences, they may have felt pressurised to respond to the 
manipulation check in a manner concordant with the message that they had received. 
Second, in Prados’ first study outlined previously, floor effects may have been 
observed such that this task prompted insufficient levels of worry to elicit an 
observable difference between conditions. Third, in Prados’ second study, by 
explicitly instructing participants to worry, there may have been ceiling effects such 
that all participants were engaging in high levels of worry, and as a consequence, it 
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was not possible to observe a difference between conditions. Finally, the manipulation 
messages may have been insufficiently persuasive to have an impact on actual worry 
behaviour. As such, it is possible that any or all of these reasons may account for the 
observed pattern of findings.  
In an attempt to create an experimental manipulation of appraisals about RNT 
with greater power, an alternative manipulation was developed for the current study. 
In this manipulation, participants were asked to recall occasions when they had 
engaged in RNT, and either found the experience helpful or unhelpful. By building on 
genuine personal experiences, the manipulation may be stronger and more persuasive. 
Moreover, by asking participants to recall and answer questions about their 
experiential memories of RNT, it may be slightly less apparent to participants that 
they are being manipulated to view RNT in a favourable or unfavourable light, 
relative to a scenario where they are simply passive recipients of generic information 
about the positive/negative aspects of RNT. Whilst participants would undoubtedly be 
aware that they are being asked to consider favourable or unfavourable aspects of 
RNT, they may not be aware that this is a manipulation – instead, they may instead 
believe that the aim is to explore the kind of memories they have about RNT, or the 
type of problems that they dwell on and the consequences that it had.  
Finally, it is important to consider phase C of the ABC paradigm, in which 
RNT is assessed. The most widely used self-report measures of rumination and worry 
(e.g., the Response Styles Questionnaire, Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991; the 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire, Meyer et al., 1990) assess trait rumination and 
worry, and therefore would not be suitable for this study since the intention was to 
observe changes in RNT over a short time period in response to the experimental 
tasks (i.e., state RNT). As such, RNT was assessed using an adapted version of a 
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“breathing focus task”, originally designed to measure worry (Borkovec et al., 1983; 
Hirsch, Hayes, & Matthews, 2009; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). The Borkovec et al. 
(1983) version of this task used fewer thought probes and did not assess content or 
type of thought, only whether the thought was positive or negative. The Ruscio and 
Borkovec (2004) version of the task did assess some of the qualities of the thoughts 
experienced during the breathing exercise, but used fewer thought probes (four 
probes). Previous studies using this type of task indicate that it is a sensitive measure 
of state worry that allows for differences in state worry to be detected across groups 
(Hirsch et al., 2009; Ruscio & Borkovec, 2004). However, it is important to note that 
these studies looked at the effect of instructed worry periods using this task, rather 
than naturally-occurring RNT as in the current study.  
The version used in the current study was closest to the task used by Hirsch et 
al. (2009), in which participants were asked to focus on their natural breathing for five 
minutes, during which they responded to a series of 12 computer-generated tones by 
indicating where their attention was focused when the tone sounded. The task was 
modified for this experiment such that after the five-minute exercise, participants 
rated any thoughts they had on five dimensions that assessed qualities particularly 
characteristic of RNT (frequency, duration, distress, repetitiveness, and 
uncontrollability). Assessing the thoughts on these five qualities allows for more 
nuanced identification of thoughts that can be classified as characteristic of RNT. If 
thoughts were only rated according to their positive, neutral or negative valence, it 
would not be possible to conclude as to whether the manipulation specifically 
influenced RNT per se, rather than negative thinking. 
It was predicted that there would be an increase in state RNT for all 
participants following the self-discrepancy task (i.e., a main effect of Time), but 
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critically, the perception-of-benefit hypothesis predicts that participants manipulated 
to view RNT as helpful would show a greater increase in state RNT relative to those 
manipulated to view RNT as unhelpful (i.e., a Condition X Time interaction). It was 
predicted that this difference in state RNT between experimental conditions would be 
observed only in response to a situation that affords RNT (i.e., after the self-
discrepancy task), but not as a direct effect of the experimental manipulation of 
perceived benefit (i.e., no differential effect across condition after the appraisal 
manipulation).  
4.2. Method 
4.2.1. Design 
This was an experimental study in which participants were randomly allocated 
to two conditions (RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) using a blocked design, 
to ensure that each condition contained equal numbers of participants. The 
independent variable (IV) to be manipulated was perceived helpfulness of RNT, and 
the dependent variables (DVs) were state RNT and mood.  
4.2.2. Participants 
Sixty student participants (age range 18 – 29 years, M = 19.92, SD = 2.70; 
86.7% female; 70.0% white British, 13.3% other white background, 8.3% Chinese, 
6.7% mixed ethnic groups, 1.7% other Asian background) from the University of 
Exeter were recruited to the study by e-mail, electronic newsletter and posters 
advertising the study, which was described as “examining personality and thinking 
styles”. Participants gave informed consent to participate in the study, were fully 
debriefed afterwards, and received either £5 cash or course credits for participating.  
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4.2.3. Measures  
Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS, 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RSQ-RRS is a 22-item questionnaire that 
assesses ruminative responses focused on the self, symptoms, and possible causes and 
consequences of low mood. Total scores range from 22-88, with higher scores 
indicating greater trait rumination. It has acceptable convergent validity and high 
internal consistency (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure of trait worry, assessing the 
tendency to engage in excessive, uncontrollable and generalised worry. Scores range 
from 16-80, with higher scores indicating greater trait worry. It has good internal 
consistency and construct validity (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9, Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). 
The PHQ-9 is a nine-item measure designed to assess the severity of depression 
symptoms over the past two weeks. Scores range from 0 to 27, with greater scores 
indicating more severe symptoms of depression. It has good internal reliability and 
construct validity (Kroenke et al., 2001). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State subscale (STAI, Spielberger, 1989). The 
“state” subscale of the STAI is a 20-item measure of state anxiety, with high internal 
consistency (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). Respondents rate statements (e.g., “I feel 
nervous”) on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”, to indicate 
their feelings over the past two weeks, giving scores from 20-80 (higher scores 
indicating greater state anxiety).  
Why Ruminate scale (WR, Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). The WR scale is a 46-
item questionnaire measuring perceived benefits and functions of rumination, with 
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participants indicating their agreement with each item on a scale from 1 (“not true at 
all”) to 5 (“completely true”). Scores range from 46 – 230, with higher scores 
indicating more perceived benefits and functions of rumination. The scale has high 
internal consistency and criterion validity (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001).  
Mood ratings. Participants rated their mood on the following two dimensions: 
Sadness and Anxiety. Ratings were made using computerised 100-point visual 
analogue scales, which were scaled from 0 to 100 (0 = Happy / Confident, 100 = Sad / 
Anxious), with higher scores indicating greater sadness and anxiety. Similar visual 
analogue scales have demonstrated good validity and reliability (e.g., Stern, Arruda, 
Hooper, Wolfner, & Morey, 1997). 
Appraisals of the usefulness of RNT. A two-item measure was created to 
assess participants’ appraisals of the usefulness of RNT for two purposes: (i) to ensure 
that there was no baseline difference on this measure across conditions, and (ii) to 
serve as a manipulation check, assessing whether participants in the RNT-as-Helpful 
versus RNT-as-Unhelpful conditions differentially appraised the usefulness of RNT. 
The first item was “Right now, how helpful or unhelpful do you think it is to 
repeatedly think through problems or difficulties, and repeatedly think about their 
causes, meanings, and implications?”, which was rated on a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (“very unhelpful”) to 7 (“very helpful”). The second item was “At this 
moment, how much do you think that repeatedly dwelling on problems and 
difficulties, and thinking about their causes, meanings and implications, influences 
your sense of understanding and insight?”, also rated on a 7-point Likert scale, 
ranging from 1 (“it greatly decreases my sense of understanding and insight”) to 7 (“it 
greatly increases my sense of understanding and insight”). A mean score of these two 
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items was calculated to represent judgements about the usefulness of RNT, with 
higher scores indicating more favourable judgements (α = .64). 
4.2.4. Procedure 
The experiment involved two key phases: first, a manipulation of beliefs about 
RNT (involving recall of experiences when RNT was experienced as helpful or 
unhelpful), and second, exposure to a situation that would highlight personal self-
discrepancy (completing the self-discrepancy task). State RNT and mood were 
measured three times during the experiment: at Baseline, Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation, and Post-Self-Discrepancy. State RNT was assessed using thought 
probes during a five-minute breathing exercise.  
Before the experiment, participants completed an online battery of 
questionnaires containing the RSQ-RRS, PSWQ, PHQ-9, STAI (state subscale), and 
appraisals about the usefulness of RNT. The experiment began with the first 
assessment of state RNT and mood (Baseline), followed by the appraisal 
manipulation task. Next, there was a second assessment of the perceived usefulness of 
RNT, state rumination and mood (Post-Appraisal-Manipulation), followed by the self-
discrepancy task. Finally, there was the third assessment of state RNT and mood 
(Post-Self-Discrepancy), after which the Why Ruminate scale was completed.  
After the experiment, participants were asked to briefly write down what they 
thought the study was about, before being fully debriefed about the nature of the study.  
4.2.5. Tasks 
4.2.5.1. Assessment of state repetitive negative thought. 
State RNT was assessed using an adaptation of a “breathing focus task” 
(Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). Each assessment involved a five-minute period in 
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which spontaneously occurring thoughts were measured using thought probes. The 
task was explained to participants as a “breathing exercise” in which they told to 
“close their eyes, and focus their attention on their natural breathing”. Twelve tones 
were presented at randomised intervals between 20-30 seconds apart, and in response 
to each tone, participants indicated whether their attention was focused on “breathing” 
or “any other thought”. If “any other thought” was selected, participants indicated 
whether the thought was positive, negative, or neutral, and provided a brief written 
description of the thought. 
Immediately after each five minute period, participants provided fuller written 
descriptions of all “any other thoughts”, as well as rating any negative thoughts on 
five criteria assessing RNT qualities during the five minutes: thought frequency (rated 
from 0 “only once” to 4 “more than 4 times”), duration (0 “only for an instant” to 6 
“nearly all the time”), distress (rated 0 “not at all” to 4 “extremely”), repetitiveness 
(“When thinking about this subject, how much did your thoughts keep coming back to 
the same or similar ideas again and again?”, rated 0 “not at all” to 4 “a great deal”), 
and uncontrollability (“How difficult did you find it to stop this thought coming or to 
move on to other thoughts?”, rated 0 “not at all” to 4 “extremely”).  
For each assessment period, there were 12 thought probes, and five ratings of 
RNT qualities for each of these probes, giving a total of 60 ratings. Ratings were zero 
if in response to the thought probe, participants were (i) focusing on their breathing, 
(ii) having positive or neutral thoughts, or (iii) having negative thoughts that were 
rated as having no RNT qualities on the above five dimensions. Engagement in RNT 
was indexed by taking the mean of the 60 ratings for each exercise, generating one 
state RNT score for each participant at each of the three assessment periods 
(minimum 0, maximum 4.4). 
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4.2.5.2. Manipulation of perceived benefit of repetitive negative thought. 
Beliefs about RNT were manipulated with a writing exercise exploring 
participant-generated examples of times when they had engaged in RNT. Participants 
were asked to identify “two occasions when repeated thinking about a problem over 
and over again” was either helpful (RNT-as-Helpful condition) or unhelpful (RNT-as-
Helpful condition). They were told to “spend a moment getting a vivid sense of the 
problem and the way thinking about it was helpful/unhelpful”.  
In the RNT-as-Helpful condition, participants were then prompted to write 
about the way repetitive thinking about the problem was helpful, and they were asked 
to cover three questions that explored this in their answer (e.g., “In what way did 
repetitive thinking improve your understanding and insight?”, “In what way did 
dwelling on the problem help you know what to do about it?”).  
In contrast, in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition, participants were prompted to 
write about the way repetitive thinking about the problem was unhelpful, also 
covering three questions exploring this (e.g., “In what way did repetitive thinking 
about the problem seem unhelpful or unconstructive?”, “In what way did dwelling on 
the problem have a negative impact on your mood?”). 
After completing the exercise with reference to the first memory, they 
repeated the task with reference to a second memory, so as to make participants 
consider RNT as something helpful or unhelpful in more than one context.  
4.2.5.3. Self-discrepancy task. 
As an indirect and covert way of exposing participants to a situation that may 
prompt RNT, participants completed a modified version of the Integrated Self-
Discrepancy Index (ISDI; Hardin & Lakin, 2009), which is a measure designed to 
explore self-discrepancy. Participants were asked to list five traits for each of the 
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following types of self: “ideal self”, “should self”, and “undesired self”. For example, 
for ideal or should self, participants might list positive traits such as “thoughtful” or 
“kind”; for undesired self, participants might list negative traits such as “intolerant” or 
“jealous”. Then, each of the traits were rated on a 5-point Likert scale reflecting how 
much they believed the trait accurately described them at that moment (1 = “Does not 
describe me at all”, 5 = “Completely describes me”). Two modifications were made: 
First, the original ISDI contains questions about the ideal, should and undesired selves 
from the perspective of others (i.e., the participant is asked to generate characteristics 
that they think other people may find important for the ideal, should, and undesired 
selves), and these questions were removed so as to concentrate the focus on self-
discrepancies from the participants’ perspectives.  
Second, as a means of increasing the salience and awareness of self-
discrepancy (i.e., to shift the task from being a measure of self-discrepancy to being a 
means of inducing a sense of self-discrepancy), some additional questions were asked. 
Following the ideal/should self items, participants were asked, “Of the five words you 
listed, which is the ideal/should self trait that you feel least describes you?”, and 
following the undesired self items, participants were asked, “Of the five words you 
listed, which is the undesired self trait that you feel most describes you?”. Participants 
then elaborated on these questions in response to the following open-ended questions: 
“In a few sentences, please can say more about this ideal/should/undesired self trait, 
and describe how you would like to be different”. These alterations to the task were 
designed to highlight any existing self-discrepancies and focus the participant’s 
attention on self-discrepancy to increase the likelihood of inducing rumination.  
In order to control for the degree to which the task made self-discrepancy 
salient, a mean score of the ratings for the ideal self, should self, and undesired self 
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(reverse scored) was calculated, with lower scores indicating greater perceived self-
discrepancy, and higher scores indicating less perceived self-discrepancy (range 1 – 
5). 
4.3. Results 
4.3.1. Data Preparation and Preliminary Analyses 
All of the variables were screened for skew and kurtosis. Since significant 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated that the variables were not 
normally distributed, all variables were subject to square root transformations. Whilst 
these statistical tests indicated that the variables were still not normally distributed 
after transformation (which is not surprising because one would not expect the data 
collected in this study to adhere to a normal distribution), visual examination of 
histograms indicated that the square root transformation had improved the normality 
of the distributions.  
 
4.3.1.1. Baseline differences. 
Independent samples t tests revealed that there were no significant differences 
between conditions on any of the baseline measures of RNT (RSQ-RRS, t(1, 58) = -
.23, p = .818; PSWQ, t(1, 58) = .46, p = .650), depression and anxiety symptoms 
(PHQ-9, t(1, 58) = .71, p = .481; STAI state subscale, t(1, 58) = .81, p = .420), beliefs 
about rumination (WR, t(1, 58) = .001, p = .999), or judgements about usefulness of 
RNT (t(1, 58) = -.62, p = .540); see Table 4.1 for means and standard deviations. 
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Table 4.1. Means (and standard deviations) for the variables measured at baseline by 
experimental condition, prior to square root transformations 
 
RNT-as-Helpful  
(n = 30) 
RNT-as-Unhelpful 
(n = 30) 
RSQ-RRS 38.17 (10.52) 39.40 (14.88) 
PSWQ 45.23 (13.55) 43.73 (14.70) 
PHQ-9 2.97 (2.55) 2.53 (3.43) 
STAI (State Subscale) 34.63 (8.82) 32.90 (9.01) 
Why Ruminate scale 130.53 (30.68) 131.17 (35.47) 
Appraisals of the usefulness of RNT 4.50 (1.45) 4.68 (1.26) 
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; PHQ-9: Patient Health Questionnaire; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
 
4.3.1.2. Manipulation check. 
A 2 (Condition: RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) by 2 (Time: 
Baseline versus Post-Manipulation) repeated measures Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) was conducted to examine appraisals about the usefulness of RNT at 
Baseline and Post-Appraisal Manipulation. As expected, there was no main effect of 
Time (F(1, 58) = .23, p = .632), but there was a main effect of Condition (F(1, 58) = 
5.61, p = .021), which was secondary to a significant Condition X Time interaction 
(F(1, 58) = 18.74, p < .001), reflecting an increase in perceptions of RNT as helpful in 
the RNT-as-Helpful condition relative to the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition (see Table 
4.2 for means and standard deviations), confirming the success of the manipulation. 
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Table 4.2. Means (and standard deviations) for the dependent variables by experimental condition, prior to square root transformations 
 RNT-as-Helpful (n = 30) RNT-as-Unhelpful (n = 30) 
 Baseline 
Post-
Appraisal-
Manipulation 
Post-
Discrepancy-
Salience 
Baseline 
Post-
Appraisal-
Manipulation 
Post-
Discrepancy-
Salience 
Appraisals of the Usefulness of RNT 4.50 (1.45) 5.07 (1.33)  4.68 (1.26) 3.41 (1.26)  
State RNT 0.54 (.77) 0.56 (.72) 0.60 (.85) 0.45 (.69) 0.85 (.85) 0.69 (1.00) 
Sadness 25.13 (16.26) 25.50 (12.53) 31.83 (15.77) 22.40 (11.95) 29.13 (14.29) 29.47 (13.97) 
Anxiety 34.57 (21.31) 31.30 (17.25) 35.17 (17.46) 30.03 (18.79) 36.30 (20.09) 34.73 (18.57) 
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4.3.2. Main analyses 
4.3.2.1. Change in state RNT and mood from Baseline to Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation. 
A 2 (Condition: RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) by 2 (Time: 
Baseline versus Post-Appraisal-Manipulation) repeated measures ANOVA was used 
to examine the changes in the DVs from Baseline to Post-Appraisal-Manipulation. As 
predicted, there was no effect of Time (F(1, 58) = 3.18, p = .080), Condition (F(1, 58) 
= .25, p = .621), or Condition X Time (F(1, 58) = 1.85, p = .180) on state RNT. There 
was no main effect of Condition on Sadness (F(1, 58) = .03, p = .867), but there was a 
significant main effect of Time on Sadness (F(1, 58) = 9.66, p = .003), which was 
secondary to a significant interaction effect of Condition X Time (F(1, 58) = 4.84, p 
= .032): Contrary to expectation, Participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition 
became sadder than participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition (see Table 4.2). 
Finally, there was no main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = 1.95, p = .168) or Condition 
(F(1, 58) = .03, p = .872) on Anxiety, but there was a significant interaction effect of 
Condition X Time on Anxiety (F(1, 58) = 9.46, p = .003): Participants in the RNT-as-
Unhelpful condition became more anxious relative to participants in the RNT-as-
Helpful condition. 
4.3.2.2. Change in state RNT and mood from Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation to Post-Self-Discrepancy. 
A 2 (Condition: RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) by 2 (Time: Post-
Appraisal-Manipulation versus Post-Self-Discrepancy) repeated measures ANOVA 
was used to examine the changes in the DVs from Post-Appraisal-Manipulation to 
Post-Self-Discrepancy. Contrary to the prediction, there was no significant effect of 
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Time (F(1, 58) = .64, p = .427), Condition (F(1, 58) = .55, p = .460), or Condition X 
Time on state RNT (F(1, 58) = 1.04, p = .313). There was no main effect of Condition 
on Sadness (F(1, 58) = .03, p = .860), but there was a main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = 
8.68, p = .005), which was secondary to a significant interaction effect of Condition X 
Time on Sadness (F(1, 58) = 5.59, p = .021): Participants in the RNT-as-Helpful 
condition became sadder relative to participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition. 
Finally, there was no main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = .98, p = .326) or Condition (F(1, 
58) = .33, p = .570) on Anxiety, but there was a significant interaction of Condition X 
Time on Anxiety (F(1, 58) = 4.04, p = .049): Participants in the RNT-as-Helpful 
condition became more anxious relative to participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful 
condition.  
4.3.2.3. Self-discrepancy task. 
In order to test whether the self-discrepancy task was effective at inducing 
self-discrepancy and to determine whether this was different across conditions, an 
independent samples t test was conducted and found that there was no significant 
difference between conditions on the level of perceived self-discrepancy (t(1,58) = -
.71, p = .481, RNT-as-Helpful mean perceived discrepancy = 3.31, SD = .46, RNT-
as-Unhelpful mean perceived discrepancy = 3.39, SD = .49). As such, the findings 
cannot be explained by the conditions differentially perceiving self-discrepancy. 
Moreover, examination of these self-discrepancy scores indicates that participants did 
not generally perceive high levels of self-discrepancy, since a score of 5 indicates no 
self-discrepancy, and a score of 1 indicates high levels of self-discrepancy.  
In addition, to examine whether participants were having thoughts about the 
self-discrepancy task in the breathing exercise that immediately followed that task, 
the number of thoughts that each participant had that related to the task were counted. 
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Thoughts were counted as relating to the self-discrepancy task if the participant either 
explicitly stated that they were thinking about that task (e.g., “I was thinking about the 
traits I had described in the previous exercise”), or if the thoughts were about one of 
the self-discrepancies identified in the task (e.g., the undesired trait of “selfish” is 
identified, and then participant has a thought of “I should be there more for friends 
and family”). A proportion score was calculated for each participant, representing the 
percentage of thoughts that were about the self-discrepancy task (i.e., total number of 
thoughts about the self-discrepancy task ÷ total number of thoughts). On average, 
19.56% of thoughts were about the self-discrepancy task (SD = 27.22). As such, just 
over 80% of thoughts reported during the breathing exercise that immediately 
followed the self-discrepancy task were not about self-discrepancy, indicating that 
participants were not generally dwelling a lot on the task.  
Finally, to examine whether the appraisal manipulation might have more of an 
impact on state RNT in people who perceived self-discrepancy more strongly, a 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis was conducted in which Post-Self-
Discrepancy state RNT was the dependent variable, with Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation state RNT at Step 1, Condition at Step 2, Perceived Self-Discrepancy at 
Step 3 and a Perceived Self-Discrepancy X Condition interaction at Step 4 (Table 4.3). 
The interaction of Perceived Self-Discrepancy X Condition was not significant, 
indicating that the effect of the appraisal manipulation was not influenced by 
perceived self-discrepancy. 
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Table 4.3. Regression analysis examining the effects of Condition, Self-Discrepancy, and Condition X Self-Discrepancy on Post-Self 
Discrepancy state RNT 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B Β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Appraisal State RNT .32 .13 .32* .34 .13 .33* .31 .14 .30* .31 .14 .31* 
Condition    -.06 .15 -.05 -.05 .16 -.04 -.05 .16 -.04 
Self-Discrepancy        -.38 .57 -.09 -.59 .86 -.13 
Self-Discrepancy X Condition          .36 1.13 .06 
R2 .10 .10 .11 .11 
Adjusted R2 .09 .07 .06 .05 
R2 Change .10 .00 .01 .00 
F for change in R2 6.58* .16 .45 .10 
 
Note. *p < .05 
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4.3.2.4. Appraisal manipulation task. 
Whilst the manipulation check indicated that the appraisal manipulation was 
successful, it is possible that a potential confound may have been introduced by 
participants writing answers of varying lengths across conditions: Some participants 
may have written more lengthy answers in response to the manipulation questions 
(e.g., “In what way did repetitive thinking improve your understanding and insight?”), 
whereas other participants may have written less. 
To investigate this, the number of words written during the writing exercise 
was examined. There was considerable variation in the length of answers provided 
(mean number of words = 225.63, SD = 106.58, range = 48 - 498). An independent 
samples t test also revealed a difference between conditions on the number of words 
written, with participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition writing significantly more 
(RNT-as-Helpful mean number of words = 260.63, SD = 95.95; RNT-as-Unhelpful 
mean number of words = 190.63, SD = 106.63; t(1, 58) = 2.67, p = .010). As such, 
this difference in words written between conditions is a potential confound, although 
it seems unlikely that on its own it would produce any differential effects between 
conditions.  
4.4. Discussion 
This study sought to contribute to an understanding of one of the vulnerability 
factors for RNT by examining the causal relationship between beliefs about the 
helpfulness of RNT and engagement in state RNT. Specifically, building upon prior 
correlational and prospective evidence, this study experimentally manipulated beliefs 
about the helpfulness of RNT in increasing sense of understanding and insight, and 
examined the effect on subsequent state RNT.  
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The manipulation check indicated that the appraisal manipulation was 
successful, as participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition had more favourable 
appraisals of RNT relative to participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition. 
Immediately after the manipulation, there was no difference between conditions on 
state RNT, which was consistent with the prediction that there would be no difference 
between conditions until after the self-discrepancy task. However, contrary to 
predictions, after exposure to the self-discrepancy task, state RNT did not increase for 
all participants (i.e., no main effect of Time), and there was no difference between 
conditions on state RNT (i.e., no Condition X Time interaction). The self-discrepancy 
task did not seem to be successful at affording engagement in RNT, as it did not elicit 
increases in RNT in either condition. Closer examination of the self-discrepancies 
indicated that the average self-discrepancy was small, which could explain why this 
task did not induce RNT, because there was insufficient perceived self-discrepancy in 
this undergraduate population to induce RNT (i.e., on average, the undergraduates 
were feeling good about themselves). 
Regarding the observed effects on mood, participants in the RNT-as-
Unhelpful condition reported more sadness and anxiety immediately after the 
manipulation. One possible explanation for this observation is that focusing on times 
when RNT had been unhelpful and unconstructive has a negative effect on mood: In 
this task, participants may have been focusing on unresolved and potentially still 
active negative situations that may have aroused negative emotions. After the 
discrepancy salience task, participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition became 
sadder and more anxious. One possible explanation for this finding is a regression to 
the mean effect: Participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition may have had low 
levels of sadness and anxiety straight after the appraisal manipulation, such that when 
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sadness and anxiety were measured again after the self-discrepancy task, they had 
regressed to the mean. 
A number of methodological issues may be responsible for the observed 
pattern of results. First, at the beginning of the experiment, there were higher than 
expected levels of RNT. One possible explanation for this is that the RNT occurring 
during the baseline assessment may have resulted from administration of the PHQ-9 
and the STAI at the beginning of the experiment. Asking participants to respond to 
questions about low mood and anxious feelings immediately prior to the first 
breathing exercise may have inadvertently acted as a minor RNT induction. Since 
participants began the experiment with elevated levels of RNT, this may have 
diminished the opportunity to observe subsequent increases in RNT generated by the 
tasks experienced later in the experiment.  
Second, the elevated levels of state RNT may have been maintained across 
both conditions as a result of the manipulation task in which all participants wrote 
about their previous experiences of RNT. In this task, the instructions did not specify 
that these memories of RNT had to be about resolved issues, and as such, the 
examples generated could have related to situations that are ongoing and unresolved, 
which could trigger lower mood, and potentially, increased levels of RNT. In the 
RNT-as-Unhelpful condition, increased levels of RNT could have been maintained as 
a consequence of focusing on unconstructive experiences RNT about potentially 
ongoing negative events. In the RNT-as-Helpful condition, increased RNT could have 
been maintained as a consequence of thinking about a potentially unresolved issue 
that it has been helpful to think about, thus potentially motivating participants to 
continue engaging in RNT about that unresolved situation. As such, whilst the 
increased levels of RNT may have been maintained for slightly different reasons 
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across experimental conditions, these explanations may account for why this task may 
have maintained the elevated levels of RNT observed at baseline, thus leading to a 
possible ceiling effect whereby state RNT did not further increase after the 
discrepancy salience task.  
Third, due to the writing exercise format of the manipulation task, it was 
difficult to control for the amount written by each participant. Whilst participants 
were instructed to respond to specific questions in their written responses, and the 
task instructions indicated the approximate length of answer expected, there was 
considerable variation between participants on the length of written answers provided. 
Specifically, participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition wrote significantly more 
than participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition. As such, whilst the 
manipulation check indicated that the manipulation was successful, a difference in the 
length of answers written across conditions could potentially introduce a confound 
(e.g., difference in extent of elaboration of reasoning behind written answers across 
conditions).  
Fourth, and most critically, it appears that the discrepancy salience task may 
have been insufficiently powerful to prompt engagement in RNT. When descriptions 
of the thoughts generated during the breathing exercise immediately after the 
discrepancy salience task were examined, relatively few thoughts were related to self-
discrepancy (mean percentage of thoughts about self-discrepancy as a proportion of 
all thoughts reported = 19.56%). Moreover, examination of the mean self-discrepancy 
scores indicated that participants did not generally perceive high levels of self-
discrepancy during this task.  
In conclusion, whilst a manipulation check revealed that the manipulation of 
the perceived benefits of RNT was successful, contrary to predictions, no difference 
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in state RNT was observed between conditions following the self-discrepancy task. 
Given that there was no main effect of Time and no interaction effect of Condition X 
Time on state RNT following exposure to the self-discrepancy task, it suggests that 
this task was not successful in prompting participants to engage in RNT.  
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4.5. Appendix A: Analyses Examining the Effect of a Condition X Rumination 
and a Condition X Worry Interaction on State RNT 
To examine whether the findings remained consistent across varying levels of 
trait rumination and worry, two regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
effect of Condition X Rumination and Condition X Worry interaction terms on Post-
Discrepancy-Salience state RNT. The interaction term was not a significant predictor 
of state RNT, indicating that the effect of the experimental manipulation did not vary 
as a result of trait rumination or trait worry (see Table 4.4 and Table 4.5).  
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Table 4.4. Regression analysis examining the effects of Rumination, Condition, and Condition X Rumination on Post-Discrepancy-Salience state 
RNT 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Appraisal-Manipulation State RNT .33 .13 .32* .30 .13 .30* .31 .13 .30* .34 .14 .33* 
Rumination    .09 .08 .14 .09 .08 .14 .23 .13 .36 
Condition       -.06 .15 -.05 -.07 .15 -.06 
Condition X Rumination interaction          -.22 .17 -.29 
R2 .10 .12 .12 .15 
Adjusted R2 .09 .09 .08 .09 
R2 Change .10 .02 .00 .03 
F for change in R2 6.58* 1.15 .15 1.83 
 
Note. *p < .05
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Table 4.5. Regression analysis examining the effects of Worry, Condition, and Condition X Worry on Post-Discrepancy-Salience state RNT 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Appraisal-Manipulation State RNT .33 .13 .32* .30 .13 .30* .31 .13 .30* .33 .14 .32* 
Worry    .12 .07 .20 .12 .07 .20 .15 .11 .25 
Condition       -.04 .15 -.03 -.04 .15 -.04 
Condition X Worry interaction          -.07 .15 -.08 
R2 .10 .14 .14 .15 
Adjusted R2 .09 .11 .10 .08 
R2 Change .10 .04 .00 .00 
F for change in R2 6.58* 2.56 .07 .19 
 
Note. *p < .05
    241 
4.6. Appendix B: Normality Statistics Pre- and Post-Data Transformations 
Study 3 reported the use of square root transformed data due to the data, as 
expressed in its original form, not being normally distributed. Due to the nature of the 
variables being measured (e.g., depression score), one would not expect to observe a 
normal distribution. Whilst the square root transformations do not completely rectify 
the skewness and kurtosis within the data (i.e., Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests still give significant values post-transformation), transformation does 
substantially improve the normality of the distributions. To demonstrate this, Table 
4.4 displays skew and kurtosis statistics for all variables pre- and post-transformation.   
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Table 4.4. Study 3 skew and kurtosis statistics pre- and post-square root 
transformation 
Measure  
Pre-Transformation Post-Transformation 
Skew Kurtosis Skew Kurtosis 
RSQ-RRS 1.23   .98 .96 .15  
PSWQ .53 -.25 .20 -.48  
PHQ-9 2.37   7.91  1.85  4.78 
STAI 1.49   2.24  1.17  1.32 
Why Ruminate -.55 -.77  -.75 -.51 
ISDI Discrepancy Score -1.52 3.63  -1.93  5.45 
Time 1 State RNT 1.40   1.42  .70 -1.16 
Time 2 State RNT .75  -.79  .17  -1.64 
Time 3 State RNT 1.50   1.38  .65 -.98 
Time 1 Sadness .79 .53  -.49 1.05  
Time 2 Sadness .45 .66 -1.03 2.63  
Time 3 Sadness .56 .08 -.10 -.17  
Time 1 Anxiety .84 .37  -.18 .35  
Time 2 Anxiety .85 1.09 -.35 1.13 
Time 3 Anxiety .61 1.22  -.64 1.45  
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; PHQ-9: Patient Health Questionnaire; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale); ISDI: Integrated Self-Discrepancy Inventory mean discrepancy score.  
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CHAPTER 5: Study 4 - Believing That Repetitive Thought is Helpful Increases 
Repetitive Negative Thought in Response to Stress 
5.1. Preface 
This chapter reports a further experimental study examining the effects of 
manipulating the perceived helpfulness of RNT and examining the effect on 
subsequent engagement in RNT. A paper reporting this study is currently under 
review:  
Kingston, R. E. F., and Watkins, E. R. (under review). Believing that 
repetitive thought is helpful increases repetitive negative thought in response to stress.  
The study described in this chapter reports a replication of the study described 
in Chapter 4, but with a number of key methodological modifications that address the 
concerns identified in the Discussion (Chapter 4, Section 4.4).  
First, to address the concern about the higher than expected levels of RNT 
observed at the beginning of the experiment, the format of the session was modified 
such that participants did not complete the PHQ-9 (Kroenke et al., 2001) and the 
STAI state subscale (Spielberger, 1989) at the beginning of the session. Instead, these 
measures were completed online, at the time of the experiment booking, so that there 
would be a gap between the completion of measures that may prompt engagement in 
RNT, and the beginning of the experimental session. 
Second, to address the concern that the manipulation task may have been too 
emotionally arousing and may prompt engagement in RNT, the instructions to this 
task were modified such that participants were required to recall memories of 
helpful/unhelpful RNT about problems that were resolved and in the past. Preventing 
participants from focusing on current unresolved problems would hopefully reduce 
emotional arousal and motivation to engage in RNT at this stage of the experiment
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making the interpretation of any findings cleaner. In the previous experiment, it was 
not possible to discern whether the effect on mood was as a result of condition (i.e., 
RNT-as-Helpful or RNT-as-Unhelpful), or whether as a result of thinking about a 
resolved versus an unresolved issue, and so by making this modification to the 
experiment to ensure that everyone was remembering occasions of RNT about 
resolved situations (whether helpful or unhelpful), this possible confound was 
removed. 
Third, to address the concern about the differential levels of elaboration across 
conditions during the manipulation task when writing about memories of 
helpful/unhelpful RNT, the format of the task was switched from a written exercise to 
a verbal interview. When conducting the manipulation exercise in a written format as 
reported in the previous chapter, there was significant variation in the degree to which 
participants elaborated in response to the task (i.e., some participants wrote a lot and 
explored in more detail the ways in which rumination was helpful/unhelpful, whereas 
other participants wrote significantly less). As such, by switching to an interview 
format, it was easier to ensure that participants elaborated adequately and to a similar 
degree, since for brief and unelaborated answers, participants could be immediately 
prompted to provide further information before proceeding. As such, the interview 
format was designed to ensure more detailed and consistent elaboration in response to 
the appraisal manipulation across participants, and greater control over the 
manipulation of appraisals. In addition, the interview format also enabled better 
monitoring of the examples of helpful/unhelpful RNT, such that it was possible to 
ensure the comparability of the examples given across conditions. For instance, it was 
possible to check that participants in both conditions were recalling examples of RNT, 
rather than other types of thinking about an issue, avoiding this potential confound. 
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Finally, to address the most critical methodological concern about the self-
discrepancy task being insufficiently powerful to prompt engagement in RNT, this 
task was changed. Instead, an insolvable anagram task incorporating failure feedback 
was used as a potential task to induce RNT (cf. Moulds et al., 2010; Watkins et al., 
2008). This task has been successfully used in previous studies, with evidence that it 
is powerful enough to prompt involuntary rumination, but not so powerful that it 
would not be possible to differentiate level of state RNT between conditions. It is 
important to note that this task (anagram failure) may be more likely to elicit 
ruminative thought content, rather than worry thought content (although it may still 
induce some worry), and in previous studies it has been used to afford rumination. As 
previously outlined, most tasks designed to afford engagement in RNT tend to 
concentrate on either eliciting rumination or worry, and as such, in order to use a 
well-validated approach, it was necessary to use a task that might elicit rumination, as 
an exemplar for RNT.  
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Believing That Repetitive Thought is Helpful Increases Repetitive Negative Thought 
in Response to Stress 
Rosemary E. F. Kingston and Edward R. Watkins 
Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, 
University of Exeter, UK, EX4 4QG 
5.2. Abstract 
The perception-of-benefit hypothesis proposes that appraising repetitive 
negative thought (RNT) to be helpful causes RNT. Consistent with this, positive 
metacognitive beliefs about RNT are correlated with and prospectively predict RNT. 
However, the causal hypothesis has not been directly tested by manipulating such 
appraisals. This experiment tested the hypothesis that perception-of-benefit causes 
RNT by manipulating perceived helpfulness of RNT. Participants were randomly 
allocated to perceive RNT as either helpful or unhelpful by means of an interview 
exploring participant-generated examples of constructive versus unconstructive 
outcomes of RNT. Participants were then exposed to a stressful insolvable anagram 
task. Participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition engaged in more RNT after the 
stressor relative to participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition. This effect cannot 
be explained by a differential mood response to the task because there was no 
difference in post-stressor anxiety and sadness across conditions. This finding 
provides the first direct experimental evidence that metacognitive beliefs cause RNT. 
5.3. Introduction 
Depressive rumination, the process of repeatedly thinking about negative 
moods, problems and difficulties, and their possible causes and consequences (Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991), is implicated in the development and maintenance of depression 
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and anxiety (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Watkins, 2008). Worry, 
defined as a chain of uncontrollable negative thoughts and images concerning 
uncertainty and potential negative outcomes (Borkovec, Robinson, Pruzinsky, & 
DePree, 1983), is also associated with depression and anxiety (Segerstrom, Tsao, 
Alden, & Craske, 2000; Watkins, 2008).  
Rumination and worry can be conceptualised as representing a common 
process of repetitive negative thought (RNT; Ehring & Watkins, 2008): both are (i) 
repetitive; (ii) focused on negative content; (iii) experienced as passive and relatively 
uncontrollable; and (iv) abstract in processing style. Previous empirical research has 
emphasised the commonality between rumination and worry (Watkins, Moulds, & 
Mackintosh, 2005; Watkins, 2008). Moreover, RNT has been proposed as a 
transdiagnostic process that is common to and causally contributes to a large number 
of mental health problems (Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & 
Shafran, 2004).  
Paradoxically, despite pathological consequences for mood and mental health, 
a subset of individuals demonstrates a tendency towards frequent and persistent RNT. 
This raises the following important theoretical and clinical question: Despite these 
negative outcomes, why do these people continue to ruminate and worry? 
A wide range of potential vulnerability factors for RNT have been identified 
(Kingston, Watkins, & O’Mahen, 2013a; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011). One 
explanation for why people might persist in RNT is that despite its disadvantageous 
consequences, they appraise RNT to have useful functions that result in beneficial 
outcomes, which reinforces their continued use of RNT (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008, 
Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). This perception-of-benefit account hypothesises that the 
appraisal that RNT has advantages and benefits (whether accurate or not) causes RNT 
    248 
(Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). A specific operationalisation of this hypothesis is in 
terms of metacognitive beliefs, which refer to “beliefs and appraisals about one’s 
thinking and the ability to monitor and regulate cognition” (Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2001b, p. 160). For example, positive metacognitive beliefs about RNT reflect beliefs 
about the advantages of RNT as a coping strategy. 
Despite considerable interest in and investigation of the perception-of-benefit 
and positive metacognitive belief approach to RNT, the key hypothesis that 
appraising RNT as beneficial causally increases RNT has not been directly tested. 
Cross-sectional studies conducted in depressed and nondepressed samples have found 
associations between self-reported positive beliefs about rumination and trait 
rumination (Kingston, Watkins, & O’Mahen, 2013a; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a; 
Papageorgiou and Wells, 2003; Roelofs, Huibers, Peeters, Arntz, & van Os, 2010; 
Roelofs, Papageorgiou, Gerber, Huibers, Peeters, & Arntz, 2007, Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). Similarly, in a quasi-experiment, Moulds, Yap, Kerr, 
Williams, and Kandris (2010) exposed individuals with high versus low levels of 
positive beliefs about rumination to an unsolvable anagram task, and assessed 
subsequent self-reported rumination. Regardless of whether participants received 
positive, negative, or neutral feedback about anagram performance, participants with 
higher endorsement of positive beliefs about rumination reported more state 
rumination than participants with lower levels of positive beliefs.  
Cross-sectional studies examining worry also demonstrate an association 
between having metacognitive beliefs about the utility of worry, and engagement in 
worry  (Bacow, Pincus, Ehrenreich, & Brody, 2009; Cartwright-Hatton & Wells, 
1997; Davis & Valentiner, 2000; de Jong-Meyer, Beck, & Riede, 2009; Irak & Tosun, 
2008; Nuevo, Montorio, & Borkovec, 2004; Wells, 2005; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 
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2004; Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998; Yilmaz, Gençöz, & Wells, 2008). However, all 
of these studies are correlational, leaving the causal direction of this relationship 
unresolved. 
In an experimental study, Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) 
examined the effects of rumination versus distraction manipulations on perceived 
level of insight in dysphoric and nondysphoric students. All participants reported 
greater levels of insight following the rumination induction relative to the distraction 
induction, with the authors noting that rumination made participants “sadder but wiser” 
(p. 346). This study suggests that repeated thinking about the self and feelings 
increases perceived insight relative to not thinking about the self (i.e., distraction), but 
it did not test whether perception-of-benefit influences rumination.   
A small number of prospective longitudinal studies have examined whether 
perceived benefits of RNT predict future RNT. Weber and Exner (2013) found that in 
a nondepressed student sample, positive metacognitive beliefs about rumination 
predicted changes in rumination two months later. Sica, Steketee, Ghisi, Chiri, and 
Franceschini (2007) found that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about 
worry predicted subsequent level of worry after four months. In a prospective study 
examining the relationships between stressful events, positive beliefs about worry and 
engagement in worry, Iijima and Tanno (2013) found that positive beliefs about worry 
significantly moderated the relationship between stressful events and worry, with 
stressful events leading to greater levels of worry in individuals with high positive 
beliefs about worry. Examining rumination and worry as a common process of RNT 
in a prospective study incorporating a range of putative vulnerability factors (e.g., 
parenting style, stress, neuroticism), Kingston, Watkins, and O’Mahen (2013b) found 
that only neuroticism and the belief that repetitive thinking increases insight and 
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understanding predicted increases in RNT over six to eight weeks. Notably, within a 
range of metacognitive beliefs (e.g., perceiving rumination to aid self-control and 
social control), only this specific metacognitive belief predicted increases in RNT.  
Although these prospective studies suggest that it is unlikely that the observed 
relationship is due to RNT causing positive appraisals because the assessment of 
positive metacognitive beliefs temporally precedes increases in RNT, they cannot rule 
out the role of possible third factors. The definitive way to infer causality is by bi-
directionally manipulating the independent variable of interest (i.e., perception-of-
benefit) and investigating its influence on the dependent variable (i.e., state RNT). 
However, to our knowledge, there have been no experimental studies that directly test 
the perception-of-benefit/positive metacognitive belief hypothesis to examine the 
effects on rumination or RNT. The only experimental study to manipulate beliefs 
about the utility of worry did not find an effect on post-manipulation worry (Prados, 
2011). However, this study had a number of methodological limitations, particularly 
relating to the tasks used to prompt engagement in worry.  
The current study aimed to address this critical gap in the literature by testing 
the perception-of-benefit/positive metacognitive beliefs hypothesis: Participants were 
manipulated to view RNT as helpful versus unhelpful to test how this would influence 
state RNT, assessed by thought probes, following a subsequent stressful event. We 
manipulated appraisals of whether RNT improves understanding and insight, because 
only this particular perception was found to be important in the prospective study by 
Kingston et al. (2013b). 
We expected that there would be an increase in state RNT for all participants 
following the stressful event (i.e., a main effect of Time), but critically, the 
perception-of-benefit hypothesis predicts that participants manipulated to view RNT 
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as helpful would show a greater increase in state RNT relative to those manipulated to 
view RNT as unhelpful (i.e., a Condition X Time interaction). We expected to 
observe this difference in state RNT between experimental conditions only in 
response to a stressor that affords RNT (i.e., from post-appraisal-manipulation to 
post-anagram-stressor), but not as a direct effect of the experimental manipulation of 
perceived benefit (i.e., no effect from baseline to post-appraisal-manipulation).  
5.4. Method 
5.4.1. Design 
This was an experimental study in which participants were randomly allocated 
to two conditions (RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) using a blocked design, 
to ensure that each condition contained equal numbers of participants. The 
independent variable (IV) to be manipulated was perceived helpfulness of RNT, and 
the dependent variables (DVs) were state RNT and mood.  
5.4.2. Participants 
Sixty participants (age range 18 – 57 years, mean = 25.32, SD = 9.56; 83.3% 
female; 83.3% white British, 10.0% other white background, 5.0% Chinese, 1.7% 
mixed ethnic groups; socioeconomic data not collected) from staff and students at the 
University of Exeter were recruited to the study by e-mail, electronic newsletter and 
posters advertising the study, which was described as “examining cognitive abilities 
and thinking styles”. Participants gave informed consent to participate in the study, 
were fully debriefed afterwards, and received either £5 cash or course credits for 
participating.  
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5.4.3. Procedure 
The experiment involved two key phases: first, a manipulation of beliefs about 
RNT (involving recall of experiences when RNT was experienced as helpful or 
unhelpful), and second, exposure to a stressor (an insolvable anagram task). State 
RNT and mood were measured three times during the experiment: at Baseline, Post-
Appraisal-Manipulation, and Post-Anagram-Stressor. State RNT was assessed using 
thought probes during a five-minute breathing exercise.  
Before the experiment, participants completed an online battery of 
questionnaires containing the RSQ-RRS, PSWQ, PHQ-9, STAI (state subscale), and 
appraisals about the usefulness of RNT. The mean number of days between 
completion of the online battery of questionnaires and participation in the experiment 
was 9.25 days (SD = 7.38). The experiment began with the first assessment of state 
RNT and mood (Baseline), followed by the manipulation task. Next, there was a 
second assessment of the perceived usefulness of RNT, state RNT and mood (Post-
Appraisal-Manipulation), followed by the stressor task. Finally, there was the third 
assessment of state RNT and mood (Post-Anagram-Stressor), after which the Why 
Ruminate scale was completed.  
After the experiment, participants were asked to briefly write down what they 
thought the study was about, before being debriefed about the nature of the study. The 
anagram task was explained such that participants understood that half of the 
anagrams were insolvable and their performance was normal. 
5.4.4. Measures  
Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS, 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RSQ-RRS is a 22-item questionnaire that 
assesses ruminative responses focused on the self, symptoms, and possible causes and 
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consequences of low mood. Total scores range from 22-88, with higher scores 
indicating greater trait rumination. It has acceptable convergent validity and high 
internal consistency (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ, Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990). The PSWQ is a 16-item measure of trait worry, assessing the 
tendency to engage in excessive, uncontrollable and generalised worry. Scores range 
from 16-80, with higher scores indicating greater trait worry. It has good internal 
consistency and construct validity (Molina & Borkovec, 1994). 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9, Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). 
The PHQ-9 is a nine-item measure designed to assess the severity of depression 
symptoms over the past two weeks. Scores range from 0 to 27, with greater scores 
indicating more severe symptoms of depression. It has good internal reliability and 
construct validity (Kroenke et al., 2001). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory – State subscale (STAI, Spielberger, 1989). The 
“state” subscale of the STAI is a 20-item measure of state anxiety, with high internal 
consistency (Barnes, Harp, & Jung, 2002). Respondents rate statements (e.g., “I feel 
nervous”) on a 4-point scale ranging from “not at all” to “very much”, to indicate 
their feelings over the past two weeks, giving scores from 20-80 (higher scores 
indicating greater state anxiety).  
Why Ruminate scale. The Why Ruminate scale (WR, Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001) is a 46-item questionnaire measuring perceived benefits and functions of 
rumination, with participants indicating their agreement with each item on a scale 
from 1 (“not true at all”) to 5 (“completely true”). Scores range from 46–230, with 
higher scores indicating more perceived benefits and functions of rumination. The 
scale has high internal consistency and criterion validity (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). 
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Mood ratings. Participants rated their mood on the following two dimensions: 
Sadness and Anxiety. Ratings were made using computerised 100-point visual 
analogue scales, which were scaled from 0 to 100 (0 = Happy / Confident, 100 = Sad / 
Anxious), with higher scores indicating greater sadness and anxiety. Similar visual 
analogue scales have demonstrated good validity and reliability (e.g., Stern, Arruda, 
Hooper, Wolfner, & Morey, 1997). 
Appraisals of the usefulness of RNT. A two-item measure was created to 
assess participants’ appraisals of the usefulness of RNT for two purposes: (i) to ensure 
that there was no baseline difference on this measure across conditions, and (ii) to 
serve as a manipulation check, assessing whether participants in the RNT-as-Helpful 
versus RNT-as-Unhelpful conditions differentially appraised the usefulness of RNT. 
The two items were “Right now, how helpful or unhelpful do you think it is to 
repeatedly think through problems or difficulties, and repeatedly think about their 
causes, meanings, and implications?”, and “At this moment, how much do you think 
that repeatedly dwelling on problems and difficulties, and thinking about their causes, 
meanings and implications, influences your sense of understanding and insight?”, 
each rated on 7-point Likert scales, respectively ranging from 1 (“very unhelpful”) to 
7 (“very helpful”) and 1 (“it greatly decreases my sense of understanding and 
insight”) to 7 (“it greatly increases my sense of understanding and insight”). A mean 
score of these two items was calculated to represent appraisals about the usefulness of 
rumination, with higher scores indicating more favourable appraisals (α = .64). 
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5.4.5. Tasks 
5.4.5.1. Assessment of state RNT. 
State RNT was assessed using an adaptation of a “breathing focus task”, 
originally designed to measure worry (Hirsch, Hayes, & Mathews, 2009). Each 
assessment involved a five-minute period in which spontaneously occurring thoughts 
were measured using thought probes. The task was explained to participants as a 
“breathing exercise” in which they told to “close their eyes, and focus their attention 
on their natural breathing”. Twelve tones were presented at randomised intervals 
between 20-30 seconds apart, and in response to each tone, participants indicated 
whether their attention was focused on “breathing” or “any other thought”. If “any 
other thought” was selected, participants indicated whether the thought was positive, 
negative, or neutral, and provided a brief written description of the thought. 
Immediately after each five minute period, participants provided fuller written 
descriptions of all “any other thoughts”, as well as rating any negative thoughts on 
five criteria assessing RNT qualities during the five minutes: thought frequency (rated 
0 “only once” to 4 “more than 4 times”), duration (0 “only for an instant” to 6 “nearly 
all the time”), distress (rated 0 “not at all” to 4 “extremely”), repetitiveness (“When 
thinking about this subject, how much did your thoughts keep coming back to the 
same or similar ideas again and again?”, rated 0 “not at all” to 4 “a great deal”), and 
uncontrollability (“How difficult did you find it to stop this thought coming or to 
move on to other thoughts?”, rated 0 “not at all” to 4 “extremely”).  
For each assessment period, there were 12 thought probes, and five ratings of 
RNT qualities for each of these probes, giving a total of 60 ratings. Ratings were zero 
if in response to the thought probe, participants were (i) focusing on their breathing, 
(ii) having positive or neutral thoughts, or (iii) having negative thoughts that were 
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rated as having no RNT qualities on the above five dimensions. Engagement in RNT 
was indexed by taking the mean of the 60 ratings for each exercise, generating one 
state RNT score for each participant at each of the three assessment periods 
(minimum 0, maximum 4.4). 
There was a significant correlation between Post-Anagram-Stressor state RNT 
and trait RNT, as measured by the RSQ-RRS (r = .40, p = .002) and PSWQ (r = .35, p 
= .006), indicating that the measure of state RNT has good convergent validity.  
5.4.5.2. Manipulation of perceived benefit of RNT. 
Beliefs about RNT were manipulated by way of a detailed structured interview 
exploring participant-generated examples of when they had engaged in RNT. 
Participants were asked to identify “two occasions when repeated thinking about a 
problem over and over again” was either helpful (RNT-as-Helpful condition) or 
unhelpful (RNT-as-Unhelpful condition).  
In order to minimise emotional arousal, participants were asked to only recall 
RNT about resolved issues (rather than current unresolved problems). After the 
problems were identified, the experimenter verified that participant found the RNT 
helpful/unhelpful as per their experimental condition. 
In the RNT-as-Helpful condition, the interview contained three questions that 
explored the ways in which RNT was helpful, with particular reference to improving 
understanding and insight (e.g., “In what way did repetitive thinking about the 
problem improve your understanding and insight?”). In contrast, the RNT-as-
Unhelpful manipulation interview contained three questions exploring the ways in 
which RNT was unconstructive in each situation (e.g., “In what way did repetitive 
thinking about the problem seem unhelpful or unconstructive?”). 
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Participants were asked to spend approximately one minute answering each 
question aloud, with the experimenter using standardised prompts for unelaborated 
answers. The interview was conducted with reference to two distinct memories, to 
make participants consider RNT as something helpful or unhelpful in more than one 
context.  
5.4.5.3. Anagram stressor task. 
The stressor comprised a difficult anagram task and subsequent false failure 
feedback that has been successfully used in a number of studies to induce rumination 
(e.g., Moulds et al., 2010, Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). Participants were 
presented with a list of 30 five-letter anagrams, without being made aware that 15 
were unsolvable. They had three minutes to solve as many as possible, and were told 
to work quickly and accurately. False high expectations of performance were 
established: Participants were told that based on previous participants’ performance, 
they were expected to solve five or six anagrams. However, on average, participants 
solved just one. They were also falsely informed that their performance was a reliable 
and valid indicator of future academic success. 
After the task was complete, all participants were given failure feedback. To 
try to ensure that participants believed that all anagrams were solvable, the 
experimenter then highlighted several solvable anagrams that the participant had 
missed.  
5.5. Results 
5.5.1. Data Preparation and Preliminary Analyses 
All of the variables were screened for skew and kurtosis. Since significant 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests indicated that the variables were not 
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normally distributed, all variables were subject to square root transformations, which 
substantially improved the normality of the distributions. 
5.5.1.1. Baseline differences. 
Independent samples t tests revealed that there were no significant differences 
between conditions on any of the baseline measures of RNT (RSQ-RRS, t(1, 58) = -
1.20, p = .234; PSWQ, t(1,58) = -1.20, p = .234), depression and anxiety symptoms 
(PHQ-9, t(1, 58) = -1.24, p = .220; STAI state subscale, t(1, 58) = -.944, p = .444), 
beliefs about rumination (WR, t(1, 58) = -.192, p = .848), or appraisals about 
usefulness of RNT (t(1, 58) = -.409, p = .684); see Table 5.1 for means and standard 
deviations. 
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Table 5.1. Means (and standard deviations) for the variables measured at baseline by 
experimental condition, prior to square root transformations 
 
RNT-as-Helpful  
(n = 30) 
RNT-as-Unhelpful 
(n = 30) 
RSQ-RRS 40.57 (13.10) 44.50 (12.20) 
PSWQ 48.97 (13.20) 51.03 (13.84) 
PHQ-9 3.53 (4.10) 4.90 (4.43) 
STAI (State Subscale) 41.57 (12.65) 44.53 (11.68) 
Why Ruminate scale 138.23 (26.31) 139.73 (33.62) 
Appraisals of the usefulness of RNT 4.58 (1.25) 4.73 (1.57) 
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PHQ-9 = Patient 
Health Questionnaire; STAI = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory.  
 
5.5.1.2. Manipulation check. 
A 2 (Condition: RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) by 2 (Time: 
Baseline versus Post-Appraisal-Manipulation) repeated measures Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA) examined appraisals about the usefulness of RNT. As expected, 
there was no main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = .23, p = .632, d = .07, 95% CI for d [-
.44, .58]), but there was a main effect of Condition (F(1, 58) = 5.61, p = .021, d = .59, 
95% CI[.53, .66]), which was secondary to a significant Condition X Time interaction 
(F(1, 58) = 18.74, p < .001, d = 1.16, 95% CI[1.05, 1.25]), reflecting an increase in 
appraisals of RNT as helpful in the RNT-as-Helpful condition relative to the RNT-as-
Unhelpful condition (see Table 5.2 for means and standard deviations), confirming 
the success of the manipulation.  
 
    260 
Table 5.2. Means (and standard deviations) for the dependent variables by experimental condition, prior to square root transformations 
 RNT-as-Helpful (n = 30) RNT-as-Unhelpful (n = 30) 
 Baseline 
Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation 
Post-Anagram-
Stressor 
Baseline 
Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation 
Post-Anagram-
Stressor 
Appraisals of the Usefulness of RNT 4.58 (1.25) 5.32 (1.02)  4.73 (1.57) 3.82 (1.40)  
State RNT 0.16 (.18) 0.17 (.25) 0.56 (.60) 0.14 (.17) 0.29 (.33) 0.46 (.89) 
Sadness 30.00 (19.14) 30.30 (17.90) 41.30 (20.42) 28.37 (13.37) 35.70 (19.00) 41.07 (20.17) 
Anxiety 41.27 (20.97) 38.37 (19.22) 51.37 (22.20) 38.77 (21.91) 41.70 (22.21) 48.33 (23.36) 
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5.5.2. Main Analyses 
5.5.2.1. Change in state RNT and mood from Baseline to Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation. 
A 2 (Condition: RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) by 2 (Time: 
Baseline versus Post-Appraisal-Manipulation) repeated measures ANOVA examined 
the changes in the DVs from Baseline to Post-Appraisal-Manipulation. As predicted, 
there was no effect of Time (F(1, 58) = 1.66, p = .203, d = .23, 95% CI [.11, .32]), 
Condition (F(1, 58) = .89, p = .350, d = -.25, 95% CI [-.32, -.17]), or Condition X 
Time (F(1, 58) = 1.82, p = .182, d = -.35, 95% CI [-.50, -.21]) on state RNT. There 
was no main effect of Condition on Sadness (F(1, 58) = .14, p = .715, d = .10, 95% 
CI[-.32, .44]), but there was a significant main effect of Time on Sadness (F(1, 58) = 
7.11, p = .010, d = .23, 95% CI[-.14, .66]), which was secondary to a significant 
interaction effect of Condition X Time (F(1, 58) = 6.75, p = .012, d = .68, 95% 
CI[.48, .99]): Participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition became sadder than 
participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition (see Table 5.2). Finally, there was no 
main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = .01, p = .938, d = .01, 95% CI[-.50, .53]) or Condition 
(F(1, 58) = .02, p = .884, d = .04, 95% CI[-.49, .56]) on Anxiety, but there was a 
significant interaction effect of Condition X Time on Anxiety (F(1, 58) = 4.71, p 
= .034, d = .57, 95% CI[.27, .83]): participants in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition 
became more anxious relative to participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition .  
5.5.2.2. Change in state RNT and mood from Post-Appraisal-
Manipulation to Post-Anagram-Stressor. 
A 2 (Condition: RNT-as-Helpful versus RNT-as-Unhelpful) by 2 (Time: Post-
Appraisal-Manipulation versus Post-Anagram-Stressor) repeated measures ANOVA 
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examined the changes in the DVs from Post-Appraisal-Manipulation to Post-
Anagram-Stressor. As predicted, there was no significant main effect of Condition on 
state RNT (F(1, 58) = .00, p = .961, d = .01, 95% CI[-.10, .14]), but there was a 
significant main effect of Time (F(1, 58) = 10.85, p = .002, d = .48, 95% CI[.32, .60]), 
which was secondary to a significant interaction effect of Condition X Time on state 
RNT (F(1, 58) = 4.79, p = .033, d = .58, 95% CI[.41, .74]): All participants engaged 
in more RNT after the stressor, but participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition 
showed a greater increase in state RNT relative to participants in the RNT-as-
Unhelpful condition (see Table 5.2). There was a significant effect of Time on 
Sadness (F(1, 58) = 12.63, p = .001, d = .44, 95% CI[.01, .93]) and Anxiety (F(1, 58) 
= 18.37, p < .001, d = .48, 95% CI[-.02, 1.11]): All participants became more sad and 
anxious post-stressor. There was no effect of Condition (F(1, 58) = .34, p = .562, d 
= .15, 95% CI[-.25, .57]) or Condition X Time (F(1, 58) = 1.27, p = .264, d = -.30, 
95% CI[-.69, .17]) on Sadness, and no effect of Condition (F(1, 58) = .04, p = .852, d 
= .05, 95% CI[-.41, .62]) or Condition X Time (F(1, 58) = 1.31, p = .257, d = -.30, 
95% CI[-.74, .23]) on Anxiety. 
5.5.2.3. Anagram task performance. 
In order to establish that group differences in state RNT were not accounted 
for by differential performance on the anagram task, we examined the number of 
anagrams solved across the two conditions. There was no significant difference 
between conditions on the number of anagrams solved during the stressor task (t(1,58) 
= 1.33, p = .187, d = .36, 95% CI[-.02, .67], RNT-as-Helpful mean = 1.17, SD = 1.05, 
RNT-as-Unhelpful mean = .83, SD = .87), suggesting that the observed group 
differences could not be explained by differential anagram task performance.  
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5.6. Discussion 
To the best of our knowledge, the current study provides the first experimental 
test of the hypothesis that appraising RNT as beneficial causally contributes to state 
RNT. Participants manipulated to appraise RNT as helpful had greater levels of state 
RNT after subsequent exposure to a stressor than participants manipulated to perceive 
RNT as unhelpful. Consistent with the perception-of-benefit hypothesis (Watkins & 
Baracaia, 2001), this finding suggests that beliefs about RNT can cause increased 
RNT. 
These findings are consistent with perception-of-benefit and positive 
metacognitive belief accounts of RNT, which hypothesise that appraising RNT as 
having advantages and benefits causes RNT (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2001a; Watkins 
& Baracaia, 2001). These results suggest that people may continue to engage in RNT 
despite its unhelpful consequences because they perceive it to be beneficial in 
increasing their sense of understanding and insight. This experimental evidence of 
causality is convergent with evidence that individuals who engage in high levels of 
RNT report more positive beliefs about RNT (e.g., Kingston et al., 2013a): together 
these findings suggest that such beliefs may influence level of RNT in the real world. 
If these findings are replicated in clinical populations, they suggest that identifying 
and challenging such beliefs in a therapeutic context may be an effective means to 
reduce state RNT.  
We note that this study only demonstrated an effect on state RNT. It is not 
known whether manipulating beliefs and appraisals would influence trait RNT. 
Because trait RNT reflects the tendency to repeatedly engage in state RNT, we 
hypothesise that factors that consistently increase engagement in state RNT, such as 
long-term elevation of these metacognitive beliefs, would influence trait RNT. It is 
    264 
important to therefore test whether repeatedly challenging beliefs about RNT reduces 
RNT in the long term. 
The experimental manipulation and exposure to the stressor also influenced 
mood. Immediately after the appraisal manipulation, participants in the RNT-as-
Unhelpful condition became more sad and anxious relative to participants in the 
RNT-as-Helpful condition. This is unsurprising because the RNT-as-Unhelpful 
condition involved focus on a situation that was negative and difficult to resolve. 
After exposure to the anagram stressor, regardless of condition, all participants 
became more sad and anxious. Importantly, despite engaging in more RNT, 
participants in the RNT-as-Helpful condition did not show increased levels of sadness 
or anxiety relative to those in the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition, suggesting that the 
difference in state RNT between the two groups post-stressor is not due to differential 
mood reactions to the task. 
The study had a number of strengths. First, it is the first study to test the 
hypothesis that beliefs about RNT cause engagement in RNT by manipulating 
experimental conditions to establish causality. Second, the random allocation of 
participants to experimental conditions reduces the likelihood that the effects are due 
to sampling bias or unassessed confounds. Third, we used a dynamic real-time 
thought probe measure of RNT, providing better ecological validity and reducing 
concerns about retrospective reporting bias common to questionnaire measures, 
repeated three times throughout the study.   
There were some limitations to the study. First, there was no control condition 
in which metacognitive beliefs were not manipulated.  We are therefore unable to 
assess the default response that individuals would make in the absence of the 
manipulation, and whether the differential effect of the two conditions was a result of 
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the RNT-as-Helpful condition actively increasing RNT, the RNT-as-Unhelpful 
condition actively reducing RNT, or both. Second, the possibility of demand effects 
influencing responses to the tasks cannot be definitively ruled out. However, this 
seems unlikely, given that the effect of the manipulation on state RNT was only 
observed in response to the anagram stressor, and was not observed immediately after 
the manipulation. Moreover, no participants identified that the experiment was 
designed to manipulate appraisals of RNT. Third, as this study was conducted with a 
nonclinical sample, it is not possible to generalise the results to clinical populations. 
Whilst we have no theoretical reason to believe that perceptions-of-benefit would 
differentially impact RNT in depressed versus nondepressed individuals, we need to 
replicate these findings with participants who are currently depressed, to see whether 
the causal relationships remain robust.   
An important area for future research is to establish whether the perception 
that RNT increases insightfulness is accurate or not. The current study demonstrated 
that this perception causally influences RNT, but the question of whether RNT does 
lead to improved understanding and insight was not tested. In summary, we found that 
experimentally manipulating appraisals about the usefulness of RNT influenced 
subsequent engagement in state RNT in response to a stressor, consistent with 
metacognitive accounts of RNT.   
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5.7. Appendix A: Analyses Examining the Effect of a Condition X Rumination 
and a Condition X Worry Interaction on State RNT 
To examine whether the findings remained consistent across varying levels of 
trait rumination and worry, two regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
effect of Condition X Rumination and Condition X Worry interaction terms on Post-
Anagram-Stressor state RNT. The interaction term was not a significant predictor of 
state RNT, indicating that the effect of the experimental manipulation did not vary as 
a result of trait rumination or trait worry (see Table 5.3 and Table 5.4).  
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Table 5.3. Regression analysis examining the effects of Rumination, Condition, and Condition X Rumination on Post-Anagram-Stressor state 
RNT 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Appraisal-Manipulation State RNT .50 .17 .36** .27 .18 .19 .32 .18 .23 .33 .18 .23 
Rumination    .17 .06 .36** .18 .06 .38** .19 .08 .40* 
Condition       -.23 .11 -.25* -.23 .10 -.25* 
Condition X Rumination interaction          -.02 .11 -.03 
R2 .13 .23 .29 .29 
Adjusted R2 .11 .20 .25 .24 
R2 Change .13 .10 .06 .00 
F for change in R2 8.34** 7.56** 4.65* .03 
 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01
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Table 5.4. Regression analysis examining the effects of Worry, Condition, and Condition X Worry on Post-Anagram-Stressor state RNT 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Appraisal-Manipulation State RNT .50 .17 .36** .39 .17 .28* .45 .17 .32* .53 .18 .38** 
Worry    .13 .06 .28* .13 .06 .28* .22 .08 .47** 
Condition       -.21 .11 -.22 -.22 .11 -.23 
Condition X Worry interaction          -.18 .11 -.28 
R2 .13 .20 .24 .28 
Adjusted R2 .11 .17 .20 .23 
R2 Change .13 .07 .05 .03 
F for change in R2 8.34** 4.99* 3.54 2.56 
 
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01
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5.8. Appendix B: Examining the Effect of the Anagram Task on Thoughts 
In the previous chapter, the self-discrepancy task that was used to expose 
participants to a situation that would afford RNT was judged to be unsuccessful 
because it did not elicit any increases in RNT. Moreover, in the breathing exercise 
that immediately followed the self-discrepancy exercise, a relatively small proportion 
of thoughts were about self-discrepancy, indicating that participants were not 
generally dwelling much on the task (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.5.3).  
To examine whether the anagram task was more successful at eliciting 
dwelling about task performance in the breathing exercise immediately after anagram 
failure, the number of thoughts that each participant had relating to the anagrams were 
counted. Thoughts were counted as relating to the anagram task if the participant 
either explicitly stated that they were thinking about that task (e.g., “Not getting any 
of the anagrams in the previous task”), or if the thoughts directly considered the 
implications of failing the anagram task (e.g. “I feel incapable and stupid because I’m 
normally good with words”).  
A proportion score was calculated for each participant, representing the 
percentage of thoughts that were about the anagram task (i.e., total number of 
thoughts about the anagram task ÷ total number of thoughts). On average, 37.92% of 
thoughts were about the anagram task (SD = 30.51). Compared to the self-
discrepancy task, after which 19.56% of the thoughts were about self-discrepancy, a t 
test indicated that there were a significantly greater proportion of thoughts about the 
anagram task than the self-discrepancy task (t(118) = -3.48, p = .001). As such, it can 
be concluded that the anagram task was more successful at eliciting dwelling and 
putting participants in a situation conducive to RNT.  
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However, whilst the anagram task was successful at eliciting RNT, the levels 
of RNT reported were still very low (see Table 5.2). Nonetheless, an effect on state 
RNT was still observed, demonstrating proof-of-principle. There are several potential 
explanations for the low levels of RNT.  
First, the scoring system utilised to assess state RNT was extremely 
conservative (see Section 5.4.5.1). To recap on the scoring system, for each 
assessment period of RNT, there were a total of 12 thought probes, and five ratings of 
RNT qualities for each of those probes (e.g., repetitiveness, uncontrollability, etc.), 
giving a total of 60 ratings for each exercise. Ratings were zero if participants were (i) 
focusing on their breathing in response to the thought probe, (ii) having positive or 
neutral thoughts; or (iii) having negative thoughts that were rated as not having any 
qualities of RNT (e.g., if in response to the question about repetitiveness, “How 
difficult did you find it to stop this thought coming or to move on to other thoughts?”, 
the participant answered “Not at all”, it would be scored zero). A mean state RNT 
score was calculated by taking the mean of the 60 ratings for each exercise. This 
represents a very conservative way of scoring the exercise because many of the 
ratings would be zero (e.g., if the participant was focusing a lot on their breathing or 
having many neutral thoughts), thus considerably lowering the overall mean score.  
A second explanation for the observed low levels of RNT is that the anagram 
stressor task was still a relatively mild task for eliciting RNT. As such, one would not 
expect to see very high levels of RNT after a relatively mild stressor. Whilst the 
choice of task may have diminished the opportunity to observe high levels of RNT, it 
was necessary to select a task to elicit RNT that was relatively mild such that it did 
not lead to ceiling effects for state RNT, preventing observation of a difference in 
RNT between conditions.  
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A third explanation is that the study utilised a non-clinical sample who did not 
report high levels of trait RNT or elevated level of symptoms of depression and 
anxiety (see Table 5.1). In clinical samples, it is possible that higher levels of RNT 
would be observed in response to the tasks in this experiment.   
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5.9. Appendix C: Normality Statistics Pre- and Post-Data Transformations 
Study 4 reported the use of square root transformed data due to the data, as 
expressed in its original form, not being normally distributed. Due to the nature of the 
variables being measured (e.g., depression score), one would not expect to observe a 
normal distribution. Whilst the square root transformations do not completely rectify 
the skewness and kurtosis within the data (i.e., Shapiro-Wilk and Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests still give significant values post-transformation), transformation does 
substantially improve the normality of the distributions. To demonstrate this, Table 
4.4 displays skew and kurtosis statistics for all variables pre- and post-transformation. 
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Table 5.5. Study 4 skew and kurtosis statistics pre- and post-square root 
transformation 
Measure  
Pre-Transformation Post-Transformation 
Skew Kurtosis Skew Kurtosis 
RSQ-RRS .29  -.57  .02  -.84  
PSWQ -.28  .04 -.71  .55 
PHQ-9 1.81 3.79  .14  -.01 
STAI -.14  -.77  -.42  -.57 
Why Ruminate -.26 -.14  -.57  .15 
Time 1 State RNT 1.09  .15  .25  -1.31 
Time 2 State RNT 1.24 .59  .43  -1.15 
T3 State RNT 2.77  10.66  .67  .34 
Time 1 Sadness .68 .00  -.30  .65 
Time 2 Sadness .42  -.64  -.67  1.03 
Time 3 Sadness -.00  -.79  -.87  1.01 
Time 1 Anxiety .10  -.74 -.98  1.26  
Time 2 Anxiety .01 -.51 -1.20  1.81  
Time 3 Anxiety -.38 -.34 -1.61  3.11  
 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PSWQ: Penn State 
Worry Questionnaire; PHQ-9: Patient Health Questionnaire; STAI: State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (state 
subscale).  
 
 
  
    274 
5.10. Appendix D: Examining Participants’ Perceptions of the Aim of the Study 
In order to assess whether demand effects could have influenced the observed 
responses, immediately after the experiment, participants were asked to respond to the 
following open-ended question: “What do you think the overall purpose of this study 
might be?” 
Of the 60 participants tested, 15 participants correctly guessed that the 
anagram component of the task involved investigating responses to a challenging task. 
A sample of these responses are given below: 
• “Anagram was some kind of manipulation to ruminate or induce a particular 
state. The breathing exercise was to assess my rumination levels or areas of 
focus. It measured my rumination and reactivity levels to problem solving.” 
• “Something to do with the effect of particular tasks (anagram/discussing 
difficult times in one’s life and talking it through in retrospect) has on our 
thought processes” 
• “To study how I reflect on a problem I cannot solve.” 
• “To look at how people respond to difficult problems and how those problems 
are then thought about for a time after.” 
 
A total of 3 participants guessed that the experiment had something to do with 
attitudes or beliefs about RNT:  
• “Testing beliefs about rumination and ability to control it.” 
• “See the positives behind rumination, which is often seen as a negative thing.” 
• “Whether people dwell on problems and whether they think this is helpful and 
why.” 
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However, no participants identified the true aim of the study, and critically, no 
participants indicated that they were aware of the experimental manipulation of 
appraisals of RNT, or indicated an awareness of the different experimental conditions. 
As such, it is unlikely that demand effects can account for the observed difference 
between experimental conditions.  
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CHAPTER 6:  Study 5 - Investigating the Reinforcing Functions of Depressive 
Rumination 
6.1. Preface 
This chapter describes an experimental study examining the effects of a 
processing mode manipulation (abstract rumination versus concrete thinking) on a 
range of outcomes that may potentially reinforce rumination. A paper reporting this 
study is currently under review: 
Kingston, R. E. F., Watkins, E. R., & Nolen-Hoeksema, S. (under review). 
Investigating the reinforcing functions of depressive rumination.  
Study 2 in Chapter 3 demonstrated that beliefs about RNT increasing 
instrumental understanding prospectively predicted maintenance of RNT. Study 4 
reported in Chapter 5 demonstrated that experimentally manipulating these appraisals 
causally influenced the level of state RNT. Therefore, there is convergent evidence 
indicating that beliefs that RNT increases understanding influences level of RNT. 
However, it remains unresolved as to whether these beliefs are accurate or not, that is, 
whether RNT actually increases insightfulness. 
Therefore, this study aimed to examine whether rumination has consequences 
that may maintain and potentially reinforce the ruminative process. Specifically, the 
study examined whether rumination increases sense of insightfulness and 
confidence/control (cf. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & Baracaia, 
2001), and whether it affords justification for avoidance (cf. Ferster, 1973; Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008). Referring back to the theoretical model presented in Chapter 
1 (Figure 1.1), these potentially reinforcing outcomes of rumination have not been 
illustrated because the model depicts temporally preceding causes, rather than 
consequences of RNT. Considering where these factors would fit in such a model, it 
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is hypothesised that they might follow rumination, but also lead to further rumination, 
such that in the model there would be a pathway from rumination to these outcomes, 
and a pathway from these outcomes to rumination. The study reported in this chapter 
intends to test the first of those pathways (i.e., whether rumination leads to these 
outcomes).  
This study will focus on rumination as a specific exemplar of RNT for three 
reasons. First, focusing on rumination affords better experimental parsimony and 
simplicity, and it allows for adaptation of existing paradigms. Most manipulations 
have tended to focus on either rumination or worry, rather than both, and so in order 
to manipulate both together, it would have been necessary to use a completely novel 
and unvalidated task. By focusing solely on rumination, as an exemplar of RNT, 
allows the use or adaptation of well-validated approaches. However, it is worth noting 
that whilst the manipulation focused on manipulating rumination rather than RNT, as 
rumination is an exemplar of RNT, the manipulation did involve manipulating 
processes common to other forms of RNT, including worry.  
 Second, focusing on manipulating rumination alone afforded better 
experimental control and homogeneity within the manipulation task itself, since the 
manipulation could be highly focused and controlled so as to minimise the 
introduction of potential confounds. Third, the range of potential outcomes of 
rumination and worry suggested by the theoretical literature is very broad, and as such, 
to include measures of all of these potential outcomes for rumination and worry in a 
single design could be overly complex and lead to difficulties with participant burden. 
For example, additional potential outcomes of worry that are not measured in the 
current study include worry as a form of coping preparation, and worry as a 
motivating device (Borkovec, 1994). By restricting the paradigm to examination of 
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rumination and its consequences, fewer outcomes need to be measured, this creating a 
less complex and burdensome experimental design. 
Considering the theoretical background and what outcomes rumination might 
have that could potentially reinforce its use, there are two main themes that arise from 
the literature: First, that rumination increases sense of insightfulness, and second, that 
rumination affords avoidance. The notion that rumination may increase sense of 
insightfulness has been suggested by a number of researchers (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001), who have hypothesised that ruminators 
believe that this sort of thinking helps them to gain insight and understanding into the 
meanings of feelings and problems, and give them a better sense of why things 
happen. A parallel and potentially complementary account is that ruminating may 
give people justification for avoiding taking action with threatening situations 
(Martell et al., 2001; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008): Whilst rumination itself may be 
experienced as aversive, individuals may be motivated to engage in rumination if it 
allows them to develop justifications for avoiding taking action with something even 
more aversive. As such, it was necessary to develop a paradigm for the current study 
that would explore these hypotheses relating to insightfulness and avoidance.  
The study reported in the following paper describes a paradigm that was 
specifically developed for this experiment. An overview of the experimental structure 
is as follows. First, participants were exposed to a threatening situation typical of 
those that people may ruminate about (in this case, having to be assertive with a close 
person about a difficult issue). Then, participants were randomly allocated to think in 
detail about the threatening situation either in a manner analogous to depressive 
rumination (abstract rumination), or in a manner phenomenologically inconsistent 
with rumination (concrete thinking) (Watkins et al., 2008). A range of outcomes 
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relating to the insightfulness and avoidance hypotheses were measured, to assess the 
impact of abstract rumination versus concrete thinking. Specifically, measures were 
taken on multiple occasions to assess sense of insightfulness, sense of 
confidence/control, justification for avoidance, self-efficacy relating to addressing the 
feared situation, and anxiety.   
For the first portion of the experiment, it was necessary to develop a task that 
involved focusing on a situation that had ecological validity for rumination, such that 
the situation would be typical of experiences that are ruminated about. The task also 
needed to be meaningful and motivating for the potential functions under test to be 
used (e.g., participants would not need to use rumination for avoidance if there was 
nothing sufficiently aversive to avoid). However, in order for participants to be able to 
complete the experimental tasks successfully, the problem also needed to be one that 
would be commonly encountered, such that all participants would be able to think of a 
relevant example of that sort of problem with relative ease. 
In an attempt to fulfil these criteria, the task developed for the experiment 
involved participants having to focus on being assertive with a close person about an 
interpersonal difficulty or conflict (i.e., wanting to confront somebody about 
something that they had or hadn’t done). For many people, the idea of confrontation 
and being assertive about a difficult interpersonal problem can be quite uncomfortable 
and provoke anxiety, and as such, this would be a context in which it would be 
meaningful to want to avoid taking action, affording examination of the avoidance 
hypothesis.   
It was also necessary to create a task that manipulated processing mode, such 
that participants were either exposed to an experimental analogue of rumination about 
threat, or were made to think in detail about the threatening problem in a way 
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uncharacteristic of rumination. Comparing rumination with an appropriate thinking 
control meant that it was possible to establish whether any observed effects were due 
to the ruminative qualities of the thinking, whereas studies that have used non-
thinking control groups (e.g., rumination versus distraction) cannot rule out that any 
observed effects are simply due to thinking versus not thinking about a problem (e.g., 
Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 2001). To ensure that the abstract rumination 
condition was analogous to depressive rumination, participants were asked “why”-
type questions that explored the meanings and implications of the problem, which 
would also be relevant to the outcomes under test (i.e., it would be expected to 
increase insight and understanding, because the focus of the thinking is on exploring 
the meanings of the issue). As with Study 4 (Chapter 5), an interview format was 
selected for the manipulation, such that it was possible to ensure that all participants 
were responding to questions and considering the assertiveness issue in the 
appropriate processing mode for their condition, as well as ensuring that participants 
elaborated in response to the manipulation questions to approximately the same extent.  
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Investigating the Reinforcing Functions of Depressive Rumination 
Rosemary E. F. Kingston, Edward R. Watkins, and Susan Nolen-Hoeksema 
Psychology, College of Life and Environmental Sciences, 
University of Exeter, UK, EX4 4QG 
6.2. Abstract 
It remains unresolved why people keep ruminating even though it confers 
vulnerability to depression. It has been hypothesised that rumination is reinforced by 
(i) increasing insight and understanding into difficulties and/or (ii) providing a 
rationale for avoiding taking action, thereby avoiding aversive situations. To test this, 
we used an experimental analogue to rumination about threat: Participants were 
confronted with being assertive about a difficult interpersonal issue, and randomly 
allocated to repetitively think about this in an abstract style characteristic of 
depressive rumination (“Why?”) or a concrete style inconsistent with depressive 
rumination (“How?”). Relative to abstract rumination, concrete thinking significantly 
enhanced sense of confidence, control, and assertiveness self-efficacy, but not insight 
and understanding. In contrast, rumination increased justification for avoidance 
relative to concrete thinking. These findings suggest that rumination does not increase 
insight relative to other problem-focused thinking, but it may be reinforced by 
providing evidence that supports inactivity and avoidance.  
6.3. Introduction 
Depressive rumination refers to a passive and repetitive way of responding to 
low mood, which involves focusing on feelings of distress and the possible causes and 
consequences of those feelings (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). 
Depressive rumination has robustly been found to contribute to the development and 
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maintenance of depression and anxiety disorders (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008; 
Watkins, 2008), indicating the importance of understanding its underlying processes, 
and identifying which factors contribute to individual differences in rumination. One 
potential paradox is that a subset of individuals (high ruminators) continues to 
ruminate frequently and persistently, despite its negative consequences. A key 
question in understanding its underlying mechanisms is therefore: “What makes it so 
difficult to break free of rumination once it has begun?” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008, p. 418). 
One hypothesis is that rumination may have functions that lead to outcomes 
that reinforce its further use. Rumination may be maintained for two reasons: (i) 
because of its perceived functions (i.e., conscious beliefs that it is helpful, which may 
be accurate or inaccurate), and/or (ii) because of actual reinforcement and procedural 
learning. 
There is some evidence supporting the notion that rumination may be 
maintained because of its perceived beneficial functions. People report beliefs that 
rumination helps them to gain insight into the meanings of their feelings and problems, 
and discern the reasons why things happen to them (Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; 
Kingston, Watkins, & O’Mahen, 2013a). However, only one study has examined the 
effects of experimentally manipulating rumination on subjective sense of insight and 
understanding. Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) found that relative to a 
distraction induction, dysphoric and nondysphoric participants undergoing a 
rumination induction rated themselves as more insightful. Based on this finding, 
Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993, p.347) hypothesised that “the perception 
that one possesses insight (and not actual insight per se) may lead some dysphorics to 
continue ruminating” (p. 347).  
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However, this study was limited in that it did not examine the effect of 
rumination on a real-world problem. Furthermore, perceived insight was only 
assessed post-manipulation, so it was not possible to examine the change in perceived 
insightfulness resulting from rumination. Critically, this study only compared 
rumination to distraction, such that thinking about the self, feelings and problems (i.e., 
rumination) was compared with not thinking about feelings and problems. As such, it 
cannot be concluded that any observed differential effects are specific to rumination 
rather than the general benefit of thinking about and focusing on the problem, versus 
not thinking about the problem. 
One goal of the current study was to provide a more robust test of this insight 
hypothesis, by examining whether rumination specifically enhances feelings of 
insight relative to other ways of thinking about problems, as opposed to distraction. 
To address this, the current study ensured that all participants thought in detail about a 
personal problem, but with one condition thinking in a style analogous to depressive 
rumination (abstract processing), whereas the other condition involved thinking in a 
style phenomenologically inconsistent with rumination (concrete processing, see 
Watkins, 2008; Watkins, Moberly, & Moulds, 2008). Depressive rumination is 
characterised by abstract and evaluative processing, focused on analysing the causes, 
meanings, and implications of feelings and negative events (Watkins, 2008). In 
contrast, concrete thinking refers to a mode of processing which is experiential and 
focused on the contextual and specific details of a situation, which is uncharacteristic 
of naturally occurring depressive rumination, and found to have distinct constructive 
effects in contrast to rumination in experimental studies (Watkins, 2008; Watkins et 
al., 2008). Since both groups were matched for thinking about problems, any 
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observed effects cannot be explained by the effect of thinking versus not thinking 
about a problem.  
A parallel account is that rumination is negatively reinforced because it is a 
passive behaviour that allows individuals to avoid directly engaging with their 
aversive environment (Ferster, 1973). Martell, Addis, and Jacobson (2001, p. 121) 
hypothesise that “although the rumination may be experienced as aversive to the 
individual, it is possible that it is maintained by the avoidance of even more aversive 
conditions”. Correlational evidence for this relationship comes from Giorgio et al. 
(2010), who found that trait rumination was significantly correlated with greater self-
reported avoidance. Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008, p. 408) hypothesised that 
“rumination is reinforced by the reductions in distress that come from withdrawing 
from aversive situations, from being relieved of responsibility, and from a sense of 
certainty about one’s conclusions”. Hence, rumination may be maintained by acting 
as a means of avoiding aversive situations and responsibility. More specifically, 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008, p. 407) hypothesised that “rumination serves to build a 
case that the individual is facing a hopelessly uncontrollable situation and so he or she 
is not able to take action to overcome the situation”. If this avoidance hypothesis is 
correct, rumination would be predicted to increase the generation of reasons for not 
taking action and lead to negative predictions about the effectiveness of action, 
thereby reducing the likelihood of engaging in personally challenging or threatening 
behaviours. More speculatively, it may potentially avoid the increases in anxiety 
associated with such behaviours.  
Previous attempts to examine the putative avoidant functions of rumination 
(e.g., Giorgio et al., 2010) did not involve exposing participants to a challenging or 
threatening situation, which would afford the opportunity or necessity to avoid. In the 
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absence of a situation that may motivate individuals towards avoidance, it is difficult 
to assess whether any behaviour functions as avoidance. To address this, the current 
study exposed participants to a potentially threatening situation, typical of those that 
trigger rumination: having to be assertive about an interpersonal problem. This 
approach therefore tested whether abstract rumination afforded more justification for 
avoiding assertiveness relative to concrete thinking. 
If the insight hypothesis is correct, then participants in the abstract condition 
(analogous to depressive rumination) will report greater sense of understanding and 
insight relative to those in the concrete thinking condition. If the insight hypothesis is 
correct, we predict that this enhanced sense of insightfulness would also lead to 
greater sense of confidence and control for participants in the abstract rumination 
condition relative to those in the concrete thinking condition. In contrast, the 
processing mode theory (Watkins, 2008), which hypothesises that adopting concrete 
processing of difficulties is more constructive than abstract processing, predicts that 
sense of confidence and control will be greater for participants in the concrete 
condition relative to the abstract condition. 
If the avoidance hypothesis is correct, then participants in the abstract 
rumination condition are predicted to (a) generate more justifications for avoidance 
and (b) report less assertiveness self-efficacy, relative to participants in the concrete 
thinking condition. We also explored whether abstract rumination may also make the 
problem seem less proximal and thus reduce the activation of anxiety associated with 
confronting a problem, relative to concrete thinking.  
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6.4. Method 
6.4.1. Design 
This was an experimental study with participants randomly allocated to one of 
two conditions: Abstract Rumination versus Concrete Thinking, manipulating the 
independent variable (IV) of processing mode. The five dependent variables (DVs) 
were: (i) sense of understanding and insight, (ii) sense of confidence and control, (iii) 
assertiveness self-efficacy, (iv) justification for avoidance, and (v) state anxiety. 
6.4.2. Participants 
The sample consisted of 95 undergraduate students (84.2% female; age range 
18 – 42, M = 20.17, SD = 4.40; 91.58% identified as White; 4.26% identified as 
Asian; 4.21% identified as Mixed Ethnicity).  
6.4.3. Tasks 
6.4.3.1. Exposure to threatening situation: Confrontation with 
assertiveness task. 
Participants were asked to identify and describe an issue that they wanted to 
be assertive about with someone close to them. The issue had to be unresolved, 
personally significant rather than trivial, and something not previously raised. To 
ensure a clear focus on the assertiveness issue and to make the idea of confronting the 
issue seem more real and threatening, participants were told to focus on what they 
would like to express to the close person, in order to make them more ready to be 
assertive. They were left alone in the room to do this for two minutes. 
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6.4.3.2. Manipulation of processing mode: Abstract rumination / concrete 
thinking interview. 
Processing mode was manipulated by means of a detailed structured interview 
about the assertiveness issue. We adopted an interview method so that the 
experimenter could ensure that participants were using the appropriate processing 
mode for their condition. Participants in the Abstract Rumination condition, designed 
to be an analogue of depressive rumination, were interviewed with questions that 
were abstract and focused on the “why” of the situation, with a focus on the meanings, 
causes, and implications of the issue (e.g., “why is this issue important to you?”, 
“what consequences does this issue have on your relationship with this close 
person?”). Participants in the Concrete Thinking condition, designed to be 
uncharacteristic of depressive rumination, were interviewed with questions that were 
focused on the contextual, sensory, and sequential details of “how” the situation may 
occur (e.g., “what exactly do you want to say?”, “where will you discuss this?”). Each 
interview contained seven questions delivered in the same order for all participants. 
Participants were asked to try and spend approximately one minute responding to 
each question. If answers were brief or unelaborated, set prompts were used (e.g., 
“can you tell me more about that?”). Critically, both sets of interviews equally 
focused on the assertiveness concern and did not differ in emotional content. 
6.4.4. Measures 
Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS, 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). The RSQ-RRS is a 22-item questionnaire that 
assesses ruminative responses focused on the self, symptoms, and possible causes and 
consequences of low mood. Total scores range from 22-88, with higher scores 
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indicating greater trait rumination. It has acceptable convergent validity and high 
internal consistency (α = .89; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991). 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9, Kroenke, Spitzer, & Williams, 2001). 
The PHQ-9 is a nine-item measure designed to assess the severity of depression 
symptoms over the past two weeks. Scores range from 0 to 27, with greater scores 
indicating more severe symptoms of depression. It has good internal consistency and 
construct validity (Kroenke et al., 2001). 
Sense of understanding and insight. A 16-item measure was created for this 
study, adapted from Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993), to assess current 
perceived understanding and insight (e.g., “Right now, how much do you understand 
yourself?”, “Right now, how much insight do you have into other people?”). 
Responses for each item were given on a scale from 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 
5 (“Very strongly”). A mean score was calculated, with scores ranging from 1 to 5, 
with higher scores indicating a greater sense of understanding and insight. Internal 
consistency was good (α = .86).  
Sense of confidence and control.  A 9-item measure was created for this study 
to assess current perceived control and confidence (e.g., “Right now, how much do 
you feel that you are in control of your life?”, “Right now, how confident do you feel 
about your ability to handle your personal problems?”). Responses for each item were 
given on a scale from 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“Very strongly”). A mean 
score was calculated, with scores ranging from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating a 
greater sense of confidence and control. Internal consistency was good (α = .82).  
Assertiveness self-efficacy. A 6-item measure was created to assess 
participants’ self-efficacy regarding being assertive (e.g., “Right now, how confident 
are you that it would go well if you were to be assertive?”, “Right now, how risky 
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does being assertive feel to you?”). Responses for each item were given on a scale 
from 1 (“Very slightly or not at all”) to 5 (“Very strongly”). A mean score was 
calculated, with scores ranging from 1 to 5, with higher scores indicating greater 
assertiveness self-efficacy. Internal consistency was acceptable (α = .77).  
State anxiety. State anxiety was assessed by using the 4 items from the 
“activated unpleasant” subscale of the Circumplex Measure of Affect (Larsen & 
Diener, 1992; Russell, 1980). The whole measure was delivered so as to conceal our 
interest in the anxiety items. A mean score was calculated, with scores ranging from 1 
to 5, with higher scores indicating greater trait anxiety. Internal consistency in our 
sample for this scale was acceptable (α = .76). 
Justification for avoidance. Degree of justification for avoidance was assessed 
by coding of interview transcripts by a rater blind to participant condition. A coding 
scheme was developed for the current study where three types of avoidance were 
coded: (i) avoidance because of perceived lack of control (i.e., avoiding the issue 
because of a perceived certainty that efforts will be fruitless, that individual has no 
control over the problem, and that nothing he/she could do would work); (ii) 
avoidance because of a reduced sense of responsibility (i.e., avoiding the issue 
because of a perception that he/she is not responsible for the situation itself or for 
resolving the situation), and (iii) avoidance because of a wish to avoid distress (i.e., 
avoiding the issue because he/she wants to avoid a negative, unpleasant or 
uncomfortable outcome, either in terms of his/her own emotions or the emotions of 
others). Each of these three dimensions were rated on a scale ranging from 1 (“not 
demonstrated at all”) to 4 (“demonstrated a lot”), giving each participant three scores 
for avoidance, with higher scores indicating greater justification for avoidance. Inter-
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rater reliability between two raters for 10% of the items was moderate to good (mean 
Cohen’s kappa = .67). 
Interview coding of abstract / concreteness. Interview transcripts were coded 
by a rater blind to the aims of the experiment and the participant condition, as a means 
of assessing whether the manipulation was successful (i.e., whether participants in the 
Abstract Rumination condition were more abstract than those in the Concrete 
Thinking condition). Ratings were made using the abstract and concreteness rating 
scale outlined in Stöber and Borkovec (2002), which comprises a 5-point scale: 1 
(abstract, defined as “indistinct, cross-situational, equivocal, unclear, aggregated”), 2 
(somewhat abstract), 3 (neither-nor), 4 (somewhat concrete), 5 (concrete, defined as 
“distinct, situationally specific, unequivocal, clear, singular”). Inter-rater reliability 
was moderate to good (mean Cohen’s kappa = .61). 
Importance of understanding and insight. Two single-item measures were 
created for the current study to assess the perceived importance of having insight into 
the self and others (“How important to you is it to understand and have insight into 
yourself?”, “How important to you is it to understand and have insight into other 
people?”). Responses to each item were made on a scale from 1 (“Not at all”) to 10 
(“Extremely”).  
6.4.5. Procedure 
Prior to the experiment, participants completed the RSQ-RRS and PHQ-9 
online. The experiment comprised three phases. In Phase 1, participants were given a 
false cover story stating that the study was examining assertiveness and whether 
certain ways of thinking about interpersonal problems can encourage assertiveness. 
They were told that they would be asked to identify an important current interpersonal 
problem that they wanted to be assertive about, and that they would be followed up in 
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two weeks to see if they had been assertive, and were further told, “whilst you are free 
to decide what to do, we are very keen for you to try and be assertive about this issue, 
and would strongly encourage you to speak to the other person about your concern”. 
Participants then completed the importance of understanding and insight measure, as 
well as a battery of state measures (Baseline) comprising sense of understanding and 
insight, sense of confidence and control, assertiveness self-efficacy, and state anxiety.  
Next, participants were exposed to the threatening situation by completing the 
confrontation with assertiveness task. Afterwards, participants completed the battery 
of state measures again (Post-Threat).  
In Phase 2, processing mode was manipulated by giving participants either the 
Abstract Rumination or the Concrete Thinking interview, which was audio recorded.  
In Phase 3, participants completed the battery of state questionnaires for a 
third time (Post-Manipulation). Participants were debriefed and told that they would 
not be followed up after the session to check whether they had been assertive. 
6.5. Results 
6.5.1. Preliminary Analyses  
No outliers were detected in the sample on any variables, and thus all 
participants’ data were retained. Moreover, no problematic multicollinearity was 
detected in the sample after examining VIF and tolerance statistics (no tolerance 
values were less than .1 and no VIF values were greater than 10; Myers, 1990). 
Independent samples t tests revealed that there were no differences between the 
conditions on any of the baseline measures of rumination (t(93) = -.20, p = .839), 
depression (t(93) = -.10, p = .918), understanding and insight (t(93) = -.60, p = .551), 
confidence and control (t(93) = -.49, p = .626), assertiveness self-efficacy (t(93) = .19, 
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p = .850), and state anxiety (t(93) = .65, p = .515); see Table 6.1 for means and 
standard deviations. 
6.5.1.1. Interview manipulation check. 
A t test was conducted to see whether the two conditions differed on level of 
concreteness. There was a significant difference between the groups, indicating that 
the manipulation was successful, as interview responses from participants in the 
abstract rumination condition were rated as more abstract (M = 2.39, SD = .34) than 
those in the concrete thinking condition (M = 2.81, SD = .29), t(93) = 6.397, p < .001).
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Table 6.1. Means (and standard deviations) for the dependent variables across time and condition 
 Abstract Rumination (n = 48) Concrete Thinking (n = 47) 
 Baseline Post-Threat Post-Manipulation Baseline Post-Threat Post-Manipulation 
RRS-RSQ 37.98 (10.15)   37.53 (11.23)   
PHQ-9 3.90 (2.95)   3.83 (3.28)   
Sense of Understanding and Insight 3.24 (.50) 3.21 (.61) 3.37 (.60) 3.18 (.47) 3.17 (.46) 3.45 (.48) 
Sense of Confidence and Control 3.15 (.54) 3.14 (.63) 3.21 (.64) 3.09 (.57) 3.08 (.65) 3.43 (.61) 
Assertiveness Self-Efficacy 2.92 (.68) 2.97 (.72) 3.17 (.73) 2.95 (.69) 2.93 (.71) 3.45 (.61) 
State anxiety 1.72 (.60) 2.09 (.72) 1.84 (.75) 1.81 (.74) 2.04 (.83) 1.79 (.83) 
Avoidance: No Control   1.73 (.84)   1.17 (.48) 
Avoidance: Not Responsible   1.42 (.08)   1.13 (.05) 
Avoidance: Avoid Distress   2.17 (.12)   1.11 (.05) 
Note. RSQ-RRS: Response Styles Questionnaire – Ruminative Response Scale; PHQ-9 = Patient Health Questionnaire. 
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6.5.2. Main Analyses 
In order to examine the differential effects of rumination versus concrete 
thinking on our dependent variables of interest, a series of two-way repeated measures 
Analyses of Variance (ANOVAs) and independent samples t tests were conducted 
(see Table 6.1 for means and standard deviations).  
6.5.2.1. Post-threat analyses. 
We did not expect any differential effect of exposing participants to the 
assertiveness threat prior to the manipulations of rumination versus concrete 
processing. We conducted 2 (Condition: Abstract Rumination versus Concrete 
Thinking) by 2 (Time: Baseline versus Post-Threat) ANOVAs respectively on the 
dependent variables of understanding and insight, confidence and control, 
assertiveness self-efficacy, and anxiety. There was a main effect of Time on anxiety 
(F(1, 93) = 29.06, p < .001): all participants became more anxious after exposure to 
the threatening situation. There were no other main effects of Time (F range .06 – .23, 
p range .63 - .81), and as predicted, there were no main effects of Condition (F 
range .01 – .26, p range .61 - .94) or interaction effects of Time X Condition (F 
range .00 – 1.66, p range .20 - .96) on any of the dependent variables (see Table 6.1). 
6.5.2.2. Post-manipulation analyses. 
Further ANOVAs were conducted to examine the effect of Condition 
(Abstract Rumination versus Concrete Thinking) and Time (Post-Threat to Post-
Manipulation) on the dependent variables identified above.  There was a main effect 
of Time (F(1, 93) = 35.25, p < .001) on understanding and insight: All participants 
reported a greater sense of understanding and insight after the manipulation. However, 
there was no main effect of Condition (F(1, 93) = .05, p = .833) or interaction of Time 
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X Condition (F(1, 93) = 2.52, p = .116) on understanding and insight, inconsistent 
with the insight hypothesis: Participants in the Abstract Rumination condition did not 
have a greater increase in understanding and insight than participants in the Concrete 
Thinking condition (see Table 6.1). 
There was a significant main effect of Time (F(1, 93) = 26.52, p < .001) but 
not Condition (F(1, 93) = .426, p = .516) on sense of confidence and control, which 
was secondary to a significant interaction effect of Time X Condition (F(1, 93) = 
11.67, p = .001): participants in the Concrete Thinking condition reported a 
significantly greater increase in sense of confidence and control relative to 
participants in the Abstract Rumination condition (see Table 6.1).   
Consistent with the avoidance hypothesis, there was a significant effect of 
Time (F(1, 93) = 40.41, p < .001) but not Condition (F(1, 93) = .826, p = .366) on 
assertiveness self-efficacy, which was secondary to a significant interaction effect of 
Time X Condition (F (1, 93) = 1.30, p = .005): Participants in the Abstract 
Rumination condition reported less increase in assertiveness self-efficacy after the 
manipulation relative to participants in the Concrete Thinking condition (see Table 
6.1).  
There was a main effect of Time (F(1, 93) = 21.96, p < .001) on state anxiety: 
All participants became less anxious after the manipulation. However, there was no 
main effect of Condition (F(1, 93) = .113, p = .737) or interaction of Time X 
Condition (F(1, 93) = .00, p = 1.00) on anxiety: Participants in the Abstract 
Rumination condition did not show a greater decrease in anxiety relative to 
participants in the Concrete Thinking condition. 
Three independent samples t tests were conducted to examine the effect of 
condition on the three types of justification for avoidance. Consistent with the 
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avoidance hypothesis, participants in the Abstract Rumination condition were 
significantly more likely than those in the Concrete Thinking condition to report that 
they were avoiding assertiveness because they perceived that they had no control over 
outcomes (t(93) = -4.00, p < .001), that they were not responsible for resolving the 
situation (t(93) = -2.97, p = .004), and because they wanted to avoid distress (t(93) = -
8.41, p < .001). Abstract Rumination therefore afforded more justification for 
avoiding a threatening situation relative to Concrete Thinking about being assertive 
(see Table 6.1). 
6.5.2.3. Relationship with trait rumination. 
To investigate whether these findings were consistent across different levels of 
trait rumination (e.g., do high ruminators find abstract rumination more useful than 
low ruminators?), a series of four hierarchical multiple regression analyses were 
conducted, with the dependent variable measured at Post-Manipulation, and the 
dependent variable at Post-Threat entered at Step 1, trait rumination at Step 2, 
Condition at Step 3, and Condition X trait rumination interaction at Step 4. There was 
no significant effect of Condition X trait rumination in any of the analyses (β range = 
-.04 to -.09, p range = .336 to .655), indicating that the observed effects are consistent 
across the whole spectrum of trait rumination.  
Lastly, we examined whether our sample replicated previous findings that 
rumination is seen to be helpful and important by individuals high on trait rumination 
(Watkins & Baracaia, 2001). Consistent with previous research, there was a positive 
correlation between trait rumination and participants reporting that it is important to 
have insight into the self (r(93) = .263, p = .010) and other people (r(93) = .238, p 
= .020). There was also a negative correlation between trait rumination and baseline 
sense of understanding and insight (r(93) = -.327, p = .001). As such, participants 
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high on trait rumination believed that it was more important to be insightful, but at the 
same time, reported feeling less insightful than those lower on trait rumination.  
6.6. Discussion 
Because individuals persist in rumination despite it being detrimental to 
wellbeing, the current study sought to understand why people continue to ruminate, 
by assessing whether rumination has any beneficial outcomes that might be 
reinforcing. One hypothesis was that depressive rumination, by focusing on meanings 
and implications, increases sense of insight into problems (the insight hypothesis). 
Another hypothesis is that rumination serves as a form of avoidance by allowing 
people to generate reasons for not taking action (the avoidance hypothesis). To test 
these hypotheses, we conducted the first experimental study to compare rumination 
focusing on meanings and implications versus thinking focused on concrete behaviour 
in the context of a situation that afforded avoidance – being confronted with being 
assertive. 
Inconsistent with the insight hypothesis, abstract rumination, analogous to 
depressive rumination, about a challenging assertiveness concern did not differ from 
concrete thinking in terms of increasing sense of understanding and insight. Moreover, 
concrete thinking led to an increased sense of confidence and control relative to 
abstract rumination, at odds with the insight hypothesis, but consistent with 
processing mode theory (Watkins, 2008), which hypotheses that concrete processing 
of difficulties leads to more constructive outcomes than abstract processing. 
However, our results are broadly consistent with the avoidance hypothesis: 
abstract rumination lead to greater justification for avoiding taking action (e.g., 
because of the perception of having no control over the situation), relative to concrete 
thinking. Moreover, abstract rumination lead to significantly less assertiveness self-
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efficacy relative to concrete thinking. However, there were no differences between 
conditions on anxiety, contrary to the speculative prediction that abstract rumination 
may reduce anxiety. Finally, through examining the interaction between condition and 
trait rumination, we found that these effects were maintained at all levels of trait 
rumination. 
Our findings indicate that when applied to a real-world situation and compared 
with an appropriate control matched for thinking about a problem, rumination does 
not differentially increase self-reported insight and understanding. When we used this 
more ecologically valid control and assessed change in sense of insight over time, we 
did not replicate the findings of Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993). We 
interpret this pattern of findings as indicating that rumination does not genuinely lead 
to enhanced feelings of insight, relative to any other form of thinking, even though the 
abstract rumination involved a focus on meanings and implications. We suggest that 
the Lyubomirsky and Nolen-Hoeksema (1993) finding may be a consequence of the 
methodological design that compared thinking versus not thinking (i.e., the process of 
thinking caused the increased sense of insight, rather than ruminative thinking per se). 
Our findings suggest that beliefs that rumination differentially increases insight and 
understanding (e.g., Kingston et al., 2013a; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) are 
misplaced. Despite involving a focus on meanings and implications, depressive 
rumination does not specifically increase sense of insight. We note that there has been 
some debate as to whether rumination leads to actual or perceived insight. For 
example, Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993, (p. 347) noted that “given that 
dysphoric people who ruminate appear to be less successful at interpersonal problem 
solving … rumination may lead to enhanced feelings of insightfulness but to less 
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actual insight”. Our findings suggest that this debate may be moot, as rumination does 
not differentially increase subjective insight relative to an appropriate control. 
We found that rumination was significantly less helpful than concrete thinking 
for sense of confidence and control: Thinking concretely about a difficulty led to 
significantly greater improvements in confidence and control, relative to rumination. 
This is consistent with processing mode theory (Watkins, 2008). Processing mode 
theory has demonstrated the benefits of concrete processing on actual problem-
solving behaviour and emotional reactivity relative to abstract processing (e.g., 
Watkins et al., 2008; Watkins & Moulds, 2005). This study provides confirmatory 
evidence that processing style also has benefits in terms of subjective confidence and 
control.  
Regarding the avoidance hypothesis, our findings suggest that rumination 
provides reasons for avoiding confronting a threatening situation by reducing 
assertiveness self-efficacy, and by affording the accumulation of evidence against 
taking action. However, it is not known whether this avoidance directly reinforces 
rumination. The wider model proposed by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) predicts that 
rumination leads to avoidance by generating reasons not to take action. In turn, this is 
negatively reinforced because it avoids negative emotions, thereby reinforcing and 
maintaining rumination. This study examined the first part of this model by 
demonstrating that rumination gives people reasons not to take action with threatening 
situations, by making negative predictions about the effectiveness of action. Whilst 
this is consistent with the possibility that rumination may have an avoidant function, 
this study did not test the second part of the model relating to reinforcement because 
we did not measure whether avoidance behaviour actually reinforces rumination. 
Whilst the reasons people give for avoiding taking action are likely to be a good 
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proxy for actual avoidance behaviour, the next step is to test the second part of the 
model by manipulating or assessing avoidance post-rumination, and measuring the 
effects on subsequent rumination. This would make it possible to draw conclusions 
about whether rumination is maintained because it is being reinforced.  
We explored whether the abstract processing mode adopted in the rumination 
condition might lead to the assertiveness issue appearing more distal, thus temporarily 
reducing anxiety. However, this was not found. We speculate that the combination of 
avoiding the actual situation (which may reduce anxiety) and dwelling on the 
situation (which may increase anxiety) might result in the effects on overall anxiety 
being balanced out, explaining the observed pattern of findings.   
The study had a number of strengths. To the best of our knowledge, it is the 
first experimental study to examine the consequences of abstract rumination about a 
threatening situation relative to another form of thinking uncharacteristic of 
rumination. Since both conditions involved thinking in detail about the threatening 
issue, it is possible to conclude that any observed differences between conditions are 
due to the mode of thinking (i.e., abstract rumination or concrete thinking), whereas in 
previous studies that have used non-thinking control groups (e.g., distraction), this has 
not been possible. Second, we examined the avoidance hypothesis with reference to 
an example of a threatening situation that each participant might want to avoid. This 
enhanced ecological validity, and also allowed us to examine the consequences of 
rumination in response to a genuinely threatening personal problem, rather than an 
artificial threatening situation created in the laboratory.  
The study had a number of limitations. Since the sample was limited to 
undergraduate students, we cannot be sure that findings would generalise to clinical 
populations. Whilst we did test for an interaction between condition and rumination to 
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check that the effects were present across the whole range of trait rumination scores, it 
is important to conduct this experiment in a clinical sample, to see whether the 
observed effects are maintained. A further limitation is the reliance on self-report 
measures, although we note that certain constructs (e.g., sense of insight, sense of 
confidence) are inherently subjective and require self-report assessment. Moreover, 
with respect to the question of what maintains rumination, subjective sense of insight 
or confidence and control would be potentially sufficient to maintain rumination. 
Nonetheless, future research would benefit from behavioural and observational 
assessments, particularly of avoidance. Lastly, there was a difference between 
conditions on temporal focus, which may act as a potential confound. Specifically, the 
“why” questions in the Abstract Rumination condition were focused on the past, 
present, and future, whereas the “how” questions in the Concrete Thinking condition 
were entirely focused on the future. The sense of having better anticipated and 
considered future events in the latter condition could partially account for the 
observed difference in change in confidence between conditions. 
Whilst it is important to attempt to replicate these findings in participants with 
clinical levels of depression and rumination, these findings have some potential 
clinical implications. First, we demonstrated that metacognitive beliefs that 
rumination increases insightfulness are inaccurate, because rumination did not 
increase understanding and insight relative to concrete thinking. It may be important 
for such beliefs about the utility of rumination to be tackled therapeutically, with 
therapists challenging the accuracy of these beliefs, as a means to reduce motivation 
to engage in rumination. Second, the study demonstrates the advantages of thinking in 
a concrete, rather than abstract ruminative way, when faced with difficulties, since 
concrete thinking lead to a greater sense of confidence, control, and assertiveness self-
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efficacy. Psychoeducation interventions for people at risk for rumination could 
emphasise the advantages of this way of thinking, rather than informing individuals 
not to dwell on problems at all, and to instead think about the situation in a more 
constructive, solution-focused way (see Watkins, Mullan, et al., 2011; Watkins et al.,  
2012).   
In sum, because of rumination’s deleterious outcomes for mood and mental 
health, it is important to have a clearer understanding of the factors that cause people 
to ruminate. This study demonstrates that beliefs about the utility of rumination may 
not be accurate, since it does not have advantageous outcomes relating to 
insightfulness, and confidence and control, relative to other non-ruminative ways of 
thinking about a problem. However, the findings suggest that rumination may have an 
avoidant function as it allows people to generate justifications for not taking action. 
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6.7. Appendix A: Analyses Examining the Effect of a Condition X Rumination 
Interaction on the Outcome Variables 
To examine whether the findings remained consistent across varying levels of 
trait rumination, a series of four regression analyses were conducted to examine the 
effect of a Condition X Rumination interaction term on the outcome variables (see 
Section 6.5.2.3). The interaction term was not a significant predictor of any of the 
outcome variables, indicating that the effect of the experimental manipulation did not 
vary as a result of trait rumination (see Table 6.2, Table 6.3, Table 6.4, and Table 6.5).  
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Table 6.2. Regression analysis examining the effects of Rumination, Condition, and Condition X Rumination on Post-Manipulation 
understanding and insight 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Threat Understanding and Insight .77 .07 .77*** .78 .07 .78*** .78 .07 .78*** .79 .07 .79*** 
Rumination    .00 .00 .06 .00 .00 .06 .01 .01 .11 
Condition       -.11 .07 -.10 -.11 .07 -.10 
Condition X Rumination interaction          -.01 .01 -.07 
R2 .60 .60 .61 .61 
Adjusted R2 .60 .60 .60 .60 
R2 Change .60 .00 .01 .00 
F for change in R2 136.37*** .86 2.49 .55 
 
Note. ***p < .001
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Table 6.3. Regression analysis examining the effects of Rumination, Condition, and Condition X Rumination on Post-Manipulation confidence 
and control 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Threat Confidence and Control .77 .07 .78*** .75 .07 .76 .76 .07 .77*** .78 .07 .79*** 
Rumination    -.00 .00 -.05 -.00 .00 -.04 .00 .01 .06 
Condition       -.27 .08 -.21** -.27 .08 -.21** 
Condition X Rumination interaction          -.01 .01 -.13 
R2 .60 .60 .65 .66 
Adjusted R2 .60 .65 .64 .64 
R2 Change .60 .00 .05 .01 
F for change in R2 140.68*** .50 11.69** 2.44 
 
Note. **p < .01,  ***p < .001
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Table 6.4. Regression analysis examining the effects of Rumination, Condition, and Condition X Rumination on Post-Manipulation assertiveness 
self-efficacy 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Threat Assertiveness Self-Efficacy .63 .08 .66*** .64 .08 .67*** .65 .07 .68*** .66 .08 .68*** 
Rumination    .01 .01 .07 .01 .01 .08 .01 .01 .10 
Condition       -.32 .10 -.23** -.32 .10 -.23** 
Condition X Rumination interaction          -.00 .01 -.04 
R2 .43 .44 .49 .49 
Adjusted R2 .43 .42 .47 .47 
R2 Change .43 .01 .05 .00 
F for change in R2 70.61*** .78 9.62** .12 
 
Note. **p < .01,  ***p < .001
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Table 6.5. Regression analysis examining the effects of Rumination, Condition, and Condition X Rumination on Post-Manipulation anxiety 
Measure 
Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β B SE B β 
Post-Threat Anxiety .80 .07 .78*** .78 .07 .77*** .78 .07 .77*** .78 .07 .76*** 
Rumination    .00 .01 .05 .00 .01 .05 .01 .01 .08 
Condition       .01 .10 .01 .01 .10 .01 
Condition X Rumination interaction          -.00 .01 -.04 
R2 .61 .61 .61 .62 
Adjusted R2 .61 .61 .60 .60 
R2 Change .61 .00 .00 .00 
F for change in R2 146.49*** .53 .01 .20 
 
Note. ***p < .001
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CHAPTER 7: General Discussion 
This final discussion section is organised into five sections. First, the findings 
from the studies reported in this thesis will be reviewed (Section 7.1), followed by a 
discussion of their theoretical and clinical implications (Section 7.2). Then, the 
strengths and limitations of the research will be considered (Section 7.3), which will 
lead into a discussion of the next steps for future research studies (Section 7.4). The 
chapter will finish with a final concluding summary (Section 7.5). 
7.1. Summary of Thesis Findings 
Study 1 (Chapter 2) examined the cross-sectional relationship between a 
variety of putative vulnerability factors and rumination and worry, examined together 
as the transdiagnostic process of RNT. Based on a review of the vulnerability factors 
for RNT (Chapter 1), an integrative theoretical model was developed and tested in a 
large, nonclinical sample of adults. The key predictions and findings are outlined in 
Table 7.1. 
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Table 7.1. Summary of predictions and findings from Study 1 
Predictions Findings 
1. Rumination and worry will form a valid latent variable 
representing RNT. 
Hypothesis supported. A SEM model in which RSQ-RRS and PSWQ 
were used as measured indicators for a latent variable representing RNT 
provided a good fit to the data. 
2. Distal vulnerability factors will be indirectly associated with 
RNT via their relationship with proximal vulnerability factors. 
Hypothesis partially supported. Emotional abuse had an indirect 
association with RNT via perceived function of RT, neuroticism, abstract 
processing, and current distress. Low levels of participant report precluded 
examination of physical/sexual abuse variables. Overcontrolling parenting 
was not indirectly or directly associated with RNT. 
3. Proximal vulnerability factors will be directly associated with 
RNT. 
Hypothesis partially supported. Perceived function of RT was directly 
associated with RNT. Abstract processing was not directly associated with 
RNT, but was indirectly associated with RNT via neuroticism. 
4. Neuroticism will act as an intermediate factor with both proximal 
and distal qualities, and will have both a direct effect on RNT as 
well as an indirect effect on RNT through its effect on beliefs about 
the function of RT and current distress. 
Hypothesis supported.  
5. Current distress will be directly associated with RNT, but 
proximal vulnerability factors will have an association with RNT 
over and above the effects of current distress. 
Hypothesis supported. 
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Study 2 (Chapter 3) examined the prospective relationships between 
rumination and worry, examined together as a common and shared process of RNT, 
and a range of vulnerability factors. Specifically, the study used hierarchical multiple 
regression to examine which factors contributed to change in RNT over 6-8 weeks 
after controlling for symptoms of depression, anxiety, and current stress. The key 
predictions and findings are outlined in Table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2. Summary of predictions and findings from Study 2 
Predictions Findings 
1. Distal factors will not prospectively 
predict change in RNT after controlling 
for symptoms. 
Hypothesis supported. Emotional abuse 
and overcontrolling parenting did not 
predict change in RNT after controlling 
for symptoms of depression, anxiety and 
stress.  Low levels of participant report 
precluded examination of physical/sexual 
abuse variables. 
2. Proximal factors will prospectively 
predict change in RNT after controlling 
for distal factors and symptoms. 
Hypothesis partially supported. 
Neuroticism and the perception that RT 
aids instrumental understanding predicted 
change in RNT after controlling for distal 
factors and symptoms of depression, 
anxiety and stress. Other types of belief 
about RNT (e.g., the belief that RT aids 
self and social control) did not predict 
change in RNT.  
 
Building on the finding from Study 2 that beliefs about RT aiding instrumental 
understanding prospectively predicted change in RNT, Study 3 (Chapter 4) sought to 
examine causality by experimentally manipulating perceived helpfulness of RNT and 
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examining the effect on state RNT. Specifically, participants were randomly allocated 
to a manipulation in which they were either manipulated to appraise RNT as helpful 
for increasing understanding and insight, or appraise RNT as unhelpful and 
unconstructive. They were then exposed to a task that may prompt engagement in 
RNT (a task highlighting self-discrepancy), so that the effect of the manipulation on 
state RNT could be measured. The key predictions and findings are outlined in Table 
7.3. 
 
Table 7.3. Summary of predictions and findings from Study 3 
Predictions Findings 
1. There will be no difference in state 
RNT between conditions (manipulated to 
appraise RNT as helpful vs. unhelpful) 
immediately after the experimental 
manipulation, before the self-discrepancy 
task.  
The experimental manipulation itself did 
not result in a difference between 
conditions on state RNT. 
2. After exposure to the self-discrepancy 
task, state RNT will increase for all 
participants, but participants manipulated 
to appraise RNT as helpful will show a 
greater increase in state RNT than 
participants manipulated to appraise RNT 
as unhelpful. 
Hypothesis not supported. After the self-
discrepancy task, there was no increase in 
state RNT for all participants, and there 
was no difference in change in state RNT 
between conditions.  
 
Building upon Study 3, Study 4 (Chapter 5) aimed to rectify some of the 
methodological issues encountered in Study 3 that could potentially have accounted 
for a failure to observe changes in state RNT. Three changes were made: (i) measures 
of depression and anxiety were taken online rather than immediately before the 
experiment to avoid inducing RNT at baseline; (ii) the appraisal manipulation was 
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switched from written to interview format and participants were asked to only focus 
on resolved problems to minimise emotional arousal and to ensure increased 
homogeneity within responses to the manipulation; and (iii) the task to afford 
engagement in RNT was switched from the self-discrepancy task to an insolvable 
anagram task which may be better at eliciting RNT. As such, Study 4 examined 
whether experimentally manipulating beliefs about the helpfulness of RNT using an 
interview task influenced engagement in state RNT following exposure to a stressful 
insolvable anagram task. The key predictions and findings are outlined in Table 7.4.  
 
Table 7.4. Summary of predictions and findings from Study 4 
Predictions Findings 
1. There will be no difference in state 
RNT between conditions (manipulated to 
appraise RNT as helpful vs. unhelpful) 
immediately after the experimental 
manipulation, before exposure to the 
stressor. 
The experimental manipulation itself did 
not result in a difference between 
conditions on state RNT. 
2. After exposure to the stressor, state 
RNT will increase for all participants, but 
participants manipulated to appraise RNT 
as helpful will show a greater increase in 
state RNT than participants manipulated 
to appraise RNT as unhelpful. 
Hypothesis supported. After the stressor, 
state RNT increased for all participants, 
but participants manipulated to appraise 
RNT as helpful showed a greater increase 
in RNT relative to participants 
manipulated to appraise RNT as 
unhelpful.   
 
Following on from Study 4, which demonstrated that manipulating beliefs 
about the helpfulness of RNT influenced state RNT, Study 5 (Chapter 6) aimed to test 
whether rumination actually has any helpful consequences, such as increasing 
insightfulness, that could potentially reinforce and maintain the ruminative process. In 
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addition to rumination potentially increasing insight, it has also been hypothesised 
that rumination may be maintained because of its avoidance functions (e.g., giving 
individuals justification for avoiding taking action with a feared situation; Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 2008).  
Therefore, Study 5 was an experimental study in which the putative insight 
and avoidance functions of rumination were tested. Participants were exposed to a 
threatening situation – being assertive about a difficult issue with a close person – as a 
means of making the putative functions salient (i.e., participants may want to avoid 
being assertive). Processing mode was then manipulated by making participants think 
in detail about the assertiveness situation in a ruminative or non-ruminative manner. 
This meant that it was possible to examine the consequences of thinking about threat 
in a manner analogous to depressive rumination (abstract rumination), relative to 
thinking in a manner phenomenologically inconsistent with depressive rumination 
(concrete thinking). A range of potentially reinforcing outcomes relating to insight 
and avoidance were measured before and after the processing mode manipulation: 
sense of insightfulness, sense of confidence and control, justification for avoidance, 
assertiveness self-efficacy, and anxiety. The key predictions and findings are outlined 
in Table 7.5.   
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Table 7.5. Summary of predictions and findings from Study 5 
Predictions Findings 
1. There are two alternative predictions 
relating to insightfulness and 
confidence/control arising from opposing 
theoretical models:  
(a) The prediction arising from the insight 
hypothesis is that participants receiving 
an abstract rumination manipulation will 
report a greater sense of insightfulness 
and confidence/control relative to 
participants receiving a concrete thinking 
manipulation. 
(b) The prediction arising from the 
processing mode hypothesis is that 
participants receiving a concrete thinking 
manipulation will report a greater sense 
of confidence and control relative to 
participants receiving an abstract 
rumination manipulation. 
Processing mode hypothesis supported, 
insight hypothesis not supported: 
Rumination did not differ from concrete 
thinking on increasing understanding and 
insight. Concrete thinking lead to a 
greater sense of confidence/control 
relative to rumination.   
2. Participants receiving an abstract 
rumination manipulation will report more 
justification for avoidance and less 
assertiveness self-efficacy relative to 
participants receiving a concrete thinking 
manipulation. 
Hypothesis supported. Rumination led to 
more justification for avoidance and less 
assertiveness-self efficacy than concrete 
thinking.  
3. Participants receiving an abstract 
rumination manipulation will report less 
state anxiety relative to participants 
receiving a concrete thinking 
manipulation. 
Hypothesis not supported. Rumination 
did not differ from concrete thinking in 
its effects on state anxiety.  
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Taking the findings from these studies together, there is convergent evidence 
from cross-sectional, prospective, and experimental studies that the perception that 
RNT is helpful for increasing insight and understanding contributes to maintenance of 
RNT. In contrast, experimental evidence suggests that rumination does not actually 
increase insightfulness, at least relative to alternative ways of thinking in detail about 
a difficulty. However, rumination may be maintained because it allows people to 
generate justifications for avoidance.  
7.2. Theoretical and Clinical Implications 
In the following section, there will be discussion of the implications of the 
findings for theoretical accounts of RNT outlined in the literature review (Chapter 1), 
as well as discussion of the clinical implications arising from this research. 
7.2.1. Implications for the Transdiagnostic Conceptualisation of Repetitive 
Negative Thought 
In Chapter 1 (Section 1.4), the theoretical argument for considering rumination 
and worry together as a transdiagnostic common process of RNT was outlined and 
evidence was presented to justify the transdiagnostic approach. Three primary 
justifications were proposed for the transdiagnostic approach (Ehring & Watkins, 
2008; Harvey et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011): (i) that rumination 
and worry are highly correlated and there is considerable commonality between their 
qualities (e.g., Fresco et al., 2002; Hong, 2007; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Watkins, 
Moulds, & Mackintosh, 2005); (ii) that there is considerable overlap between their 
consequences and the disorders that rumination and worry predict, for example, both 
predict depression and anxiety (e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; 
Ehring & Watkins, 2008; Harvey et al., 2004; Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011; 
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Watkins, 2008); and (iii) that there is considerable theoretical overlap between models 
of rumination and worry.  
With respect to the first justification, Ehring and Watkins (2008) argued that 
whilst rumination and worry may differ in terms of specific content (e.g., rumination 
focused on loss, worry focused on threat), there are four qualities common to the 
processes involved in rumination and worry, as they are both (i) repetitive, (ii) passive 
and/or relatively uncontrollable, (iii) characterised by an abstract style of processing, 
and (iv) focused on negative content. This argument is supported by studies that have 
demonstrated strong associations and little disparity between rumination and worry 
(e.g., Fresco et al., 2002; Hong, 2007; Segerstrom et al., 2000; Watkins et al., 2005).  
Considering the second justification, there is evidence demonstrating that there 
is considerable overlap between the disorders predicted by rumination and worry, and 
evidence that experimental manipulations of worry and rumination both influence 
symptoms of anxiety and depression (e.g., Blagden & Craske, 1996; Calmes & 
Roberts, 2007; Ciesla & Roberts, 2007; Hong, 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2007; 
Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Schwartz & Koenig, 1996; Watkins, 2008; see 
Section 1.4.1.2 for a review). Finally, considering the overlap between theoretical 
models of rumination and worry, in reviewing theoretical accounts, it becomes clear 
that many common mechanisms have been hypothesised to underpin vulnerability 
rumination and worry (see Section 1.4.1.3 for a full review).  
Study 1 (Chapter 2) provides further support for this transdiagnostic 
conceptualisation in which rumination and worry reflect a common process of RNT. 
In Study 1, using SEM, a model in which measured indicators of rumination 
(measured by the RSQ-RRS) and worry (measured by PSWQ) loaded onto a latent 
variable representing RNT provided a good fit to the data. When considering the 
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relationship between the most widely used measures of rumination and worry, they 
provide a good quantitative fit when being considered together as indicators of the 
single latent construct of RNT. One of the advantages of using SEM, rather than just 
examining correlations, is that SEM allows the construction of latent variables. Latent 
variables can thus be examined as unobserved, hypothetical constructs that can 
explain covariation in behaviour, such that they represent an underlying cause of 
multiple observed behaviours (Kline, 1998). Thus, the use of SEM allows for 
examination of whether rumination and worry both represent good indicators of the 
hypothesised underlying construct of RNT. 
 Study 2 also examined rumination and worry together, using a composite 
variable of RNT, and the findings from this study also provide some support for the 
transdiagnostic conceptualisation, with some caveats. There are several reasons as to 
why a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted using a composite variable 
representing RNT (for a full justification of this approach, see Chapter 3, Appendix 
C). In summary, multiple regression afforded the opportunity to enter variables in a 
hierarchical order into the analysis according to their temporal distance to RNT. 
Moreover, the previous analysis in Study 1 demonstrated that a latent variable 
representing RNT gave a good fit to the data, lending support to a theoretically 
identical conceptualisation of an aggregated variable representing both rumination 
and worry. 
In the main analysis using the composite variable of RNT, early experience 
factors (abuse and overcontrolling parenting) and abstract processing styles did not 
predict change in RNT. However, RNT was predicted by neuroticism and the specific 
belief that RT aids instrumental understanding. When repeating these analyses 
examining rumination and worry separately (see Chapter 3, Appendix A), the overall 
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pattern of predictors was similar: neither rumination nor worry were predicted by 
abuse, overcontrolling parenting, or abstract processing styles. However, there were 
some differences relating to neuroticism and beliefs about RT.  Neuroticism was a 
significant prospective predictor of worry and a predictor of rumination at the trend 
level, suggesting that this may be common across worry and rumination. Moreover, 
whilst the belief that RT aids instrumental understanding prospectively predicted 
rumination, this particular belief did not predict worry. Instead, the belief that RT 
reduces past distress had a negative prospective relationship with worry. Since this 
study demonstrated that an identical range of vulnerability factors did not predict 
rumination and worry, this result may reflect the distinction between rumination and 
worry that relates to their content, rather than processes (Ehring & Watkins, 2008). 
Specifically, the transdiagnostic approach to RNT (Ehring & Watkins, 2008) 
emphasises that whilst rumination and worry share common processes, they can differ 
in content (e.g., temporal orientation). Therefore, the differential association of 
particular metacognitive beliefs with worry and rumination may reflect differences in 
RNT content. 
7.2.2. Implications for Metacognitive Models of Repetitive Negative Thought 
Perceived function and metacognitive accounts of RNT propose that RNT can 
be initiated by positive beliefs about its utility (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 
1993; Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Watkins & Baracaia, 2001; Wells, 1995). 
Similarly, the avoidance theory of worry (Borkovec, 1994) proposes that worry is 
reinforced as it can be perceived to have positive consequences (e.g., believing that 
worry affords better coping with future negative events).  
In Study 1 (Chapter 2), using SEM, a latent variable representing a range of 
beliefs about the function of RT (believing that RT aids instrumental understanding; 
    319 
aids self and social control; reduces past distress; and aids motivation, learning and 
problem-solving) remained directly associated with trait RNT after taking into 
account the effects of other powerful predictors, namely neuroticism and current 
distress (symptoms of depression, anxiety, and stress). This is consistent with 
metacognitive models of RNT, and models which emphasise the importance of 
perceptions about the function of RNT (Borkovec, 1994; Papageorgiou & Wells, 
2003; Wells, 1995).  
Moreover, in Study 1, perceived function of RT mediated the relationship 
between neuroticism and RNT, and emotional abuse and RNT. Whilst the SEM model 
utilised correlational data (the causal relationship may occur in the opposite direction 
to what is predicted in the model, or the relationship may be bidirectional), the study 
highlighted the relationship between perceptions of the function of RT and other 
vulnerability factors for RNT. It would be of theoretical interest to explore how 
metacognitive beliefs or beliefs about RT being functional develop and are 
maintained, since such beliefs seem to be powerfully associated with engagement in 
trait RNT. One possibility is that metacognitive beliefs may develop as a result of 
early life experiences: Wells (1995) hypothesised that various developmental 
experiences may result in the development of metacognitive beliefs. Specifically, 
parental modelling of RNT may result in children developing beliefs about its utility, 
and/or the experience of aversive, uncontrollable environments may lead to beliefs 
about RNT buffering against the impact of unexpected negative events. To test these 
hypotheses would require prospective longitudinal studies in children, in which 
parenting behaviours and home environments are assessed alongside measures of 
metacognitive beliefs about RT. 
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Moreover, it is worth exploring the finding that perceived function of RT 
mediated the relationship between neuroticism and RT. One possible explanation for 
this finding is that individuals prone to negative emotional experiences that are 
frequent and intense may be particularly likely to have a strong desire to try to 
understand and make sense of their emotional reactions. Consistent with this is the 
hypothesis that people are motivated towards “meaning-making” in response to 
stressful events (see Park, 2010, for a review and evidence). It is possible that people 
high on trait neuroticism may be particularly likely to view RNT as a potential means 
of gaining understanding and insight into their negative feelings, moods and 
emotional reactions. In contrast, individuals low on trait neuroticism may not have a 
particularly strong desire to understand and make sense of negative feelings if they 
are troubled by them less frequently and less intensely, and therefore they may not 
develop beliefs about the helpfulness of rumination in achieving this.  
In Study 2 (Chapter 3), the specific belief that RT aids instrumental 
understanding prospectively predicted change in RNT after 6-8 weeks, when 
controlling for other vulnerability factors and symptoms of depression, anxiety, and 
stress. Notably, other perceived functions of RT (self and social control, reducing past 
distress, and aiding motivation, learning and problem-solving) did not predict change 
in RNT. This study is therefore strong evidence consistent with a metacognitive 
account as it finds that beliefs about the utility of RT predict future RNT. Moreover, 
this study was the first to demonstrate the potential specificity of beliefs that influence 
change in RNT, since previous theoretical accounts have tended to focus on beliefs 
and perceptions of function more generally (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Wells; 
1995; Borkovec, 1994). If this finding was replicated, there would be implications for 
these accounts of RNT since only certain types of belief or perception may be 
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associated with vulnerability to RNT, and models would need to be revised to take 
into account the specificity of the beliefs. However, this finding is consistent with 
previous research that has demonstrated the association between rumination and 
increased sense of insightfulness (Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993; Watkins 
& Baracaia, 2001).  
The perception that RT aids understanding and insight may be a particularly 
powerful predictor of RNT for two reasons. First, the need to understand and make 
sense of feelings and experiences is an important and common need (e.g., Heine et al., 
2006). Second, people may perceive prolonged dwelling and mental analysis of an 
issue to be the only way of achieving that need. In contrast, other putative functions 
for RNT (such as it helping to reduce feelings of past distress) could be achieved by 
other activities, such as distraction. It would be interesting to explore these hypotheses 
through further studies examining higher-level personal needs, such as the needs for 
understanding and insight, and the various strategies that people employ as a means of 
attempting to meet these needs. For example, one study could involve giving 
participants a list of putative functions for RNT (e.g., to gain understanding and 
insight, to feel in control of one’s life, to make sense of unhappy events, etc.), and 
then ask them to generate lists of strategies that they personally use to try to achieve 
these things (e.g., in response to “how to feel in control of life”, participants might 
generate responses such as “repeatedly think about my problems”, “write lists to help 
me feel more organised”, “talk to friends and ask for advice”, “deal with problems 
immediately rather than putting them off”, etc.).  
To the best of my knowledge, Study 3 and Study 4 reported the first 
experimental tests of the perceived function and metacognitive accounts of RNT, by 
experimentally manipulating perceived helpfulness of RNT at increasing 
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understanding and insight, and examining subsequent engagement in state RNT. Due 
to methodological issues, Study 3 was not able to successfully test this hypothesis, but 
Study 4 provides experimental evidence consistent with this theoretical account. 
Specifically, participants experimentally manipulated to appraise RNT as useful for 
increasing understanding and insight engaged in more state RNT in response to a 
stressor relative to participants manipulated to appraise RNT as unhelpful. This 
experimental evidence builds upon previous correlational and prospective evidence 
(see Chapter 5, Section 5.3 for a summary) by providing causal evidence that 
appraisals of the utility of RNT causally influence engagement in state RNT. 
However, it is important to note that in this study, only the specific appraisal that 
RNT increases sense of understanding and insight (following on from the findings of 
Study 2) was manipulated. As such, this study cannot provide experimental support 
for the broader perceived function and metacognitive belief accounts that emphasise 
the role of positive beliefs more generally. 
Finally, whilst Study 5 (Chapter 6) did not actually test metacognitive models 
of RNT that make predictions about the way perceived beneficial consequences of 
RNT influence RNT, the study examined whether rumination resulted in actual 
beneficial consequences. The study demonstrated that abstract rumination did not 
confer advantages for sense of insightfulness relative to concrete thinking. Relating 
this to metacognitive accounts of RNT, this suggests that beliefs that rumination 
increases sense of understanding and insight may be misplaced, since despite an 
increased focus on meanings and implications, rumination did not lead to increased 
insightfulness relative to thinking in an alternative, non-ruminative manner.  
However, it is also important to acknowledge that the studies in this thesis 
have only explored the influence of positive metacognitive beliefs in the maintenance 
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of RNT. Both metacognitive accounts of rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) 
and worry (Wells, 1995) hypothesise that negative metacognitive beliefs are also 
implicated in vulnerability to RNT. In the metacognitive model of rumination 
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003), whilst negative metacognitive beliefs do not directly 
influence rumination (instead, rumination is initiated by positive metacognitive 
beliefs), they are hypothesised to influence depressive symptoms (e.g., “I can’t stop 
myself from ruminating”). As such, negative metacognitive beliefs are hypothesised 
to maintain the positive beliefs, which relate to the need to ruminate to help cope with 
difficulties. In the metacognitive model of worry (Wells, 1995), negative 
metacognitive beliefs about worry are hypothesised to have a direct impact on 
engagement in worry, such that negative metacognitive beliefs (e.g., about the 
uncontrollability of worry) are hypothesised to lead to worrying about worry itself 
(i.e., meta-worry). As such, it would be beneficial to explore the causal role of 
negative metacognitive beliefs in the maintenance of RNT. 
In sum, these studies provide convergent evidence that strongly supports the 
metacognitive and perceived function accounts of RNT. However, the studies also 
suggest that these accounts may need to be refined and nuanced as only particular sets 
of beliefs and functions may be strongly linked to RNT. 
7.2.3. Implications for Control Theory and Processing Mode Accounts of 
Repetitive Negative Thought 
Control theory (Martin & Tesser, 1996) proposes that problematic progress 
with the attainment of personal goals drives RT, with the prediction that abstract goals 
are likely to cause problematic goal progress due to being difficult to achieve or 
abandon. Elaborating on this account, processing mode theory (Watkins, 2008) 
proposes that construing goals at an abstract level can have negative impact on 
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problem solving and self-regulation, and can lead to negative overgeneralisations. 
Similarly, the reduced concreteness theory of worry (Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) 
hypothesises that worrying about problems in an abstract manner diminishes the 
likelihood of finding concrete solutions to the problems, thus allowing them to remain 
unresolved so the worrying continues.  
Taken together, these approaches make some specific predictions about the 
relationship between abstract processing and RNT. Martin and Tesser (1996) 
proposed that a tendency towards overly abstract processing will cause more 
unresolved goals to be linked to higher-level personal goals, resulting in more 
activation of RT, which leads to an increased frequency of rumination (i.e., more trait 
rumination). Watkins (2008) proposes that abstract processing leads to ineffective 
episodes of rumination with unconstructive consequences, which is likely to cause 
these episodes to become prolonged (i.e., more extended state rumination). However, 
it is important to be aware that these approaches conceptualise rumination in a slightly 
different way to trait rumination as conceptualised in response styles theory (Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1993). Martin and Tesser (1996) argue that linking concrete goals to 
higher-order, abstract goals increases the frequency of persistent, unconstructive 
rumination, but this sort of rumination may not be the same sort as the habitual trait 
rumination identified in the response styles theory.  
In Study 1 (Chapter 2), the prediction that abstract processing would be 
directly associated with trait RNT was not supported in the SEM analysis. However, 
in supplementary analyses examining abstract processing on its own without other 
vulnerability factors (Chapter 2, Appendix 2), after controlling for depression and 
anxiety symptoms, abstract processing was a significant predictor of rumination, but 
not worry. This indicates that abstraction is related to trait rumination, but that this 
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relationship is lost once accounting for other more powerful predictors, such as 
neuroticism. In Study 2 (Chapter 3), the prospective follow-up to Study 1, the 
prediction that abstract processing, characterised as a proximal vulnerability factor (cf. 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Watkins, 2011), would influence change in RNT over 6-8 weeks 
was not supported. 
There are several possible explanations for these findings. As briefly outlined 
previously, a distinction can be drawn between goal-driven rumination identified in 
control theory accounts of RT (Martin & Tesser, 1996; Watkins, 2008) and the more 
habitual rumination identified in response styles theory (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
1993). One interpretation of these results is that habitual RNT, as assessed by the 
RSQ-RRS and the PSWQ used in Study 1 and Study 2, is not influenced by abstract 
processing of goals, but it is influenced by neuroticism and metacognitive beliefs, 
which may be two potentially complementary pathways to RNT. Instead, in line with 
Martin and Tesser’s (1996) control account, abstract processing may have more of an 
influence on state RNT (i.e., individual “bouts” of rumination and worry), rather than 
the generalised habitual tendency to engage in RNT as captured by the RSQ-RRS and 
PSWQ. Moreover, whilst Watkins’ (2008) processing mode account proposes that 
abstract processing leads to more unconstructive outcomes of rumination (e.g., 
Watkins, 2004; Watkins & Moulds, 2007; Watkins & Teasdale, 2001), it does not 
predict that abstract processing necessarily leads to trait rumination. However, 
ineffective rumination could influence the duration of episodes of rumination and lead 
to repeated bouts of rumination, thus potentially influencing rumination at the trait 
level. 
A further explanation for the observed pattern of findings may arise from 
methodological issues. First, it is possible that abstract processing of goals may have a 
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direct influence on trait rumination, but this may not be detected by measures such as 
the RSQ-RRS and the PSWQ, because these measures are not sensitive to RNT about 
personal goals. Second, it is possible that observed patterns of findings may have 
arisen as a consequence of the way abstract processing was operationalised. In Study 
1 and Study 2, abstract processing style was assessed with the Problem Elaboration 
Questionnaire (PEQ; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002), which examined abstract processing 
of problems with reference to two specific examples, rather than the more generalised 
tendency to process in an abstract fashion. Moreover, the measures did not assess the 
tendency to be abstract in response to feelings, emotions and moods, which is a 
critical component of RNT. As such, if the PEQ is not a valid measure of the more 
generalised tendency towards abstract processing, it is not possible to draw clear 
conclusions from these studies about the effect of more generalised abstract 
processing of moods and problems on RNT.   
Moreover, in Study 1, SEM analysis of a hypothesised theoretical model 
indicated that the relationship between abstract processing and RNT was fully 
mediated by neuroticism. This is consistent with previous experimental research 
demonstrating that abstract processing leads to greater emotional responses to 
negative events (Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004; Watkins et al., 2008), and 
experience sampling data associating negative affectivity with abstract thinking 
(Takano & Tanno, 2010). Whilst emotional reactivity and neuroticism are not 
synonymous constructs, conceptualising neuroticism as an increased susceptibility to 
negative emotional states (Watson & Clark, 1984), it makes theoretical sense that 
individuals high on trait neuroticism would display increased emotional reactivity and 
more negative responses to difficulties. However, whilst SEM allows the researcher to 
hypothesise the causal directions of the relationships in structural models, this SEM 
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analysis with cross-sectional data cannot establish the causal relationships between 
these variables. 
As such, it is important to consider the meaning of the finding that neuroticism 
mediates the relationship between abstract processing and RNT. It suggests that 
abstract processing is associated with neuroticism, and that neuroticism accounts for 
the relationship with RNT. However, this could be because neuroticism causes 
abstract processing, or because abstract processing causally contributes to neuroticism, 
or because they are both related to a common third factor that was not assessed. For 
instance, both abstract processing and neuroticism might influence emotional 
reactivity, but neuroticism might have a bigger impact on the overall variance within 
emotional reactivity.  
It is important to explore these alternative options, and the implications that 
they would have. There is some evidence that abstract processing may increase the 
tendency towards negative emotional responses, and this may be one of the 
mechanisms underpinning neuroticism. As previously outlined, there is experimental 
evidence from studies manipulating processing mode indicating that abstract 
processing causally contributes to greater emotional reactivity to negative events 
(Moberly & Watkins, 2006; Watkins, 2004a; Watkins et al., 2008). There is also 
evidence from a variety of laboratory and non-laboratory settings that this emotional 
reactivity is strongly associated with neuroticism (Augustine et al., 2013). For 
instance, in the lab, individuals high on neuroticism demonstrate greater negative 
emotional reactivity to false performance feedback (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1989) and to 
affective images and films (e.g., Augustine & Larsen, 2011; Hemenover, 2003). 
Outside of the lab, individuals high on neuroticism demonstrate greater emotional 
reactivity to negative interpersonal events (Suls et al., 1998), and more negative 
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appraisals of daily stressors (Gunthert et al., 1999). As such, whilst the correlational 
nature of this data prevents conclusions from being drawn about the nature of the 
relationship between emotional reactivity and neuroticism, it is possible that 
emotional reactivity is an underpinning component of neuroticism. Therefore, if 
abstract processing causally contributes to increased emotional reactivity to negative 
events, this is a possible mechanism by which abstract processing could contribute to 
neuroticism.  
Considering the opposite relationship, there is also some indirect evidence that 
could be consistent with the alternative hypothesis that neuroticism may influence the 
tendency towards abstract processing. There is a broad range of evidence that 
neuroticism influences cognitive style (e.g., Shapiro, 1965), and evidence that people 
higher on neuroticism show diminished cognitive control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008), 
such that they are poorer at flexibly responding and inhibiting dominant responses. 
Relating this to abstract processing, Watkins (2008) argued that the adoption of 
abstract processing might reflect a dysregulation of the ability to shift processing style 
in response to situational demands. Dysregulation in ability to shift level of construal 
may make people more susceptible to persisting with abstract processing, regardless 
of situational circumstances, when shifting to a more concrete level of construal may 
be more adaptive. Watkins (2011, p. 265) proposed that “if a negative mood signals a 
problematic situation, then a shift to a concrete level of goal/action identification 
would be adaptive because it provides more contextual detail about the specific means 
and alternatives by which to proceed”. Consistent with this level-of-construal 
dysregulation hypothesis, Watkins, Moberly, and Moulds (2011) found that currently 
depressed participants were impaired at shifting level of construal in response to 
changes in mood, relative to never-depressed participants. As such, this is consistent 
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with the hypothesis that negative affectivity and neuroticism may interfere with 
adaptive regulation of processing mode in response to situational demands.  
Considering these alternative accounts of the relationship between neuroticism 
and abstract processing, the current evidence indicates that the relationship between 
neuroticism and abstract processing may be bidirectional, such that abstract 
processing contributes to neuroticism, and neuroticism contributes to abstract 
processing. Further studies would be required to test this hypothesis (see Section 7.4).   
Study 5 (Chapter 6) also examined a prediction of the processing mode 
account of RNT (Watkins, 2008), by examining the consequences of abstract 
rumination relative to concrete thinking. Specifically, the study demonstrated that 
relative to abstract rumination, concrete thinking about being assertive on a difficult 
interpersonal issue resulted in a greater sense of confidence and control. This is 
consistent with the processing mode prediction by Watkins (2008) that concrete 
processing of difficulties leads to more constructive outcomes than abstract 
processing, particularly in contexts where abstract processing might lead to 
unconstructive outcomes for self-regulation.  
In summary, whilst the current findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 
abstract processing may lead to unhelpful episodes of RNT, the current findings do 
not fit the hypothesis that abstract processing is directly associated with or predicts 
trait RNT. Any relationship between abstract processing and trait RNT is mediated by 
neuroticism, which accounts for a greater share of the variance in RNT. However, 
methodological limitations (e.g., the operationalisation of abstract processing) prevent 
firm conclusions from being drawn as to the nature of the relationship between 
abstract processing and trait RNT, so some caution is merited. Nonetheless, on the 
basis of Study 1 and 2, whilst existing data (see Watkins, 2008) indicates that control 
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theory and processing mode theory provide a good account of (a) goal discrepancy 
driven state rumination, and (b) the consequences of rumination, it appears that they 
do not provide a good account of trait rumination. The current data suggests that 
different processes (neuroticism, beliefs about RT) may be more important in habitual 
trait rumination as assessed by the measures used in this thesis. In conclusion, there 
may be theoretical value in making a distinction between state rumination, which can 
be driven by goal discrepancy, and more habitual trait rumination, which is an 
automatic tendency to ruminate in the context of negative moods (consistent with the 
conceptualisation of Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
7.2.4. Implications for Response Styles Theory 
Response styles theory (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991) proposes that rumination is a 
consistent and enduring habitual response style which can contribute to prolonging 
symptoms of depression, through (i) exacerbating negative thinking, (ii) reducing 
instrumental behaviour, and (iii) impairing social problem solving. In this section, 
there will be detailed discussion of the extent to which three specific hypotheses, 
developed by Nolen-Hoeksema within the response styles theory perspective, are 
supported by the studies in this thesis. Specifically, this section will discussion the 
following hypotheses: (i) that rumination develops as a result of certain negative early 
life experiences (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991); (ii) that rumination is a cognitive 
manifestation of neuroticism (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 1994); and (iii) that rumination 
is maintained because it affords justification for avoidance (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 
2008). 
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7.2.4.1. RNT and negative early life experiences. 
Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed that a ruminative response style could 
develop as a result of particular parenting experiences and early environments. 
Specifically, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) hypothesised that parental modelling and 
overcontrol could contribute to the development of rumination, as well as the 
experience of being in an environment in which adaptive ways of responding to 
difficulties are not taught (e.g., abusive or neglectful environments).  
In the SEM analysis reported in Study 1, maternal and paternal overcontrol 
were not associated with RNT when taking into account other predictors included in 
the model. However, there were small correlations between maternal and paternal 
overcontrol and measures of rumination (RSQ-RRS) and worry (PSWQ). Examining 
the effect of an abusive environment, SEM analyses indicated that emotional abuse 
was indirectly associated with RNT via its association with beliefs about the function 
of RT, abstract processing, neuroticism, and current distress. Whilst low levels of 
participant report precluded further examination of the physical and sexual abuse 
variables in the structural model, there were small but significant correlations between 
sexual and physical abuse and rumination (RSQ-RRS) and worry (PSWQ). 
Considering the theoretical implications of these findings, this suggests that in 
adulthood, other proximal vulnerability factors may have a greater impact on the 
tendency to engage in RNT than early life experiences.   
In Study 2 (Chapter 3), early experience factors (overcontrolling parenting and 
emotional abuse; sexual and physical abuse not examined) did not predict change in 
RNT over 6-8 weeks, when controlling for symptoms of depression, anxiety and 
stress. One interpretation of these findings is that when considered in the context of 
other powerful proximal predictors of RNT in a model to be tested with SEM, early 
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experiences of overcontrolling parenting and abuse are insufficiently powerful to 
remain significantly associated with RNT. When examining the correlations between 
these variables and RNT without taking into the account the effect of other variables, 
a significant relationship is observed. As such, the finding that early experience 
factors are no longer associated with RNT when other vulnerability factors are 
included suggests either (i) that the effect is mediated by these other variables (i.e., 
there is shared variance between these variables), or (ii) that the effect is harder to 
detect as there is less statistical power when more variables are entered into the 
analysis.  
Moreover, Nolen-Hoeksema’s (1991) hypothesis about early experiences 
specifically concerns their involvement in the initial development, rather than 
maintenance, of a ruminative response style. Since the studies reported in this thesis 
are concerned with factors that maintain RNT, rather than factors associated with the 
onset of RNT, the data cannot establish whether any of the factors measured would 
influence initial development of a ruminative response style. As such, further 
developmental studies measuring these factors in children and adolescents are 
required in order to satisfactorily test this hypothesis. Considering the implications of 
these findings for response styles theory, the current data suggest that these negative 
early experiences are less important for short-term maintenance of RNT, suggesting 
that they may play a less important role in the response styles theory model, relative 
to other vulnerability factors implicated by this account. 
7.2.4.2. RNT and neuroticism. 
Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1994) also hypothesise that rumination is a cognitive 
manifestation of the personality trait of neuroticism, stating that “ruminative coping 
may be one mechanism by which global traits such as neuroticism and private self-
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consciousness are related to depression … although ruminative coping is related to 
neuroticism and private self-consciousness, it is a better predictor of changes in 
depression over time than those global variables, and may mediate the relationship 
between neuroticism and private self-consciousness and depression” (p. 93). There is 
a considerable body of correlational evidence (e.g., Kuyken et al., 2006; Muris et al., 
2005), and to a lesser extent prospective evidence (e.g., Barnhofer & Chittka, 2010), 
associating neuroticism and rumination (see Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3.7 for a full 
summary). There is evidence that people high on neuroticism are more prone to 
rumination (e.g., Hankin, Fraley, & Abela, 2005; Roberts et al., 1998). 
In Study 1 and Study 2, neuroticism was characterised as a variable with both 
proximal and distal qualities, because as with other proximal variables, neuroticism is 
a within-person characteristic that could directly influence the way a person responds 
in the here-and-now (Augustine et al., 2013), but like other distal variables, 
neuroticism has genetic and environmental origins (e.g., Loehlin, 1992). In the SEM 
analysis for Study 1, neuroticism had both a direct effect on RNT, consistent with the 
hypothesis of Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (1994), and an indirect effect, as the relationship 
between neuroticism and RNT was significantly mediated by both current distress, 
and beliefs about the function of RT. Moreover, neuroticism was a significant 
mediator of the relationship between emotional abuse and RNT, and abstract 
processing and RNT. 
In the previous section (Section 7.2.3), the relationship between neuroticism 
and abstract processing was considered. It is also important to consider the 
relationship between neuroticism and emotional abuse. Several studies have 
demonstrated an association between childhood trauma (including physical, sexual, 
and emotional abuse) and neuroticism (e.g., Gamble et al., 2006; Lyasker, Meyer, 
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Evans, Clements, & Marks, 2001; Talley, Boyce, & Jones, 1998; Roy, 2002; 
Schwandt, Heilig, Hommer, George, & Ramchandani, 2013). Studies have tended to 
examine sexual or physical abuse, with possible reasons for this being that sexual and 
physical abuse are seen to be more prevalent, more damaging to physical and mental 
health, and more salient to the victim (Schwandt et al., 2013). Alternatively, it could 
be because unlike sexual or physical abuse, emotional abuse is not considered a 
criminal act (Thompson & Kaplan, 1996), or because emotional abuse is more 
difficult to define (Rees, 2010). The mechanism by which emotional abuse could 
contribute to neuroticism could concern the parent-child attachment relationship. 
Specifically, emotional maltreatment is hypothesised to lead to insecure attachment 
styles (Bowlby, 1969), and insecure attachment styles have been associated with 
neuroticism (e.g., Eggert, Levendosky, & Klump, 2007; Hagekull & Bohlin, 2003). 
Thus, insecure attachment styles may underpin the observed relationship between 
emotional abuse and neuroticism. In order to test this in future studies, it would be 
necessary to conduct a prospective study in which attachment styles are assessed in 
young children (e.g., using the Strange Situation procedure; Ainsworth, Blehar, 
Waters, & Wall, 1978) to see how attachment styles influence the development of 
trait neuroticism.  
In Study 2, neuroticism and beliefs about the function of RT were the only 
prospective predictors of change in RNT over 6-8 weeks, after symptoms of 
depression, anxiety, and stress were statistically controlled. Neuroticism remained a 
significant predictor of change in RNT even after taking into account the effect of 
other vulnerability factors included in the regression analysis (overcontrolling 
parenting; physical, sexual, and emotional abuse; beliefs about the function of RT; 
abstract processing). However, whilst this thesis contains cross-sectional and 
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prospective evidence consistent with personality models of RNT, this data alone 
cannot establish causality and further experimental studies are required to elucidate 
the causal nature of the relationship between the factors.  
It is helpful to attempt to understand exactly what qualities or components of 
the neuroticism trait may be important in the relationship with RNT. A simple 
interpretation of the relationship concerns the way response styles theory 
conceptualises rumination: If rumination is conceptualised as a habitual response to 
sad moods, if an individual is more likely to experience sad moods as a result of being 
high on trait neuroticism, they may be more likely to ruminate, because they will 
experience more of the contextual cues (low mood) that trigger the ruminative habit. 
A slightly more complex account concerns the cognitive components of 
neuroticism and how they may influence RNT. Referring to the qualities of 
neuroticism stated by Eysenck and Eysenck (1991, p. 4), people high on neuroticism 
are “overly emotional, reacting too strongly to all sorts of stimuli, and finds it difficult 
to get back on an even keel after each emotionally arousing experience”. Being prone 
to negative emotionality may confer vulnerability to persistent RNT because people 
who are more prone to strong negative emotional responses may be particularly 
motivated to engage in RNT as a means to understand and make sense of their 
negative moods and feelings. In contrast, people who are less prone to negative 
emotional states and who less frequently experience strong negative emotional 
reactions have less of a need to use RNT as a means of understanding and making 
sense if their emotional state is usually relatively stable.  
It is also important to consider the underlying cognitive mechanisms by which 
neuroticism could contribute to RNT. One hypothesis outlined by Augustine et al. 
(2013) is that individuals high on neuroticism are also prone to some specific 
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cognitive biases. For example, neurotic individuals are more prone to self-focused 
attention (Field et al., 2010), the tendency to report an increased number of negative 
events (Suls & Martin, 2005), and poorer attentional control (Moriya & Tanno, 2008).  
This combination of negative cognitive biases may lead to neurotic individuals 
engaging in more RNT about negative events: Individuals who report an increased 
frequency of negative experiences, who are prone to focus their attention internally 
and who also have difficulties flexibly shifting attention may find themselves 
particularly prone to persistent RNT. Further studies are required to examine whether 
the combination of these components of neuroticism predict the tendency towards 
RNT.  
However, it is also important to consider whether overlaps in the measures of 
RNT and neuroticism may account for some of the association between the two 
variables. The RSQ-RRS (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1991), PSWQ (Meyer et al., 
1990), and the EPQ-N-SF (Eysenck et al., 1985) – measures that are used in this 
thesis and that are three of the most widely used measures of rumination, worry, and 
neuroticism – contain some items that seem conceptually similar. Some examples of 
this include: the RSQ-RRS item “Think about how alone you feel”, and the EPQ-N-
SF item “Do you often feel lonely?”; the RSQ-RRS item “Think about how sad you 
feel”, and the EPQ-N-SF item “Do you ever feel just miserable for no reason?”; and 
the PSWQ item “I’ve been a worrier all my life”, and the EPQ-N-SF “Are you a 
worrier?”. This similarity between the popular self-report measurement tools of these 
constructs could introduce bias through conceptually overlapping measurement items: 
Criterion contamination could be occurring as these measures may be assessing 
components that are not part of the pure criterion construct (Messick 1989).  
    337 
In conclusion, considering the theoretical implications of these findings, the 
current data suggest that neuroticism plays an important role in the maintenance of 
RNT, in support of the account proposed in response styles theory. The data also 
suggest that neuroticism may mediate the relationships between more distal 
vulnerability factors (e.g., emotional abuse) and RNT.  
7.2.4.3. RNT and avoidance. 
Finally, a number of theoretical accounts propose that RNT may be 
maintained because it has functional properties that may reinforce the process of RNT, 
such as its passive nature avoiding the exacerbation of negative situations, and RNT 
affording justification for avoiding taking action that may be seen as aversive 
(Borkovec, 1994; Ferster, 1973; Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). In Study 5 (Chapter 6), 
the aim of the experiment was to see whether rumination had functions that might 
potentially reinforce its further use, with participants thinking about a threatening 
situation (being assertive about an interpersonal problem) in either an abstract 
ruminative mode (analogous to depressive rumination) or a concrete mode 
(inconsistent with depressive rumination). It is important to note that whilst this study 
did not test the reinforcement hypothesis directly (i.e., it did not measure whether the 
outcomes of rumination lead to greater use of rumination), it did test the first part of 
this hypothesis by examining whether rumination had any beneficial outcomes that 
might maintain the process of rumination. As such, the findings of this study have 
theoretical implications for functional models of RNT.  
Of most theoretical interest is the finding that relative to concrete thinking, 
rumination resulted in significantly more justification for avoidance, and a lower 
sense of assertiveness self-efficacy. This is consistent with the hypothesis proposed by 
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Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) that rumination affords justification for avoiding taking 
action with feared situations. 
Within this account, Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008) proposed a detailed 
avoidant function or rumination, hypothesising that “rumination is reinforced by the 
reductions in distress that come from withdrawing from aversive situations, from 
being relieved of responsibility, and from a sense of certainty about one’s conclusions” 
(p. 404). Rather than rumination simply serving as a form of cognitive avoidance of 
aversive situations (Ferster, 1973; Martell et al., 2001), rumination is hypothesised to 
“provide depressed individuals with the evidentiary base to justify withdrawal and 
inactivity” (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008, p. 407). Specifically, rumination is 
hypothesised to aid the accumulation of evidence that any efforts at active problem 
solving will be fruitless, with this sense of certainty reinforcing the ruminative 
process. Rumination is also hypothesised to aid the development of rationalisations 
for avoiding taking action or responsibility, and this inactivity is then reinforced 
because it avoids exposure to aversive situations. It is noteworthy that the effect 
observed on avoidance in Study 5 was found in nonclinical, nondysphoric participants 
matched for level of rumination and depression, simply as a result of manipulating the 
nature of repetitive thinking about a threatening issue to match the type of thinking 
found in depressive rumination. As such, this provides strong evidence that abstract 
rumination does increase avoidance relative to concrete thinking.  
One possible criticism of Study 5 is that the threatening task used – an 
assertiveness situation – may be a task that is more suited for eliciting anxiety and 
possible avoidance than one that is suitable for eliciting a sense of understanding. This 
could potentially explain why an effect was found for avoidance, but not sense of 
understanding and insight. Nonetheless, understanding is still arguably an important 
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component of considering assertiveness, as it involves making sense of another’s 
behaviour. However, it is worth considering suitable alternative tasks that could be 
used if this experiment were to be repeated. Possible alternative tasks could involve 
being faced with a difficult to understand situation, such as an unexpected behaviour 
from a close person, or a betrayal. 
As this study is a preliminary experimental test of the avoidance hypothesis, it 
is important to note that not all potential avoidant functions were examined in the 
study. Specifically, in this study, only three types of justification for avoidance were 
measured: avoidance because of a perceived lack of control, avoidance because of a 
reduced sense of responsibility, and avoidance because of a wish to avoid distress. 
Sense of assertiveness self-efficacy was also measured (i.e., how confident 
participants felt about taking action with the assertiveness issue, their perceived 
likelihood of success). Although this study was only examining rumination, other 
putative avoidant functions of RNT suggested by Borkovec (1994) in the avoidance 
theory of worry (e.g., RNT as a form of avoidance of deeper emotional topics) were 
not examined. As such, whilst the findings of this study are consistent with the 
hypothesis outlined by Nolen-Hoeksema et al. (2008), it is not known if it applies to 
other forms of avoidance.  
In summary, the convergent findings are consistent with predictions within 
response styles theory, particularly regarding neuroticism and avoidance. More 
specifically, these findings give greater salience and importance to neuroticism than 
previously discussed in the original theoretical account. In particular, it is important 
for future studies to assess the cognitive substrates of neuroticism (Augustine et al., 
2013) and the means by which these may influence engagement in RNT.  
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7.2.5. Implications for an Integrative Theoretical Model 
To conclude the discussion of the theoretical implications of these findings, it 
is worth revisiting the integrative theoretical model hypothesised at the end of Chapter 
1 (Section 1.6). This original model was designed to illustrate hypothetical 
relationships that may exist between the putative vulnerability factors for RNT. After 
reviewing the findings from the thesis and the theoretical implications arising from 
these, it is possible to make some revisions and propose an alternative theoretical 
model in light of the findings relating to neuroticism, metacognitive beliefs, and 
avoidance, and the way that these factors may maintain habitual trait RNT. This 
revised and simplified model is outlined in Figure 7.1.  
 
 
Figure 7.1. Revised theoretical model demonstrating the hypothesised causal 
relationships between neuroticism, the belief that RT aids understanding and insight, 
avoidance, and RNT. 
 
In summary, as demonstrated in Study 1, the belief that RT aids understanding 
and insight mediated the relationship between neuroticism and RNT (see Section 
7.2.2 for a discussion of this relationship). In Study 2, neuroticism and the belief that 
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RT aids instrumental understanding both prospectively predicted change in RNT. In 
Study 4, experimentally manipulating the belief that RT aids understanding and 
insight influenced engagement in state RNT. In Study 5, relative to concrete thinking, 
rumination led to increased avoidance.  
It is important to highlight three of the predicted relationships displayed in this 
model that have not yet been directly tested with experimental studies. First, whilst 
the belief that RT aids understanding and insight mediated the relationship between 
neuroticism and RNT in the SEM analysis conducted in Study 1, this analysis utilised 
cross-sectional data. It is predicted that neuroticism would lead to an individual 
developing beliefs about the need to understand and make sense (see Section 7.2.2), 
but the causal relationship has yet to be directly tested. 
Second, the prediction that avoidance may lead to RNT has not been directly 
tested (see Section 7.2.4.3). It is predicted that avoidance may reinforce the process of 
RNT (Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008), but further studies are required to examine 
whether avoidance resulting from RNT leads to the continued use of RNT (i.e., 
whether avoidance reinforces RNT).   
Finally, whilst neuroticism was cross-sectionally and prospectively associated 
with RNT, and it is predicted that neuroticism causes increased RNT, the causal 
relationship has not yet been tested with experimental studies (see Section 7.2.4.2). 
Whilst neuroticism is not a variable that appears to be obviously tractable to 
experimental manipulation, it is possible that studies could manipulate cognitive 
components of neuroticism to examine the effect on subsequent RNT.     
7.2.6. Clinical Implications 
There is considerable clinical benefit to an understanding of the vulnerability 
factors for RNT. Understanding the factors that are associated with onset of RNT in 
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childhood and adolescence affords identification of those at risk for developing 
pathological RNT, as well as informing prevention interventions. However, this thesis 
has focused on examining the factors that may maintain RNT. Understanding the 
factors that maintain RNT in adulthood can inform the focus of therapeutic work, 
such that maintaining factors can be tackled clinically. In addition, identifying factors 
that might reinforce RNT is also of clinical use such that the motivation to engage in 
RNT can be addressed therapeutically.  
The findings from this thesis suggest that proximal vulnerability factors may 
be more important in the maintenance of RNT in adulthood. This finding is of clinical 
relevance as it suggests that whilst distal factors may be important in establishing an 
individual’s baseline tendency towards RNT, proximal factors may have more of an 
impact on adult engagement in RNT. As such, if these findings were replicated in 
clinical populations, it may be of therapeutic utility to focus on these distal 
vulnerability factors in treatment and prevention interventions. 
One specific factor demonstrated to have a significant relationship with RNT 
is the specific metacognitive belief that RNT aids insight and understanding. This 
belief was associated with RNT in cross-sectional, prospective, and experimental 
studies. A further factor, neuroticism, was demonstrated to have both a cross-sectional 
and a prospective association with RNT. This is of potential clinical value, since 
clinicians can assess these factors to identify individuals at increased risk for RNT. It 
is then possible for clinicians to target these factors in therapeutic settings – for 
example, by challenging the belief that RNT aids insight and understanding – as a 
putative means to prevent or reduce RNT. One successful intervention for rumination, 
rumination-focused CBT, includes a focus on analysing and then replacing the 
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potential functions of rumination for patients (Watkins et al., 2007; Watkins, Mullan, 
et al., 2011). The findings from this thesis lend support to that clinical approach. 
In addition to demonstrating the role of specific metacognitive beliefs in 
causing engagement in rumination, Study 5 also demonstrated that the metacognitive 
belief that RT increases insightfulness is inaccurate, because rumination did not 
increase understanding and insight relative to concrete thinking. In addressing this 
metacognitive belief in a therapeutic setting, therapists may wish to challenge the 
accuracy of these beliefs, as a means to reduce the motivation to engage in rumination. 
This study also demonstrated the advantages of thinking in a concrete, rather than 
abstract ruminative way, when faced with difficulties, since concrete thinking lead to 
a greater sense of confidence, control, and self-efficacy. Psychoeducation 
interventions for people at risk for rumination could emphasise the advantages of this 
way of thinking, rather than informing individuals not to dwell on problems at all, and 
to instead think about the situation in a more constructive, solution-focused way (see 
Watkins, 2009; Watkins, Mullan, et al., 2011; Watkins et al., 2012). Naturally, these 
findings require replication in clinical populations before definitive clinical 
recommendations can be made.  
7.3. Strengths and Limitations of the Research 
In this section, the strengths and limitations of the research reported in this 
thesis will be discussed, with particular reference to the aims of the research outlined 
in Chapter 1. 
7.3.1. Strengths of the Research 
Considering the strengths of the research, first, the correlational and 
prospective studies reported in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 provide a robust test of the 
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transdiagnostic approach by examining rumination and worry together as a common 
process of RNT. By examining rumination and worry together, they contribute to a 
growing evidence base that suggests that these processes may be more common than 
they are different. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, these are the first studies to 
be conducted that examine RNT alongside a wide range of putative vulnerability 
factors. Examining multiple vulnerability factors together in a single analysis affords 
identification of stronger or weaker predictors of RNT, and it allows for exploration 
of the relationship between vulnerability factors. This enhances the ecological validity 
of the approach, since in the real world, multiple vulnerability factors may be at play 
and the effect of any single vulnerability factors is not exerted in a vacuum. As such, 
whilst studies that explore individual vulnerability factors in detail are undoubtedly of 
value, it is also important to consider the interplay between the various factors that 
may influence vulnerability to RNT. Not only is this of theoretical interest, because it 
helps to identify factors that may be particularly strong predictors of vulnerability to 
RNT, it also is of clinical use: Identifying factors that seem to be most important in 
maintaining RNT means that these factors can be tackled in therapeutic or prevention 
interventions, and clinical work is not concentrated on factors that may have less of an 
influence on RNT. 
Second, by adopting an online methodology for the correlational and 
prospective studies reported in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 and recruiting participants 
from all around the UK, data were collected from a large and geographically diverse 
sample (n = 506). As such, it was possible to test a range of vulnerability factors, and 
have greater confidence in the generalisability of the findings across nonclinical 
populations.  
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 Third, the experimental studies reported in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 were the 
first studies to be conducted that directly tested metacognitive models of RNT: thus 
far, no other studies have experimentally manipulated beliefs about RNT and 
measured the effects on subsequent engagement in RNT. Whilst the experimental 
study reported in Chapter 4 had some methodological problems, it was helpful in 
developing the paradigm that was successfully used in the experimental study 
reported in Chapter 5. As such, these studies provide a valuable contribution to the 
literature by providing the first experimental test of a prominent theory of RNT. 
Finally, the study reported in Chapter 6 also filled a gap in the literature by 
being the first study to test a range of potential outcomes of ruminative thinking (e.g., 
sense of insightfulness, justification for avoidance) relative to other forms of thinking. 
Previous studies have tended to examine rumination against a non-thinking control 
group (e.g., distraction), and as such, this study was able to provide evidence that 
demonstrates the specific outcomes of abstract ruminative thinking.  
7.3.2. Limitations of the Research 
 There were also a number of limitations to the research reported in this thesis. 
First, whilst Chapter 1 identified a weakness of the vulnerability RNT literature by 
demonstrating that previous studies had heavily relied on the use of self-report 
measures, undoubtedly, a number of studies reported in this thesis can be subject to 
the same criticism. Study 1 and Study 2 adopted a method that necessitated all factors 
being measured by self-report, and in the experimental studies (Study 3, Study 4 and 
Study 5), there was also some use of self-report measures. For Study 1 and Study 2, if 
alternative measures were used (e.g., observation, other-report), the trade-off would 
be a reduction in sample size, which would have potentially resulted in problematic 
statistical power since such a wide range of vulnerability factors were being assessed. 
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As such, self-report measures were selected in order to benefit from a large and 
geographically diverse sample. Moreover, in all of the studies, self-report measures 
are necessary to assess particular constructs due to their personal and highly 
subjective nature (e.g., beliefs about the function of RT as measured in Study 1 and 
Study 2; subjective sense of understanding and insight as measured in Study 3 and 
Study 5, etc.). Whilst some factors can be measured in alternative ways (e.g., using a 
clinician-assessed measure of symptoms of depression anxiety such as the SCID; 
using a retrospective parent-report of parenting styles), many factors examined in this 
thesis are necessarily assessed with self-report techniques. 
 Second, a number of important vulnerability factors identified in the literature 
review (Chapter 1) were not examined in more detail in the studies reported in this 
thesis. As such, this thesis cannot claim to be a fully comprehensive analysis of the 
wide-ranging factors that may contribute to maintenance of RNT. However, Study 1 
and Study 2 involved the measurement of as many vulnerability factors as possible, 
and there were practical reasons for not measuring all factors. Specifically, there was 
no measure of attention inhibition or cognitive control, but this was because it would 
have been not possible to measure this adequately using a self-report measure 
administered remotely, over the internet. As such, since this construct may be best 
measured in a laboratory setting, this factor was not measured. In addition, intolerance 
of uncertainty was also not assessed. Whilst this factor is undoubtedly of relevance to 
vulnerability to RNT and there is a good self-report measure of this construct 
available, constraints relating to participant burden precluded inclusion of a measure 
of this construct. The extant measures included in Study 1 took approximately 
between 45 – 55 minutes for participants to complete, which can be argued as already 
representing significant participant burden. As such, whilst there were additional 
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measures that it would have been useful to include, it would have been unwise to 
increase the time requirements for participants. However, this did mean that it was not 
possible to measure all theoretically relevant constructs.  
Third, in Study 2, the longitudinal study, the follow-up assessments only 
occurred 6-8 weeks after the baseline assessments. As such, the prospective findings 
are limited in only being able to demonstrate what factors are implicated in the 
maintenance of rumination in the short to medium term.  Longer-term follow-ups 
would afford identification of factors associated with long-term maintenance of RNT. 
Moreover, in this study, measures were only administered at two timepoints, with all 
of the vulnerability factors being measured at a single timepoint, at baseline. 
Prospective studies utilising multiple timepoints for follow-ups would afford a more 
robust analysis, and it would allow for mediating factors to be examined prospectively 
(e.g., to examine whether distal factors prospectively predict proximal factors, which 
in turn prospectively predict RNT). Specifically, Kraemer et al. (2001, p. 850) 
highlight that “the conceptual definition of ‘B mediates A’ … suggests that B explains 
how and why A works to produce O. If so, logically A must temporally precede B in 
order that B mediate A. The very term ‘mediator’ suggests that the mediator stands 
between that which it mediates and the outcome”. As such, it is important to examine 
vulnerability factors at multiple time points such that any mediating factors can be 
identified.  
Fourth, these studies have focused on the maintenance of rumination within 
adult and predominantly undergraduate student samples. As such, the retrospective 
approach and the use of adult participants in these studies preclude drawing 
conclusions about whether the distal factors measured influence initial onset of RNT 
in childhood and adolescence. In order to study the onset of RNT, a developmental 
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follow-up study using a younger sample would be required, in which a range of 
proximal and distal vulnerability factors are measured in child and adolescent 
participants in a prospective longitudinal or cohort study. However this was beyond 
the scope of this PhD project. Ideally, baseline measures of RNT and putative 
vulnerability factors should be taken from children at just before the age that 
rumination and worry emerge, at approximately 8 years old (Vasey & Daeleiden, 
1994), and then children should be followed up until mid- to late-adolescence, such 
that a clear developmental picture can be created of the factors that are associated 
with initial onset versus ongoing maintenance of RNT.  
Finally, the studies reported in this thesis were conducted with nonclinical 
participants. Whilst the experimental studies tested for an interaction between 
experimental condition and trait rumination and found that the effects were 
maintained across the whole spectrum of trait rumination within these samples, it is 
important to attempt to replicate these findings in clinical samples to test whether they 
generalise beyond nonclinical populations.  
7.4. Future Research Directions 
There are several additional research studies that it would be beneficial to 
conduct as a means of increasing understanding of vulnerability to RNT. First, it 
would be useful to see if any of these findings can be replicated in clinical samples. 
Whilst there may not be an obvious theoretical reason as to why different processes 
may maintain RNT in depressed or anxious participants, it is unwise to assume that 
these findings would generalise to participants experiencing higher levels of 
psychopathological symptoms. As such, it would be useful to repeat these studies with 
participants who are currently depressed and/or anxious such that the hypotheses can 
be tested in clinical populations.  
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Second, it would be interesting to repeat a version of Study 4 with appropriate 
modifications such that the task used to prompt engagement in RNT elicited more 
worrisome thoughts, rather than ruminative thoughts. Whilst the study measured state 
RNT after manipulating appraisals about the helpfulness of RNT, the task used to 
prompt RNT – the insolvable anagram task – is arguably more likely to elicit thoughts 
with ruminative content, rather than worrisome content. Specifically, whilst 
rumination and worry share common processes, the content can differ (Ehring & 
Watkins, 2008), and in this case, the anagram task arguably makes people focus on 
content more typical of rumination (i.e., dwelling on past performance, and the 
experience of failing the task). As such, it would be useful to repeat the experiment 
with an alternative task to see whether the results are maintained when a task used to 
elicit worry is used instead. It would be important to select a task that is likely to 
afford the opportunity for worry, without explicitly instructing people to worry. 
Standard worry induction tasks, such as the task developed by McLaughlin et al. 
(2007), generally involve participants being asked to list their most worrisome topics, 
and then they are instructed to select the most worrisome topic and close their eyes 
and worry as intensely as possible for a period of five minutes. This sort of task would 
not be appropriate as it involves instructed worry: It is not possible to instruct people 
to worry/ruminate in a task designed to examine the effects of a manipulation on 
naturally-occurring worry/rumination. 
One possibility of a task to elicit worry that has been successfully used in 
other studies is a speech preparation task, where participants are asked to prepare for 
delivering a speech on a difficult topic, which will be video recorded. For example, 
Phillips and Giancola (2008) told participants that their “thinking style” would be 
assessed by examining the way they prepared and delivered a speech to camera. The 
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topic of the speech concerned body image, and participants were told that they would 
have 6 minutes to prepare for a 3-minute speech discussing the things that they liked 
and disliked about their bodies whilst standing directly in front of a video camera 
(unbeknownst to participants, they never actually have to deliver the speech). Such a 
speech performance task, albeit with varying topics for the speech itself, has been 
used successfully to elicit anxiety and worrisome thoughts in numerous studies (e.g., 
Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993; Sayette, Martin, Perrott, Wertz, & Hufford, 
2001; Ullrich, Lutgendorf, & Kreder, 2007). This task may be more likely to elicit 
worry because it focuses on a future threat, which is more typical of the content of 
worrisome thoughts.  
Third, to test the hypothesis that manipulating positive metacognitive beliefs 
can impact trait as well as state RNT, it would be beneficial to conduct a study that 
moved from a single-session manipulation of beliefs, to repeated, longer-term 
manipulation of beliefs, such that the effect on trait RNT could be examined. The 
manipulation delivered in Study 4 was not designed to manipulate long-term 
appraisals of RNT, and as such, it would be interesting to examine the effects of 
alternative manipulations of appraisals over a longer time period to explore the effects 
on trait RNT. Given the previous theoretical and empirical work, it is predicted that 
longer-term modification of metacognitive beliefs would influence engagement in 
trait RNT. 
To explore the longer-term impact of modifying positive metacognitive beliefs, 
participants selected on the basis of reporting high levels of positive metacognitive 
beliefs about RNT could receive regular therapeutic information (e.g., through a 
computerised therapeutic programme to be completed weekly over a period of 6-8 
weeks) that either contains information that is designed to challenge and reduce these 
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beliefs in addition to other therapeutic materials, or a programme that does not contain 
any information challenging metacognitive beliefs but contains otherwise identical 
materials. By regularly measuring engagement in RNT, this trial design would help to 
elucidate whether longer-term manipulation of beliefs about RNT have any impact on 
trait RNT beyond a brief experimental setting. 
Fourth, to further test the hypothesis that positive metacognitive beliefs about 
RT result in increased RNT, it would be useful to repeat a version of Study 4 with the 
addition of a control condition in which metacognitive beliefs are not manipulated. 
Study 4 did not have a control condition, and instead compared a manipulation of 
RNT-as-Helpful with a manipulation of RNT-as-Unhelpful (i.e., there was no 
condition in which participants were not exposed to any information about the 
helpfulness or unhelpfulness or RNT). The use of a control condition would allow for 
examination of what the “default” response would be in the absence of any 
manipulation. A possible control condition might involve making participants simply 
describe a past problem in factual terms (e.g., “How long ago did this problem 
occur?”, “Who else was involved in the problem?”), so that the conditions are 
matched for thinking about a resolved problem. Using a control condition would be 
informative is it would allow conclusions to be drawn about the nature of the effects 
arising from the manipulation (i.e., Does the RNT-as-Helpful manipulation lead to 
increases in RNT, relative to the control condition? Or does the RNT-as-Unhelpful 
condition lead to decreases in RNT, relative to the control? Or are both of these 
effects observed?).  
Considering the RNT-as-Helpful condition, it would be predicted that state 
RNT would increase for participants in this condition, relative to the control condition. 
Considering the RNT-as-Unhelpful condition, it is less easy to make a single 
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prediction based on existing theoretical accounts: The metacognitive model of 
rumination (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) proposes that whilst negative 
metacognitive beliefs do not directly influence rumination (unlike positive 
metacognitive beliefs, which initiate rumination), they are hypothesised to influence 
depressive symptoms. Negative metacognitive beliefs (e.g., “It’s impossible not to 
ruminate”) are hypothesised to maintain the positive beliefs, which relate to the need 
to ruminate to help cope with difficulties. On the other hand, the metacognitive model 
of worry (Wells, 1995) predicts that specific negative metacognitive beliefs contribute 
to increased engagement in worry, but this is only for specific negative metacognitive 
beliefs (i.e., the belief that worry is uncontrollable). As such, the RNT-as-Unhelpful 
condition may lead to increased state RNT if participants specifically consider the 
belief that RNT is uncontrollable in the manipulation task, but otherwise, it is less 
clear how this condition may influence state RNT.  
Fifth, one limitation of Study 5 was that it involved examining the 
consequences of a manipulation of rumination, rather than RNT, and as such, it is 
necessary to test the generalisability of these findings to worry. As such, it would be 
beneficial to repeat a version of Study 5 with appropriate modifications such that it 
manipulates worry relative to a non-worrisome form of thinking, and measures a 
range of potential outcomes of worry that could be reinforcing the worry process. For 
example, considering potential functions for worry (Borkovec, 1994), the study could 
examine whether relative to an alternative, non-worrisome form of thinking, worry 
does actually make people feel more motivated to address difficulties, or whether it 
does actually confer a better sense of feeling prepared for upcoming negative events. 
This sort of study would help to reveal factors that may maintain worrisome thinking.  
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Considering the differences between rumination and worry in content (Ehring 
& Watkins, 2008), with worry generally concerning future threatening events, it 
would be necessary to develop a task that might motivate people to engage in worry. 
One possibility is that participation could be restricted to final-year undergraduate 
students who have not yet secured their plans for after graduation (i.e., they do not 
have a job offer or a place on a further course of study), with the cover story of the 
experiment being that the study is designed to investigate personal thoughts and 
feelings about the future after university. The “worrisome situation” would then 
involve participants focusing on this future uncertainty and potential negative future 
outcomes. Keeping the interview structure of the experiment the same as Study 5, half 
of the participants could be assigned to the “concrete thinking” condition, in which 
they think in detail in a non-worrisome manner about how to prepare for dealing with 
the future after university (e.g., “What are some of the exact steps you need to take in 
order to find a suitable job?”). The other participants could be assigned to the 
“worrisome thinking” condition in which they are manipulated to think in a 
worrisome manner about the same topic (e.g., “What could happen if you are not able 
to secure a job or place on a course after you graduate?”). The outcomes to be 
measured could be modified from Study 5 such that they reflect the possible outcomes 
of worry as outlined by Borkovec (1994). For instance, a measure could be developed 
to tap into feeling motivated to address difficulties (e.g., “Right now, I feel motivated 
to do something to improve my future prospects”) and feeling prepared for upcoming 
negative events (e.g., “Right now, I feel prepared for what could happen in the 
future”).  
Sixth, a key study following on from Study 5 would involve testing the 
hypothesis that rumination may be maintained by outcomes that are perceived to be 
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beneficial. Specifically, Study 5 demonstrated that whilst rumination led to increased 
justification for avoidance, it did not test whether this avoidance was reinforcing the 
rumination. As such, further studies could test whether outcomes of rumination that 
may be perceived as beneficial actually lead to increased engagement in rumination, 
thus directly examining the hypothesis relating to reinforcement (Nolen-Hoeksema et 
al., 2008).  
A possible study to test whether the outcomes of rumination actually reinforce 
rumination could involve experimentally manipulating potential outcomes of 
rumination and then measuring the subsequent effects on state rumination. For 
example, participants could be asked to complete a difficult and emotionally arousing 
task (e.g., difficult anagrams), and then they could be instructed to ruminate about the 
task to try and understand what happened. After this, participants could then be either 
randomly exposed to a harder (more aversive, condition A) or easier (less aversive, 
condition B) version of the same task, which are identical in presentation to 
participants, and the impact of this task could be examined on a subsequent period of 
naturally-occurring rumination. This design thus ensures that the experience of 
participants in condition B is that ruminating about the task leads to better 
performance the second time (i.e., potentially reinforcing the rumination), whereas in 
condition A, ruminating about the task does not lead to better performance. If the 
hypothesis that positive outcomes of rumination increase rumination is correct, then 
rumination post-task will be greater in condition B than condition A. 
Seventh, to further explore the relationships between abstract processing, RNT, 
and neuroticism, it is necessary to test the possible bi-directional relationship that may 
exist between neuroticism and abstract processing (see Section 7.2.3). To test the 
prediction that abstract processing influences neuroticism, a study might involve 
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examining whether repeated concreteness training (Watkins, Mullan, et al., 2011; 
Watkins et al., 2012), which has been demonstrated to reduce abstract processing and 
reduce symptoms of depression, also has an impact over time on self-reported trait 
neuroticism and/or neurotic responding as assessed by experience sampling methods 
(e.g., Jacobs et al., 2011).  
To test the prediction that neuroticism influences abstract processing, a study 
adopting a quasi-experimental design could test to see if trait neuroticism impacts the 
shift in processing mode found to mood inductions in a similar way to depression, by 
adapting the study by Watkins, Moberly, et al. (2011), in which currently-depressed 
participants were impaired at shifting level of construal (abstract versus concrete) in 
response to changes in mood. If neuroticism influences abstract processing, it is 
predicted that participants selected on the basis of being high on trait neuroticism 
would show impairments at shifting level of construal relative to participants low on 
trait neuroticism.  
Adopting the method used in the Watkins, Moberly, et al. (2011) study to 
assess how neuroticism influences abstract processing would also resolve the issue 
noted in Study 1 and Study 2, concerning the measurement of abstract processing. 
Watkins, Moberly, et al. (2011) used the Behavioural Identification Form (BIF; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989) to assess processing style. This measure involves 
participants being provided with a form containing a wide range of behaviours (e.g., 
“eating”), and they then select the description, out of a choice of two, that they believe 
best matches the behaviour.  Processing style is assessed by examining whether an 
abstract (e.g., “getting nutrition”) or a concrete (e.g., “chewing and swallowing”) 
description is selected. The advantage of this measure of abstract processing over the 
Problem Elaboration Questionnaire (PEQ; Stöber & Borkovec, 2002) is that it 
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assesses processing style in a broader range of contexts (rather than just with 
reference to two specific problems), and thus it may be a more suitable measure of the 
broader tendency towards abstract processing.  
Finally, in order to learn more about factors associated with onset of RNT, it 
would be highly beneficial to conduct a prospective longitudinal study with children 
and adolescents, such that it is possible to identify vulnerability factors directly 
associated with the onset of RNT at that early age. It would be beneficial to measure 
the full range of factors identified in Study 1, in addition to including measures of 
intolerance of uncertainty and cognitive control, and follow up children from before 
the period that trait RNT seems to emerge (from approximately age 8 years old) until 
mid- to late-adolescence, to see which factors predict initial onset of trait RNT, and 
which factors contribute to its maintenance. There are several advantages to this sort 
of study. First, adopting a prospective approach would reduce problems associated 
with retrospective adult report of childhood events, and it would also afford clear 
identification of when and how particular vulnerability factors emerge and contribute 
towards RNT. Second, using a prospective design which involves the researcher 
meeting face-to-face with child and adolescent participants and their parents allows 
for alternative measurements of key constructs, as one of the weaknesses of Study 1 
and Study 2 was their reliance on self-report measures. In a longitudinal study with 
children, a range of methods to measure constructs could be used. For instance, rather 
than relying on retrospective reports of overcontrolling parenting, parenting 
behaviours could be assessed by observing parent-child interactions (e.g., Nolen-
Hoeksema et al., 1995). Cognitive control and inhibitory abilities could be assessed 
using computer-based cognitive tasks. Symptoms of depression and anxiety could be 
assessed with clinician-administered interviews, which could also complement parent- 
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and child-report of symptoms. It is predicted that factors such as overcontrolling 
parenting and maltreatment would predict initial onset of RNT, but that these factors 
would not contribute towards longer-term maintenance of RNT. Instead, intrapersonal 
cognitive and personality factors, such as beliefs about the function of RT and 
neuroticism, are predicted to contribute more towards the maintenance of RNT during 
adolescence.  
7.5. Final Summary and Conclusions  
Taking the findings of these studies together, four key concluding points can 
be made. First, the construct of RNT seems to be a valid way of conceptualising 
rumination and worry. Future studies would benefit from looking at the broader 
transdiagnostic process in addition to examining specific iterations of RNT. The 
transdiagnostic perspective affords more parsimonious theoretical accounts and 
empirical investigations, contributes to knowledge that can benefit identification of 
individuals at risk for psychopathology, and affords more efficient treatment and 
prevention interventions by targeting fundamental process rather than disorder-
specific processes in individuals who may have multiple comorbid diagnoses.  
Second, it appears that distal vulnerability factors (abuse and parenting) may 
be less important than proximal factors in maintaining RNT in adulthood. As such, 
whilst prevention and therapeutic intervention may be targeted towards young people 
at risk for RNT as a result of these vulnerability factors, it is perhaps less useful to 
focus therapeutically on these factors in adults who have already developed a 
tendency towards RNT. As such, it may be of greater clinical utility to focus on more 
proximal mechanisms, such as beliefs about the function of RT, which are more 
tractable to therapeutic change. However, it is important to note that the pattern of 
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findings relating to proximal and distal predictors of RNT would need to be replicated 
in a clinical sample. 
Third, experimental evidence reveals that the specific belief that RT aids 
instrumental understanding causally influences engagement in RNT. In addition to 
providing causal evidence in support of metacognitive accounts of RNT, this finding 
has potential clinical utility in the sense that it suggests that modifying favourable 
beliefs about RNT may assist in disrupting the maintenance of RNT when faced with 
difficulties. However, this finding would need to be replicated in clinical samples, and 
further studies would need to be conducted to examine the longevity of the effect on 
RNT after appraisals of RNT are manipulated.  
Finally, rather than just considering the aetiology of rumination and worry, it 
is important to consider the factors that keep people ruminating and worrying once 
they have already started. The findings from this thesis suggest that avoidant 
functions may keep people engaged in RNT, but as outlined previously, further 
studies are required to test whether avoidance reinforces rumination. 
In conclusion, this thesis contributes towards a better understanding of 
rumination and worry, two common processes associated with the development and 
maintenance of various psychological disorders, by exploring through correlational, 
prospective, and experimental means, the factors that may maintain and exacerbate 
this sort of repetitive negative thinking. Continuing this work by means of further 
prospective and experimental studies would help to further develop knowledge of the 
important transdiagnostic process of RNT, a better understanding of which can 
improve treatment and prevention interventions for people currently experiencing, or 
at risk of experiencing, mental health problems.
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Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheets and Consent Forms 
Study 1 and Study 2 
Understanding Worry and Rumination Study 
 
Principal Investigator:  Rosie Kingston, PhD Student 
Address: Mood Disorders Centre, University of Exeter, School of Psychology, Washington Singer 
Laboratories, Perry Road, Exeter, EX4 4QG 
E-mail: refk201@exeter.ac.uk  
Tel: (01392) 724003 
Supervisors:  Prof. Edward Watkins (e.r.watkins@exeter.ac.uk) 
Dr. Heather O’Mahen (h.o’mahen@exeter.ac.uk) 
 
Purpose of this study 
The purpose of this study is to examine individual differences in the tendency for people to engage in 
negative repetitive thought, such as worry and rumination.  
 
Worry is the tendency to repetitively think about problems and possible risks and threats, wondering 
about what could go wrong. Rumination is repetitive thinking focused on self, mood, and difficulties, 
and about the meanings and implications of self, mood, and difficulties.  
 
We know that there are large individual differences in the tendency to worry and ruminate, such that 
some people are prone to high levels of worry and rumination, whereas other people hardly worry or 
ruminate at all. Moreover, previous research indicates that excessive rumination and worry 
contribute to the development of depression and anxiety. Thus, understanding what might influence 
individual differences in rumination and worry may lead to developments in psychological treatments 
which can help prevent mental health problems associated with these forms of thought. Therefore, 
this research will explore a range of factors that have been proposed to explain individual differences 
in the tendency to worry and ruminate.  
 
Procedure 
Participating in this study will require the completion of a series of online questionnaires on two 
separate occasions: one initial series of questionnaires, and then a shorter series of follow-up 
questionnaires, to be completed 6 – 8 weeks later. 
 
In part one of the study, you will be asked to complete a series of questionnaires which will assess 
the following:  
• Your current mood 
• Your tendency to engage in rumination and worry 
    405 
• Your current levels of stress 
• Problems or issues you are currently worrying about 
• Whether you experienced any physical, emotional and sexual abuse before the age of 16 
• Your relationship with your parents when you were younger 
• Aspects of your personality  
• How you prefer to describe certain emotional situations  
• Brief demographic and contact details (e.g., age, occupation, gender, and e-mail address) 
 
Each of these questionnaires assesses different factors that have been considered to influence 
worry and rumination – we will investigate how these factors are correlated with worry and 
rumination concurrently at the first occasion, and then investigate which of these factors predict 
worry and rumination 6 - 8 weeks later at the second occasion of assessment. 
 
It is important to note that these questionnaires will be kept private and confidential and will be 
recorded and saved in a database that is anonymised (i.e., no e-mail addresses will be linked to the 
questionnaire scores – instead an identification code will be used). The only people to have access 
to this information will be the principal investigator and her supervisors. 
 
It is also important to note that these questionnaires are designed to capture a wide range of human 
experience – for most people, only some of the items will be relevant. Nonetheless, it is still very 
useful to have your responses to all items even if it is to report “not present” on the questionnaires.  
 
In part two of the study, which will take place 6 - 8 weeks after the first set of questionnaires, you will 
be asked to complete a much shorter series of questionnaires, repeating some of the measures you 
completed previously. You will be asked questions on the following topics:   
• Your mood, and your tendency to engage in rumination and worry 
• Your current levels of stress 
 
To take part in the first part of this study, after reading the information and giving your informed 
consent, you can answer the questionnaires online by following the link at the bottom of this page. 
For the second part of the study, you will receive an e-mail invitation approximately 6 – 8 weeks after 
you participate in part one of the study. The e-mail will contain a web link, which you can follow to 
complete the second set of questionnaires online. 
 
The first series of questionnaires will take approximately 45 - 55 minutes to complete. The second 
series of questionnaires will take approximately 15 - 20 minutes to complete. 
 
Remuneration 
Part One: All participants completing part one of the study will be entered into a prize draw, where a 
winner will be randomly selected to win an Amazon.co.uk voucher worth £75.  
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Part Two: All participants completing part two, the follow-up questionnaires, will be entered into a 
prize draw, where winners will be randomly selected to win an Amazon.co.uk voucher worth £125. 
All participants who complete both parts of the study will be entered into both prize draws. Prize 
winners will receive their vouchers via e-mail.  
Course credits: Undergraduate students studying for the Psychology BA/BSc at the University of 
Exeter can also receive course credits for the PSY1206 module for their participation, as well as 
being entered into the above prize draw. For completion of part one, students can receive 1 course 
credit. For completion of part two, students can receive 0.5 course credits. After participating in each 
part of the study, please e-mail Rosie Kingston (refk201@exeter.ac.uk), if you are an undergraduate 
student at Exeter and wish to receive course credits for your participation in this study. 
 
Potential risks and ethical considerations 
We note that there some of the questionnaires ask about personal information, negative moods and 
past upsetting events relating to childhood experiences and abuse, and there is a chance that some 
participants may find reporting on these experiences upsetting. You do not have to respond to 
questions which you do not feel comfortable answering, and if at any point you do not wish to 
continue, you can stop answering the questions at any time. We note that the questionnaires will ask 
you to report on whether or not particular types of difficult events occurred, but will not ask you to 
provide specific details, or explore the events in depth. The following link provides some sources of 
support should you require help with any of the issues that this study may raise: [see Sources of 
Help document]. Should you need any further assistance, please contact the principal investigator, 
Rosie Kingston (refk201@exeter.ac.uk), or her supervisors, who are qualified clinical psychologists, 
for further advice and guidance. 
 
One of the questionnaires is designed to measure symptoms of depression. A high score on this 
questionnaire may indicate that you are currently experiencing clinical depression. If you score highly 
on this questionnaire, or if you report a high level of suicidal thinking, the principal investigator will 
send you an e-mail with some more information about depression, and about where to seek help. 
The aim of the e-mail is to provide you with some information and resources that you may find 
helpful, should you not already be managing or seeking help for your symptoms. This does not affect 
your participation in this study in any way, and if you receive this e-mail, you may proceed to 
participate in the second part of the study as described above. 
 
Confidentiality 
The information that you give in response to the questionnaires will be kept strictly confidential, 
except as may be required by law or the ethical professional guidelines that govern psychologists. 
Your responses to the questionnaires will not be personally identifiable; all information will be 
identified by an identification code, and not your name or e-mail address. Your e-mail address is 
required for prize draw entry, and to link your response data from part one and part two of the study. 
Your e-mail address will be stored separately from the questionnaire response data. This, and any 
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other personally identifying information, will never be associated with any research publications that 
report the results of the questionnaires. Should you request it, your data will be destroyed at any time. 
  
Withdrawal  
Your participation in this study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your consent to 
participate in this study at any time. 
 
Invitation to ask further questions 
If you have any questions about this study, or are unsure about any aspect of the information 
presented here, please contact the investigator, Rosie Kingston (refk201@exeter.ac.uk). You should 
ask any questions you have concerning this research before you give your consent to participate in 
this study. 
 
Consent 
Please check the following boxes to indicate your agreement with the statements and your giving of 
informed consent to participate in this research study. 
 
I confirm that I am at least 18 years old.  
I confirm that I have read and understood the information presented to me about this study, 
and have received answers to any questions I asked. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw from the study 
at any time, without giving any reason.  
I give my consent to take part in this research study, which involves completing 
questionnaires online on two occasions separated by 6 - 8 weeks. 
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Study 3 
Study Information Sheet: Investigating Personality and Thinking Styles 
 
Purpose of Study 
This experiment is designed to investigate various aspects of your personality. Specifically, 
we will look at the way you respond to problems, and how easily those ways of responding 
come to mind. Also, we will get you to think about your personality, and the particular 
characteristics you find desirable or undesirable. You will also do a simple breathing and 
thought sampling exercise between the tasks, to assess what was on your mind during the 
experiment, and to see if the effect of one task carries on to another. 
 
Procedure 
There are a few different tasks that you will be asked to do during the experiment. To start, 
you will be asked to do a simple breathing exercise. Then, you will be asked to call to mind 
three different situations when you have repetitively thought about or dwelled on a problem, 
and you’ll be asked to fill in a questionnaire which examines the way in which you thought 
about the problem and the effect it had on you. Before moving on to the next task, you’ll 
complete the breathing exercise for a second time. Then, you’ll be asked to fill in a 
questionnaire that asks you to think about your personality, and the personality characteristics 
that you find desirable or undesirable. You will then complete the breathing exercise for a 
third time. The session will finish with you being given a final pack of questionnaires to 
complete, before being debriefed. The whole session will last approximately 40 minutes. 
 
Remuneration 
Participants will receive a single payment of £5 (subject to funding availability) or 1.5 course 
credits for PSY1206 for their participation in this study. At the end of the experiment, you will 
be asked whether you wish to receive payment or course credit. 
 
Potential Risks and Ethical Considerations 
The main risk associated with participation in this study is possible discomfort when 
answering some personal questions. No other risks are known to the investigators at this time. 
 
Confidentiality 
The information you give in this study will be kept strictly confidential, except as may be 
required by law or the ethical professional guidelines that govern psychologists (e.g., if 
something is revealed that suggests that you are at significant risk of harm to yourself or 
others, in which case information may be disclosed to a doctor or another professional, but 
normally only after discussion with you). No-one outside of the research team immediately 
involved with this specific research study will see or have access to any of the data you 
provide in this study. All personally identifying information will be deleted from questionnaires 
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prior to any analysis, and will never be associated with any research publications or 
presentations that report the results of this study. Should you wish it, you can request that the 
data you provide (i.e., questionnaires and/or audio tapes) be destroyed at any time.  
 
Withdrawal  
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your 
consent to participate at any time. You do not need to provide any explanation if you do not 
wish to continue with the study. 
 
Invitation to Ask Further Questions 
If you have any questions relating to any aspect of this study, or if you find any part of this 
information unclear, please ask the experimenter for clarification now. 
 
Consent 
If you wish to take part in this study, please inform the experimenter, who will provide you with 
a Consent Form to sign. If you have any questions about the study, please make sure to ask 
them before signing this form. Even if you sign the consent form, you remain free to withdraw 
from the study at any time. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
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Consent Form 
 
Study Title: Investigating Personality and Thinking Styles 
Name of Researchers: Rosemary Kingston, PhD student, supervised by Prof. Ed Watkins 
and Dr. Heather O’Mahen 
 
Please tick the box if you agree with the statement: 
 
1. I have read and understood the study information sheet, and have had the  
opportunity to ask questions.  
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw  
from the experiment at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
 
3. I give my informed consent to participate in this study. 
 
 
Participant name (please print):  _____________________________________________ 
Participant signature: _______________________________    Date:________________ 
Experimenter name: ________________________________    Date: ________________ 
 
If you would be willing to be contacted about participating in other research studies that are 
being conducted in the Mood Disorders Centre at the University of Exeter, please write your 
e-mail address below. If you would prefer not to be contacted, please leave this section blank.  
E-mail address: __________________________________________________________ 
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Study 4 
Study Information Sheet: Cognitive Abilities and Thinking Styles 
 
Purpose of Study 
This study is designed to investigate various aspects of your personality, specifically, the way 
you respond to problems, and how easily those ways of responding come to mind; and how 
these might be linked to some specific cognitive abilities. You will also do a simple breathing 
and thought sampling exercise between the tasks, just to assess what was on your mind 
during the experiment, and to see if the effect of one task carries on to another. 
 
Procedure 
There are a few different tasks that you will be asked to do during the experiment. To start, 
you will be asked to do a simple breathing exercise. Then, you will be asked to call to mind 
two different situations when you have repetitively thought about or dwelled on a problem, 
and the experimenter will ask some questions that examine the way you thought about the 
problem and the effect it had on you, and you’ll be asked to speak your answers aloud (if you 
consent to this, this section will be audio-recorded). Before moving on to the next task, you’ll 
complete the breathing exercise for a second time. Then, you’ll be asked to complete a short 
cognitive task, which involves unscrambling anagrams to make real words as quickly and 
accurately as possible. You will then complete the breathing exercise for a third time. The 
session will finish with you being given a final pack of questionnaires to complete, before 
being debriefed. The whole session will last approximately 60 – 70 minutes. 
 
Remuneration 
Participants will receive a single payment of £5 or 1.5 course credits for PSY1206 for their 
participation in this study.  
 
Potential Risks and Ethical Considerations 
The main risk associated with participation in this study is possible discomfort when 
answering some personal questions. No other risks are known to the investigators at this time. 
 
Confidentiality 
The information you give in this study will be kept strictly confidential, except as may be 
required by law or the ethical professional guidelines that govern psychologists (e.g., if 
something is revealed that suggests that you are at significant risk of harm to yourself or 
others, in which case information may be disclosed to a doctor or another professional, but 
normally only after discussion with you). No-one outside of the research team immediately 
involved with this specific research study will see or have access to any of the data you 
provide in this study. All personally identifying information will be deleted from questionnaires 
prior to any analysis, and will never be associated with any research publications or 
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presentations that report the results of this study. Should you wish it, you can request that the 
data you provide (i.e., questionnaires and/or audio recordings) be destroyed at any time.  
 
Withdrawal  
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your 
consent to participate at any time. You do not need to provide any explanation if you do not 
wish to continue with the study. 
 
Invitation to Ask Further Questions 
If you have any questions relating to any aspect of this study, or if you find any part of this 
information unclear, please ask the experimenter for clarification now. 
 
Consent 
If you wish to take part in this study, please inform the experimenter, who will provide you with 
a Consent Form to sign. If you have any questions about the study, please make sure to ask 
them before signing this form. Even if you sign the consent form, you remain free to withdraw 
from the study at any time. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
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Consent Form 
 
Study Title: Cognitive Abilities and Thinking Styles 
Name of Researchers: Rosemary Kingston, PhD student, supervised by Prof. Ed Watkins 
and Dr. Heather O’Mahen 
 
Please tick the box if you agree with the statement: 
 
1. I have read and understood the study information sheet, and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions.  
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw from the 
experiment at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
 
3. I give consent to have my verbal responses to questions from the researcher about times 
when I have repeatedly thought about problems audio-recorded for further analysis. 
 
 
4. I give my informed consent to participate in this study.  
 
 
Participant name (please print): ______________________________________________ 
Participant signature: ________________________________  Date: _________________ 
Experimenter name: _________________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
If you would be willing to be contacted about participating in other research studies that are 
being conducted in the Mood Disorders Centre at the University of Exeter, please write your 
e-mail address below. If you would prefer not to be contacted, please leave this section blank.  
E-mail address: ___________________________________________________________ 
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Study 5 
Study Information Sheet: Assertiveness and Thinking Styles 
 
Purpose of Study 
The purpose of this study is to explore the factors which make it easy or hard for individuals to 
be assertive with people they are close to, when faced with particular problems or concerns. 
Specifically, the study will examine whether certain ways of thinking about problems or 
concerns can help people to find it easier to put assertiveness into action.  
 
Procedure 
There are a few different tasks which you will be asked to do during the experiment. To start, 
you will be asked to fill in some questionnaires about yourself, to get an idea of how you are 
currently feeling, and the sort of person that you are. You will then be asked to identify a 
current personal issue which you’d like to be assertive about. You will be given some 
questionnaires which explore this concern in more detail, and then you’ll be asked to take part 
in a short exercise, where you will spend a few moments thinking through the assertiveness 
issue. Next, you’ll be asked to think about being assertive – with the experimenter prompting 
you with a series of questions to help you think about the issue in a certain way, which are 
intended to help you become more assertive. This discussion will be recorded on a digital 
audio recorder. The session will finish with you being given a final pack of questionnaires to 
complete. The whole session will last approximately 45 minutes. 
 
Two weeks after the initial session, the experimenter will contact you via e-mail, inviting you to 
complete a very brief electronic questionnaire (less than 5 minutes), to see if you were able to 
take any action with the assertiveness issue, and talk to the other person about your concern. 
You are under no obligation to do anything or take any action relating to the issue you 
identified in the initial session; this brief questionnaire is simply to identify whether or not 
participating in the session today has any effect on your future assertiveness. 
 
Remuneration 
Participants will receive a single payment of £5 or 1 course credit for PSY1206 for their 
participation in this study. At the end of the experiment, you will be asked whether you wish to 
receive payment or course credit. 
 
Potential Risks and Ethical Considerations 
The main risk associated with participation in this study is possible discomfort when 
answering some personal questions during the questionnaires or interview. It is possible that 
some participants may feel anxious or uncomfortable when thinking about confronting the 
assertiveness issue. No other risks are known to the investigators at this time. 
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Confidentiality 
The information you give in this study will be kept strictly confidential, except as may be 
required by law or the ethical professional guidelines that govern psychologists (e.g., if 
something is revealed that suggests that you are at significant risk of harm to yourself or 
others, in which case information may be disclosed to a doctor or another professional, but 
normally only after discussion with you). No-one outside of the research team immediately 
involved with this specific research study will see or have access to any of the data you 
provide in this study. All personally identifying information will be deleted from audio tapes 
and questionnaires prior to any analysis, and will never be associated with any research 
publications or presentations that report the results of this study. Audio recordings of the brief 
interview will only be heard by the experimenter and the immediate team directly involved in 
this research to assist in analysing information for the purposes of the study. Furthermore, the 
audio recordings will be used solely for the purposes above, in accordance with the ethical 
standards of confidentiality that govern psychologists. The audio recordings will be destroyed 
within two years of completion of the study. Should you wish it, you can request that the data 
you provide (i.e., questionnaires and/or audio tapes) be destroyed at any time.  
 
Withdrawal  
Your participation in this research study is entirely voluntary, and you may withdraw your 
consent to participate at any time. You do not need to provide any explanation if you do not 
wish to continue with the study. 
 
Invitation to Ask Further Questions 
If you have any questions relating to any aspect of this study, or if you find any part of this 
information unclear, please ask the experimenter for clarification now. 
 
Consent 
If you wish to take part in this study, please inform the experimenter, who will provide you with 
a Consent Form to sign. If you have any questions about the study, please make sure to ask 
them before signing this form. Even if you sign the consent form, you remain free to withdraw 
from the study at any time. 
 
Thank you for reading this information sheet. 
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Consent Form 
 
Study Title: Assertiveness and Thinking Styles 
Name of Researchers: Rosemary Kingston, PhD student, supervised by Prof. Ed Watkins 
and Dr. Heather O’Mahen 
 
Please tick the box if you agree with the statement: 
 
1. I have read and understood the study information sheet, and have had the opportunity to 
ask questions.  
 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw from the 
experiment at any time, without giving a reason.  
 
 
3. I understand that this study involves me talking to the researcher about an assertivness 
issue that I have not yet resolved with the person or people it concerns. 
 
 
4. I give consent to have my verbal responses to questions from the researcher about being 
assertive audio-recorded for further analysis. 
  
 
5. I give my informed consent to participate in this study.  
 
 
Participant name (please print): ______________________________________________ 
Participant signature: ________________________________ Date: _________________ 
Experimenter name: _________________________________  Date: _________________ 
 
If you would be willing to be contacted about participating in other research studies that are 
being conducted in the Mood Disorders Centre at the University of Exeter, please write your 
e-mail address below. If you would prefer not to be contacted, please leave this section blank.  
E-mail address: ___________________________________________________________  
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Appendix 3: Supplementary Ethical Protocols 
Some of the studies reported in this thesis involved the potential risk of 
participants becoming distressed whilst participating. As such, some specific ethical 
protocols were developed for these studies, which are outlined as follows. 
Study 1 and Study 2 
Study 1/Study 2 involved the risk of participant distress relating to the 
completion of self-report measures exploring highly personal issues, specifically, 
depression and the experience of childhood abuse. As such, a thorough and carefully 
conceived protocol was developed and ethically approved for dealing with the report 
of moderate/severe symptoms of depression, the report of thoughts of suicide or self-
harm, and/or the report of physical or sexual abuse in childhood.  
If reporting moderate/severe symptoms of depression (BDI-II score >= 20) 
and/or suicidal thoughts or thoughts of self-harm (scoring 2 or 3 on item 9 on the 
BDI-II), an e-mail was sent (see Figure 8.1). The text was modified to reflect whether 
the participant reported a high BDI score, suicidal/self-harm thoughts, or both high 
BDI score and suicidal/self-harm thoughts. A PDF file was also attached to the e-mail, 
which was an electronic copy of a leaflet produced by the Royal College of 
Psychiatrists, which contained more information about depression and seeking help.  
 
Hello,  
 
You are receiving this e-mail because you recently participated in a research study, 
where you completed a series of online questionnaires designed to investigate 
individual differences in worry and rumination. Thank you very much for your 
participation. 
 
The reason I am contacting you again is because on one of the questionnaires, the 
Beck Depression Inventory, you scored above a particular threshold score, indicating 
that you may currently be experiencing a high level of symptoms of depression 
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and/or that you may currently be experiencing a high level of thoughts about 
suicide or self-harm.  
 
You may not be interested in receiving any information about depression, or you 
may already be managing or seeking help for your symptoms. Alternatively, what you 
reported in the questionnaires may have resolved itself since you completed the 
questionnaires, or the questionnaires may have exaggerated how distressed you were 
feeling (which can sometimes happen since questionnaires only have limited response 
options). If any of the above is the case, please feel free to disregard this e-mail. 
This does not affect your participation in this study in any way – if you wish to 
participate in part two of the study, please follow the link in the follow-up e-mail you 
will receive at a later date. 
 
However, if you are experiencing these difficulties and not currently receiving help, or 
if you are interested in receiving some more information about depression, you may 
find the following information helpful.  
 
First of all, there is a PDF attached to this email that provides useful information on 
depression.  
 
Second, if you are experiencing depression or suicidal thoughts, and you are 
currently not receiving any treatment, it is strongly recommended that you make an 
appointment with your GP to talk about how you are feeling and to consider 
treatment options. Your GP is there to support you and can either directly provide 
treatment (e.g., by prescribing medication, if that is appropriate and your choice), or 
can access other treatments (such as psychological therapy) for you. 
 
Third, if you want immediate support or advice for any difficulties, we recommend 
you contact the following: 
 
Samaritans  
Samaritans provides confidential emotional support, 24 hours a day, for people who 
are experiencing feelings of distress or despair. Samaritans are there if you’re 
worried about something, feel upset or confused, or just want to talk to someone.  
Telephone (24 hours): 08457 90 90 90 
E-mail: jo@samaritans.org  
Website: http://www.samaritans.org  
Address: Chris, P.O. Box 9090, Stirling, FK8 2SA 
 
Depression Alliance 
Depression Alliance is a charity which aims to assist people who are affected by 
depression. Depression Alliance offer information, a range of publications, self-help 
and support groups for people with depression.  
Telephone (to request an information pack): 0845 123 23 20 
E-mail: information@depressionalliance.org 
Website: http://www.depressionalliance.org 
Address: Depression Alliance, 20 Great Dover Street, London, SE1 4LX 
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SANEline 
SANEline is a national out-of-hours telephone helpline, offering emotional support and 
information for people affected by mental health problems. They also offer e-mail 
support through SANEmail, their e-mail service.  
Telephone (6pm – 11pm, daily): 0845 767 8000 
E-mail: visit http://www.sane.org.uk/SANEmail  
Website: http://www.sane.org.uk/SANEline  
Address: 1st Floor Cityside House, 40 Adler Street, London E1 1EE 
 
National Association for People Abused in Childhood (NAPAC) 
NAPAC offers support for adult survivors of any form of childhood abuse, including 
sexual, physical and emotional abuse, and neglect. They offer support, advice and 
guidance via their national freephone support line, by e-mail, and in writing. They 
can also provide information about local support services. 
Telephone (see website for current opening hours): 0800 085 3330 
E-mail: info@napac.org.uk  
Website: http://www.napac.org.uk  
Address: NAPAC, 42 Curtain Road, London, EC2A 3NH 
 
Fourth, if you have any specific questions or concerns, please contact me at 
refk201@exeter.ac.uk, and I or my supervisors, who are qualified and experienced 
clinical psychologists, will provide further advice and guidance. 
 
Kind regards, 
Rosie Kingston 
Principal Investigator – Understanding Worry and Rumination Study 
 
Figure 8.1. E-mail sent to participants reporting moderate/severe symptoms of 
depression and/or thoughts of suicide or self-harm.  
 
For participants reporting particular abuse experiences on the Life Events 
Questionnaire, an alternative e-mail was sent (see Figure 8.2). Consideration was 
given as to which items or combinations of items should trigger the e-mail, since 
certain items could be endorsed without the participant intending to indicate that they 
had experienced abuse (e.g., reporting being hit or kicked could indicate an abusive 
incident, or it could indicate a less serious incident, for example, a minor fight with a 
sibling). As such, the e-mail was sent if any of the following conditions were met: 
 
(i) Answering “yes” to any of the sexual abuse items (LEQ questions 39 - 64); 
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(ii) Answering “yes” to three or more of the following physical abuse items: Q29 
“Did anyone ever throw or push you?”; Q31 “Were you ever hit hard with a 
fist, kicked, or slapped really hard?”; Q32 “Were you ever beaten up?”; Q33 
“Did any adults ever hit you with an object?”. 
(iii) Answering “yes” to one or more of the following physical abuse items: Q28 
“Did any of your caretakers fail to protect you from physical harm?”; Q30 
“Did anyone ever lock you in a room or closet for several hours?”; Q34 “Did 
anyone ever try to choke, strangle or smother you?”; Q35 “Did anyone ever 
deliberately cause you serious physical pain?”; Q36 “Did anyone ever attack 
you with a weapon?”; Q37 “Were you ever tied up so you could not protect 
yourself from harm?; Q39 “Did a boyfriend/girlfriend/date ever hit, kick, 
shove or throw you?”  
Hello, 
 
You are receiving this e-mail because you recently participated in a research study, 
where you completed a series of online questionnaires designed to investigate 
individual differences in worry and rumination. Thank you very much for your 
participation.  
 
The reason I am contacting you again is because on one of the questionnaires, the 
Life Events Questionnaire, you reported items that could indicate that you may have 
experienced physical and/or sexual abuse before you were 16 years old.  
You may not be interested in receiving any information for adult survivors of abuse, 
or you may feel that you do not want or need any help or support. Alternatively, the 
questionnaires may have exaggerated the impact, frequency or severity of the 
incident that you reported (e.g., you may have reported that you had been hit, 
kicked or pushed, but this may have been by a sibling and you but do not feel as 
though this constitutes physical abuse). If this is the case, please feel free to 
disregard this e-mail. This does not affect your participation in this study in any way 
– if you wish to participate in part two of the study, please follow the link in the 
follow-up e-mail you will receive at a later date.  
 
However, if you are experiencing any difficulty or distress following your experience, 
and you are not currently receiving help, or if you are interested in receiving more 
information for adults who were abused in childhood, you may find the following 
organisations helpful.   
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National Association for People Abused in Childhood (NAPAC) 
NAPAC offers support for adult survivors of any form of childhood abuse, including 
sexual, physical and emotional abuse, and neglect. They offer support, advice and 
guidance via their national freephone support line, by e-mail, and in writing. They 
can also provide information about local support services. 
Telephone (see website for current opening hours): 0800 085 3330 
E-mail: info@napac.org.uk  
Website: http://www.napac.org.uk  
Address: NAPAC, 42 Curtain Road, London, EC2A 3NH 
 
Help for Adult Victims of Child Abuse (HAVOCA) 
HAVOCA is an organisation which aims to provide help, support and information for 
any adult who has experienced abuse in childhood. The website contains a large 
amount of information and resources, and also contains details of local support 
organisations. 
Website: http://www.havoca.org/HAVOCA_home.htm  
 
Samaritans  
Samaritans provides confidential emotional support, 24 hours a day, for people who 
are experiencing feelings of distress or despair. Samaritans are there if you’re 
worried about something, feel upset or confused, or just want to talk to someone.  
Telephone (24 hours): 08457 90 90 90 
E-mail: jo@samaritans.org  
Website: http://www.samaritans.org  
Address: Chris, P.O. Box 9090, Stirling, FK8 2SA 
 
Finally, if you have any specific questions or concerns, please contact me at 
refk201@exeter.ac.uk, and I or my supervisors, who are qualified and experienced 
clinical psychologists, will provide further advice and guidance. 
 
Kind regards, 
Rosie Kingston 
Principal Investigator – Understanding Worry and Rumination Study 
 
Figure 8.2. E-mail sent to participants reporting certain childhood abuse or 
maltreatment experiences.   
 
For participants reporting high levels of depression symptoms as well as abuse 
experiences, an e-mail was sent combining the messages displayed in Figure 8.1 and 
Figure 8.2. Participant responses were screened as quickly as possible after being 
submitted and all necessary e-mails were sent within 24 hours of the response being 
submitted. As such, using this e-mail sending procedure, I was able to respond in an 
ethically sensitive way to participant risk and report of distressing experiences.   
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Study 5 
As Study 5 involved participants having to talk in detail about a current and 
unresolved interpersonal difficulty, a protocol was developed to deal with participant 
distress, or participant disclosure of risk to self or others. The protocol is displayed 
below. 
 
To be triggered if the participant raises a very serious topic when asked to identify an 
assertiveness issue, or identifies an issue where they, or someone else, is at risk; or if 
participant becomes distressed during the session. Rough wording: 
“That sounds like a really difficult problem. Can I just ask if this is something you’ve 
sought help for/have you had any help for this?” 
Whether yes or no: 
“It seems as though this topic might be difficult/upsetting to talk about. Are you happy 
to continue, or would you like us to stop the session now? Please let me know what 
you would prefer to do, there is no pressure to continue if you do not feel comfortable.” 
Experimenter to terminate the session immediately if participant does not wish to continue. If 
participant does wish to continue, experimenter may still discontinue the session if the 
participant appears distressed. 
 
If participant disclosure relates to mental health problems (not including suicide risk), and they 
do not say that they have had any help with it, say something like: “I would strongly 
encourage you to make an appointment to speak with your GP about these feelings.” 
 
If participant disclosure relates to someone else harming them, and they do not say that they 
have any help with it, say something like: “Have you spoken to the police about this? If you 
have been harmed/are at risk of being harmed in the future, it is really important that you tell 
the police.” 
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If participant discloses anything suggesting that they are having thoughts of suicide, enact 
MDC Risk Protocol. 
 
If experimenter is seriously concerned about the welfare of the participant at any stage (i.e., 
they seem very distressed, and/or have not sought any help at all for a serious problem), 
whether or not they choose to continue with the session, say something like: “This sounds like 
a very serious issue and I am concerned for your wellbeing at this moment. I think it might be 
helpful for me to get my supervisor, because it’s important to make sure you are receiving the 
right kind of support. I’m just going to telephone him now.” 
 
Experimenter also has copy of “Sources of Support” document, containing contact details for 
various support organisations, to give to participant if appropriate.  
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Appendix 4: Measures, Tasks, Interview Scripts, and Coding Protocols  
Measures, tasks, interview scripts, and interview coding protocols that are 
non-copyright or that have been developed for this thesis will be reported in this 
appendix as follows. 
Measures 
 
Measure Author(s) Page No. 
Response Styles Questionnaire – 
Ruminative Response Scale (RSQ-RRS) 
Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991 
421 
Penn State Worry Questionnaire (PSWQ) Meyer, Miller, Metzger, & 
Borkovec, 1990 
423 
Patient Health Questionnaire (PHQ-9) Kroenke, Spitzer, & 
Williams, 2001 
424 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI-
State) 
Spielberger, 1989 425 
Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) Cohen & Williamson, 1988 426 
Children’s Report of Parental Behaviour 
Inventory (CRPBI-30) 
Schludermann & 
Schludermann, 1988 
427 
Life Events Questionnaire (LEQ) Gibb et al., 2001 429 
Revised Eysenck Personality 
Questionnaire – Neuroticism Short Form 
(EPQR-N-SF) 
Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barratt, 
1985 
436 
Why Ruminate scale Watkins & Baracaia, 2001 437 
Problem Elaboration Questionnaire 
(PEQ) 
Stöber & Borkovec, 2002 439 
Effortful Control Scale (EC Scale) Lonigan & Phillips, 2001 440 
Integrated Self-Discrepancy Index (ISDI) Hardin & Lakin, 2009; 
modified for Study 5 
441 
Circumplex Measure of Affect Larsen & Diener, 1992; 
Russell, 1980 
444 
Appraisals of the usefulness of RNT Developed for Study 3 and 
Study 4 
445 
Sense of understanding and insight Developed for Study 5 446 
Sense of confidence and control Developed for Study 5 447 
Assertiveness self-efficacy Developed for Study 5 448 
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Tasks 
 
Task Author(s) Page No. 
Breathing exercise and measurement of 
state RNT 
Adapted from Hirsch, Hayes, 
& Mathews, 2009; developed 
for Study 3 and Study 4 
449 
Writing exercise manipulation of 
appraisals of RNT 
Developed for Study 3 450 
Anagram stressor task Watkins, Moberly, & 
Moulds, 2008 
452 
 
 
Interview Scripts 
 
Interview Script Author(s) Page No. 
Interview manipulation of appraisals of 
RNT 
Developed for Study 4 454 
Interview manipulation of abstract 
rumination versus concrete thinking 
processing mode 
Developed for Study 5 458 
 
 
Interview Coding Protocols 
 
Interview Coding Protocol Authors(s) Page No. 
Abstract versus concrete processing Stöber & Borkovec, 2002 462 
Justification for avoidance Developed for Study 5 464 
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RSQ-RRS 
People think and do many different things when they feel down, sad or depressed. 
Please read each of the items below and indicate whether you never, sometimes, 
often, or always think or do each one when you feel down, sad or depressed. Please 
indicate what you generally do, not what you think you should do, by placing a tick 
in the appropriate box. 
 
 
Almost           Almost 
Never     Sometimes    Often       Always 
 
 
1. Think about how alone you feel. 
 
2. Think “I won’t be able to do my 
job/work because I feel so bad” 
 
3. Think about your feelings of fatigue 
and achiness 
 
4. Think about how hard it is to 
concentrate 
 
5. Think about how passive and 
unmotivated you feel 
 
6. Analyse recent events to try and 
understand why you are depressed. 
 
7. Think about how you don’t seem to 
feel anything anymore 
 
8. Think “Why can’t I get going?” 
 
9. Think “Why do I always react this 
way?” 
 
10. Go away by yourself and think about 
why you feel this way 
 
11. Write down what you are thinking 
about and analyse it 
 
12. Think about a recent situation, wishing 
it would have gone better 
 
13. Think “Why do I have problems other 
people don’t have?” 
 
14. Think about how sad you feel 
 
15. Think about all your shortcomings, 
failings, faults and mistakes 
!   427 
 
Almost           Almost 
Never     Sometimes    Often       Always 
 
16. Think about how you don’t feel up to 
doing anything 
 
17. Analyse your personality to try and 
understand why you are depressed 
 
18. Go someplace alone to think about 
your feelings 
 
19. Think about how angry you are with 
yourself 
 
20. Listen to sad music 
 
21. Isolate yourself and think about the 
reasons why you feel sad 
 
22. Try to understand yourself by focusing 
on your depressed mood 
 
23. Think “What am I doing to deserve 
this?” 
 
24. Think “I won’t be able to concentrate if 
I keep feeling this way”.  
 
25. Think “Why can’t I handle things 
better?”
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PSWQ 
Enter the number that best describes how typical or characteristic each item is of you, putting the number 
next to the item. 
 
            1 2 3 4 5 
not at all typical  somewhat typical  very typical 
 
_____  1. If I don't have enough time to do everything, I don't worry about it. 
_____  2. My worries overwhelm me. 
_____  3. I don't tend to worry about things. 
_____  4. Many situations make me worry. 
_____  5. I know I shouldn't worry about things, but I just can't help it. 
_____  6. When I am under pressure I worry a lot. 
_____  7. I am always worrying about something. 
_____  8. I find it easy to dismiss worrisome thoughts. 
_____  9. As soon as I finish one task, I start to worry about everything else I have to do. 
_____  10. I never worry about anything. 
_____  11. When there is nothing more I can do about a concern, I don't worry about it anymore. 
_____  12. I've been a worrier all my life. 
_____  13. I notice that I have been worrying about things. 
_____  14. Once I start worrying, I can't stop. 
_____  15. I worry all the time. 
_____  16. I worry about projects until they are all done. 
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PHQ-9 
 
Over the last 2 weeks, how often have you been bothered by any of the following 
problems? 
 
 
 
Not 
at all 
Several 
days 
More 
than 
half the 
days 
Nearly 
every 
day 
1. Little interest or pleasure in doing things 0 1 2 3 
2. Feeling down, depressed, or hopeless 0 1 2 3 
3. Trouble falling or staying asleep, or 
sleeping too much 0 1 2 3 
4. Feeling tired or having little energy 0 1 2 3 
5. Poor appetite or overeating 0 1 2 3 
6. Feeling bad about yourself – or that you 
are a failure or have let yourself or your 
family down 
0 1 2 3 
7. Trouble concentrating on things, such as 
reading the newspaper or watching television 0 1 2 3 
8. Moving or speaking so slowly that other 
people could have noticed. Or the opposite – 
being so fidgety or restless that you have 
been moving around a lot more than usual 
0 1 2 3 
9. Thoughts that you would be better off 
dead or of hurting yourself in some way 0 1 2 3 
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STAI-State 
 
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below. Read 
each statement and then circle the appropriate value to the right of the statement to indicate how 
you have been feeling during the last two weeks, including today. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Do not spend too much time on any one statement but give the answer which seems to 
describe your present feelings best. 
 
I feel calm    not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel secure    not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I am tense   not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel strained    not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel at ease   not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel upset  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I am presently worrying about possible 
misfortunes 
not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel satisfied   not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel frightened not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel comfortable  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel self-confident  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel nervous  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I am jittery  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel indecisive not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I am relaxed  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel content  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I am worried  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel confused not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel steady  not at all somewhat moderately very much 
I feel pleasant not at all somewhat moderately very much 
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PSS 
The questions in this scale ask you about your feelings and thoughts during the last month. 
In each case, you will be asked to indicate by circling how often you felt or thought a certain 
way. 
 
0 = Never    1 = Almost Never   2 = Sometimes    3 = Fairly Often    4 = Very Often 
 
 
1. In the last month, how often have you been 
upset because of something that happened 
unexpectedly?  
 
2. In the last month, how often have you felt 
that you were unable to control the important 
things in your life? 
 
3. In the last month, how often have you felt 
nervous and “stressed”?  
 
4. In the last month, how often have you felt 
confident about your ability to handle your 
personal problems? 
 
5. In the last month, how often have you felt 
things were going your way? 
 
6. In the last month, how often have you found 
that you could not cope with all the things you 
had to do? 
 
7. In the last month, how often have you been 
able to control irritations in your life? 
 
8. In the last month, how often have you felt 
that you were on top of things? 
 
9. In the last month, how often have you been 
angered because of things that were outside of 
your control? 
 
10. In the last month, how often have you felt 
difficulties were piling up so high that you could 
not have overcome them? 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 
    432 
CRBPI-30 
Please read each statement on the following pages and circle the answer that most closely describes the 
way each of your parents acted toward you, before you were 16 years old. 
If you think the statement describes a person who was Not Like your parent, circle 1. 
If you think the statement describes a person who was Somewhat Like your parent, circle 2. 
If you think the statement describes a person who was A Lot Like your parent, circle 3. 
MY MOTHER WAS A PERSON WHO … Not Like 
Some-
what 
Like 
A Lot 
Like 
1.  … made me feel better after talking over my worries with her. 1 2 3 
2.  … told me of all the things she had done for me. 1 2 3 
3.  … believed in having a lot of rules and sticking with them. 1 2 3 
4.  … smiled at me often. 1 2 3 
5.  … said, if I really cared for her, I would not do things that caused    
        her to worry. 1 2 3 
6.  … insisted that I must do exactly as I was told. 1 2 3 
7.  … was able to make me feel better when I was                                           
        upset. 1 2 3 
8.  … was always telling me how I should behave. 1 2 3 
9.  … was very strict with me. 1 2 3 
10.  … enjoyed doing things with me. 1 2 3 
11.  … would have liked to be able to tell me what to do all the time. 1 2 3 
12.  … gave hard punishment. 1 2 3 
13.  … cheered me up when I was sad. 1 2 3 
14.  … wanted to control whatever I did. 1 2 3 
15.  … was easy with me. 1 2 3 
16.  … gave me a lot of care and attention. 1 2 3 
17.  … was always trying to change me. 1 2 3 
18.  … let me off easy when I did something wrong. 1 2 3 
19.  … made me feel like the most important person in her life. 1 2 3 
20.  … only kept rules when it suited her. 1 2 3 
21.  … gave me as much freedom as I wanted. 1 2 3 
22.  … believed in showing her love for me. 1 2 3 
23.  … was less friendly with me, if I did not see things her way. 1 2 3 
24.  … let me go any place I pleased without asking. 1 2 3 
25.  … often praised me. 1 2 3 
26.  … would avoid looking at me when I had disappointed her. 1 2 3 
27.  ... let me go out any evening I wanted. 1 2 3 
28.  … was easy to talk to. 1 2 3 
29.  … if I had hurt her feelings, stopped talking to me until I pleased  
          her again. 1 2 3 
30.  … let me do anything I liked to do. 1 2 3 
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MY FATHER WAS A PERSON WHO … Not Like 
Some-
what 
Like 
A Lot 
Like 
1.  … made me feel better after talking over my worries with him. 1 2 3 
2.  … told me of all the things he had done for me. 1 2 3 
3.  … believed in having a lot of rules and sticking with them. 1 2 3 
4.  … smiled at me often. 1 2 3 
5.  … said, if I really cared for him, I would not do things that caused    
        him to worry. 1 2 3 
6.  … insisted that I must do exactly as I was told. 1 2 3 
7.  … was able to make me feel better when I was                                           
        upset. 1 2 3 
8.  … was always telling me how I should behave. 1 2 3 
9.  … was very strict with me. 1 2 3 
10.  … enjoyed doing things with me. 1 2 3 
11.  … would have liked to be able to tell me what to do all the time. 1 2 3 
12.  … gave hard punishment. 1 2 3 
13.  … cheered me up when I was sad. 1 2 3 
14.  … wanted to control whatever I did. 1 2 3 
15.  … was easy with me. 1 2 3 
16.  … gave me a lot of care and attention. 1 2 3 
17.  … was always trying to change me. 1 2 3 
18.  … let me off easy when I did something wrong. 1 2 3 
19.  … made me feel like the most important person in his life. 1 2 3 
20.  … only kept rules when it suited him. 1 2 3 
21.  … gave me as much freedom as I wanted. 1 2 3 
22.  … believed in showing his love for me. 1 2 3 
23.  … was less friendly with me, if I did not see things his way. 1 2 3 
24.  … let me go any place I pleased without asking. 1 2 3 
25.  … often praised me. 1 2 3 
26.  … would avoid looking at me when I had disappointed him. 1 2 3 
27.  ... let me go out any evening I wanted. 1 2 3 
28.  … was easy to talk to. 1 2 3 
29.  … if I had hurt his feelings, stopped talking to me until I pleased  
          him again. 1 2 3 
30.  … let me do anything I liked to do. 1 2 3 
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LEQ (Modified) 
 
Instructions: Please read each item carefully and decide whether you have ever, before you turned 16 
years old, had the experience described. Then circle yes or no to indicate whether you have ever had 
the experience. If you are not sure whether an experience you have had “fits” a given item, please circle 
not sure. 
 
Please note: We use the word “caretaker” throughout this questionnaire to refer to adults who were 
primarily responsible for taking care of you while you were growing up. Parents are the usual caretakers, 
but many people also grew up with other caretaking adults such as step-parents, grandparents, foster 
parents, and others. “Siblings” refers to biological brothers and sisters, as well as stepbrothers and 
stepsisters or adopted siblings.  
 
 
Background Information  
 
A. When you were growing up (i.e., until you left your family home as an adult), who were your primary 
caretakers?  
 
Please circle as many as apply:  
 
1) Biological mother  
2) Biological father  
3) Stepmother  
4) Stepfather  
5) Grandparent  
6) Other (please describe) ____________________________  
 
B. Did you have brothers or sisters (including stepsiblings with whom you lived)? If yes, how many?  
 
Brothers = _____ Sisters = _____  
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1. Did you feel that any of your caretakers clearly preferred your brother(s) or sister(s) over you? For 
example, were much more affectionate, gave more attention or presents or privileges? Or, did any of 
your caretakers ever appear to lavish love or attention on another child while acting in a cold, 
rejecting, or indifferent manner towards you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
2. Did any adults ever say to you that you were not as good as other children? For example, say that you 
were not as smart, friendly, talented, or attractive as another child?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
3. Did any of your caretakers ever say they wished they were not parents or that you had never been 
born?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
4. Did anyone ever say they wished you were dead?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
5. Were you labeled the “black sheep” or the “bad kid” or the “troublemaker” of your family?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
6. Were you often punished unfairly for things you did not do?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
7. Did anyone humiliate or demean you in the presence of other people? (For example, a teacher saying 
you were stupid in the presence of other students, a parent saying you were fat or ugly in front of 
your boy/girlfriend)?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
8. Did anyone ever say negative things to you about your personal attributes (e.g., your intelligence, 
personality, physical appearance, etc.)?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
9. Did anyone ever say very negative things about your personal attributes (e.g., intelligence, personality, 
physical appearance, etc.) in a teasing way? For example, say something critical about you but then 
laugh as if they didn’t mean it.  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
10. Did anyone continue to say something to you that made you feel bad even after you had told them it 
hurt your feelings or you had acted visibly upset?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
11. Did anyone consistently swear at you a lot (e.g., calling you a bitch, bastard, etc.)?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
12. Did anyone say to you that you were selfish, hateful, no-good, mean, or that you had other negative 
qualities?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
13. Did anyone ever say that they weren’t giving you something (e.g., a toy) because you didn’t deserve 
it or you weren’t good enough?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
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14. Did anyone ever tell you that you would be punished or doomed later in life for being a bad person?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
15. Did anyone ever tell you that you wouldn’t succeed in something that was important to you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
16. Were you ever punished for not doing well enough at something even though you had tried very hard 
to succeed?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
17. Did any important person in your life ever express disappointment in your efforts or achievements 
even though you believed you had made your best effort?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
18. Did any important person in your life set such high standards for you that you believed you could not 
meet the standards? Note that “setting standards” may be done directly by telling you what they 
expect of you (e.g., “You should earn an A average”), or indirectly by holding up their own or others’ 
accomplishments as models (e.g., saying “When I was in high school, I was a prefect” while criticising 
your school performance).  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
19. Did any of your caretakers or an important boyfriend or girlfriend or a date ever refuse to speak to 
you (e.g., give you the “silent treatment,” convey messages to you through other people, etc.)?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
20. Did any of your caretakers ever disown you or threaten to disown you or cut off your financial 
support (e.g., say they would leave you out of their will, say they would no longer pay for your 
education expenses even though they had agreed to support you through school)?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
21. Did anyone ever keep you under such strict control that you were unable to participate in activities 
that most other people your age considered ordinary? (For example, a parent demanding that you be 
at home at all times you were not at school so that you could never date or participate in 
extracurricular activities such as dances or clubs?)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
22. Did anyone ever deliberately try to frighten you by “playing tricks” or “practical jokes” on you? For 
example, hiding in your closet at night with a flashlight pointed at his/her face so you were very 
frightened when you opened your closet door, or holding a pillow over your face so you feared you 
would smother, then saying it was a joke?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
23. Did anyone ever deliberately and repeatedly try to frighten you? (For example, by threatening to kill 
you or harm somebody you loved.)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
24. Did anyone ever tell a lie in order to cause you pain? (For example, telling you that your dog had 
been killed when nothing at all had happened to the dog?)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
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25. Did anyone ever try to get you to do what he/she wanted by threatening to do something that would 
have extremely negative consequences for you (not physical consequences)? (For example, 
“blackmailing” you by threatening to spread a rumor that you had AIDS, threatening to tell your 
teacher a lie that you cheated on an exam?)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
26. Did anyone ever try to get you to do what he/she wanted by threatening you or someone you loved 
with physical harm?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
27. Did anyone ever seem to enjoy being physically cruel or violent to you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
28. Did any of your caretakers ever fail to protect you from being physically harmed by someone else? 
For example, one parent watching while the other parent or sibling beat you? Note: This question 
does NOT apply to a parent’s failure to protect you from sexual abuse.  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
29. Did anyone ever throw or push you? For example, push you down a staircase or throw you into a 
wall?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
30. Did anyone ever lock you in a room or closet for several hours or longer?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
31. Were you ever hit hard with a fist, kicked, or slapped really hard?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
31. Were you ever beaten up (hit, kicked, or punched repeatedly)?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
32. Did any adults ever hit you with an object such as a belt, whip, coat hanger, brush, wooden spoon, 
etc.?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
33. Did anyone ever try to choke, strangle, or smother you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
34. Did anyone ever deliberately cause you serious physical pain? (For example, burn you with a 
cigarette, break a bone, cut you?)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
35. Did anyone ever attack you with a weapon such as a knife or gun? (Note: Actually being stabbed or 
shot is not required to say yes; all that is required is that the attacker had the weapon and indicated 
by words or actions that he/she might use it.)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
36. Were you ever tied up, held down, or blindfolded, so you could not protect yourself from harm? For 
example, one or more people held you while someone else hit you, or someone tied you up and left 
you alone in a remote place, such as out in the woods?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
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37. Did a boyfriend/girlfriend/date ever hit, kick, shove, or throw you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
38. Did any adult or someone more that five years older than you ever kiss you in a passionate manner, 
so that you felt the kiss was not merely friendly or the kind of kiss a relative might give a child? Were 
you ever afraid of being kissed by this person because the kisses seemed wrong or creepy?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
39. Did anyone about your own age, or up to five years older than you, ever expose himself/herself to 
you sexually in a way that seemed wrong or creepy? For example, you brother or sister exposing 
their genitals to you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
40. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever expose himself/herself to you 
sexually? For example, show you that they had no clothes on under their coat?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
41. Did anyone about your own age, or up to five years older than you, ever insist that you touch 
him/her in a sexual way?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
42. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever insist that you touch him/her in a 
sexual way?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
43. Did anyone about your own age, or up to five years older than you, ever threaten to force you to 
engage in sexual activities, but you did not end up having sexual intercourse with him/her?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
44. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever ask you to engage in sexual 
activities, or ever threaten to force you to engage in sexual activities, but you did not end up having 
sexual intercourse with him/her?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
45. Did anyone about your own age, or up to five years older than you, ever touch you in a sexual way 
that seemed wrong or creepy? For example your brother or sister touching you in the genital area, or 
touching your breasts or buttocks?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
46. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever touch you in a sexual way? For 
example, touch you in the genital area, touch your breasts or buttocks?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
47. Did anyone about your own age, or up to five years older than you, ever attempt to force you to 
have sexual intercourse with him/her against your will? For example, your cousin tried to force you to 
have sexual intercourse with him/her but you talked him/her out of it, or struggled and got away, etc.  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
48. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you attempt to force you to have sexual 
intercourse with him/her but you talked him/her out of it, or struggled and got away, etc.  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
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49. Did anyone about your age, or up to five years older than you, ever forrce you to have sexual 
intercourse against your will? For example, your brother or sister forced you to have sexual 
intercourse with him/her.  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
50. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever force you to have sexual 
intercourse against your will? For example, your caretaker forced you to have sexual intercourse with 
him/her. (Do not count if the person tried to have intercourse with you but you got away or avoided 
it.)  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
51. Did you ever have cause to believe that someone wished to seriously hurt you or kill you if you told 
that he/she was sexually molesting you, even if he/she never verbally threatened you with harm? For 
example, told you that he/she would hurt you, or you had observed this person being violent towards 
someone else and believed that he/she might hurt you too.  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
52. Did anyone ever use any objects in a sexual way while forcing you to engage in sexual activities? For 
example, use a cattle prod, a knife, scissors, etc., while they were engaging in sexual activities with 
you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
53. Did your caretakers ever tell you that you were lying or that they did not believe you when you 
reported that someone was maltreating you sexually?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
54. Did your caretakers ever fail to protect you form being sexually maltreated, even though you were 
pretty positive your caretakers knew about it? For example, daughter believes mother knows 
stepfather is sexually abusing her, but mother does nothing to stop the abuse?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
55. Did you ever find out that a brother or sister was being sexually molested by someone, and worry 
that the same thing might happen to you?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
56. Were you ever asked to keep a “sexual secret” with anyone? For example, being told not to tell about 
a sexual activity that had occurred?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
57. Did a boyfriend/girlfriend/date ever use psychological pressure to get you to have sex? For example, 
saying they would never go out with you again unless you had sex, say they would damage your 
reputation unless you had sex?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
58. Did a boyfriend/girlfriend/date ever use physical force to get you to have sex?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
59. Were you ever raped in a situation that you didn’t indicate for one of the above questions?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
 
60. Did you ever observe adults in your family engaging in sexual activities even though they knew you 
could see what they were doing?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE   
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61. Were you ever forced to dress up like a child of the opposite sex, or pretend to be the opposite sex? 
For example, a parent dressing a son like a girl, telling other people the son is a girl?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
62. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever involve you in pornography? For 
example, force you to pose for nude photos, film you in sexual activities?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
 
63. Did any adult or someone more than five years older than you ever force you to view pornography 
against your will? For example, insist that you look at nude photos or watch X-rated films even 
though you did not want to?  
NO  YES   NOT SURE  
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EPQR-N-SF 
 
Please answer each question by circling either ‘yes’ or ‘no’.  There are no right or 
wrong answers, and no trick questions. Please work quickly, and do not think too 
long about the exact meaning of the questions. 
  
1. Does your mood often go up and down? Yes No 
2. Do you ever feel "just miserable" for no reason? Yes No 
3. Are you an irritable person? Yes No 
4. Are your feelings easily hurt? Yes No 
5. Do you often feel "fed up"? Yes No 
6. Are you often troubled about feelings of guilt? Yes No 
7. Would you call yourself a nervous person? Yes No 
8. Are you a worrier? Yes No 
9. Would you call yourself tense or "highly-strung"? Yes No 
10. Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience? Yes No 
11. Do you suffer from “nerves”? Yes No 
12. Do you often feel lonely? Yes No 
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Why Ruminate Questionnaire 
 
Everyone ruminates on negative things from time to time. By ruminate, we mean spending time 
dwelling on current problems, past difficulties or losses, negative mood or yourself, brooding on 
difficulties, worrying about problems, repeatedly thinking about yourself and negative experiences, for 
example, repeatedly asking “why did this happen? why me?”. For example, most people would spend 
some time ruminating after the end of a relationship or when they failed to do as well as they hoped in 
a job application. 
 
Please use the scale below to express the extent to which each you believe each of the following 
statements is true (write the number in front of each statement in the space provided). 
 
 
1       2          3           4   5  
 
Not true at all   |   Corresponds a little  |  Corresponds somewhat  |  Mostly true | Completely true 
 
 
 
1. __ I think about something to help get over it. 
 
2. __ I ruminate about the past in order to learn from my mistakes. 
 
3. __ I ruminate to try and maintain my standards. 
 
4. __ I ruminate to help stick to my goals. 
 
5. __ I ruminate because I think there must be a solution to my problem. 
 
6. __ I ruminate because I am a good person. 
 
7. __ I ruminate to help solve problems 
 
8. __ I ruminate to understand and thereby change myself. 
 
9. __ I ruminate to understand my feelings to help get better. 
 
10. __ I ruminate because I need to know the reasons for why things happen. 
 
11. __ I ruminate to make sense of past events, so that they bother me less. 
 
12. __ I ruminate to remove the pain of upsetting memories and images. 
 
13. __ I ruminate to try and stop bad things happening again. 
 
14. __ If I ruminate, I can find better ways of doing things. 
 
15. __ I ruminate in the hope of knowing what to do. 
 
16. __ I ruminate to try and put the past behind me. 
 
17. __ I ruminate to try and find the answer to my problems. 
 
18. __ I ruminate because I am searching to find some meaning in my life. 
 
19. __ I ruminate because important questions should be resolved immediately and definitely. 
 
    443 
20. __ I ruminate because understanding the past and present is essential to improve things. 
 
21. __ I ruminate because making sense of things helps me to accept them. 
 
22. __ Thinking about why something happened makes it less painful. 
 
23. __ I ruminate to help cope with difficult events. 
 
24. __ I ruminate to try and find a way out of my current difficulties. 
 
25. __ I ruminate because I want to be sure about what happened before. 
 
26. __ I ruminate because I like to be certain about things. 
 
27. __ I think about the causes of bad events to prevent them happening again. 
 
28. __ I ruminate because if a difficulty comes to mind, I should think it through. 
 
29. __ I ruminate because I should make sense of unhappy memories. 
 
30. __ I ruminate because analysing a painful memory is less upsetting than imagining it in vivid detail. 
 
31. __ I ruminate to avoid repeating mistakes. 
 
32. __ I ruminate to stop myself losing control. 
 
33. __ I ruminate to avoid becoming selfish or shallow. 
 
34. __ I ruminate to prevent future mistakes. 
 
35. __ I ruminate to distract myself from painful memories 
 
36. __ I ruminate to avoid criticism from others. 
 
37. __ I ruminate to try and get a sense of control 
 
38. __ I ruminate to pre-empt the impact of future negative feelings 
 
39. __ I ruminate to anticipate how other people will respond to me 
 
40.  __ I ruminate to change my feelings 
 
41. __ I ruminate to motivate myself 
  
42. __ I ruminate to have better control over my life 
 
43. __ I ruminate to protect myself 
 
44. __ By ruminating I can stop bad things from happening 
 
45. __ I ruminate in order to avoid disappointment 
 
46. __ I ruminate because it has been useful in the past
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PEQ 
 
Please note down the two major problems or issues that you are currently 
ruminating about (that is repeatedly dwelling on and frequently thinking about). 
These problems or issues should be ones that you are greatly concerned about 
and spend a lot of time thinking about. 
 
1 _____________________________________________________________ 
 
2 _____________________________________________________________ 
 
Please write a brief description of the first major problem or issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please write down three potential negative consequences of the first major 
problem or issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please write a brief description of the second major problem or issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please write down three potential negative consequences of the second major 
problem or issue. 
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EC Scale 
 
Below are a number of sentences a person might use to describe themselves.  Read each sentence, 
then circle the appropriate number next to each sentence to show how much this sentence 
describes you. Indicate how much each sentence describes how you are most of the time. 
 
 
 Not at 
All 
Not 
Much 
Some
-what 
Often Very 
Much 
1. I do not complete my homework. 1 2 3 4 5 
2. I am able to resist laughing or smiling when it isn’t 
appropriate. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3. I really dislike it when someone breaks the rules. 1 2 3 4 5 
4. I have difficulty completing assignments on time. 1 2 3 4 5 
5.  When I don’t get what I want, it’s hard to enjoy 
something else. 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Whenever I decide anything I always think about 
whether it’s right or wrong. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7. I have a hard time following instructions. 1 2 3 4 5 
8. I plan and organize my schoolwork very carefully. 1 2 3 4 5 
9. When an activity or task is difficult, I give up. 1 2 3 4 5 
10.  I find it easy to concentrate on what I am doing. 1 2 3 4 5 
11. My parent’s ideas of how to do things have always 
proven best. 
1 2 3 4 5 
12.  I will move from one task to another without 
completing any of them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
13. I can easily stop an activity when told to do so. 1 2 3 4 5 
14. I usually keep at a task or project until it’s done. 1 2 3 4 5 
15. I wait to be called on before speaking. 1 2 3 4 5 
16. Even little things distract me. 1 2 3 4 5 
17. I like to stop and think things over before I do 
them. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
18. I leave my own projects or tasks unfinished. 1 2 3 4 5 
19. I have a hard time concentrating on my work 
because I’m always thinking about other things. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20. Once I’m involved in a task, nothing can distract 
me from it. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
21. I start many things that I don’t finish. 1 2 3 4 5 
22. I often get lost in my work. 1 2 3 4 5 
23. I can lower my voice when asked to do so. 1 2 3 4 5 
24. When I get frustrated with projects or tasks, I 
quit. 
1 2 3 4 5 
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ISDI (Modified) 
 
You are now going to be asked to list qualities that you might apply to yourself. 
You will be asked to list these for three different types of self:  
 
• Your “SHOULD self”: Traits that you think you OUGHT to possess; the 
type of person you have a duty, obligation, or responsibility to be; the 
traits you are morally obligated to possess.  
 
• Your “IDEAL self”:  Traits that you would IDEALLY like to possess; the 
type of person you wish, desire, or hope to be.  
 
• Your “UNDESIRED self”:  Traits that, in general, you do NOT want to 
possess, traits that are UNDESIRED.  
 
How are the “should self” and “ideal self” different? 
 
Here is an example of how the ideal and should selves are different:  I may hope 
to be rich someday, being rich may be a goal I have for myself, but I do not think 
I have a duty or a moral obligation to be rich.  So, rich would be a word that 
describes the type of person I ideally want to be, but it is not a word that 
describes the type of person I think I should be.  
 
Is the “should self” just more realistic than the “ideal self”? 
 
No, not necessarily.  Everyone differs in how realistic the traits of the ideal and 
should selves are, as well as how much they actually possess those traits.  For 
you, just think about who you ideally want to be and who you think you should be, 
not about which one is more realistic. 
 
For each list, think carefully about the type of qualities you are being asked to list. 
You may use any words you want to describe these different types of self.  
 
Before continuing, please answer the following questions by putting an X next to 
the best answer: 
 
1.  The should self refers to 
           what I am now 
           what others want me to be 
           my moral obligation   
 
2.  The ideal self is 
           unattainable and perfect 
           what I want, dream, or desire to be 
           my normal, usual self 
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Please list the attributes of the type of person you would IDEALLY like to 
be; the type of person you wish, desire, or hope to be.   
         
Ideal 1: __________________________ 
Ideal 2: __________________________ 
Ideal 3: __________________________ 
Ideal 4: __________________________ 
Ideal 5: __________________________ 
 
Please list the attributes of the type of person you believe you SHOULD 
or OUGHT to be; the traits you believe you are morally obligated to 
possess. 
 
Should 1: __________________________ 
Should 2: __________________________ 
Should 3: __________________________ 
Should 4: __________________________ 
Should 5: __________________________ 
 
Please list the attributes of the type of person you do NOT want to be; 
the traits that are UNDESIRED. 
 
Undesired 1: __________________________ 
Undesired 2: __________________________ 
Undesired 3: __________________________ 
Undesired 4: __________________________ 
Undesired 5: __________________________ 
 
Please tell the experimenter if you are having difficulty completing your lists. 
[Experimenter to supply paper copy of “positive word list” and “negative word list” 
found at the end of this document if participant cannot generate 15 attributes 
themselves.]  
 
We would now like you to answer some questions about each of the 
traits you have listed.  For each trait, please indicate how much you think 
the word actually describes or applies to you at this time by selecting the 
appropriate option for each word. 
 
[The computer on which the questionnaire is running will display each of the 15 
words that the participant listed, with the following Likert scale for each word] 
 
1 Does not describe me at all 
2 Describes me slightly 
3 Describes me somewhat 
4 Describes me well 
5 Completely describes me  
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1a. Of the five words you listed, which is the “IDEAL self” trait that you 
feel LEAST describes you?  
 
__________________ 
 
1b. In a few sentences, please say more about this “IDEAL self” trait, and 
describe how you would like to be different.  
 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
2a. Of the five words you listed, which is the “SHOULD self” trait that you 
feel LEAST describes you? 
 
__________________ 
 
2b. In a few sentences, please say more about this “SHOULD self” trait, 
and describe how you would like to be different. 
 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
3a. Of the five words you listed, which is the “UNDESIRED self” trait that 
you feel MOST describes you? 
 
__________________ 
 
3b. In a few sentences, please say more about this “UNDESIRED self” 
trait, and describe how you would like to be different. 
 
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________ 
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Circumplex Measure of Affect 
 
Please read each emotion word, and then on the line below, circle a response representing the extent to which you feel this emotion 
right now. 
 
Nervous 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Unhappy 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Excited 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Tired 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Calm 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Sad 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Elated 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Active 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Relaxed 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Euphoric 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Inactive 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Aroused 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Bored 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Grouchy 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Dull 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Intense 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Enthusiastic 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Quiet 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Sluggish 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Delighted 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Cheerful 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Astonished 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Happy 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Miserable 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Anxious 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
At rest 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Content 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Annoyed 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Pleased 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Still 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Fearful 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
Tranquil 
Not at all Somewhat Quite a bit A lot 
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Appraisals of the Usefulness of RNT 
 
Please answer the following questions based on how you feel right now, at this 
very moment.  
 
1. Right now, how helpful or unhelpful do you think it is to repeatedly 
think through problems or difficulties, and repeatedly think about their 
causes, meanings and implications? 
 
1 - Very unhelpful  
2 - Somewhat unhelpful 
3 - A little unhelpful 
4 - Neither helpful nor unhelpful 
5 - A little helpful 
6 - Somewhat helpful 
7 - Very helpful 
 
2. At this moment, how much do you think that repeatedly dwelling on 
problems and difficulties, and thinking about their causes, meanings and 
implications, influences your sense of understanding and insight? 
 
(By “understanding and insight”, we mean things like your understanding of 
yourself, other people, the situation, why things happened, what you should do 
about the situation, etc.) 
 
1 - It greatly increases my sense of understanding and insight 
2 - It somewhat increases my sense of understanding and insight 
3 - It very slightly increases my sense of understanding and insight 
4 - It has no effect on my sense of understanding and insight 
5 - It very slightly decreases my sense of understanding and insight 
6 - It somewhat decreases my sense of understanding and insight 
7 - It greatly decreases my sense of understanding and insight 
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Sense of Understanding and Insight 
  
Please read each question, and then place a tick in the appropriate column to 
indicate your response, based on your feelings right now. 
 
 Not 
at all 
A 
little 
Some
-what 
Quite 
a bit A lot 
Right now, how much insight do you 
have into other people? 
     
Right now, how much insight do you 
have into your feelings? 
     
Right now, how much do you have a 
sense of why things happen to you? 
     
Right now, how much do you understand 
yourself? 
     
Right now, do you have a sense that you 
know how to improve things in the 
future? 
     
Right now do you feel like you know the 
answer to your problems? 
     
Right now, how much do you understand 
the way the world works? 
     
Right now do you feel that you 
understand how to avoid repeating past 
mistakes? 
     
Right now, do you have a sense that you 
understand how to prevent negative 
things from happening again? 
     
Right now, how much do you feel that 
you understand other people? 
     
Right now, how much insight do you 
have into how your mind works? 
     
Right now, do you feel like you 
understand what you should do? 
     
Right now, how much do you understand 
why other people do (or don’t do) 
things? 
     
Right now, do you feel like you 
understand how to resolve your current 
problems? 
     
Right now, how much insight do you 
have into yourself? 
     
Right now, how much sense do you have 
of why you do (or don’t do) things? 
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Sense of Confidence and Control 
 
Please read each question, and then place a tick in the appropriate column to 
indicate your response, based on your feelings right now. 
 
 Not 
at all 
A 
little 
Some
-what 
Quite 
a bit A lot 
Right now, how much do you feel that you 
are unable to control the important things 
in your life? 
     
Right now, how much do you feel in 
control of your life?      
Right now, how much do you feel that 
things are going your way?      
Right now, how much do you feel ready to 
try new things?      
Right now how certain do you feel about 
things in your life?      
Right now, how ready do you feel to take 
a chance?      
Right now, how much do you feel that you 
cannot cope with all the things that you 
have to do? 
     
Right now, how confident do you feel 
about your ability to handle your personal 
problems? 
     
Right now, how much do you feel that you 
are on top of things?      
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Sense of Assertiveness Self-Efficacy 
 
Please read each question, and then place a tick in the appropriate column to 
indicate your response, based on your feelings right now. 
 
 Not 
at all 
A 
little 
Some
-what 
Quite 
a bit A lot 
Right now, how confident are you that it 
would go well if you were to be assertive?      
Right now, how risky does being assertive 
feel to you?      
Right now, how confident are you about 
saying the right thing if you were to be 
assertive? 
     
Right now, how confident do you feel 
about expressing your opinion?      
Right now, how confident do you feel 
about asking someone for something?      
Right now, how confident do you feel 
about standing up for yourself?      
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Breathing Exercise 
 
During the 5-minute exercise in response to the tone: 
 
Tone 1 
1. Where was your attention focused just before your heard the tone? (circle one) 
(a) Breathing  (b) Any other thought 
2. Was this thought positive, negative, or neutral? (circle one) 
(a) Positive  (b) Negative  (c) Neutral 
3. Please provide a brief description of this thought (a few words)         
 
After the 5-minute exercise, elaborating on “any other thought” items: 
 
Tone 1 
Please provide a fuller description of the thought. 
              
               
 
 
1. How often did this thought or a very similar thought come to mind during the 5 minutes of the 
breathing exercise? 
Only once   Twice           Three times           Four times     More than four times 
 
 
 
2. How long were you thinking about the subject of the thought during the 5 minutes?  
 
Only for an 
instant 
Under 10 
seconds 
About 30 
seconds 
About a 
minute 
About half 
the time 3-4 minutes 
Nearly all of 
the time 
 
 
 
 
3. When thinking about this subject, how much did your thoughts keep coming back to the same or 
similar ideas again and again? 
 
Not at all           A bit       Somewhat        Moderately   Extremely 
 
  
 
4. How upsetting or distressing was the thought? 
 
Not at all   A bit               Somewhat        Moderately   Extremely 
 
 
 
5. How difficult did you find it to stop this thought coming or to move on to other thoughts? 
 
Not at all           A bit                Somewhat        Moderately   Extremely 
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Writing Exercise Manipulation of Appraisals of RNT 
 
 
RNT-as-Helpful Manipulation 
Sometimes, when people have a personal problem, they spend time thinking 
through the difficulty and the situation that they’re in. This process of thinking 
things through and repeatedly dwelling on the problem can be really helpful, 
because reflecting on the situation can give people a greater sense of 
understanding and insight, and this can help them make sense of the situation. 
 
You are now going to be asked to think of two occasions when repeated thinking 
about a problem over and over again was helpful to you. It doesn’t matter what 
type of situation you describe, but if possible, please try to select two different 
types of problem (e.g., situation A – a problem at work; situation B – a problem 
in a friendship).  
 
 
 
Please think of a time when thinking about the causes, meanings and implications 
of a problem was helpful to you. Spend a moment getting a vivid sense of the 
problem and the way thinking about it was helpful. 
 
 
 
1. What was the problem? Please describe it briefly (i.e., a few 
sentences).  
 
2. In what way was repetitive thinking about the problem helpful? Please 
describe how thinking through the problem was helpful, making sure to 
cover the following questions in your answer. 
 
• In what way did repetitive thinking about the problem improve your 
understanding/insight? 
• In what way did dwelling on the problem help you know what to do about 
it? 
• How did repeatedly thinking about the problem help you realise why it 
happened? 
• In what way did repetitive thinking about the problem help you learn more 
about yourself/other people? 
 
[Repeat for second example] 
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RNT-as-Unhelpful Manipulation 
Sometimes, when people have a personal problem, they spend time thinking 
through the difficulty and the situation that they’re in. This process of thinking 
things through and repeatedly dwelling on the problem can be really unhelpful, 
because dwelling on the situation can make people focus on negative emotions, 
negative aspects of themselves, the situation and other people, without actually 
moving them any close to taking actions that would resolve the situation. 
 
You are now going to be asked to think of two occasions when repeated thinking 
about a problem over and over again was not helpful for you. It doesn’t matter 
what type of situation you describe, but if possible, please try to select two 
different types of problem (e.g., situation A – a problem at work; situation B – a 
problem in a friendship).  
 
 
 
Please think of a time when thinking about the causes, meanings and implications 
of a problem was unhelpful to you. Spend a moment getting a vivid sense of the 
problem and the way thinking about it was unhelpful. 
 
 
 
1. What was the problem? Please describe it briefly (i.e., a few 
sentences).  
 
2. In what way was repetitive thinking about the problem unhelpful? 
Please describe how thinking through the problem was unhelpful, 
making sure to cover the following questions in your answer. 
 
• In what way did repetitive thinking about the problem seem unhelpful or 
unconstructive? 
• In what way did dwelling on the problem have a negative impact on your 
mood? 
• In what way did repeatedly thinking about the problem make you feel 
more negative about yourself, your thoughts or your actions? 
 
[Repeat for second example]
!   457 
Anagram IQ Test 
 
On the next page is a list of anagrams. The letters of each anagram make a real 
word, but the letters are presented here in a scrambled order. Your task is to 
unscramble each anagram to make a word, and then to write that word on the 
response sheet provided. You should try to complete as many of the anagrams as 
possible. If you find a particular anagram is too difficult to solve, you should 
move on to the next one. 
 
You will need to work quickly and accurately, because your time will be limited. 
That is, you have 3 minutes to complete the task. Based on the performance of 
people who have done this task in the past, in 3 minutes we expect you to be 
able to solve about five or six of the anagrams. However, you should aim to 
complete as many as possible. From previous research conducted using these 
anagrams, we know that an individual’s performance on these types of tasks is a 
consistent and reliable indicator of their future academic success. 12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 Wechsler, D. (2008). Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Fourth Edition. San Antonio, TX: Pearson. 
2 Alloway, T. P., & Alloway, R. G. (2010). Investigating the predictive roles of working memory and IQ in 
academic attainment. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 106, 20-29.  
!   458 
 
Participant Code ____ 
ANAGRAM IQ TEST 
 
oldme ______________ datir ______________ 
egujt ______________ ifnlu ______________ 
aebrl ______________ baehp ______________ 
tinga ______________ jutan ______________ 
aewtk ______________ tanbo ______________ 
nrdko ______________ hugol ______________ 
yenpo ______________ eocva ______________ 
aitop ______________ iuegb ______________ 
milbe ______________ lcoha ______________ 
rigon ______________ gaton ______________ 
euohl ______________ rmcai ______________ 
baroc ______________ ohtna ______________ 
awrlu ______________ rdcei ______________ 
nrcui ______________ hroab ______________ 
glaei ______________ ugarv ______________ 
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Interview Manipulation of Appraisals of RNT 
 
RNT-as-Helpful Manipulation 
 
Experimenter speaks the following instructions:  
 
“Sometimes, when people have a personal problem, they spend time thinking 
through the difficulty and the situation that they’re in. This process of thinking 
things through and repeatedly dwelling on the problem can be really helpful, 
because reflecting on the situation can give people a greater sense of 
understanding and insight, and this can help them make sense of the situation. 
 
You are now going to be asked to think of two occasions when repeated thinking 
about a problem over and over again was helpful to you. It doesn’t matter what 
type of situation you describe, but if possible, please try to think of two different 
types of problem (for instance, a problem at work, and a problem with a friend). 
We also need these to be problems that are in the past, rather than current 
problems, and problems that you feel are resolved, or mostly resolved for now. 
 
So first of all, I’d like you to identify your first example of an occasion when you 
repeatedly thought about a past problem, and found the experience of thinking 
about the causes, meanings, and implications of a problem helpful for you. Please 
take a few moments, if you need to, to think of an occasion like this – you may 
have thought of something already. If you’re not sure whether what you’ve 
thought of is suitable, please just ask and I can advise. Let me know when you’ve 
thought of something.” 
 
Experimenter waits for participant to think and identify a concern. 
Experimenter asks: 
 
 “Have you thought of something?” 
 
When participant indicates that they have identified a concern, the 
experimenter reads the following passage:  
 
“Now, please can you very briefly tell me what the problem was? You don’t need 
to go into a lot of detail at all – this is just so I have a quick background 
understanding before we move on to the next few questions. Whilst you briefly 
describe the issue, I am going to switch on this audio recorder such that after the 
experiment, I can code what you say. Okay?” 
 
Experimenter switches on the recorder, and says: “Participant code X” 
Participant describes the situation, with the experimenter asking for clarity 
if necessary. Once the participant has responded, the experimenter asks: 
 
“Can I just check that this is a problem that you found helpful to repeatedly think 
through? Also, can I check that this is a past problem that you now consider to be 
resolved or mostly resolved?” 
 
Participant confirms that the identified problem is one they found helpful 
to think about, and that is in the past and resolved. If either of these 
conditions are not met, the experimenter will ask the participant to think 
of an alternative problem. NOTE: For concerns that may not be fully 
resolved, experimenter will need to judge that it is okay to proceed (and 
later, participant will rate how resolved they consider the problem to be, 
so that this can be statistically controlled). Experimenter then reads the 
following: 
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“We are now going to focus in on the ways in which repeated thinking about the 
problem was helpful for you. What will happen is that I will ask you a few 
questions for you to focus on, just to explore your feelings about thinking the 
problem through. If you need to, please take a moment to think about your 
answer, and then answer each question aloud. Try and spend about a minute 
answering each question – sometimes, I might prompt you with further questions. 
Also, some of the questions might seem quite similar, but don’t worry if it feels 
like you’re repeating yourself – this is just important to ensure you’ve thought the 
issue through thoroughly.” 
 
1. “In what way did repetitive thinking about the problem improve your 
understanding and insight?” 
Follow-up questions: “How did the repetitive thinking help you learn more about 
yourself/other people?”, “What are your reasons for thinking that?”, “Can you say 
some more about that?”. 
 
2. “In what way did dwelling on the problem help you know what to do about 
it?” 
Follow-up questions: “What are your reasons for thinking that?”, “Can you say 
some more about that?”. 
 
3. “How did repeatedly thinking about the problem help you realise why it 
happened?” 
Follow-up questions: “What are your reasons for thinking that?”, “Can you say 
some more about that?”.  
 
“Thanks for answering those questions. Now, we’re going to repeat this process 
one more time, as I ask you to think of a second example of an occasion when 
you repeatedly thought about a past problem, and found the experience of 
thinking about the causes, meanings, and implications of a problem helpful for 
you.” 
 
[Repeat for second example]  
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RNT-as-Unhelpful Manipulation 
 
Experimenter speaks the following instructions:  
 
“Sometimes, when people have a personal problem, they spend time thinking 
through the difficulty and the situation that they’re in. This process of thinking 
things through and repeatedly dwelling on the problem can be really unhelpful, 
because dwelling on the situation can make people focus on negative emotions, 
negative aspects of themselves, the situation and other people, without actually 
moving them any close to taking actions that would resolve the situation. 
 
You are now going to be asked to think of two occasions when repeated thinking 
about a problem over and over again was not helpful for you. It doesn’t matter 
what type of situation you describe, but if possible, please try to think of two 
different types of problem (for instance, a problem at work, and a problem with a 
friend). We also need these to be problems that are in the past, rather than 
current problems, and problems that you feel are resolved, or mostly resolved for 
now. 
 
So first of all, I’d like you to identify your first example of an occasion when you 
repeatedly thought about a past problem, and found the experience of thinking 
about the causes, meanings, and implications of a problem unhelpful for you. 
Please take a few moments, if you need to, to think of an occasion like this – you 
may have thought of something already. If you’re not sure whether what you’ve 
thought of is suitable, please just ask and I can advise. Let me know when you’ve 
thought of something.” 
 
Experimenter waits for participant to think and identify a concern. 
Experimenter asks: 
 
“Have you thought of something?” 
 
When participant indicates that they have identified a concern, the 
experimenter reads the following passage:  
 
“Now, please can you very briefly tell me what the problem was? You don’t need 
to go into a lot of detail at all – this is just so I have a quick background 
understanding before we move on to the next few questions. Whilst you briefly 
describe the issue, I am going to switch on this audio recorder such that after the 
experiment, I can code what you say. Okay?” 
 
Experimenter switches on the recorder, and says: “Participant code X” 
Participant describes the situation, with the experimenter asking for clarity 
if necessary. Once the participant has responded, the experimenter asks: 
 
“Can I just check that this is a problem that you did not find helpful to repeatedly 
think through? Also, can I check that this is a past problem that you now consider 
to be resolved or mostly resolved?” 
 
Participant confirms that the identified problem is one they found helpful 
to think about, and that is in the past and resolved. If either of these 
conditions are not met, the experimenter will ask the participant to think 
of an alternative problem. NOTE: For concerns that may not be fully 
resolved, experimenter will need to judge that it is okay to proceed (and 
later, participant will rate how resolved they consider the problem to be, 
so that this can be statistically controlled). Experimenter then reads the 
following: 
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“We are now going to focus in on the ways in which repeated thinking about the 
problem was not helpful for you. What will happen is that I will ask you a few 
questions for you to focus on, just to explore your feelings about thinking the 
problem through. If you need to, please take a moment to think about your 
answer, and then answer each question aloud. Try and spend about a minute 
answering each question – sometimes, I might prompt you with further questions. 
Also, some of the questions might seem quite similar, but don’t worry if it feels 
like you’re repeating yourself – this is just important to ensure you’ve thought the 
issue through thoroughly.” 
 
1. “In what way did repetitive thinking about the problem seem unhelpful or 
unconstructive?” 
Follow-up questions: “What are your reasons for thinking that?”, “Can you say 
some more about that?”. 
 
2. “In what way did dwelling on the problem have a negative impact on your 
mood?” 
Follow-up questions: “What are your reasons for thinking that?”, “Can you say 
some more about that?”. 
 
3. “In what way did repeatedly thinking about the problem make you feel 
more negative about yourself, your thoughts or your actions?” 
Follow-up questions: “What are your reasons for thinking that?”, “Can you say 
some more about that?”.  
 
“Thanks for answering those questions. Now, we’re going to repeat this process 
one more time, as I ask you to think of a second example of an occasion when 
you repeatedly thought about a past problem, and found the experience of 
thinking about the causes, meanings, and implications of a problem unhelpful for 
you.” 
 
[Repeat for second example]
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Interview Manipulation of Processing Mode 
 
Abstract Rumination Manipulation 
 
Experimenter conducts the following interview, reading the first statement 
and the following questions to the participant, prompting them as 
necessary if answers are brief or unelaborated. 
 
“We are now going to move on to the next part of the session. Some people find 
that thinking deeply about personal issues helps them to address them more 
effectively. Thinking deeply can help people feel clear about what they want, and 
feel ready to do something about it. So, to help you to be assertive about 
[identified concern], I am going to ask you some questions for you to concentrate 
on, to focus your thinking about the [identified concern]. Spend a few moments 
thinking about each question, and then answer each question aloud. Try and 
spend at least a minute answering each question aloud. Sometimes, I will prompt 
you with further questions. Some of the questions might seem quite similar, but 
don’t worry if you feel as though you may be repeating yourself – it’s important 
to ensure that you’ve thought through the issue thoroughly. 
 
Again, for this section of the session, I am going to switch on this audio recorder 
such that after the experiment, I can verify that I have asked the questions 
properly, and so I can code your spoken responses to the questions. Okay?” 
 
Experimenter switches on the recorder, and says: “Participant code X” 
 
1. “Why is [identified concern] important to you? For example, why does this 
issue bother you, and what are your reasons for wanting to change it?” 
Follow-up questions: “Why do you want to change this behaviour?”, “Why 
does [identified concern] bother you?”, “What are the reasons for wanting 
to change this?”, “Why is that important to you?”, “What are your reasons 
for thinking that?”, “Why haven’t you been able to talk to [identified 
person] about this yet?”, “Why does [identified person] behave this way?”, 
“Why is it happening that you have conflict with [identified person]?”, 
“What does it mean to you?”. For brief or unelaborated answers, “Can you 
say some more about that?”, “Can you describe that more?”, “What are 
your reasons for thinking that? Why is that?” 
 
2. “What consequences does [identified concern] have on your relationship with 
[identified person]? For example, what effect does their behaviour have on you, 
and what are the implications of their behaviour carrying on?” 
Follow-up questions: “What effect does this behaviour have on you?”, 
“What effect does it have on your relationship?”, “What does it mean for 
your relationship?”, “What are the implications of this behaviour carrying 
on?”, “What are the implications of this behaviour stopping?”. For brief or 
unelaborated answers, “Can you say some more about that?”, “Can you 
describe that more?”, “What are your reasons for thinking that? Why is 
that?” 
 
3. “Why does [identified concern] happen? For example, why does [identified 
person] do this, and what does it mean about them that they do this?” 
Follow-up questions: “What causes this problem?”, “Why does [identified 
person] keep doing this?”, “Why does this keep happening?”, “What does 
it mean about [identified person] that they do this?”, “What does it mean 
about you that they do this?”. For brief or unelaborated answers, “Can you 
say some more about that?”, “Can you describe that more?”, “What are 
your reasons for thinking that? Why is that?” 
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4. “Why haven’t you addressed this concern yet? For example, what makes it 
hard to do be assertive about this, and what does it mean about you that you 
have not done anything yet?” 
Follow-up questions: “What makes it hard to do this?”, “Why haven’t you 
said anything about it?”, “What are the reasons that you have not been 
assertive about it?”, “What are the causes of not talking it through?”, 
“What does it mean about you that you have not done anything yet?”. For 
brief or unelaborated answers, “Can you say some more about that?”, 
“Can you describe that more?”, “What are your reasons for thinking/doing 
that?” 
 
5. “Why do you want to raise [identified concern] with [identified person]? For 
example, what do you want to achieve, and what is the underlying meaning you 
want to convey to [identified person]? 
Follow-up questions: “What do you want to achieve?”, “Why is this an 
issue for you now?”, “What is the deeper meaning underlying this?”, “Why 
is now a good time to confront him/her?”, “What is the gist of what you 
want to communicate to [identified person]?”, “What is the underlying 
meaning you want to convey to [identified person]?”. For brief or 
unelaborated answers, “Can you say some more about that?”, “Can you 
describe that more?”, “What are your reasons for thinking/doing that?” 
 
6. “What effect could confronting this issue have on your relationship with 
[identified person]? For example, what would addressing this issue mean for your 
relationship?” 
Follow-up questions:  “What will it mean for your relationship?”. For brief 
or unelaborated answers, “Can you say some more about that?”, “Can you 
describe that more?”, “What are your reasons for thinking/doing that?”, 
“Why might that happen? What would that mean?” 
 
7. “What are the possible consequences of raising [identified issue] with 
[identified person]? For example, what good things could happen if you do this, 
and what could go wrong?” 
Follow-up questions: “What might happen when you are assertive about 
this?”, “What are the implications of doing this?”, “What good things could 
happen if you do this?”, “What could go wrong?”, “What would that 
mean?”. For brief or unelaborated answers, “Can you say some more 
about that?”, “Can you describe that more?”, “What are your reasons for 
thinking/doing that? Why might that happen? What would that mean?” 
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Concrete Thinking Manipulation 
 
Experimenter conducts the following interview, reading the first statement 
and the following questions to the participant, prompting them as 
necessary if answers are brief or unelaborated. 
 
“We are now going to move on to the next part of the session. Some people find 
that thinking in detail about the steps to take when faced with a problem helps 
them to go ahead and address it. Planning out what to do, how to do it, where to 
do it, and when to do it can make it more likely that any behaviour will be 
implemented. So, to help you to be assertive about [identified concern], I am 
going to ask you some questions for you to concentrate on, to focus your thinking 
about [identified concern]. Spend a few moments thinking about each question, 
and then answer each question aloud. Try and spend at least a minute answering 
each question aloud. Sometimes I will prompt you with further questions. Some 
of the questions might seem quite similar, but don’t worry if you feel as though 
you may be repeating yourself – it’s important to ensure that you’ve thought 
through the issue thoroughly. 
 
Again, for this section of the session, I am going to switch on this audio recorder 
such that after the experiment, I can verify that I have asked the questions 
properly, and so I can code your spoken responses to the questions. Okay?” 
 
Experimenter switches on the recorder, and says: “Participant code X” 
 
1. “How will you prepare in advance for talking about [identified concern]? For 
example, what actions can you take to prepare to talk with [identified person]?” 
Follow-up questions: “How will you approach talking to [identified 
person]?”, “What will you do to prepare to talk to [identified person]?”, 
“What is the first step towards talking with [identified person] about the 
[identified concern]?”, “What will help you to get ready?”, “What will make 
you feel ready to talk with [identified person]?”, “What is the first step 
towards talking about the issue with [identified person]?”. For 
unelaborated answers, use questions like “How will you do that? What 
exactly will you do?” 
 
2. “What exactly do you want to say? For example, what are some of the exact 
words you might say, and what tone of voice will you use?” 
Follow-up questions: “What are the exact words you will say?”, “How will 
you say it?”, “What tone of voice will you use?”, “How will you act?”. For 
unelaborated answers, use questions like “How will you do that? What 
exactly will you do?” 
 
3. “How do you want the other person to respond? For example, what do you 
want them to say or do, and what is their likeliest response?” 
Follow-up questions: “What exactly do you want them to say/do?”, “What 
is their likeliest response?”, “What outcome do you want from them?”. 
 
4. “How can you increase the chances that [identified person] responds how you 
want? For example, how exactly should you act to get them to respond in this 
way?” 
Follow-up questions: “What can you say or do to increase the chances 
they respond in the way you want?”, “How exactly can the way you say or 
do things influence what happens?”  
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5. “How will you address any possible difficulties that might come up? For 
example, what could go wrong, and what can you do to minimise these 
problems?” 
Follow-up questions: “What problems might there be?”, “What specifically 
could go wrong?” “How will you prevent these problems?”, “What can you 
do to minimise these problems?”, “How can you have back-up plans?”, 
“What will you do if the person does not respond to the first thing you 
say?”, “What will you do next?”. For unelaborated answers, use questions 
like “How will you do that? What exactly will you do?” 
 
6. “How will you  raise this [unresolved issue]? For example, what is the 
sequence you will follow: How will you lead up to this issue, and introduce it?” 
Follow-up questions: “How do you raise this issue?”, “What is your plan for 
raising this issue?”, “How will you lead up to the issue?”, “How will you 
introduce it?”. For unelaborated answers, use questions like “How will you 
do that? What exactly will you do?” 
 
7. “Where will you discuss it? For example, how will you decide where to do this, 
and where would you do it?” 
Follow-up questions: “What would be a suitable place to do this?”, “How 
do you decide where to do this”, “What is your final choice for where it will 
be discussed?”, “Can you commit to a place to do this?”. For unelaborated 
answers, use questions like “How will you do that? What exactly will you 
do?” 
 
8.  “When will you discuss it? For example, how will you decide when to do this, 
and what time of day would you choose?” 
Follow-up questions: “What would be the most suitable time to do this?” 
“How do you decide when to do this”, “What is your final choice for where 
it will be discussed?”, “What day would you do it?” “What time of the day 
would you do it?”, “Can you commit to a particular date to do it?”. For 
unelaborated answers, use questions like “How will I do that? What exactly 
will I do?” 
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Coding Protocol for Avoidance 
 
Code on three factors, which represent three justifications for avoidance, 
withdrawal, and inactivity:     
 
Avoidance because of Perceived Lack of Control – certainty that efforts will 
be fruitless and nothing will work.  
 
In other words, participants who talk about avoiding/failing to take action 
with the issue because they think that they have no control over the 
problem, nothing they would do would work effectively, etc. 
 
Avoidance because of Reduced Sense of Responsibility – not my fault, not 
up to me, it’s not my responsibility.  
 
In other words, participants who talk about avoiding/failing to take action 
with the issue because they don’t feel responsible for the situation itself, 
or resolving the situation, or that it isn’t any of their business, etc.  
 
Avoidance because of Wish to Avoid Distress – avoiding it to reduce or avoid 
feeling upset.  
In other words, participants who talk about avoiding/failing to take action 
with the issue because they want to avoid a negative, unpleasant or 
uncomfortable outcome, either in terms of their own emotions, or general 
‘atmosphere’ that they would find aversive. 
 
All subscales are coded on a scale of 1 to 4, which represents that each 
factor is either: 
1 – not demonstrated at all  
2 – demonstrated slightly  
3 – demonstrated moderately 
4 – demonstrated a lot 
 
NB: For all of the above, must remember to only code for avoidance that relates 
to the above three themes. So when coding, remember you are first identifying 
passages that seem avoidant, and then you are looking at them more closely to 
see what justification is given for that avoidance (i.e., which subscale it belongs 
to).  
 
Don’t code discussion of any of the themes if it doesn’t specifically relate to 
avoidance. For instance, a participant may say that the situation might cause a 
negative emotional outcome, but if they don’t talk about avoiding/failing to take 
action in relation to that, then it isn’t coded as avoidance.  
 
To give a specific example, take the following two statements: (i) “she’ll probably 
react really badly”; (ii) “she’ll probably react really badly, and that uncomfortable 
atmosphere really puts me off talking to her about it”. Example (i) mentions a 
distress outcome that is relevant to the third subscale, but the statement stands 
alone and no avoidance is mentioned. Example (ii) mentions a distress outcome 
and the subsequent desire to avoid it happening, so only this example would be 
coded on the Avoid Distress subscale.  
 
Exemplar from participant interview representing “Avoidance because of 
a Perceived Lack of Control”: 
 
“I don’t think he’s the sort of person that would deal well with criticism. I 
don’t think he’d build on that. Because I’ve tried telling him before, when I 
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was like... years ago, and he said “yeah, yeah”, but then he didn’t really 
do anything. He’s the sort of person that makes promises, but doesn’t 
keep them. So... I think it would just make it worse, or nothing would 
change. It’d just stay the same.” 
 
Exemplar from participant interview representing “Avoidance because of 
Reduced Sense of Responsibility”: 
 
“He’s never been directly… arrogant to me, and he has, he has once, and… 
I guess I was assertive in the way that I just… I just walked out of the 
room really angrily, that was my reaction. But sometimes, he just does it 
with my friends, and you know, like… they’re big children, you know, and 
they can, you know, they can stand up for themselves, it’s not my job to 
do it for them.” 
 
Exemplar from participant interview representing “Avoidance because of 
Wish to Avoid Distress”: 
 
“I’m a quite polite person, and I don’t enjoy conflict, so I haven’t done 
anything yet because if it went wrong, not only would it make me look 
impolite, and horrible, but also, I’d have to cope with him when he lives 
only a door down from me. So it wouldn’t be something that I could 
escape, it would be something that I had to face the consequences, all the 
time, for the rest of the year, which would wreck the rest of my life at 
university.” 
 
 
